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USTRACT 
This  t h e s i s  proceeds v i a  a c r i t i q u e  of t h e  labour process  debate  and  i t s  
c e n t r a l  conception of "control"  t o  t h e  at tempt  t o  develop an a l t e r n a t i v e  
theory of t h e  labour process  based on an a n a l y s i s  of exp lo i t a t ion .  This  
involves  t h e  use of a c l a s s i c a l  Marxist model of c a p i t a l i s t  economics i n  
which t h e  primary o b j e c t i v e  of v a l o r i s a t i o n  i s  emphasised a s  s t r u c t u r i n g  
the  organisa t ion  of t h e  contemporary labour process.  Two aspec ts  of t h i s  
o b j e c t i v e  a r e  invoked; t h a t  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  e x t r a c t i o n  of surp lus  value,  
in  which both t h e  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  and a b s t r a c t i o n  of labour a r e  noted a s  
cont inuing tendencies  i n  t h e  development of the  labour process,  and t h a t  
r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between paid and anpaid labour time, i n  which 
t h e  commodity s t a t u s  of labour i s  seen a s  c e n t r a l  i n  i n t e g r a t i n g  t h e  i s s u e  
of subs is tence  i n t o  t h e  h e a r t  of t h e  labour process  i t se l f .  
In  loca t ing  these  i n t e r l i n k e d  s t r ands  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r i n g  of t h e  labour pro- 
cess  t h e  t h e s i s  takes  on two f u r t h e r  tasks :  f i r s t l y  t o  demonstrate t h e  cen- 
t r a l i t y  of con t r ad ic t ions  within t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  labour process;  and secondly 
t o  u n i t e  o b j e c t i v e  and sub jec t ive  in  t h e  cons idera t ion  of t h a t  labour pro- 
cess.  This  l a t t e r  t a s k  shapes t h e  t h i r d  theme within t h e  t h e s i s ,  t h e  ana- 
l y s i s  of worker response or "c lass  consciousness". 
Our argument i n  t h i s  r e spec t  has focussed on t h e  need t o  recognise  worker 
response and r e s i s t a n c e  a5 c e n t r a l l y  "economistic", but  a t  t h e  same time 
has ind ica t ed  the  p o l i t i c a l  impl ica t ions  of such response. Empirical mat- 
e r i a l  from t h e  two case  s t u d i e s  undertaken wi th in  t h e  t h e s i s  i s  presented 
i n  o r d e r  t o  s u s t a i n  t h i s  argument, along with a b r i e f e r  survey of some pub- 
l i shed  s tudies .  Overal l ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  holds  t h a t  while  worker response must 
be recognised a s  economistic r a t h e r  than "control"-oriented, such response 
i s  rooted i n  t h e  con t r ad ic t ions  of t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  labour process,and can 
thus be understood a s  endemically undermining i t s  s t ruc tu res .  
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W I E R  ONE 
Theory of t h e  Labour Process 
In t roduct ion  
This  t h e s i s  i s  about t h e  na tu re  of work, and i t s  impact on workers, 
under capitalism. A s  such i t  canes within t h e  sphere o r i g i n a l l y  
designated by Yarx as "the labour process". This term has itself 
recen t ly  enjoyed a r ev iva l  i n  t h e  context of a vigorous "labour 
process  debate" sparked off i n  1974 by t h e  pub l i ca t ion  of Harry 
Eraverman's i n f l u e n t i a l  book Labour and Monqmly Capital 
1974 ) * 
(Braveman, 
Cur t h e s i s  i s  intended as a contr ibut ion to  this debate.  A t  t h e  
same t i m e ,  however, i t  i s  critical of s o m e  of i t s  m o s t  fundamental 
assumptions. Chief among t h e s e  i s  t h e  notion that a political 
dynamic of  "control" i s  dec i s ive  i n  governing management/worker 
r e l a t i o n s  within t h e  contemporary labcur process. In  con t r a s t ,  o u r  
argument is concerned t o  advance an understanding of the  econanic 
category of exp lo i t a t ion  a s  central t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  capitalist labour process. 
Cur approach, therefore ,  d i f f e r s  from much of t h e  argument which  
has followed i n  t h e  w a k e  of Braverman i n  adopting a pr imari ly  
economic perspec t ive  on t h e  nature of work. This  attempt t o  redress 
what has  been u n t i l  now overwhelmingly a reworking of p o l i t i c a l  and 
ideological themes wi th in  labour  process  theory i s  extended within 
t h e  t h e s i s  t o  our treatment of worker response, which w e  argue i s  
itself pr imar i ly  "econanistic" and centred on e q d o i t a t i o n .  
In t h u s  quest ioning sane of t h e  Widely accepted tenets of the  
a r r e n t  labour process debate  (which themselves are examined i n  
more detail below) we i d e n t i f y  our own theoretical pos i t i on  With 
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sane c l a s s i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s  of Marxist econanic theory. c h i e f l y  t h e  
conception of t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  labour process  as governed by t h e  
cen t r a l  ob jec t ive  of va lor i sa t ion .  As w e  s h a l l  see, while t h e  labour  
process  debate as a whole purpor t s  to draw i t s  theo re t i ca l  i n s p i r a t i o n  
from Marxirm, i t  has  e f f ec t ive ly  abandoned many of these  p r i n c i p l e s .  
While not i n s i s t i n g  on s o m e  s t a t i c  model of theo re t i ca l  r e c t i t u d e ,  
w e  nevertheless  maintain t h a t  t h e  ana lys i s  of t h e  capitalist  labour 
process  contained wi th in  Capi ta l  is of considerable  e q l a n a t o r y  p o w e r  
i n  deal ing w i t h  t h e  twin issues of managerial s t r a t egy  and worker 
response i n  t h i s  f i e l d .  What i s  more, t h e  abandonment of such an 
ana lys i s  w i t h i n  t h e  contemporary labour process debate  appears to 
owe more t o  a sweeping d i s t a s t e  f o r  "economic determinim" than t o  
any a t t a n u t  t o  e v l i c i t l y  engage w i t h  Marx's own arguments. 
Within t h e  present  t h e s i s ,  then, sane attempt i s  made t o  r e i n t e g r a t e  
Marxist  econanic theory,  and i n  general  a more m a t e r i a l i s t  approach 
which, w e  argue, more accura te ly  reflects t h e  na tu re  of worker 
response. i n t o  t h e  ana lys i s  of t h e  contemporary labour  process .  The 
ana lys i s  of workers' s t ruggles ,  t h e  corresponding treatment of 
managerial s t r a t e g i e s  and an overarching theory of t h e  r a t i o n a l e  
of t h e  labour process  under c a p i t a l i s n  are undertaken within t h e  
framework,as w e  have sa id ,  of a concept of explo i ta t ion  which itself 
i s  two-dimensional. On one s ide ,  it refers t o  w h a t  i s  argued t o  be t h e  
cen t r a l  ob jec t ive  of management under capitalism, t h a t  of m a h i s i n g  
surplus  value. On t h e  o the r ,  it i n d i c a t e s  both  the  impact of t h i s  
ob jec t ive  on the workforce i n  terms of t h e  quan t i f i ca t ion  and 
in t ens i f i ca t ion  of labour ,  and t h e  relationship between t h e  effort 
thus  ex t rac ted  and t h e  reward to  t h e  labourer .  
The theme of exp lo i t a t ion ,  which i s  developed more f u l l y  i n  Chapter 
3 ,  s t ruc tu res  the  t h e s i s  i n  two ways correspmding roughly to  t h e  
two dimensions ou t l ined  above. F i r s t l y  a theory of t h e  na tu re  of 
t h e  labour process under capitalism i s  o u t l i n e d  i n  which the  
quan t i f i ca t ion  of labour ,  sham i n  t h e  measurement and s e t t i n g  of 
ca l cu la t ed  t a r g e t s  of ou tput ,  i s  i d e n t i f i e d  as a primary f e a t u r e  
of t h e  labour process  which i tself  is  s t ruc tu red  by the  general  
need t o  reduce s o c i a l l y  necessary labour t h e  wi th in  c a p i t a l i s t  
prcduction. This f e a t u r e  i s  seen as having a two-fold e f f e c t  on 
t h e  experience of work through a simultaneous abs t r ac t ion  and 
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour .  Thus work, w i th in  t h e  mass-production 
semi-skilled manual sector with which w e  are concerned, i s  presented  
i n  t h i s  ana lys i s  both as atomised and interchangeable  and as r equ i r ing  
h igh ,  sanetimes impossible, l e v e l s  of e f f o r t .  This  t h e o r e t i c a l  
desc r ip t ion  i s  given empirical content i n  t h e  accounts of t h e  case 
s t u d i e s  undertaken wi th in  the  research i n  Chapters 6 and 7. In t h e  
f u l l e r  treatment of e q l o i t a t i o n  i n  Chapter 3, an a n a l y s i s  i s  
developed which locates e q l o i t a t i o n  as c e n t r a l  to t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of 
t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  mode of production as a whole. This  i s  because t h e  
production of exchange va lues  or commodities, which def ines  t h i s  
m d e ,  i s  dependent on t h e  production of s u r p l u s  value within t h e  
labour  process,  which i n  i t s  turn i s  def ined i n  t e n s  of t h e  excess  
of unpaid labour t i m e  above subsistence.  The price of labcur power, 
and t h e  degree to  which production ca r r i ed  o u t  by t h e  worker exceeds 
this i n  value, thus  beme cent ra l  v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  funct ioning and 
development of capitalist production. The effor t / reward struggles 
which w e  argue are endemic within t h e  capitalist labour process  can 
thus be seen as focussing on subsistence as  aga ins t  t h e  pressure  t o  
maximise t h e  production of surplus  value.  Workers' attempts t o  
maintain or increase  t h e  value of t h e i r  labarr power are pi t ted 
a g a i n s t  a cont inual  tendency towards i t s  cheapening, e i t h e r  r e l a t i v e  
to t h e  value of cons tan t  capital or i n  a b s o l u t e  terms brought about 
by desk i l l i ng ,  a f e a t u r e  t o  which Braverman has drawn a t t e n t i m  
(Braverman, 1974 @Off) .  
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The second u s e  for t h e  concept of exp lo i t a t ion  i s  i n  explor ing and 
understanding worker response. As w e  mentioned i n  t h e  introductory 
paragraph, most workplace s t ruggles  are both econanisti 'c  and parochial ;  
that is ,  they have been concerned wi th  bas i c  i s sues  of l i v i n g  
standards wi th in  l i m i t s  which extend very l i t t l e  beyond t h e  workplace 
or even t h e  workgroup. Perhaps because such s t rugg les  seem t o  have so 
l i t t l e  political p ran i se ,  d i scuss ion  of c o n f l i c t  wi th in  t h e  workplace 
has tended t o  emphasise (as w e  argue i n  more d e t a i l  below) t h e  
"alienated" na tu re  of t h e  experience of work under capitaliyn, which 
can be l inked to  t h e  tendency t m a r d s  abs t rac t ion  of labour  ind ica ted  
above. However, it i s  i n  f a c t  rare for over t  c o n f l i c t  to occur  
e x p l i c i t l y  over t h e  na ture  of work itself. The econmistic na tu re  of 
most workplace conflict has t o  be confronted. I t  i s  t h e  content ion 
of t h i s  t h e s i s  t h a t  such econcmisn both calls for recogni t ion i n  i t s  
own r i g h t  ( s ince  i t  i s  what workers a c t u a l l y  "do") and a l s o  carries 
inherent p o l i t i c a l  meaning. 
The p o l i t i c a l  impl ica t ions  of workplace s t ruggles  relate f i r s t  of 
a l l  to t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  effects of exploitation itself. Thus such 
s t ruggles  both r e f l e c t  and are a product of the  underlying 
cont rad ic t ions  wi th in  the  c a p i t a l i s t  labour process.  In o the r  words, 
whatever managerial "strategy" i s  adopted (responsible  autonomy, 
tolerance of "games", bureaucrat ic  con t ro l  etc.) conflict  w i l l  tend 
t o  sur face  a s  a result of t h e  i nhe ren t ly  an tagonis t ic  r e l a t i o n s  
involved i n  t h e  nexus of e m l o i t a t i o n .  
Secondly, because of this i r r e d u c i b l e  l e v e l  of c o n f l i c t ,  workplace 
s t ruggles ,  as w e l l  as constant ly  drawing i n  new groups from t h e  
workforce, have a spontaneous and "explosive" character which has 
the power to  cha l lenge  much wider levels of p o l i t i c a l  and state 
control .  This is, of ca r se r  an argument which has t o  be t r e a t e d  
w i t h  care, given t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  f a i l u r e  of t h e  working c l a s s s i n  
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Br i t a in  a t  least, to  go beyond reformism. However. i t  i s  worth 
r eas se r t ing ,  i n  t h e  face of theory which gene ra l ly  sees such s t ru?gles  
as s ign i f i can t  only in so fa r  as they 90 beyond economism, t h a t  many 
i f  not most of t h e  confronta t ions  which have at  least begun to expose 
t h e  class nature  of s o c i e t y  have had t h e i r  roots i n  a simple defence 
of l i v i n g  standards.  That t h i s  i s  t r u e  o f ,  for example, Russian 
revolut ionary s t rugg les  is shown i n  chapter 5 ,  which considers  t hese  
i s sues  i n  more depth. The case study material, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  
Chapters 4, 6 and 7 also provides swe empirical examples of t h e  
p a t t e r n  and meaning of workplace conflict. 
A t h i r d  use of t h e  concept of explo i ta t ion  i s ,  paradoxical ly ,  that 
of helping u s  t o  eq lo re  t h e  nature  of consent.  If w e  accept t h a t  
t h e  p r a c t i c a l  meaning of work for most semi- or unski l led  workers 
is  as a bargain i n  which t h e  provis ion of labour  i s  seen quite 
e x p l i c i t l y  as involved i n  t h e  anployer 's  purchase of labour paver ,  i t  
is  clear that i s s u e s  such as t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  of labour paver i n t o  
labour w i l l  not i n  themselves be p o i n t s  of conflict. S imi la r ly ,  
t h e  understanding of labour  under advanced capitalism as e s s e n t i a l l y  
a b s t r a c t  allows for t h e  recognition that workers i n  t h i s  sec tor  are 
un l ike ly  t o  t ake  action over i s sues  of working methods and 
organisat ion.  Rather, r e s i s t ance  w i l l  tend to  take place around 
i s s u e s  r e l a t i n g  to t h e  terns and conditions for t h e  sale of labour  
pavers which terms and condi t ions  c o n s t i t u t e  workers' s tandards Of 
l i v i n g .  T h i s  comparative "indifference" to  t h e  provis ion and 
organisat ion of labour i t s e l f  beyond effort/reward cons idera t ions  
is a recurrent  theme i n  t h e  thes i s ,  developed both within t h e  case 
s t u d i e s  and i n  chapter. 5 through a re ference  to Hawrth  and Ramsie's 
concept of the  "differ ing universes" of management and labour  (Wworth 
and Ramsie, 1985). 
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Marxism and t h e  Labour Process Debate 
The pos i t i on  ou t l ined  here can be viewed ( i n  me sense)  as a 
development of classical Marxist p r i n c i p l e s  out l ined by Elarx i n  his 
r m a r k s  on " t h e  labour process" and taken up i n  sane respects by 
Braverman. Slch p r i n c i p l e s  have gene ra l ly  been viewed s ince  t h e  
publ ica t ion  of Braverman's book as c o n s t i t u t i n g  t h e  foundations of 
t h e  "labour process  debate". Flowever, i t  i s  our contention that t h e  
assumptions used i n  t h i s  debate  have diverged f a r  from such Marxist 
p r i n c i p l e s ,  i f  indeed they have taken them up at  a l l ,  and t h a t  i n  
connection with t h i s  they have f a i l e d  t o  provide an accura te  
cha rac t e r i s a t ion  of t h e  "realities" of i n d u s t r i a l  life. I 
The introductory chapters  of t h i s  t h e s i s  are therefore  concerned with 
t h e  content of t h e  "labour process  debate", cons i s t ing  a s  it does of 
most contemporary theo r i s ing  a b w t  work, and w i t h  t h e  location of 
cLlr o m  perspec t ive  within i t .  In  the  p re sen t  chapter  w e  o u t l i n e  
f i r s t l y  an argument about the  ove ra l l  d i r e c t i o n  of t h e  study of work 
both before  and after Braverman, and secondly analyse t h e  major 
emphases of c r i t i q u e s  of Braverman i n  t h e  labour process  deba te  i t s e l f .  
In Chapter 2 we  go on to  d iscuss  i n  more d e t a i l  t h e  concept of 
"control" which i s  i d e n t i f i e d  as central t o  t h e  labour process  debate ,  
and begin to  develop an a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  which  i s  d e a l t  w i th  more 
f u l l y  i n  t h e  chapter  on "Eixploitation". 
W e  begin, then, by looking a t  t h e  l i n e s  of develqment  of " the  l a b a u  
process debate" and t h e  way i n  which these  r e f l e c t  preoccupations 
which have existed, w e  argue, for many years i n  t h e  study of work 
prior to Braverman. 
Such a pos i t i on  runs  m n t e r  t o  t h e  common conception of Braveman's  
book and t h e  response to  it  as represent ing  a new depar ture  i n  t h i s  
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f i e l d .  Braverman's r ev iva l  of t h e  Marxist term "the  labour process" 
i n  his ana lys i s  of changes i n  the s t r u c t u r e  and na tu re  of work t h a t  
have t aken  p lace  over t h e  las t  100 years i s  seen as introducing a 
Marxist perspec t ive  which has  been lacking i n  t h e  empiricist and 
u n s t r u c t u r e j  area of "industrial  sociology". An example of this 
view i s  found i n  Paul Thompson's useful  survey of t h e  development 
of t h e  labour p rocess  debate  (Thanpson, 1983), i n  which Thanpson 
states t h a t :  "Even t h e  best concepts f r m  t r a d i t i o n a l  i n d u s t r i a l  
sociology do not  g ra sp  the  in t e rac t ion  b e t w e e n  social r e l a t i o n s  and 
technica l  organisa t ion  within t h e  labour process  as a whole" (p21) op cit. 
The unique cont r ibu t ion  of Bravennan is seen as ly ing  i n  h i s  
"successful attempt t o  renew E'arx's theory of the  l a h r  process  
and apply i t  to  subsequent h i s t o r i c a l  development, taking a f r e s h  look 
a t  skills, technology and work organisat ion" (p73)-Braverman1s book i s  
charac te r i sed  as p lay ing  "a p ivo ta l  role i n  later debates because 
he combined a renewal of Marx's categories w i t h  an explanation of 
t h e  dominant t r ends  i n  t h e  world of work" ( p 6 7 ) .  
In spite of t h i s  wholehearted endorsenent of Braverman's roots i n  
classical Mardso,it i s  notable  that Thanpson's concerns wi th in  
labour process  a n a l y s i s  echo those of t h e  labwr process  deba te  a s  
a whole i n  e s s e n t i a l l y  depar t ing  f r o m  sane of t h e  major t e n e t s  of 
classical Marem. Thus, co r rec t ly  a s  far as it g o e s ,  Thanpson roots 
t h e  wave of present-day research i n t o  work i n  the  f a c t  that "postwar 
capitalist development had crea ted  s ign i f i can t  new developments for 
t h e  na tu re  of work and for c l a s s  fonation"(p67).However, t h e s e  
developments are overwhelmingly cha rac t e r i s ed  i n  terms of t h e  
subjec t ive  experience of work, t h e  n e g l e c t  of which i s ,  i n  cannon 
with most other  commentators, t h e  substance of Thanpsonts criticisms 
of Bravennan. Typical ly ,  T h q s o n  follows his historical sunandry Of 
developments i n  work and class patterns by ( i n  agrement  w i th  K u h )  
i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  associated workplace s t r u g g l e s  as " fur ther  evidence 
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of an i n c r e a s i n g  r e s t l e s sness  about the q u a l i t y  of w o r k i n g  l i fe  
and t h e  na tu re  of the job itself" (w). 
The focus of labour p r a e s s  a n a l y s i s  i s  shifted f i rmly  frm t h e  
Marxist concern w i t h  economic i s s u e s  of v a l o r i s a t i o n  t o  t h e  
subjec t ive  experience of work, an area which need  not exclude the  
former concern b u t  which i n  p r a c t i c e ,  f o r  reasons w e  shall shor t ly  
examine, t r a d i t i o n a l l y  has done. The d i r e c t i o n  of the  ana lys i s  is 
shown i n  Thanpson's i n i t i a l  criticism of Marx for imposing 'la 
deDaration of t h e  spheres of poli t ics and economics, or factory and 
s t a t e " ( p q o n  t h e  development of both theories of work and socialist 
thought. The "politics". Thanpson argues i n  canmon w i t h  w r i t e r s  such 
as Eurawoy, Er ik  Olin Wright and indeed A l t h u s s e r  and those associated 
w i t h  him, must be brought back i n t o  t h e  ana lys i s  of t h e  econanic i n  
product im through the  acknowledgement (which  he  claims i s  absent i n  
Marx) of worker re s i s t ance  wi th in  t he  labour process.  
I t  i s  this concern wi th  t h e  supe r s t ruc tu ra l ,  though of ten  expressed 
more concre te ly  i n  terms of d. specific focus on subjec t ive  mrker 
response, which links t h e  labour process debate i n  w i t h  a broader 
t r a d i t i o n  of "western F l a r d s t "  repudiat ion of economic determinism. 
A t  t h e  Same t i m e  t h e  expression of this concern through an  emphasis 
on workers' response to  the  experience of "al ienat ing" work and 
managerial daninat ion carries echoes of two o the r  earlier t r ad i t i ons :  
the  general  preoccupation wi th in  " indus t r i a l  sociology" wi th  job 
s a t i s f a c t i o n  (or lack of i t )  and the related concern with t h e  
p r i n c i p l e s  and r e l a t ionsh ips  involved i n  running an organisat ion.  
We go on t o  shcm hav and why labour process theory  s ince  Braverman 
has continued t o  promote a perspec t ive  which r e t a i n s  i n  a confusing 
fashion elements of both t r a d i t i o n a l  i n d u s t r i a l  sociology and t h e  
"wes tern  M a d s t "  approach, rather than, as claimed, br inging a 
c r e a t i v e  renewal of Marxist p r i n c i p l e s  i n t o  the s tudy of work. 
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A w r i t e r  who, l i k e  Thcmpson, has taken on t h e  t a sk  of probing 
developments i n  Marxism s i n c e  t h e  second w r l d  w a r ,  though f r a  a 
d i f f e r e n t  perspec t ive ,  i s  El len Fleikens Wood i n  " M a r ~ s o  without 
C l a s s  Struggle?" (Wood, 1983).  Addressing herse l f  t o  t h e  question 
of Wes te rn  Marxism" Wmd argues that t h e  rmts of both  Althusser- 
i a n i s n  and mroccmmunisn are "u l t imate ly  grounded i n  t h e  same 
historical r e a l i t y  t h a t  has so profoundly shaped Western Marxist 
theory and practice i n  general:  t h e  d i s inc l ina t ion  of the working 
class for revolut ionary politics" b246)opci t .  and that  t h e  r e l a t e d  
political strategies have "demanded nothing less than a redef in i t ion  
af c l a s s  itself and of t h e  whole conceptual apparatus  on w h i c h  t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  Marxist theory of class and c l a s s  struggle has res ted  
... a displacement of production r e l a t i o n s  and exploitation f r a  t h e  
core of social structure and process, and much else beside? " (p248). 
-
A quest ioning of these  fundamental ca t egor i e s  i s ,  as w e  shall see 
below, a r ecu r r ing  theme of much labour  process a n a l y s i s ,  so t h a t  
whether t h e  quest ioning i s  i n  itself r i g h t  or wrong (and w e  s h a l l  
argue t h a t  i t  l eads  t o  sane important misapprehensions of t h e  nature  
of workplace s t rugg les )  it p u t s  i n  some doubt t h e  c l a i m  to  be 
reshaping t h e  ana lys i s  of work i n  a Marxist mould. Wood continues 
t h e  argument by t r ac ing  t h e  roots of t h e  rejection of "econmism" 
c e n t r a l  t o  both  Western Marxism and t h e  labour p rocess  debate back t o  
t h e  poli t ical  a t t r a c t i o n  fe l t  by t h e  "Elay '68" genera t ion  tcwards 
hkoism and t h e  concept of " c u l t u r a l  revolution'' as covering 
"revolut ionary movements without specific points  of concentrat ion 
or focused political targets, charac te r i sed  in s t ead  by a d i f fus ion  of 
s t rugg le  throughout the  p o l i t i c a l  'system' and a l l  i t s  instruments of 
ideologica l  and p o l i t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  '' (p248-249)Wood d r a w s  a direct 
connection between this preoccupation with ideology and "culture" 
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and t h e  later shift by Poulantzas,  one of the leading exponents 
of this perspect ive,  "fran an apparent dep rec i a t ion  of l i b e r a l  
democratic forms tavards  an a l b e i t  cautious acceptance ... of t h e  
Eurocanmunist view of t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  socialism as the extension 
of exis t ing bourgeois danocratic forms "(p2ri9).In o ther  words, t h e  
i n s i s t e n c e  on t h e  c e n t r a l i t y  of ideology and paver-related p o l i t i c s  
t h e  ana lys i s  of class and work has c l e a r ,  and far from radical, 
poli t ical  implications.  
I t  i s  no part of t h e  p re sen t  argument to endorse econanisn per se, 
or indeed any vers ion of econmic  determinism. The s igni f icance  
of e c o n m i s t i c  strategies by workers is ,  as has been indicated, a 
major item of d iscuss ion  i n  t h e  t h e s i s  as a whole, and t h e  i s s u e  
of econanic determinism arises t o  sane degree  i n  this area and i n  
t h e  discussion of desk i l l i ng .  What we are concerned t o  argue here  
i s  that t h e  reac t ion  aga ins t  "econanism", which extends t o  a 
repudiat ion both of t r a d i t i o n a l  t r a d e  union s t rugg les  and any 
a n a l y s i s  of work which emphasises t h e  econorPic concerns embodied 
i n  such s t ruggles ,  i s  camon both t o  t h e  broad theo re t i ca l  
t r a d i t i o n  of Western Flardsm and to c e n t r a l  cu r ren t s  w i t h i n  t h e  
labour process  debate. The debate,  r a the r  than launching an a n a l y s i s  
of work which can i n  sane way relate t o  cons idera t ions  of value  i n  
capitalist production, has picked up and enlarged  thenes w i t h i n  a n  
earlier and broader t h e o r e t i c a l  tradition, applying these  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
t o  t h e  study of work. Thus for example Buraway argues d o n g  
Althusser ian l i n e s  (Burawoy, 1978) that ".Any work context involves  
an economic dimension (production of t h i n g s ) ,  a p o l i t i c a l  dimension 
(production of social r e l a t i o n s )  and an ideo log ica l  dimension 
(production of an experience of those relat ions) . . .The so-called 
econanic realm i s  itself inseparable fran its political and 
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ideologica l  effects, and from s p e c i f i c a l l y  political and 
idedbgical ' s t ruc tu res '  of t h e  worlcplacei (p274)op c i t .  Cm this 
b a s i s  Buraway de f ines  Taylorism, for example. p r imar i ly  i n  terms 
of i t s  function as a "mode of leg i t imat ion"  (p27+I t  has becane 
even more canmon among recent labour  process  writers to  emphasise 
t h e  overwhelming role of t h e  ideologica l  and p o l i t i c a l  i n  s t ruc tu r ing  
managerial a c t i v i t y  and worker response. 
Havever valuable  t h e s e  ideas ,  what i s  being argued he re  i s  t h a t  
they o b l i t e r a t e  crucial areas of Marxist theory for  t h e  s tudy of 
work. Although t h e  notion of ideology has  a c e n t r a l  p l ace  i n  
Marxism, it i s  advanced (as i s  o f t en  c r i t i c a l l y  noted) on t h e  b a s i s  
of an e s s e n t i a l l y  material ana lys i s  of production and soc ie ty .  
Arguments as to  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between base and supe r s t ruc tu re  are 
taken up i n  Chapter 5 .  What needs to be s a i d  here  i s  t h a t  i n ,  
i m p l i c i t l y  or e x p l i c i t l y ,  embracing t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  perspec t ive  
of Western Marxism, contemporary a n a l y s i s  of t h e  labour  process 
has lef t  many aspects of Marxist theory,  mainly r e l a t i n g  t o  
c a p i t a l i s t  ob jec t ives  of va lo r i sa t ion  and t h e  assoc ia ted  impact of 
e w l o i t a t i o n ,  e s s e n t i a l l y  unexplored. Further ,  and as importantly,  
t h e  Althusser ian emphasis on t h e  overdetermination Of ideological  
and p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e s  a l s o  raises t h e  more practical question 
of how anything i s  ever going to break through t h e  charmed circle 
crea ted  by t h e s e  structures. Rather than emphasising t h e  r o l e  of 
working class s t rugg le ,  as i t  claims t o  do, t h e  "Western Marxist" 
s t r a i n  of labour process a n a l y s i s  i n  f a c t  tends t o  ignore  or 
denigra te  t h e  s t rugg les  which do take place. 
That t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  response to Braverman has l a r g e l y  consis ted 
of taking t h e  Marxism out  of bhrx i s  f u r t h e r  demonstrated within 
t h e  labour  process debate through i ts  chal lenging Of a number of 
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knportant Marxist pr inc ip l e s .  These can be summed up a s  
respec t ive ly  the  c e n t r a l i t y  of labour to t h e  p rcduc t im of profit ,  
t h e  labour theory of value,  and t h e  commodity s t a t u s  of labour. 
In t h i s  way, paradoxica l ly ,  t h e  specific meaning of labour under 
capi ta l ism has been removed from t h e  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  labour process .  
Rather than the  considerat ion of a s p e c i f i c a l l y  capitalist labour  
process, a t t en t ion  has  sh i f t ed  (as sane au thor s  spell out  e x p l i c i t l y )  
t o  t h e  considerat ion of an a h i s t o r i c a l  l abour  process whose 
fundamental p r i n c i p l e s  are i n  var ious ways denied or contradicted 
by capitalism. \Wle this argument as to t h e  inherent  c r e a t i v i t y  
of labour,  etc., i s  i n  i t s  own tenus worthwhile, it fails t o  cane 
t o  g r i p s  with t h e  logic of the  specific s t r u c t u r i n g  of t h e  labour  
process under capitalism i n  terms of t h e  goal of va lo r i sa t ion ,  and 
thus  simultaneously evades discussion of a r e l a t ionsh ip  c e n t r a l  to 
and c o n s t i t u t i v e  of t h e  capitalist labour process, t h a t  of explo i t -  
a t i on .  We are l e f t  i n s t e a d  with a recycled and more s q h i s t i c a t e d  
version of i n d u s t r i a l  sociology. as sane of Braverman's cr i t ics  are 
ready t o  acknowledge. The connections between arguments developed 
wi th in  t h e  labour process debate and t h e  o l d e r ,  less self-consciously 
"radical" t r a d i t i o n  are now explored. 
Sociology and "Social Relationships" 
I t  would seem somewhat i r o n i c a l  t h a t  Braveman's  Labour and Monopoly 
Cani ta l .  lauded by Thompson as represent ing a " re turn  to Marx" 
(Thanpson, 1983, 7 2 )  and thus  taking d iscuss ion  of work beyond 
"even the  best concepts frcm t r a d i t i o n a l  i n d u s t r i a l  sociology" 
(Thompson, 1983, 21) has i n  f a c t  proved a c a t a l y s t  for t h e  massive 
expansion of Marxist and necMlarxist comment m t h e  labour process 
which itself has turned p rec i se ly  bade t o  those  subjec t ive  and 
"behavioural" i s s u e s  wi th  which i n d u s t r i a l  sociology had t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
been concerned. The pre-occupation with "social r e l a t ions"  which 
-1 3- 
merge i n  with "social re la t ionships" ,  or i n  other words social 
in t e rac t ion  between groups, a t  t h e  p o i n t  of prcduction, i s  one 
aspect of this, as w e  shall consider  later. Another i s  t h e  concern 
with t h e  content or q u a l i t a t i v e  n a t u r e  of work w h i c h  i s  dwonstrated 
i n  the  d i scuss ions  of d e s k i l l i n g ,  creative p o t e n t i a l  o f  labour etc 
in which t h e  u s e  value aspects of labour  are given overwhelming 
p r i o r i t y  over i t s  role i n  t h e  c r ea t ion  of exchange value. These are 
t h e  same concerns which are a t  large i n  t h e  '69s d i scuss ions  of 
"al ienat ing" w o r k  and t h e  more conventional worr ies  of. so t o  speak, 
applied i n d u s t r i a l  sociology or "behamura l  s tudies"  (McGregor , 
Herzberg etc) as to  how to improve job sat isfact ion and increase 
worker motivation. The arguments of Friedman (1977,1978) and Cressey 
and .?facInnes (1977,1980) while  w r i t t e n  from a "radical" perspec t ive ,  
i n  fact deal wi th  much t h e  same i s s u e s  and advocate sane of t h e  Same 
so lu t ions :  "bh i l e  labour process s t r u g g l e s  may be i n s u f f i c i e n t  for 
transforming t h e  working class i n t o  a revolu t ionary  class. . . they 
are not i n s u f f i c i e n t  to  changing t h e  organisa t ion  of work or i n v e s t -  
ment p a t t e r n s  under capitalism " (Frie&an,1977,45) . 
In both cases, t h e  concerns and arguments are a response to  a r ea l  
development; t h e  daninat ion of work i n  t h e  postwar period by the  
r w t i n i s e d ,  f ragnented ,  i n  many cases t i g h t l y  timed and measured 
techniques associated with mass product ion.  In both  cases, bu t  
perhaps more understandably i n  t h e  case of conventional i n d u s t r i a l  
sociology, t h e  argument skirts round t h e  root causes and furxka-ntals 
of working class response t o  this development. Thus, for example, 
while  t h e  B r i t i s h  workgroup based struggles w h i c h  beg% i n  t h e  ' 5 0 s  
mainly i n  engineer ing were almost e n t i r e l y  concerned wi th  d e t a i l e d  
effor t / reward ques t ions ,  t h e  sociology of Work bo th  pre-  and post- 
Braverman has , in  i t s  concentrat ion on t h e  "al ienat ing" n a t u r e  of 
t h e  work itself, abandoned the  a n a l y s i s  Of such s t m g g l e s  almost 
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wholly to t h e  sphere of " i n d u s t r i a l  relations".  In this latter 
sphere some extremely valuable  work has indeed been done 
(Batstone. Boraston and Frenkel,  1977: Brown a n d ~ T e r r y ,  1978: 
Edwards and sCu11iOn,1982) p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  char t ing  t h e  development 
of "informal" bargaining strategies, but  of i t s  n a t u r e  such work 
can par take  only  t o  a l imi t ed  degree of t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  perspec t ives  
ava i l ab le  t o  sociology as a whole. 
Secondly, t h e  ana lys i s  of t h e  rationale of "a l iena t ing"  work 
condi t ions  has been c a r r i e d  out  w i t h i n  t h e  framework, at  least 
for t h e  labour  process debate. of t h e  d r i v e  for managerial 
"control" and "dmina t im" .  The opportuni ty  t o  eq lore  t h e  
material condi t ions  which have l e d  t o  t h i s  breaking daun and 
s p e c i a l i s a t i o n  of work, i n  the context of a n  a n a l y s i s  of in t ens i f -  
i c a t i o n  of labour centred on t h e  ob jec t ive  of maximising surp lus  
value through t h e  reorganisat ion of work, i s  overlooked i n  t h i s  
perspec t ive .  A focus on t h e  over r id ing  tendency towards 
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour can a l l o w  us t o  understand t h e  changing 
n a t u r e  of work i t s e l f  i n  terms of t h e  economic requirements b u i l t  
i n t o  t h e  labour  process which i n  themselves lend l a r g e  a r e a s  of 
product ive work an e s s e n t i a l l y  abstract and q u a n t i t a t i v e  charac te r .  
The most important t h ing  t o  understand abmt Taylorism is  not  i t s  
use as a means of managerial daninat ion or " m o d e  of legi t imat ion" 
but  i t s  role (and purpose) i n  i n t e g r a t i n g  requirements of valor- 
i s a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  f a b r i c  of t h e  labour process.  Thus, whi le  before 
this p a r t i c u l a r  point  i n  t h e  develcpment of capitalism t h e  methods 
workers used had been very much lef t  up t o  them, t h e  introduct ion 
of - t i m e  and method (or "motion") study linked t h e  two aspects of 
t h e  production process under capitalism, defined by Marx as a labour 
process  and a process of v a l o r i s a t i o n ,  and e x p l i c i t l y  allowed the  
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objectives of one to s t r u c t u r e  the  content  of the  other. I t  is  for this 
reason, arguably,  that Braveman describes Taylorism as an e x p l i c i t  
ve rba l i s a t ion  of the capitalist  m o d e  of production" (Braverman. 1974, 
pB6+. 
Y e t  t h i s  po in t  has been cons i s t en t ly  overlooked by commentators both 
on Taylor and Braverman. Rod Coombes, for example (Combs, 1978) expresses 
a typical misconception i n  t h e  assessment of Braverman's work when he 
cmments  that "Braverman i s  presumably us ing  t h e  term 'mode of production'  
to refer to the technique of production rather than to capi ta l i sm itself 
(p83). Coanb's reading of t h i s  po in t  is  perhaps representa t ive  of many 
w r i t e r s  on the  labour  process i n  that i t  fails t o  appreciate t h e  way i n  
w h i c h  " sc i en t i f i c  management" is i n t r i n s i c a l l y  tied i n  w i t h  the very 
logic of prof i tabi l i ty ,  rather than being a strategy of "control" or 
"de-Jci l l ing" for its own sake. 
Such views can also be said to  underestimate the ways i n  which this 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  logic(a) can achieve some o b j e c t i v e  advances i n  eff ic iency,  
such as t h e  c u t t i n w u t  of needless movements, which are probably w h a t  
attracted Lenin (much maligned i n  t h i s  respect) t o  Taylorism. A f u l l  
explora t ion  of w h a t  are arguably some genuinely "sc ien t i f ic"  aspects of 
s c i e n t i f i c  management is  undertaken i n  chapter 3. 
Contemporary a n a l y s i s  of t h e  labour process, then, shares an e s s e n t i a l l y  
similar perspective w i t h  pre-Bravermanian i n d u s t r i a l  sociology 
i n  that i n  both cases any sustained attempttto explore the  
material s t ruc tu r ing  and impact of work is missing. As w e  
shall see hlw,  the s i m i l a r i t y  extends to a n  explicit disavowal 
by some labour process t h e o r i s t s  of any conception of a 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  capitalist  labour  process ,  a long  wi th  a call for 
typologies  and the r e c o p i t i o n  of complexity w h i c h  takes us 
suspic ious ly  close to the  nea t  c a t e m r i s i n g s  of a Woodward or 
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Burns and Sta lker .  
A t  least part of t h i s  re luc tance  t o  take on any of the more 
s t ra ight fonuard ly  economic aspects of ?larxist theory in  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  of work,despite t h e  obeisances towards >larem, can 
be ascr ibed t o  t h e  background of many con t r ibu to r s  t o  t h e  deba te  
i n  organisa t iona l  sociOlOgy. While i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  de f ine  t h e  
d iv id ing  l i n e  between t h e  s tudy of organisa t ions  and a more 
"production"-orientated approach, t h e  emphasis of organisa t iona l  
theory  on p r i n c i p l e s  of organisa t iona l  funct ioning (or a l t e r n a t i v e l y  
"dysfunction") has removed such theory even f u r t h e r  from any 
loca t ion  of c o n f l i c t  i n  t h e  mater ia l  con t r ad ic t ions  within t h e  
production process  itself. The oaradign of an "organisation" i s  a n  
office; l i g h t ,  q u i e t ,  '@production-less". Fran this point of view 
any examination of t h e  factors influencing, for example, "workgroup" 
a c t i v i t y  (and organisa t iona l  theory has moved f r e e l y  & t w e e n  t h e  
s tudy of profess iona l  adminis t ra tors  and that of t h e  productive 
workforce i t s e l f )  has taken p lace  i n  a context  devoid of any 
recogni t ion of t h e  material r equ i rmen t s  of p roduc t im and p r o f i t -  
a b i l i t y  . 
I t  i s  t h i s  "absence" which has  been one of  t h e  l egac ie s  of 
organisa t iona l  theory to  t h e  l a b m r  process debate.  "ixganisations",  
or, simply, workplaces, are viewed i n  terms of sets of social 
interactions ra the r  than as p a r t  of the  bus iness  of production. 
Weber defined organisa t ions  as "s t ruc tures  of daninancy"; Salaman 
tells u s  t h a t  they a r e  "s t ruc tures  of cont ro l"  (Salaman, 1981, 143). 
While t h e  unmitigated view of organisat ions as r a t i o n a l  and thus  
e f f e c t i v e  bureaucracies  has been fundamentally challenged. the  
c o n f l i c t  t h a t  i s  acknowledged has been l oca t ed  wi th in  the same 
framework of r e l a t i o n s  of au thor i ty ,  l eg i t imat ion  and damination, 
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r a t h e r  than,  even within t h e  labour process  debate ,  being 
r e l a t e d  t o  the  cont rad ic t ions  inherent  i n  the ex t r ac t ion  of 
su rp lus  value.  Thus John s to rey ,  for example, can say i n  a 
con t r ibu t ion  located f i rmly  within the labour  process  l i t e r a t u r e ,  
t h a t  "cur earlier reconceptual isat ions of organisat ions. .  .depicted 
them no t  as neu t r a l  t echnica l  systems but  as  ensembles of 
formalised ac t ion  designed t o  secure danination" (Storey, 1983, 
123) .  While i t  i s  no part  of our in ten t ion  to argue that organis- 
a t i o n s  should be seen as "neutral  technical  systems". S torey ' s  
desc r ip t ion  does raise the ques t ion  of w h a t  exac t ly  i t  is  so 
necessary t o  secure daninat ion over. 
Thus organisa t iona l  theory, while no t  c e n t r a l l y  concerned w i t h  
production i n  a w i t a l i s t  soc ie ty ,  has never the less  "appropriated" 
a t  c e r t a i n  p o i n t s  issues of class,  t rade  unionism and workplace 
c o n f l i c t ,  t h e  organisa t iona l  perspect ive on which has then been 
u n c r i t i c a l l y  absorbed i n t o  t h e  l a b r  process  debate .  I n  c o n t r a s t  
t o  t h e  presenta t ion  of  labour process theory as represent ing a new 
depar ture  fran t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  of orthodox i n d u s t r i a l  sociology, no 
such repudiat ion of organisa t iona l  theory has taken place. In  f a c t  
a confused merger seas to  continue between t h e  t w o  disciplines, 
which, given t h e  "absence of production" to  which w e  have re fer red  
i n  organisa t iona l  theory,  could be said to be even more dangerous 
to  t h e  development of a class ana lys i s  of work than a more ''simple" 
i n d u s t r i a l  sociology. Presumably no one wr i t i ng  wi th in  the contempor- 
a r y  l i t e r a t u r e  on work and the  labour process  would wish t o  c l a i m  
t h a t  theory  s ince  Braveman has been t o t a l l y  unmarked by inf lue-ces  
from earlier traditions. Nevertheless i t  appears ironical t h a t  a 
t h e o r e c t i c a l  cu r ren t  which proclaims itself a s  d i s t i n c t i v e  i n  
rev iv ing  a s p e c i f i c a l l y  Marxist perspect ive i n  the study of work 
should have reverted so c l e a r l y ,  via the i d e o l q i c a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
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emphasis of Western Marxism.  to t h e  concerns of organisa t iona l  and 
i n d u s t r i a l  sociology. A c lose r  look a t  t h e  argument within Braverman's 
book i tself ,  and t h e  specifics of t h e  response t o  it i n  t h e  "labour 
process debate", may i n d i c a t e  some of t h e  causes .  
Back t o  Braverman 
It i s  not  t h e  purpose of t h i s  t h e s i s  to p resen t  a d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  
of Braverman's book, or to  "defend" it as an unassa i lab le  pr- 
nouncement on t h e  n a t u r e  of work i n  la te  capitalism. Nevertheless,  
i t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  that some of t h e  arguments i n  t h e  book have, i n  
our view, been widely mis in te rpre ted  in ways which axe common to  
d i f f e r e n t  writers. We shall begin,  then, by  b r i e f l y  s e t t i n g  out  
w h a t  Braverman's book i s  "abcut" and go on t o  analyse t h e  response 
to i t  i n  order  to subs t an t i a t e  t h e  case m a d e  c u t  above a s  to t h e  
d i r ec t ion  t h e  labour  process debate has taken. 
Braveman makes t w o  statenents i n  his in t roduc t ion ,  t h e  f irst  of 
which has  been l a r g e l y  ignored and the second of w h i c h  has proved 
cont rovers ia l .  In  h i s  f irst  statement, Braverman says that t h e  
o r i g i n a l  motive behind t h e  book i s  to  provide  "l i t t le more than a 
study of occupational s h i f t s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta tes .  I was i n t e r e s t e d  
i n  t h e  structure of t h e  working class, and t h e  manner in which i t  
had changed (Braveman, 1974, 3). This then "'began t o  broaden to 
include t h e  evolution of labour processes  w i t h i n  occupations a s  
w e l l  as t h e  s h i f t s  of labour among occupations ... Before long I 
found myself a t tempting a study of t h e  development of t h e  capitalist 
mode of projuct ion &r ing  t h e  past 100 years '' (p4).The second 
statement i s  t h a t  "No attempt w i l l  be made t o  dea l  w i t h  t h e  modern 
working class on t h e  l e v e l  of i t s  consciousness,  organisation Or 
a c t i v i t i e s .  This  is  a book about t h e  working c l a s s  as a class & 
itself. not as a class for i t s e l f . . . w h a t  i s  needed f i r s t  of a l l  i s  
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a p i c t u r e  of the working class as it  exists, as t h e  shape given t o  
t h e  working papulat ion by t h e  capital accumulation process 
This e-licit "opting out" has been seen as an inexcusable  defect 
i n  Braverman's a n a l y s i s  by many of his critics. 
( ~ 2 6 ) .  
Braverman's i n i t i a l  statement of his i n t e n t i o n s  i n  t h e  book makes 
it clear t h a t  h i s  subjec t  matter i s  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  or technical 
development of t h e  labour process under capi ta l i sm.  In o t h e r  words 
he is not concerned wi th  "the labour  process" as a set of, l i t e r a l l y ,  
social r e l a t i o n s ,  or more accura t e ly  r e l a t ionsh ips ,  a s  many more 
recent  labcxlr process writers sean t o  be (see below) but  as a 
p a r t i c u l a r  t echn ica l  organisa t ion  of work. Second, or r a t h e r  a t  t h e  
same t i m e ,  he i s  concerned wi th  t h e  s t ruc tu r ing  of that organisa t ion  
by capitalism; w i t h  a s p e c i f i c a l l y  capitalist labcur process .  I t  i s  
from t h i s  p o i n t  of view t h a t  Braverman's explora t ions  i n t o  t h e  
Marxist concept of "labour process" and his specific i n t e r e s t  i n  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between conception and execution are undertaken. 
The u n i t y  of conception and execution is upheld, no t ,  as sane of 
Braverman's detractors assume, as a f e a t u r e  of a lost but  still 
memorable paradise of "craft control"  bu t  as t h e  def in ing  f ea tu re  
of the notion of "labour process" as such, ahistorical, ou t s ide  
any specificdass s t ruc tu re ,  as Marx first def ines  i t  i n  order 
more concre te ly  and h i s t o r i c a l l y  t o  spec i fy  t h e  character of t h i s  
labour process under d i f f e r e n t  modes of p r d u c t i o n .  
To p re sen t  Braverman's argument i n  t h i s  l i g h t  i s  t o  extrapolate 
i t  to a p a r t i c u l a r  logic and l e v e l  of o b j e c t i v i t y  not  always 
present  i n  the book itself. Braveman's personal nos t a lg i a  f o r  h i s  
p a s t  as a craftsman emerges c l e a r l y  enough and can be Seen t o  
pranote  an at  times idealistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  craft 
t r a d i t i o n  as having embodied a nag lost un i ty  of conception and 
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execution. His own u s e  of t he  term "control".  a t  which w e  look 
i n  more detail i n  t h e  next chapter ,  i s  itself ambivalent, though 
t h i s  i s  perhaps no t  su rp r i s ing  given l a c k  of, foreknowledge on how 
he  would be  a t t acked  for his use  of t h e  concept. But t h e  major 
project of the book r a n a i n s  t h e  l oca t ing  and listing of t h e  
specific dimensions of t h e  labour process  under capi ta l ism.  
Thus Taylorism, which sys temat ica l ly  works t o  separa te  conception 
frcm execution as p a r t  of an explicit technique f o r  rendering 
work opera t ions  more efficient, i s  a c e n t r a l  focus of the  a n a l y s i s  
i n  which "technique" i s  not a side i s s u e  but an i n t e g r a l  part of 
understanding the  capitalist labour  process. In con t r a s t  t o  almost 
every other w r i t e r  i n  t h e  f ie ld ,  Braverman perce ives  the  c r u c i a l  
p o i n t  that i n  " s c i e n t i f i c  management" t h e r e  occurs a union of 
technique or organisa t ion  of work and the production imperat ives  
imposed by t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  renuirenent  of va lo r i sa t ion .  
Under c a p i t a l i s n ,  product ion is s t ruc tu red  and labour is "drawn 
cut" of the workforce by t h e  over r id ing  ob jec t ive  of producing 
surp lus  value. S c i e n t i f i c  management explicitly structures t h e  
d e t a i l e d  organisa t ion  of work i n  tenus of this object ive.  I n  t h i s  
way the content  of labour  - its use-value aspects - i s  matched, 
s t ruc tu red  and approximated to i t s  purpose of producing exchange 
value.  The q u a l i t a t i v e  i s  shaped by t he  q u a n t i t a t i v e .  T h i s  is w h a t  
Marx meant by t h e  real subordination of labour, though he never 
witnessed "Taylorism". The c e n t r a l i t y  of Taylorism t o  Braverman's 
argument is r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of i t s  symbolic and real s ign i f i cance  
f o r  the specifically c a p i t a l i s t  - valor i sa t ion-or ien ted  - s t r u c t u r i n q  
of t h e  labour process. As t h e  expression of t h e  organisa t ion  of 
production f o r  exchange, Taylor isn (or any form of work s tudy)  c a n  
a l s o  provide u s  w i t h  an understanding of t h e  approximation w i t h i n  
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semi-skilled work tcwards the concept of abstract labour  w h i c h  i s  
c e n t r a l  to  mrx's economic theory and to w h i c h  Braverman also a t  
var ious  p o i n t s  links his argunent :  "This mechanical exercise of 
human faculties according to motion types which are. s tudied 
independently of t h e  particular kind of work being done, b r ings  
to  life the mrxist conception of 'abstract labour ' .  W e  see that 
this a b s t r a c t i o n  fram the concrete forms of labour...is no t  
something tha t  exists only  i n  the  pages of thefirst chapter of 
Capital, bu t  exists as  w e l l  i n  the m i n d  of capitalists, t h e  manager, 
the i n d u s t r i a l  engineer" (Braverman, 1974, pl81). 
N o n e  of this argument has anything to do with dssuos of "control" 
i n  t h e  Sense of domination/subordination r e l a t ionsh ips .  Y e t  i t  i 9  
t h e  ques t ion  of "control" which has been overwhelmingly taken up 
i n  criticisms of Bravenuan. An argument has been advanced which assumes 
that Bravenuan holds t h e  same conception of * t o n t r o l ' ~  as his critics, and 
that he has used this concept wrongly and mechanis t ical ly .  I t  i s  assumed 
that this notion of "control1' as his critics, and that he has used this 
concept wrongly and mechanis t ical ly .  I t  is assumed t h a t  this 
not ion of ''control", as i n  the alleged argument t h a t  desk i l l i ng  
is projected i n  order  to give more cont ro l  to t h e  capitalist class, 
is  c e n t r a l  to t h e  book. Y e t  w h i l e  Braverman does indeed use the 
term "control" throughout, it can be argued that his bas ic  stand- 
p o i n t  of a n a l y s i s  i n  terms of economic requirements of accumulation 
and p r o f i t a b i l i t y  means that he occupies a d i f f e r e n t  pround on 
c o n t r o l  from many of his critics. While "control" i s  ( impl i c i t l y ,  
a t  lest)  conceptualised by most of Braverman's critics i n  terms 
of r'political" r e l a t i o n s h i p s  of dcinination and subordination 
wi th in  the workplace, for Braverman the term can be taken to 
refer to techniquesckrhereby slrployers more e f f e c t i v e l y  maximise 
s u r p l u s  value. The former i s s u e  can, of murse, be argued to be 
s h p l y  a dimension of the latter. That  the t w o  perspec t ives  are 
i n  fact c r u c i a l l y  distinct is shown i n  more detail  as part of the 
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argument i n  t h r .  nex t  c h a n t e r .  
Response to araverman 
The emphasis on "control" i n  criticisms of Braverman 1 s  i n  i t se l f ,  
however, on ly  one aspect of t h e  & n e r d  t h e o r e t i c a l  s tance  from 
which most of t h e  c r i t i q u e s  have been w r i t t e n .  Having attempt& t o  
e s t a b l i s h  t h r  c e n t r a l  p o s i t i o n  of Sraverman's book agz ins t  what 
h a s  been suggested are widespread m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,  ue nOIi go 
on t o  a broader survey of t h e  response to Braveman i r  o rde r  t o  
chart t h e  main l i n e s  of t h e  labour p r o c e s s  debate. 
The overwhelming theme apparent  i n  both e a r l y  and l a t e r  criticisms 
of araverman (and t h e  response t o  t h e  book has been a h o s t  e n t i r e l y  
c r i t i ca l ,  despite an e n t h u s i a s t i c  early r e c e p t i o n )  i s  t he  npglec t  
of s u b j e c t i v i t y  or worker resnonse from Braverman's a r d y s i s .  
Braverman's d i sc l a imer  that "This i s  a book about  t h e  working class 
as  a class i t se l f ,  n o t  a s  a c l a s s  for itself"( p 27 , : s  scorned a s  
inadequate  t o  a work purporting t o  p rov ide  a wideranping theory of 
t h e  labour  process .  While t h e  detai ls  of t h i s  c r i t i q u e  are 
c a n p a r a t i v e l y  undeveloped i n  t h e  f i r s t  r e sponses  t o  Eraverman, by 
t h e  s t a g e  of  arguments such as t hose  of Lazonick (19EI or 
Thompson (1983) i t  has developed i n t o  a fully-fledgec'  argument 
over  h w  t h e  absence of an acknowledgement of worker r e s i s t a n c e  
w i t h i n  t h e  labour  process v i t i a t e s  no t  o n l y  Rravermar!'s argument 
but Varxist theo ry  on t h e  labcur process as a whole,  T a r t i c u l a r l y  
as r eo resen ted  i n  t h e  concept  of t h e  real subordinat i im of labour 
(see below,.  
Cc t h e  basis of t h i s  c e n t r a l  c r i t i q u e  t h e  labour proc?ss d r b a t e  
s i n c e  Braverman has t ended  to take t h e  form of a development of 
arguments which will i n  one  way or ano the r  make un f o r  t h i s  
nllegw' def i c i ency .  These can be sa id  to have taken  ;:ace wi th in  
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one or other of two broad frameworks: workers '  experience of t h e  
q u a l i t a t i v e  content  of t h e i r  work, and t h e  social na ture  of 
r e l a t i o n s  a t  work. The former i s  extended t o  take i n  t h e  
"desk i l l i ng  debate",  worker knavledge and t h e  creatiye p o t e n t i a l  
of labour;  t h e  l a t t e r  t o  cover a generalc$mamic of managerial 
domination and an accompanying "c l a s s  s t ruggle"  which i n  i tself 
i s  i n t e g r a l  t o  t h e  development of t h e  labour  process .  Same 
assoc ia ted  i s s u e s  which a r e  more d i r e c t l y  connected w i t h  t h e  
umbrella concept of "control"  a r e  f u r t h e r  discussed i n  t h e  next  
chapter .  
First of a l l ,  t h e n ,  t h e  argument over t h e  meaning and impl ica t ions  
of the  notion of "deski l l ing" .  C l e a r l y  i t  is seen a s  a key propos i t ion  
of Braveman's  book that t h e  development of t h e  labour process under 
l a t e  capi ta l i rm has imposed a remorseless t r a j e c t o r y  of d e s k i l l i n g  
and "degradation of work" on t h e  working class. While the  o v e r a l l  
tendency can hard ly  be se r ious ly  quest ioned,  criticism has tended 
t o  concentrate  on t h e  "unid i rec t iona l"  and inexorable  nature of 
t h i s  tendency i n  t h e  Bravemanian perspec t ive .  Thus Elger,  a n  e a r l y  
c r i t i c  of Bsaveman over  t h i s  i s s u e ,  a rgues  tha t  i n  p l ace  of a one- 
s ided  ana lys i s  l i k e  h i s  should cane a n  awareness  of t h e  camplexity 
and r eve r sab i l i t y  of t h e  d e s k i l l i n g  process, specifically based on 
an acknowledgement of worker r e s i s t ance  (Elqer ,  1979). 
The r o l e  of worker resistance i s  seen as central i n  two ways; , 
f i r s t l y  as playing an  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  i n  t h e  develqxnent of t h e  labour  
process  a s  such, and secondly a s  blocking t h e  ove ra l l  c a p i t a l i s t  
imnulsion towards d e s k i l l i n g .  Thus Foster i s  c i t e d  as  arguing 
t h a t  working class mi l i tancy  i t s e l f  "p rec ip i t a t ed  major efforts 
t o  reorganise t h e  labour process of both engineer ing and spinning" 
(Clger ,  1979, 73).Again, i n  con t r a s t  t o  Steadman-Jones' argument 
t h a t  c r a f t  workers through s t ruggle  managed t o  r e t a i n  a fOma1 
s t a t u s  for t h e i r  s k i l l s ,  Wger claims that "they w e r e  transformed 
and encapsulated within modem indus t ry  i n  ways which  sus ta ined  
s i g n i f i c a n t  forms of expertise " ( ~ 7 4  ). 
I t  is clear t h a t  worker response and r e s i s t ance  do p lay  an i n t e g r a l  
part both i n  t h e  overa l l  development of the  labour process and i n  
i t s  everyday management and organisa t ion .  But  i n  acknowledging this, 
t h e  crucial quest ion remains as to  w h a t  t h i s  resistance i s  about. 
For Elger i t  is  c l e a r l y  seen as 
t h e  content  and poss ib ly  t h e  s t a t u s  of types of work. A t  t h e  same 
time, the rationale of the  d e s k i l l i n g  process itself for capitalism 
i s  seen no t  i n  r e l a t i o n  to the technology involved and its po ten t i a l  
f o r  increased p roduc t iv i ty  but  a s  a strategy f o r  weakening organised 
worker r e s i s t a n c e  (though t o  w h a t  i s  unspec i f ied) .  Thus t h e  
a l l e g a t i o n  that Braverman "is limited i n  his understanding of t h e  
ex ten t  t o  which working class cppositim defeated Taylor isn and 
pushed capital t o  employ more s u b t l e  means of m n t r o l  i n  i t s  quest 
for au thor i ty  (Palmer, 1975, 32, cited i n  Elger, 80) encapsulates  
bo th  pos i t ions .  The emphasis on skill as a key focus of worker 
r e s i s t ance  i s  sus ta ined  i n  t h e  criticirm of Braverman's alleged 
imputation of "a switch frm thoroughgoing craft con t ro l s  t o  pervasive 
capitalist d i r e c t i o n  of t h e  labour process" (Wger 1979, 63),for 
f a i l i n g  to aupreciate i n  p a r t i c u l a r  " the manner invhich foms of 
specialised expertise and craft canpetence may be embedded with a 
ccmolex structure of c o l l e c t i v e  labour  e f f e c t i v e l y  subordinated t o  
capital accumulatim "( ~ 6 3 ) .  
d e s k i l l i n g ,  that is  about 
I t  i s  n o t  so much that such processes do n o t  occur, but that they  
are no t  necessa r i ly  cen t r a l  t o  t h e  pattern of worker r e s i s t a n c e  and 
managerial decision-making, that we watld raise aga ins t  this arguyent.  
Although Elper criticises Bravennan for n o t  i n t eg ra t ing  the specific 
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"exigencies" of pressures towards p ro f i t ab i l i t y  and accumulation a t  
d i f f e r e n t  h i s tor ica l  periods in to  h i s  argument, this concern wi+h 
the econanic s t ructure  of capitalism i s  raised more as  pa r t  of a 
plea for  greater canplexity i n  the argument, and recognition of 
pressures caning fran working-class resistance,  than a s  an attempt 
t o  chart t h e  ra t ionale  of trends of development w i t h i n  t h e  labour 
process i n  economic terms. 
In contrast  t o  Elger's argument i t  may be suggested t h a t  workers, 
while naturally -posed to  the erosion of t h e i r  craft skills as 
such, w i l l  tend t o  undergo a process of struggle i n  which while 
some attempt is  made to preserve the content of their jobs as such, 
t h e  emphasis w i l l  be on retaining sane of the privileged aspects of 
pay, job security etc. which go along with skilled work - hence the  
well-known phenaenm of "red-circling!'. Even more clearly,  a 
rat ionale  for  the implementation of deski l l ing w h i c h  must surely be 
taken in to  account i s  simply t h e  necessity t o  increase the product- 
i v i t y  of labour and thereby prof i tab i l i ty .  Thus Taylorisn, which 
the response to  Bravennan has seen almost en t i r e ly  as  a strategy of 
"control" i n  the sense of domination and suppression of the  work- 
force, must also be allowed a case for examination i n  i ts  own t e rns  
as a technique for  breaking down and reconsti tuting the organisation 
of work i n t o  pat terns  which could lead to .  i n  Marx's w o r d s ,  a c loser  
filling-up of the pores of t h e  working day" (Marx, 1976. 534) .The 
implication of t he  "labam process debate" argument about deski l l ing 
i s  that the issues  ra ised can be examined solely within a framework 
of use-value aspects of t h e  labour process; of workers' resistance 
t o  changes i n  the orqanisation of these  aspects. and managerial 
strategies aimed a t  weakening this resistance by further changing 
such organisatiar. 
exchanqe value and workers' struggles to defend their  standards 
/ 
mestions of t h e  impact of production for 
of l iv ing  as a central f e a t u r e  of their in t e rac t iond th  t h e  cap i t a l i s t  
labour process are again absent from this analysis. 
Fran another point  of view, preoccupation with the  use-value aspects 
of the labour process i s  w e l l  i l l u s t r a t e d  w i t h i n  t h e  debate by t h e  
writings of Qessey awl MacInnes (1980). Writing i n  t h e  context of 
an examination ob capital’s “material relation w i t h  lab air'^ Cressey 
and ElacInnes focus t h e i r  analysis on what they  see as a key contradict- 
ion within c a p i t a l i s t  labour processes, the repression and 
subordination of workers‘ knowledge and creat ivi ty  through the 
hierarchical and power-centred s t ruc t res  of capitalism. Thus w h i l e  
cap i ta l i s t s ,  by vir tue of the i r  whole po l i t i ca l  and ideological 
posit ion,  dauinate and cppress workers within the labour process, 
they a l s o  continually need t o  call on the knowledge, motivation and 
crea t iv i ty  possessed by these  workers. This const i tutes  a central 
contradiction: “It is precisely because capi ta l  must surrender 
t h e  use  of its means of production t o  labcur tha t  capital must t o  
sane degree seek a cc-operative relationship with it. . .The two-fold 
nature of the relationship of capital t o  labaur inirLhe workplace 
*lies d i r ec t ly  contradictory s t ra teg ies  for  both labwr and 
capital . .  . I 1  (Cressey and Flaclnnes, 1980, 14). In Managerial 
Preorogative and the mestion of Control (Storey, 1983) John Storey 
locates a similar fundamental contradictim, also centred onthe 
qua l i ta t ive  conten t  of production. As par t  of a call for a dialect-  
i c a l  approach t o  analysis of t h e  labour process, he SUQgests that 
q’Control s tnrctures  and s t ra teg ies  typically contain t h e i r  own 
inherent contradictions. Braverman implies d e - k i l l i n g  i s  almost 
an objective or end i n  itself. Yet...capital (accumulated, dead 
labatr) requires l iving labour t o  continue the cycle of praductim 
and valorisation. I n  the f ina l  analysis the inanimate factors  of 
production must be placed i n  t he  hands of l iv ing  labour if sulplus 
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value i s  t o  be real ised " (Storey, 1983. 8 ) .  
Despite the use by both these writers of central Marxist concepts 
such as contradiction and, i n  Storey's case, the d i a l ec t i c ,  neither 
makes the point that  Marx's concern with contradiction is one used 
t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  internal tensions within a given system. The very 
notion of t h e  d i a l ec t i c  indicates an interact ion of opposites 
which are defined i n  relation to one another ra ther  than to any 
variable outside t h e  bounds of t h i s  interaction. In the  emphasis 
of both Storey and Cressey and MacInnes on t h e  creat ive potent ia l  
of labour per se there  i s  an implicit contrast  between capitalism 
and sane other,  more ideal system which would be able to  act ively 
employ t h i s  potent ia l .  Yet, through this very contrast ,  t h e  notion 
of a pure, ah is tor ica l  "labour process" i s  made primary. As 
Cressey and MacInnes themselves m a k e  clear i n  another paper 
(Qessey and MacInnes 1977), the  "social relations" of capitalism 
are seen a s  a r t i f i c a l l y  and i l l og ica l ly  imposing t he i r  constraints 
on the  development of this "natural" labour process. In this w a y  
t h e  useful aspects of production, rather than the exchangevalue 
aspects which i n  fact  daninate w i t h i n  capitalism, becane the 
exclusive function of analysis. me location of central  contradict- 
ions within capitalism i n  the arena of the qual i ta t ive o r  use-value- 
related content of work -methods, expertise,  creat ive i n i t i a t i v e  
- indicates, as w e  argue throughout. a significant absence within 
t h e  labour process debate of any serious attenpt t o  get to  grips 
w i t h  the  dynamics of value creation as they Operate within t h e  
cap i t a l i s t  labour process. 
I f t h e  organisation and content  of the capitalist labour process 
i s  seen as revolving r a n d  a dynamic of worker res is tance which 
i n  i t s  turn centres on t h e  qua l i ta t ive  or "use value"-oriented 
aspects of t h e  labour process, w e  a r e  left without, a s  i t  were, 
a material handle w i t h  which t o  grasp t h e  basis of exis t ing worker 
antagonisms and cap i t a l i s t  imperatives which da i ly  surface wi th in  
t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  enterprise. Without denying the salience of workers' 
subjective experience of t he  content of work, it is  the contention 
of t h i s  thesis tha t  econanic i sues  centring on the struggle t o  
maintain bnd improve l iv ing  standards form t h e  major focus of 
worker resistance in  the context of workers' "given" position a s  
sellers of the i r  labour power. 
I t  i s  worth mentioning i n  the  context of these arguments t h a t  
there is a widespread h o s t i l i t y  t o  the notion of "real subord- 
ination of labour" par t icu lar ly  among those writers who emphasise 
the importance of resistance by workers on "control" grounds. The 
notion of real  subordinatim has, as w e  argue i n  more detail i n  
Chapter 3, been widely misinterpreted as implying a po l i t i ca l  
repression and subordination by management of workers wi th in  the 
labour process - a point which Marx specif ical ly  denies (Marx, 
1976, 1026). I t  i s  s ignif icant  that many writers w i t h i n  the labour 
process debate have interpreted a crucial  Marxist argument about 
the develqvnent and impact of the  valorisation objective within 
capitalism i n  terms of a p u r e l y g o l i t i c a l  dauination and subordin- 
ation (which they argue i s  countervailed by worker resistance 
against  t h i s  po l i t i ca l  repressim). This alwst exclusive focus on 
the  "social" aspects of the  capital/labour re la t ion at  the point 
of production i s  examined i n  t h e  next p a r t  of the argument. 
Littler and Salaman (1581) i l lus t ra te  t h i s  concern with "social 
relations", the  seccnd focus of analysis i n  the labour process 
debate, i n  t h e i r  canplaint t h a t  "throughout Braveman's analysis 
there runs a highly meachanistic, deterministic s t r a i n  whereby 
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relationships, once established as necessary, a re  regarded as 
sa t i s fac tor i ly  understood and explained.  Braverman i s  not 
interested...in questions of how these  theoret ical ly  required 
relationships are actually organised and structured i n  practice." 
( ~ 2 5 1 )  .The point is  echoed ( in  fact  predated by) t h e  arguments 
of Richard Edwards, par t icular ly  i n  an a r t i c l e  itself e n t i t l e d  
"The Social Relations of Production a t  the  Point of Production" 
(Fdwards, 1978) .Here he declares that  "Whereas Braverman concerned 
himself primarily with the technical aspects of the development of 
the labour process - "technical" i n  the sense of workers' re la t ions 
t o  the physical process of production - my analysis  w i l l  focus on 
the develcping 
production 'I (p110) .Fran Edwards' subsequent argrmrent, i t  is  clear 
that  i t  i s  the i s s u e  of "control" (simple, technical and bureau- 
cratic) that he has i n  mind i n  making these emendations. Hcavever, 
i n  t h e  same way that the concept of tfcontrol" is  itself highly 
ambivalent and "loaded", the recanmendation to explore "social 
relations" ( t o  which John Storey, as quoted cm p.17, adds his 
voice) appears based on an e l i s ion  whereby w h a t  are undabtedly 
"social" r e l a t i m s  - the re la t ions  of production specific t o  
capitalism - are transnuted i n t o  social relation- i n  the sense 
of t h e  interact ion between groups a t  the  workplace. I t  i s  
unquestimable that both the technology and t h e  patterns Of Caamand 
and conflict within labour processes are bcund up with t h e  mode of 
production and ensuing relat ions of production within which work 
takes place. In  t h i s  sense the nature of work i s  i n h b i t a b l y  "social". 
ht these "social"/production re la t ions  must not be reduced t o  
the level of aspects of social interact ion surrounding purely 
lpmer" relationships a t  work. Issues such as exploitation and 
the quant i ta t ive structuring of work towards p r o f i t a f i n e d  targets 
relat ions of production a t  t h e  point  of 
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must be taken i n t o  acccunt when discussing the.s t ructur ing of work 
itself by the c a p i t a l / l a h r  relation. 
That an analysis based on production relations has been allowed t o  
merge i n t o  one primarily concerned with t h e  nature of interaction 
between groups is  Part icular ly  c lear  i n the  writings of John Storey 
(1983). After the  statement defining organisations as "ensembles... 
designed t o  s e c u r e  danination" this author goes on t o  say tha t  
"Work organisations therefore w i l l  be viewed a s  social  outcanes 
and mre specif ical ly  as emergent prcperties of class struggle. In 
place of technological determinism cur model pos i t s  social  relation- 
ships shaping t h e  technology which i s  created and which i n  turn 
reacts upon social  re la t ions I' (Storey, 1983, p123). 
Th i s  is perhaps a key passage i n  locat ing sane aspects of can- 
tenporary labour process theory w i t h i n  what amounts t o  a sophisticated 
version not 50 much of industr ia l  sociology as social psychology. 
The argument can a l s o  be recognised a s  a small-scale repet i t ion 
of t h e  pleas of f o r  example Thumpson and Wlrawuy fo r  the integration 
of the "polit ical",  i e  labour process terms the  e d s t e n c e  of 
conflictural  social re lat ionshirs  at  work, within the  ecmanic. Such 
arguments have been extended by many writers i n  the  assumption 
that struggles w i t h i n  the labour process function on the  reproduction 
of t h e  re la t ions of pra tuc t im themselves. This point i s  d k u s s e d  
i n  more de t a i l  in the next chapter. 
In fOcussing at tent ion on "social relations",  c r i t i c s  of Bravernan 
clear ly  intend to paint a more realistic picture  of the sh i f t ing  
Datterns of conf l ic t  and consensus a t  work. Eut if we approach t h i s  
undarbtedly canplex and contradictory area unanned with t h e  
"deterministic simplicities" of Bravennan or Marx, w h a t  fram-rk 
are we t o  use to  m a k e  sense of i t ?  The cr i t ic ism of labour process 
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writers' project of exploring detailed pa t te rns  of confl ic t  a t  work 
i s  not intended as a denial  tha t  such confl ic t  exists - quite  t he  
reverse. The argument is  put to make t h e  p o i n t  that such conf l ic t  
cannot be considered i n  isolat ion - simply as a'biven" fact about 
the relat ions between managers and workers and work which i s  itself 
explained i n  self-defining terms of managerial danination and 
worker antagonism. We need t o  look at  these relationships,  but w e  
a l so  need t o  look a t  the  s t ructure  of valorisation and exploitation 
that l i e  beneath them. This thes i s  is  a p lea  for, and an attempt at, 
an analysis of the labour process i n  t h e s e  tenus. 
The C e n t r a l i t y  of the Labour Process? 
Two fur ther  points are worth making. The first is that i n  defining 
t h e  labour process simply as the site of "control" struggles, "class  
struggle" over such overtly po l i t i ca l  issues as worker resistance 
t o  the  relat ions of production i n  themselves, political re la t ions  
of managerial danination and so on, labour process w r i t e r s  them- 
selves have, a s  i t  w e r e ,  pu t  the f ina l  n a i l  i n t o  the i r  am coffin. 
I t  i s  not surprising that w r i t e r s  l ike  Littler and Salaman end up 
arguing against "the continued central i ty  of labatr and the  labour 
process" 
ra ther  incmclusive battles for  control are fought, rather than, 
as w e  would argue, the crucial  site for t h e  production of surpl!as 
value which continues to sustain the capitalist econany, i t  can 
hardly continue t o  be of much i n t e r e s t  t o  theorists concerned to 
get to  the heart of contemporary re la t ions  of production. As w e  see 
i n  Chapter 3, this argument as t o  the purely "control-centred" 
significance of the lakxlr process and thus its irrelevance to  
important econanic concerns is  put a l so  by p o l i t i c a l  econanists 
l i k e  John Roeher (1982) who see themselves as Centrally concerned 
w i t h  exploitation. To argue that the labour p rmess  i s  i n  fact 
( L i t t l e r  and Sal-, 1982, p257) - 
If the lakxlr process i s  simply a she l l  i n  which a f e w  
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c m s t i t u t i v e  of production relat ions under capitalism (or, i n  
f ac t ,  any o ther  m o d e  of production) is  to  sane ex ten t  t o  attempt 
a defence of t h e  labcur theory O f  value, a task w e  *take on i n  
Chapter 3. For t h e  manent,  however, it can be said that the argu- 
ment tha t  t h e  labour process i s  much more than simply a bundle of 
"control" re la t ions  is  t h e  central  theme of this thesis.  
A second point r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  c r i t ique  of labour process writing 
which has been put  within this chapter. The argument has been that 
labour process w r i t e r s  have apparently embraced, but have then  
largely disgarded, classical Marxism. This argument has no t  been 
put i n  order t o  embrace sane r i t u a l i s t i c  shibboleth of Marxism as 
tab le t s  of stone. I t  has been put t o  make the point that there  is  
a wealth of analysis  of t h e  labour process within classical Marldsm 
(eg i n  Volume 1 of Capital) w h i c h  appears t o  have been more or less 
ignored by contemporary writers i n  eramining t h e  labour process. 
This material deserves t o  be used, and not  merely out of archival 
interest. I t  deserves to  be used, i n  cur view, because i t  encapsulates 
a theory of the labour process which, i ronical ly ,  can reflect t h e  
nature of worker response (and managerial strategy) f a r  more 
accurately than t h e  kinds of perspectives on the labour process 
which w e  have attempted t o  survey i n  this chapter. T h i s  thesis 
attempts t o  demonstrate this point both theoretically,  and, i n  the  
case studies, empirically. The thes i s  can be regarded as an attempt 
t o  use the pr inc ip les  of c lass ica l  Marxism t o  analyse the  cantemp 
orary labaur process. 
w i n g  LQ 
In t h i s  chapter w e  have attempted to draw out two contrasting 
approaches t o  the study of work under capitalism. I n  the first,  
which w e  have argued both pre- and post- dates Braverman, work is  
seen essent ia l ly  i n  qua l i ta t ive  terms - as a process of making 
things, of handling materials and tools  i n  order to  create a useful 
product. This may seem a logical and indeed unquestionable way of 
looking at work. However, the capitalist mode of production i s  
rarely logical and frequently questionable: and it  i s  within t h i s  
mode of production that the  second, our own approach, is  located. 
Thraugh recognising the  exis t inp dynamics of this system we 
arrive a t  an analysis  of the contemporary labam process within 
manufacturing i n  which work is  examined for what it is; a 
quantitatively assessed, frequently interchangeable and thus 
"abstract" series of movements structured by the requirement 
of prof i tab i l i ty ,  to which w r k e r s  not unnaturally respond with a 
similarly pragnatic and "cash-news"-orientated approach. 
while th is  is  a harsh picture w h i c h  i n  practice may be frequently 
modified, the contrasting emphasis on w h a t  is  i n  effect a "pure" 
labour process w e r l a i d  with solely p o l i t i c a l  and ideological 
constraints  emanating fmm capitalism appears t o  u s  t o  offer a 
curiously un rea l i s t i c  perspective bereft either of t h e  ecmamic 
constraints  which ac tua l ly  govern the operation of t h e  capitalist 
labcur process or of any recognition of the overwhelmingly 
%cods l t l c*~  nature of vorkers' real rerponse. 91ch anisrims are 
perhaps caopamded most of all  i n  the debate's canception of, and 
major qhasis  an, the notion of %mtrol". I t  is this ccncqt 
wfrich we go an to  define,& critidse, i n  the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 'Iwo 
Control 
Tnn t ro l t t  has emerged as a key wncept i n  the theoketical development 
of l a m  process Ylalysis surveyed i n  the  last chapter. while used 
with a confidence which supgests that its meaning is widely under- 
stood, the concept nevertheless carries a wide range of perhaps 
unexamined implications w h i c h  w e  now set out  t o  explore. I t  is suw 
gested t h a t  the analysis projected i n  these implications falls short 
of a f u l l  understanding of the forces influencing the  nature of work  
under capitalism, and i n  par t icu lar  that it  indicates a profoundly 
ah is tor ica l  view of the  labour process. 
In  contrast  to  the perspective thus c r i t i c i s e d  w e  shall attempt to 
show how managerial a c t i v i t i e s  and patterns of worker response which 
have tended to  cane under the  loose heading of "cmtrol" can be 
analysed i n  terms of the  s t ructur ing of such interrelat ionships  
and techniques by requireaents specific to  capitalism. The forms of 
'kontrol't w i l l  be sham to be constructed by prof i tab i l i ty ,  ra ther  
than being, as they a r e  frequently depfcted, a condition of it. The 
in te r re la t ion  of "control" and "efficiency" w i l l  s imilarly be con- 
sidered and a spec i f ica l ly  capitalist " m o d e l "  of efficiency demon- 
s t ra ted.  I t  i s  i n  terms of these two overriding requirements - 
pro f i t ab i l i t y  and a quant i ta t ive understanding of efficiency - tha t  
the  concept of "control" can, w e  suh i t ,  be most usefully understood. 
Centrali ty of "Control" to  the  W r  Process Debate 
That  the  ccncept of control has both been central  to  the  arguments 
of the post-Brave- debate and assumed to  be central to  those of 
Braverman is  taken for granted by w r i t e r s  wi-n the  debate. Littler 
and Salaxnan, for exlmtple, refer i n  their introduction to "Braverman's 
analysis of a process as central  to his analysis as it i s  to the 
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capitalist labour process - the organisation and achievenent of 
control (Littler and Salaman, 1982, p251). Y e t  the concept itself, 
despite its crucial  siglificance, has so far escaped being subjected 
to any rignrws analysis. As Cnssey and bmcInnes, thgeelvts vi+ 
orous propanrnts of the concept, justifi.blsy amplain: "spite the 
siglificance of control (and its close conceptual partner ' p e r ' )  i t  
is a concept that is woefully hadequately theorised, when it is  
theorised a t  al l ,  so that it is  used i n  a contradictory fashion not 
only by different writers, but e m  by the same w r i t e r s  i n  d i f fe ren t  
conkxts" (C~CSSOY m$ ~ ~ C I ~ I W S ,  1977, ~280)  
In resparse to this lack of c l a r i t y ,  and w h a t  w e  see as thedigrifi- 
cance of w r i t e r s '  use of this concept, i t  w i l l  be the  ain of this chapter 
to explore the assumptions implicit i n  this use and to reconstruct 
an understanling of %ontrol" located i n  the historical spec i f ic i ty  
of the capitalist labour process. 
Theories of Wmtrol" 
There appear to be three main strands of ar-t or approaches to 
analysis of the labour process invalved i n  the use of the concept 
of "control" by labour,..psocess w r i t e r s .  Theserlll be aamined &p 
turn and their siaificance for the overall understanding of the 
labour process assessed. 
(i) "Forms" of cartrol . 
Considerable amounts of the l i t e r a t u r e  appear to be devoted to the 
arguwnt that the dynamic of control i s  not as mechanistic or one- 
directional as, i t  is alleged, Elravenurn suggests. A n d m  Friedman 
is an ear ly  contributor to this position, with his theory of 
"reapandble autnxmy versus direct control" ( F r i d n n ,  1977) - The 
invocation of a dual managnment strategy - the drst strand of which 
''attempts to hamess the adaptabili ty of labour pwer" and thus to 
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"capture t h e  b e n e f i t s  of v a r i a b l e  capital", and t h e  second to  
" l i m i t  i t s  harmful e f f e c t s  and treat workers as though they w e r e  
machines" (D49) i s  made s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n  o rde r  to  emphasise t h e  
sa l i ence  of r e s i s t a n c e  by workers, a factor which, i t  i s  alleged, 
both Marx and Braverman damagingly neglec t .  Thus, t y p i c a l l y ,  Friedman 
introduces h i s  article wi th  t h e  a l l ega t ion  that "Marx and Marxists 
have presumed t h e  development of the  labour  process under capi ta l i sm 
to  involve a progress ive  rise i n  direct managerial con t ro l  ... Harry 
Braverman, i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  has argued t h a t  t h e  organisa t ion  of work 
during twent ie th  century capitalism has been guided by Taylorian 
p r i n c i p l e s  which would i d e a l l y  involve t h e  con t ro l  of a l l  worker 
t i m e  and movement.. ."(~43). 
Like many criticisms of Marx i n  t h i s  respect, t h e  f i r s t  statement 
i s  t e x t u a l l y  inaccura te ;  "control" i s  no t  a central concept i n  
Marx's ana lys i s  of t h e  labour  process.  However, the  purpose of t h e  
in t roduct ion  f o r  Friedman's argument i s  that both w r i t e r s  have 
neglected those l e v e l s  of worker r e s i s t a n c e  a t  t h e  po in t  of product- 
ion which may a c t u a l l y  have a p r a c t i c a l  effect i n  changing t h e  
organisat ion of production, as opposed to overthrowing t h e  system 
a l toge the r .  I t  i s  these  forms of r e s i s t ance ,  descr ibed as causing 
"accanmodating changes within t h e  mode of production",  which are 
seen as ly ing  behind the  development of diverse forms of worker 
con t ro l  by management. 
A still more i n f l u e n t i a l  w r i t e r  wi th in  t h i s  perspec t ive  has been 
Richard Edwards, whose a n a l y s i s  of t h e  labour  process i n  terms of 
a %stage p e r i d c i s a t i o n  of "simple", "technical" and "bureaucratic" 
con t ro l  (Edwards, 1979) has  gained widespread acceptance within t h e  
debate.  The notion t h a t  c a p i t a l i s t s  do no t  r e l y  on a s i n g l e  "s t ra tegy  
of control".  and t h a t  the  a l t e r n a t i o n  between technica l  and bureau- 
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c r a t i c  forms represents significant r o o m  fo r  manmvre i s  indeed 
t h e  focus of many more recent contributions which  emphasise t h e  
ava i l ab i l i t y  of choice i n  managerial s t ra tegy a s  opposed t o  what 
i s  seen a s  the one-dimensional t ra jectory imposed by Marx and 
Braverman. 
Flan and Braverman, w e  repeat, cannot j u s t l y  be accused of oper+ting 
w i t h  the  same authority-related model of "control" as these authors, 
but t h i s  i s  not the main point  w e  wish t o  make here. Rather, w e  
would emphasise tha t  while i t  i s  undeniable t h a t  complex and 
different ia ted forms of organisation and direction of the labour 
nrocess exist, t o  focus on then within the par t icular  conceptual 
framework implied by t h e  term "control" i s  t o  lend t h i s  framework 
an exclusive emphasis which crucial ly  l i m i t s  our understanding of 
the c a p i t a l i s t  labour process. Thus the use of the term'bureaucratic 
control" implies that  s t ra teg ies  which i n  f ac t  a r e  directed a t  t h e  
incorporation of organised labour i n  a context of what can most 
b r i e f ly  be sunnnarised a s  " industr ia l  relations" are pa r t  of the same 
problematic of authori ty  re la t ions  directed at  regulating t h e  pro- 
duction of use-values as i s  indicated by the term "technical 
control". S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  use of the term "structures of control" 
implies tha t  aspects of t h e  factors  w h i c h  influence managerial 
and worker ac t iv i ty  a t  the level  of the l a b r  process, from plant  
ownershiD t o  organisation of working methods, a re  embraced within 
t h e  same framework of essent ia l ly  power and authority relations.  
For many labour process w r i t e r s ,  then, the labour process 
"control'*. A s  w e  attempted t o  show i n  the last chapter, arguments 
which take the issues which surface within the labour process up 
t o  the sphere of employment re la t ions i n  order t o  see them a s  worth 
a t ten t ion  paradoxically d i sn i s s  the labour process a s  "merely" a 
site of con t ro l  i s sues .  In t h e  same way, t o  see t h e  labcur process  
as exc lus ive ly  invoking s t r a t e g i e s  of control is  tockaw misleading 
d i s t i n c t i o n s  between, amongst o the r  t h ings ,  t h e  orbanisa t ion  of t h e  
labour  process itself and i s s u e s  surrounding terms and condi t ions  
of employment which have normally been seen as the sphere of 
"co l l ec t ive  bargaining". A s  w e  have argued, t h e  very concept of 
"bureaucrat ic  control" as expounded by Fdwards encapsulates  t h i s  
approach. W e  n m  go on t o  m a k e  more explicit our critique of t h e  
c e n t r a l i t y  of "Control" as an explanation of labaur  process  dynamics 
by undertaking a more thorough .going explora t ion  of t h e  concept 
itself. 
(ii) Labour and Labour Power 
me usefu l  way of g e t t i n g  to g r i p s  with what many labour  process  
writers are g e t t i n g  a t  when they t a l k  about "control" i s  t o  l o o k  at 
%he u s e  of t h e  concept i n  arguments on t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  of labour 
power i n t o  labour .  Hraverman i s  pra ised  by Littler and Salaman 
(1982, p252) f o r  recognising the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between these  t w o  
aspects, but  deplored for ignorning it i n  h i s  later ana lys i s .  Friedman 
r o o t s  t h e  i s s u e  d i r e c t l y  i n  h i s  understanding of managerial "authority",  
about which he attributes t h e  same view to hlarx: "The second sort 
of managerial funct ion i s  to  exercise a u t h o r i t y  over workers. Marx 
emphasised t h i s  managerial problem under capi ta l i sm by c a l l i n g  labour  
power var i ab le  capital" (Friedman, 1977, ~ 4 8 ) .  
In f a c t  Marx coined t h e  term "variable capital". as is  argued a t  
m o r e  length i n  t h e  next chapter ,  i n  order  t o  i n d i c a t e  no t  a 
"managerial problem" but  a p o t e n t i a l  for t h e  expansion of value v i a  
t h e  "fermenting agent" of labour .  This  i s  not  to deny t h a t  t h e  sale 
of labour-power by a worker t o  a c a p i t a l i s t  c o n s t i t u t e s  an unusual 
kind of bargain i n  which t h e  quan t i ty  and q u a l i t y  of t h e  goods cannot 
be specified i n  advance. Labour process  writers have, however, i n  our 
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view exaggerated t h i s  indeterminacy of labour i n  an argument which 
takes  as t h e  c e n t r a l  i s s u e  t h e  wi l l ingness  of workers to surrender  
labour as such. This  is  seen as a c e n t r a l  focus of ' f f con t ro l f f  
s t r a t e g i e s :  "To t r a n s l a t e  l e g a l  ownership i n t o  real possession thp  
employer must erect s t r u c t u r e s  Of con t ro l  over labour" (Littler and 
Salaman, ~252). Edwards m a k e s  t h e  same poin t :  "Labour power can be 
bought, bu t  between t h e  purchase of labour  power and t h e  real apprc- 
p r i a t i o n  of labour power comes a wedge; t h e  w i l l ,  motivation and 
consciousness of t h e  worker ...'y 1979, p l l l ) - f I e  has earlier argued 
t h a t ,  for t h e  same reasons, "Employers no t  only co-ordinate,  they 
also compel ... capitalists must seek t o  convert  t h e  labour  power 
they have purchased i n  t h e  marketplace i n t o  usefu l  labour under 
condi t ions  i n  which t h e  possessor of t h e  labour power has  l i t t l e  
to gain from providing usefu l  labour"(p110). 
In o the r  words, i t  i s  t h e  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  worker ( " w i l l ,  motivation, 
consciousness") which is seen as j u s t i f i a b l y  g e t t i n g  i n  t h e  way of 
t h e  employer's requirements a t  t h i s  p o i n t  of t r a n s l a t i o n .  Friedman 
sums t h i s  up: "The problem is  t h a t  people are not machines. They 
may sell t h e i r  labour  power b u t  they cannot a l i e n a t e  t h e i r  mind? or 
t h e i r  w i l l .  According to t h e  direct con t ro l  s t r a t e g y  cap i t a l 'mus t  
cont inua l ly  subdue workers' independent and of ten  h o s t i l e  w i l l s  
by appealing to t h e i r  economic se l f - in t e re s t .  H e r e  w e  have t h e  
second problem w i t h  t h e  d i r e c t  con t ro l  s t r a t e g y ' s  vis ion.  The w i l l  
of workers i s  not  guided simply by econanic se l f - in te res t"  (1977, p50). 
While t h i s  i s  true, a f u r t h e r  problem i s  t h a t  Friedman has n o t  
-Tecified w h a t  workers' w i l l s  are a c t u a l l y  h o s t i l e  2. If i t  i s  
indeed simply t o  t h e  use  of t h e i r  labour  power as labour ,  i t  w i l l  
indeed be necessary for employers to "erect s t r u c t u r e s  of control"  
merely to  ensure t h a t  workers work a t  a l l .  However. t he re  i s  ample 
evidence tha t  i t  i s  only at  qu i t e  high leve ls  of intensif icat ion 
of labour that workers resist the obligation t o  work a s  such. Other- 
wise, the  work behaviour implici t  i n  the exchange of an employment 
contract  i s  normally "pragmatically accepted"; a somewhht value- 
laden indication of t h i s  being contained i n  the slogan of "A f a i r  
day's work for a f a i r  d a y ' s  pay." 
The f a c t  t h a t  the w r i t e r s  c i t e d  above have had recourse to ephemeral 
notions such as " w i l l "  t o  characterise worker resistance indicates a 
fundamentally moralist ic approach t o  t h e  labour process w h i c h  itself 
e n t a i l s  a lack of understanding of t h e  forces a t  work within t h a t  pro- 
cess. While workers' resentment a t  t he i r  dehumanisation i s  indeed 
a powerful force demanding recognition, i t  has not ,  perhaps fortun- 
a te ly ,  i n  itself been ca ta lys t  for tangible forms of resistance. And 
though the cpposition of i n t e r e s t s  i n  terms of ownership i s  a f?ctor  
t h e  cen t r a l i t y  of which our own argument confirms, e q l i c i t  recog- 
n i t i o n  and repudiation of this by workers a t  t h e i r  everyday tasks 
i n  t h e  labour process cannot r e a l i s t i c a l l y  be seen a s  a focus Of 
resistance or of managerial "control" s t ra tegies .  The level of 
authority ccmmonly assumed by labour process w r i t e r s  t o  be necessary 
simply to keep workers a t  work (see a l so  Friedman 1985) i s  i n  most 
production contexts obviated by the existence of a widespread 
s t ructure  of machinery, measured t i m e s ,  work layouts and production 
flows which t o  a considerable ex ten t  i n  themselves ordain work fran 
workers. Workers may indeed not work a t  the  leve ls  of intensifhcation 
of labour required of them, but t h i s  is  a rather  d i f fe ren t  matter 
t o  be discussed i n  more detail i n  the next chapters. 
What emerges fran t h i s  location of "control" arguments i n  the labour 
power/labour d is t inc t ion  
a t  t h e  point of alienation of labour no longer w i s h  t o  s e e  labour 
i s  t h a t  those who place i ssues  of control 
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mer as a ccmmodity. Indeed, t h i s  view has  been made e x p l i c i t  by 
sane recent  writers (MacInnes, 1984, G i n t i s  and Bowles ,  1979) whose 
views w i l l  be  examined i n  more d e t a i l  i n  t h e  next  chapter .  Br i e f ly ,  
t h e  argument i s  t h a t  labour power i s  a "canmodity" so affected both 
by broader ideologica l  and political factors (family,  schooling, 
state, etc.) and also by i t s  own use-value aspects which employers 
cannot a f fo rd  t o  ignore ( i n  terms of t h e  need to gain co-cperation 
f r an  t h e  workforce i n  order  t o  g e t  production o u t  a t  a l l )  t h a t  i t  
can no longer be regarded, l i k e  o the r  commodities, i n  pure ly  
econanic tens. 
A s  aga ins t  t h i s ,  for t h e  manent w e  would argue simply t h a t  while  
labour power i s  indeed a unique c m d i t y  i n  t h e  sense,  amongst 
o t h e r  t h ings ,  of being a b l e  t o  create a value greater than i t s  own, 
t h e  evidence i s  t h a t  workers themselves da regard i t  i n  pragmatic 
t e n s  as a canmodity, or a bargain t h e i r  s i d e  of which they are 
prepared to "reasonably" f u l f i l ,  and t h a t  i t  i s  not  t h e  a l i e n a t i o n  
of t h e i r  labour which normally prunotes  r e s i s t ance  but  a spec t s  
of the  terms of sale of t h e i r  labour paver - i n  o the r  words, t h e i r  
own "living".  Thus managerial "control" strategies are d i rec ted  no t  
p r imar i ly  a t  coercing workers i n t o  providing labour but  a t  frag- 
menting and recons t ruc t ing  work p a t t e r n s  i n  a manner which will 
Drovide t h e  g r e a t e s t  possible p roduc t iv i ty  from t h e  labour power 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  them. This argument is expounded i n  more d e t a i l  
b e l o w .  
(iii) Socia l  Relations/Subordination and Dcmination 
Most of t h e  o the r  s t r ands  of t h e  "control" argument, which ms w e  
have seen are no t  of ten  e x p l i c i t l y  untangled, can be gathered within 
a general  sphere of a view of t h e  labour process p r imar i ly  i n  terms 
of r e l a t i o n s ,  or relation- within t h e  workplace, of au tho r i ty  
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and domination. Although m o s t  of t h e  arguments overlap and i n t e r -  
relate, t h e  follan'ng subs id ia ry  views can be found amongst them: 
(a) Socia l  Relat ions i n  t h e  Factory: "Bosses and B Q S S ~ ~ "  
We have a l ready  seen i n  Chapter 1 hau t h e  Marxist treatment of 
production r e l a t i o n s  as e s s e n t i a l l y  social has been t ransnuted within 
contemporary "labour process" arguments i n t o  a t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
soc io logica l  concern with social r e l a t ionsh ips  between groups. The 
na tu re  of these re l a t ionsh ips  i s  viewed "radical ly"  as imbued with 
c o n f l i c t ,  bu t  t h e  issue of what t h e  c o n f l i c t  i s  about has been 
l o s t  i n  a circular argument whereby managerial con t ro l  strategies 
are shaped by t h e  need t o  subdue worker resistance which i n  i t s  turn 
i s  assumed t o  be r e s i s t a n c e  aga ins t  managerial danination. 
The c e n t r a l  focus of a n a l y s i s  of "control" r e l a t ionsh ips  wi th in  t h e  
fac tory ,  then,  has  been t h i s  n e m s  of domination and subordination, 
which i n  t h e  less a n a l y t i c  manents of t h e  argument i s  assumed t o  
simply "be". Richard Edwards' argument i n  t h e  "Social  Relations of 
Production a t  t h e  Poin t  of Production" (Edwards, 1978) is  a 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  good example of t h i s :  "Chtside t h e  firm...the ' equa l i t y '  
of market r e l a t i o n s  p reva i l s .  In s ide  t h e  f i r m ,  relations between 
capitalists and workers take t h e  form of boss and bossed; that is ,  
a system of control preva i l s"  p l l l .  Littler and Salaman (1982) 
connect t h e  same a n a l y s i s  t o  t h e i r  argument about t h e  need for t h e  
anployer t o  con t ro l  workers i n  order  to extract labcurlkan t h e i r  
labour  power: "...the i n t e r io r  of t h e  firm cannot be reduced to  a 
bundle of exchange r e l a t ions .  Market m o d e l s  or not ions  of con t r ac t  
are inadequate conceptual ly  to  grasp t h e  r e l a t i o n s  of subordination 
and daninat ion governing t h e  labour process" (p252). 
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(b)  Work and t h e  Containment of Conflict 
There are o the r  vers ions  of t h i s  argument, havewr ,  i n  which t h e  
need for managerial con t ro l  or domination i s  set i n  a context  of 
i nhe ren t ly  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s .  In  Edwards' a n a l y s i s ,  for example, 
t h i s  c o n f l i c t  i s  inherent  i n  t h e  ex is tence  of t h e  employer's goal  
of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  - ye t ,  i r o n i c a l l y ,  i t  is  no t  this goal  itself which 
s t r u c t u r e s  t h e  organisa t ion  of work, but t h e  need t o  repress t h e  
c o n f l i c t  somehow assoc ia ted  with it: "(Employers') goal remains 
p r o f i t s ;  t h e i r  strategies a i m  a t  e s t ab l i sh ing  s t r u c t u r e s  of con t ro l  
a t  work. That is ,  c a p i t a l i s t s  have attempted to organise  production 
i n  such a way as t o  minimise workers' oppor tun i t i e s  f o r  res is tance. . .  
work has  been organised, then, to  conta in  conf l i c t "  (my emphasis) 
(Edwards. 1979, p16) .  
In many ways t h i s  argument sums up t h e  d i f f e rence  of perspec t ive  
between t h e  a n a l y s i s  w e  have been consider ing,  based on a not ion 
of "control", and t h e  pos i t i on  advanced i n  t h i s  t h e s i s  i n  which 
both the  roots o f  c o n f l i c t  a t  work and the  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  labour  
process itself obta in  t h e i r  na tu re  and r a t i o n a l e  fran the  over r id ing  
ob jec t ive  of p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  Thus i t  is  t h e  mechanics of making a 
p r o f i t  i n  terms of t h e  exp lo i t a t ion  of labour  which engender c o n f l i c t  
both over pay and over t h e  s t r u c t u r i n g  of t h e  labour  process  itself 
towards ever- intensifying l e v e l s  of exp lo i t a t ion  or i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  
of labour.  In  Fxlwards' argument w e  g e t  a t a n t a l i s i n g  ges tu re  i n  t h e  
d i r e c t i o n  of connecting c o n f l i c t  with p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  only to  f ind  
our way d ive r t ed  by a detour  i n  which t h e  c o n f l i c t  i tself i s  
undefined and t h e  labour process  i s  s t ruc tu red  not  towards p ro f i t ab -  
i l i t y  bu t  towards suppressing t h i s  unexplained "confl ic t" .  
C lea r ly  Edwards' argument is  not  r e a l l y  as unconnected as this, and 
sane of t h e  assumptions inherenb i n  i t  are clarified i n  an argument 
along s i m i l a r  l i n e s  by Stephen H i l l ,  (Hill, 1981). l t i l l  in t roduces  
kis book on Canpet i t ion and Cont ro l  a t  Work by l i nk ing  the  need for 
con t ro l  a t  work wi th  t h e  "ccmpetition" (by which he means ob jec t ive  
r a t h e r  than ove r t  c o n f l i c t )  of econanic i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  parties 
i n  employment. Since these  differences of i n t e r e s t  are a " s t r u c t u r a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of econcmic organisat ion" it follows t h a t  con t ro l  
will be necessary for one p a r t y  to  enforce  t h e  cc-operation of t h e  
o ther .  
We have a l ready  r e fe r r ed  to t h i s  argument on pp5-7'; again,  i t  l i n k s  
back t o  t h e  lack  of " in te r&st"  of t h e  worker i n  providing usefu l  
labour.  This  c l a s h  of i n t e r e s t s ,  this l ack  of "anything i n  i t  for 
m e "  as far as t h e  worker is  concerned, i s  held to i n d i c a t e  t h e  need  
f o r  compulsion and con t ro l  i n  management-worker r e l a t i o n s .  
An a n a l y s i s  which refers t o  a c l a s h  between class i n t e r e s t s  i s  
c e r t a i n l y ,  from our po in t  of view, g e t t i n g  closer t o  t h e  nub of 
what accounts for worker c o n f l i c t  within t h e  labour process  than 
one which simply asserts " re l a t ions  of subordination and danination" 
per. Hcwever, t h e  rou te  whereby t h i s  argument locates t h e  c l a s h  
of i n t e r e s t s  a t  t h e  l e v e l  of,  as it w e r e ,  "praperty r e l a t ions"  or 
t h e  capi ta l - labour  r e l a t i o n  itself. is  one which w e  cannot follow. 
In  our view c o n f l i c t  is  located'at a much lower, more concre te  l e v e l  
of t h e  expression of exp lo i t a t ion  within t h e  labour process.  The 
quest ion w e  r e a l l y  have to ask i s  how t h i s  d i f fe rence  of i n t e r e s t  
a c t u a l l y  mani fes t s  i t s e l f  wi th in  t h e  labour  process  - and t h i s ,  
w e  would submit, is  no t  i n  terms of "author i ty  r e l a t ions"  ( re ference  
to which merely begs t h e  ques t ion)  or t h e  explicit recogni t ion of 
unequal proper ty  r e l a t i o n s ,  bu t  i n  terms of t h e  "surfacing" of 
s t ruc tura l  con t r ad ic t ions  embodied i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  of exp lo i t a t ion  
and ex t r ac t ion  of surplus value  inherent  i n  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  labour  
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process. Thus "control" r e l a t i o n s  becane necessary because of t h e  
ex i s t ence  and working out  of these  con t r ad ic t ions ,  no t  because of 
t h e i r  transparency a t  t h e  l e v e l  of t h e  employment.relationship. 
(c)  Keeping t h e  Relat ions of Production Going. 
A less ccmmon argument about con t ro l  and daninat ion within t h e  
labour process i s  one which assumes an ongoing "class s t ruggle"  
a t  work i n  which both ccmbatants a r e  presented as having r w g h l y  
equal power. Thus for example both S tark  (1978) and Friedman 
(1978) criticise theo r i e s  which assume t h e  domination of c a p i t a l i s n  
i n  t h e  development of the  labour process ,  on t h e  grounds t h a t  
workpr r e s i s t a n c e  has  played an i n t e g r a l  role i n  t h a t  development. 
We have a l ready  ( i n  Chapter 1) considered a similar argument by 
F lger  (1979) i n  t h e  context  of d e s k i l l i n g .  Again, w h a t  i s  questioned 
here  i s  no t  t h a t  an tagon i s t i c  relations are embodied i n  t h e  traject- 
ory  of develmment of t h e  labour process, b u t  t h e  assumed basis of 
these  an tagon i s t i c  r e l a t ions .  According to t h e  Brighton Labour 
Process Group, who share  t h i s  perspec t ive  of an a c t i v e  and ongoing 
"class s t ruggle"  a t  t h e  h e a r t  of t h e  labour  process ,  the focus 
of t h i s  s t rugg le  i s  t h e  very r e l a t i o n s  of production themselves: 
f'. . . t h i s  r e l a t i o n  of c a p i t a l  to I a b m r  i s  n o t  a s ta t ic  one, but is  
cons tan t ly  reproduced i n  new condi t ions.  I t  i s  a site of cons tan t ly  
renewed class struggle"(I3LPG. 1977, 11) The a r t i c l e  goes on t o  
approvingly cite t h e  arguments of one A.n. Elagaline, who w r i t e s  t h a t  
"In t h e  capitalist  mode of production t h e  p r i n c i p a l  site of t h e  
reproduction of the  r e l a t i o n s  of production i s  t h e  c l a s s  s t rugg le  
i n  production ... which i s  expressed i n  the  cont inual  upheaval i n  
t h e  technica l  and social organisa t ion  of t h e  labour  process ,  i e  
i n  the  cont inual  revolu t ion is ing  of t h e  fo rces  of production" (pll). 
The very r e l a t i o n s  of production themselves, then, according to 
t h i s  view, are cons tan t ly  being challenged by workers and thus  
r equ i r e  cont inual  "reproduction" within t h e  fabric' of t h e  labour  
process .  The development of t h e  fo rces  of production, also, i s  
a t t r i b u t e d  to t h e  attempt by t h e  b o u r p o i s i e  to keep t h e  upper hand 
wi th in  this process of upheaval and def iance  of t h e i r  ru l e .  
An i n t e r e s t i n g  vers ion of t h e  same argument i s  posed by David 
mrdon i n  h i s  considerat ion of "Cap i t a l i s t  Efficiency and S o c i a l i s t  
Ffficiency" (Gordon, 1976) ..::As w e  d i scuss  i n  more d e t a i l  below, 
Cordon uses  Drec ise ly  cmposite criteria i n  h i s  cha rac t e r i s a t ion  
of c a p i t a l i s t  as d i s t i n c t  from socialist e f f i c i ency  from those used 
i n  t h e  present  t h e s i s .  Thus f o r  Gordon "production processes embody 
capitalist  e f f i c i ency  if they  best reproduce c a p i t a l i s t  cont ro l  
over t h e  production process and minimise p r o l e t a r i a n  r e s i s t ance  t o  
t h a t  control"(Gordon, 1976, 26) .  Elsewhere he has  noted that " t h i s  
d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  aspect of e f f i c i ency  embodies what 
Braveman, Phrgl in  (1976) and o t h e r s  call ,'Control' " (p36fIn c o n t r a s t  
(see below) it is  c e n t r a l  t o  our awn argument that capitalist 
e f f ic iency  i s  defined as e s s e n t i a l l y  quan t i t a t ive .  Leaving this 
aspect of t h e  argument aside, however, w e  no te  here  t h a t  Gordon 
bases h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  of c a p i t a l i s t  e f f i c i e n c y  as "qual i ta t ive"  on 
an explicit a s s e r t i o n  of t h e  need for capi ta l i sm to con t inua l ly  
reproduce i t s  own r e l a t i o n s  of production: "In any class soc ie ty ,  a 
m o d e  of production can cont inue to danina te  i f  and only  i f  preva len t  
production processes reproduce the  class r e l a t i o n s  def ined by ( t h e  
logic of)  t h a t  m o d e  of production" ( ~ 2 2 ) .  
The whole m o d e  of operat ion of t h e  capitalist labour process  i s  
thus  defined i n  exc lus ive ly  p o l i t i c a l  terms r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  mainten- 
ance of t h e  o v e r a l l  system r a t h e r  than i n  terms of production of 
value and t h e  pressures surrounding t h i s .  While, a s  w e  have noted 
abow, Gordon i s  not alone i n  t h i s  outlook, the premisses on which 
it  rests should perhaps be examined more fully.  These are f i r s t l y  
tha t  a given mode of production actual ly  needs t o  have i ts  re la t ions  
continually and painfully "reproduced"; and secondly that t h i s  
process of reproduction takes place a t  every level including the 
level of production. Thus, for  example, a l i t t l e  fur ther  on i n  
Gordon's argument "class struggle" i s  assumed t o  take place within 
production a s  a countervailing force t o  "competition" and the 
relat ion between the two t o  be subject t o  t h e  same d ia l ec t i c  a s  
tha t  mediating the relat ion between quant i ta t ive and qua l i ta t ive  
efficiency. H e r e  "class struggle" i s  evidently understmd as a 
struggle against the re la t ions  of po l i t i ca l  daninance embodied i n  
Gordon's notion of "qual i ta t ive efficiency". I n  t h i s  way any con- 
ception of struggle over the imperatives of guant i ta t ive efficiency 
i s  overlooked. 
I would argue, i n  contrast ,  that  c a p i t a l i s t  re la t ions of production 
a re ,  t o  a s ignif icant  extent,  self-sustaining in t he i r  overall  
s t ructure  and tha t  conscious e f f o r t s  t o  reinforce or reprocbce 
them a r e  made at  the ideological level through currents which 
permeate society as a whole rather  than being the focus of specific 
concrete struggles a t  the point  of production. I t  i s  misleading t o  
see the c a p i t a l i s t  labour process as the site of t h i s  "reproduction", 
which  i s  not i t s  purpose. To present t h e  labour process a s  
exclusively or primarily a context for  expl ic i t  ideological o r  
p o l i t i c a l  struggle i s  t o  d iver t  a t tent ion fran the central  issues  
fundamental t o  the functioning and purpose of the c a p i t a l i s t  labour 
process, those surroudning the  creation of surplus value at  t h e  
point of production itself. 
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The hrphas is  on Use-Values: An Ahistorical V i e w  of t h e  Labour Process 
We now pass  on to t h e  c e n t r a l  i s s u e  i n  t h i s  argument, t h e  underlying 
view of t h e  labour  process by writers i n  t h e  f ie ld .which has allwed 
t h e  "control" pe r spec t ive  i t s  unquestioned c e n t r a l i t y .  The argument 
w i l l  be approached through f irst  d iscuss ing  an as ye t  unconside-d 
s t r and  of t h e  "control" perspec t ive ,  t h a t  emphasising t h e  use-value 
aspects of t h e  labour  process. Through explor ing t h e  implications i n  
t h i s  a n a l y s i s  w e  go on to present  an a l t e r n a t i v e  perspec t ive  i n  which 
s t r u c t u r e s  specific to  t h e  capitalist  labour  process  are shown to  
orda in  t h e  kind of work p a t t e r n s  which have e i t h e r  been a t t r i b u t e d  
to  managerial "danination" or mistakenly excluded f r a n  considerat ion 
of t h e  labour process a l toge the r .  
Although Littler and Salaman, for example, have presented an argument 
i n  which control i s s u e s  are considered l a r g e l y  i n  t h e  context  of 
work content  i n  a q u a l i t a t i v e  sense,  t h e  most d e t a i l e d  explora t ion  
of use-value aspects of t h e  labour process  has been undertaken by 
Cressey and MacInnes i n  two recent  papers, (1977, 1980). Here they  
explore  f i r s t l y  w h a t  i s  seen as t h e  c e n t r a l  cont rad ic t ion  between 
t h e  need for capitalists t o  e l ic i t  t h e  co-aperation of workers and 
t h e  antagonism inhe ren t  i n  t h e  capi ta l - labour  r e l a t i o n ,  and secondly 
what they desc r ibe  as the  " s t r u c t u r e  o f  cont ro l"  which is  argued to 
embrace managerial dec is ionmaking  at  both corporate  and p l a n t  l e v e l ,  
and also t o  raise t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of labour  extending i t s  con t ro l  
beyond t h e  p l a n t  t o  l e v e l s  such as investment planning. 
In both of these  approaches t h e  key p o i n t  being made by Cressey and 
MacInnes is  t h a t  technica l  use-value.aspects of t h e  labour  process 
are no t  "neutral".  Rather, such aspects both demonstrate cont rad ic t -  
i o n s  which are inherent  i n  t h e  surrounding context  of capitalis+ 
social r e l a t i o n s ,  and are themselves c r u c i a l l y  distorted by ' those 
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relations.  Thus i n  c r i t i c i s i n g  t h e  f a l s e  dis t inct ion said t o  have 
been made between the "technologico-material process of production" 
and "the social re la t ions surrounding production" they argue tha t  
"it i s  that very  process of production itself which i s  d i rec t ly  social 
and has  t o  be analysed as such " (1977, 283).This argument i s  
extended t o  examine the influence of the "social aspect" of product- 
ion on t h e  shape takm by material/technical factors  wi th in  t h e  
labour process itself i n  the sense tha t  while "It i s  exactly for  
t h i s  ( t o  'control '  nature) tha t  labour paver i s  purchased a t  a l l . . .  
y e t  because i t  is  so purchased, fran the social  aspect it  appears 
that  within the process of production it i s  purely the object,  not 
subject, of control " (1977, 287). 
What Cressey and MacInnes seem to  be arguing here is  tha t  super- 
imposed on t o  a "natural" labour process, ie t h e  production of use- 
values, a r e  "social relations" which impose par t icu lar  kinds of 
wpressive and contradictory controls on labour. The same "social" 
dis tor t ion of a "natural" labour proaess i s  a l so  implied i n  the 
associated contradiction w i t h i n  c a p i t a l i s t  production which Cressey  
and MacInnes regard a s  central ,  that between management's need for  
worker cc-operation and t h e  oppressive controls which capitalism 
imposes on labour. 
The authors have e a r l i e r  c i ted  Marx's dictum tha t  " the  work is not 
done twice over. once t o  produce...a use-value...and a second t i m e  
t o  generate value..." (1977, 287) t o  support t he i r  argument as t o  
t h e  structuring of work organisation by these social  factors.  Unfort- 
unately the i r  analogy f a i l s  on the very point of how the operation 
of a specif ical ly  capitalist labour process i s  to  be understood. Thus 
while Marx's whole argument is  imbued by reference t o  t h e  aentral  
objective of the labour process under capitalism of creating value, 
Cressey and FlacInnes' argument i s  s i l e n t  on t h i s  p o i n t ,  subs t i t -  
u t ing  only  t h e  too th l e s s  c o n s t r a i n t  of "control".  A s  i n  t h e  arguments 
w e  examined earlier, "social r e l a t ions"  or r e l a t ionsh ips ,  with a l l  
t h e i r  overtones of oppression, domination etc, have been subs t i t u t ed  
f o r  t h e  concept of "production r e l a t ions"  which p inpo in t s  t h e  na tu re  
of va lue  c rea t ion  within a p a r t i c u l a r  mode of production. An a n a l y s i s  
such as t h i s  can he lp  u s  only t o  appreciate t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e ,  and no t  
t h e  c r u c i a l  q u a n t i t a t i v e ,  p re s su res  a t  work within t h e  capitalist 
labour process. 
A second p o i n t  c e n t r a l  to Cressey and MacInnes' argument a l s o  i n d i c a t e s  
t h e  specific view of t h e  labour  process, ccmmon to many w r i t e r s ,  which 
w e  s h a l l  o u t l i n e  below. This  i s  t h e  argument t h a t  i t  i s  not  i n  fact 
"natural ly"  more e f f i c i e n t  t o  have h i e ra rch ie s ,  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of 
funct ion,  separat ion of conception and execution, etc. opera t ing  within 
production. In  t h i s  way t h e  p o t e n t i a l  for more democratic forms of 
"labour control" ,  such as workers' a l t e r n a t i v e  p l ans ,  in te rvent ion  
i n  investment planning etc. i s  invoked within t h e  present  organisa t ion  
of nroduction. 
While w e  can agree  with Cressey and MacInnes on t h e  ob jec t ive  i n e f f i c -  
iency of r i g i d  h i e ra rch ie s  and d iv i s ions  of function within production 
(and, i n  our case a t  least, d isagree  on t h e  a b i l i t y  of capitalism to 
anbrace t h e  forms of "labour cont ro l"  listed) n e i t h e r  of these  is, for 
t h e  moment a t  least, t h e  po in t .  The p o i n t  i s  ins t ead  t h a t  t h e  m i s s i o n  
of any ana lys i s  i n  terms of va lue  m a k e s  t h e  forms of con t ro l  cited by 
Cressey and MacInnes inexpl icable  i n  t h e i r  am r igh t .  There appears t o  
be no explanation as to why workers should be pushed i n t o  r i g i d l y  
s t ruc tured ,  fragmented, "deskilled" methods of working apart  f rm 
the  wish by c a p i t a l i s t s  to dominate and con t ro l  t h e  wrkforce. 
Correspondingly, worker r e s i s t a n c e  is  seen as a response pure ly  
~~ 
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a g a i n s t  that oppression and daninat ion and towards t h e i r  own 
con t ro l  of t h e  content  of work; and even more s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  no 
real reason exists as to  why these  antagonisms within t h e  
production process should no t  be co-operat ively overcane. Thus a 
l a r g e  n a r t  of Cressey and MacInnes' pos i t i on  i s  t h a t  labour has a 
c r e a t i v e  p o t e n t i a l  which n o t  on ly  needs t o  be harnessed by management 
but  can  also provide the  b a s i s  f o r  i n i t i a t i v e s  by workers i n  t h e  
areas of investment planning, etc., r e f e r r e d  to  above. 
In fact both t h e  emphasis on t h e  use -va lue re l a t ed  or "creat ive" 
and p o t e n t i a l l y  "co -qe ra t ive"  aspec ts  of t h e  labour  process  (along 
w i t h  t h e  i l l u s i o n  t h a t  t hese  can be successfu l ly  in t eg ra t ed  i n t o  
c a p i t a l i s t  production) and t h e  simultaneous exc lus ive  concentrat ion 
on p o l i t i c a l  elements of domination and oppression, spr ing  from t h e  
s a m e  source - a profoundly a h i s t o r i c a l  conception of t h e  labour 
process .  The "labour process" i s  seen as a nature-converting 
funct ion independent of any specific m o d e  of production ( thus  t h e  
argument t h a t  t h e  purpose of purchasing labour paver i s  to  "control" 
n a t u r e  ignores  t h e  fact t h a t  labour has  always been "controlled" 
even i n  modes of production which do n o t  involve t h e  purchase of 
labour power), on to  which are superimposed t h e  elements of danin- 
a t ion  and cppression which, f o r  writers l i k e  Cressey and MacInnes, 
apparent ly  de f ine  capitalism. Such a conceptua l i sa t ion  of t h e  system 
i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  moralistic and cannot he lp  u s  to gain a real under- 
s tanding of t h e  system's m o d e  of operat ion.  
A n  important example of t h i s  can be found i n  Cressey and MacInnes' 
a s se r t ion  t h a t  t h e  forms of organisa t ion  of ,product ion ,  or w h a t  
they term "control",  under capitalism, are not "natural ly"  more 
e f f i c i e n t .  While t h i s  i s  of course  c o r r e c t ,  it misses t h e  po in t  
t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  way capitalism, by d e f i n i t i o n ,  opera tes .  Such 
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forms may no t  be "good", but they are i n t r i n s i c  to t h e  meaninq of 
e f f ic iency  under capitalism. S t ruc tu res  such as d iv i s ion  of labour ,  
f r a p e n t a t i o n  and spec ia l i s a t ion  of labour ,  separat ion of conception 
and execution and even h ie rarchy  of a u t h o r i t y  (though t o  a lesser 
e x t e n t )  are imposed by employers p r imar i ly  i n  order  to inc rease  t h e  
p roduc t iv i ty  of labour ,  to reduce time spent on product ion,  no t  
because such forms are seen as p o l i t i c a l l y  desirable. The whole logic 
of capitalist production i s  q u a n t i t a t i v e ,  one i n  which t h e  extr .-ction 
of t h e  m a x i m u m  amount of va lue  i n  t h e  minimum t i m e  is  the  d r i v i n g  
force; i t  i s  t h i s  which s u s t a i n s  the  system. Thus m o s t  of t h e  elements 
of "control" focussed on by labour  process w r i t e r s  are i n  fact methods 
d i r e c t e d  a t  reducing labour time. Time i s  an issue almost t o t a l l y  
ignored i n  the  literature. y e t  one which i s  of crucial importance 
( i t  w i l l  be considered i n  depth i n  t h e  next  chapters). 
P r o f i t a b i l i t y  and Eff ic iency as they S t ruc tu re  "Control" 
\\'hat i s  a t  i s s u e  i n  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  labour process ,  then, 
i s  n o t  what i s  moral ly  r i g h t  and progressive,  or what i s  to be 
morally condemned as a r b i t r a r i l y  g e t t i n g  
of a "pure" labour  process ,  but  t h e  way i n  which t h e  requirements of 
t h e  capitalist mode of production s t r u c t u r e  t h e  methods of production 
i t s e l f .  In  c o n t r a s t  t o  m e  of the  pos i t i on  ou t l ined  above, therefore ,  
w e  wish to  put  t h e  follcxving arguments: 
i n  t h e  way  of t h e  operat ion 
(i) p r o f i t a b i l i t y  structures t h e  patterns of "control" ( r a t h e r  
than con t ro l  being a condi t ion of p r o f i t a b i l i t y )  
(ii) There i s  a s p e c i f i c a l l y  c a p i t a l i s t  logic and meaning of 
e f f i c i e n c y  which i s  not  p r imar i ly  to  be unders tmd i n  terms of 
a u t h o r i t y  r e l a t i o n s .  
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(i) P r o f i t a b i l i t y  and t h e  P a t t e r n s  of Control 
W e  have a l ready  listed j u s t  above sane of t h e  examples of managerial 
patterns of work organisa t ion  which are of ten  grouped under t h e  
t e n  "control" - d e t a i l  labour ,  conmand h ie ra rch ie s ,  etc. Though 
f e w  au thors  provide a l ist  of what counts  as "control" a t  work, 
Storey i s  an exception - i n  Managerial Prerogat ive and t h e  m e s t i o n  
of Control (Storey,  lQ33), he provides  a whole series of examples, 
ranging f r o m  changing shop steward s t a t u s  through t h e  Ford d i s c i p l i n -  
ary code (apnl ied to workers who f a i l  to work normally) t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  
Steel "rescue plan" which involved new working p r a c t i c e s ,  e l iminat ion 
of overmanning, and i n t e n s i f i d w o r k i n g  arrangements. Scme of t hese  
examnles u s e f u l l y  raise t h e  i s s u e  of " i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t ions" ,  which 
w e  a t tempt  t o  locate within t h e  "control" perspec t ive  below. :)thers 
are examples of t h e  kind of i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour s t r a t e g i e s  
which w e  have a l r eady  descr ibed as serving more fundamental needs 
of capitalism than "control". s to rey ,  i n  c m o n  w i t h  many o the r  
w r i t e r s ,  p r o j e c t s  an ob jec t ive  for management of "control" per se. 
However, sane w r i t e r s  have gone fu r the r  than t h i s  i n  drawing a 
connection between cont ro l  and p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  and i t  i s  these  argu- 
ments w e  wish to  examine. 
L i t t l e r  and Salaman. to  t ake  our  f irst  example, are almost aggress ive  
i n  t h e i r  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  " C a p i t a l i s t s  are not ,  after a l l ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  
i n s i s t e n c e  of sme recent  au thors ,  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  con t ro l  per se." 
They go on t o  say t h a t ,  "The f i r s t  p r i o r i t y  of capitalisn i s  
accumulation, no t  cont ro l .  Control only becanes a concern when 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i s  threatened " ( L i t t l e r  and Salaman, 1982, 2 6 5 ) .  
Unfortunately t h i s  argument seems to be used as a b a s i s  f o r  saying, 
no t  t h a t  "control" i s s u e s  are a subs id ia ry  e l emen t  i n  the management, 
of t h e  labour process ,  bu t  t h a t  t h e  labour process  i t s e l f  i s  of less 
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importance i n  pursuing p r o f i t a b i l i t y  than are a c t i v i t i e s  "away f r a n  
the no in t  of production" a l toge the r .  (We have discussed this argument 
more fullyabov?, Chapter 1). Wce again,  t h e  labour  process 
"control";  i f  w e  d i m i s s  con t ro l  i s s u e s ,  w e  dismiss  t h e  labour process.  
A t  t h e  sane t i m e  i t  i s  implied t h a t  a loss of con t ro l  can " threaten" 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  
Stephen H i l l  i s  more eq l i c i t  i n  h i s  presenta t ion  of cont ro l  wi th in  
t h e  labour process  as a condi t ion of p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  Arguing on t h e  
b a s i s  of t h e  need f o r  cont ro l  posed by t h e  fundamental worker/ 
management c o n f l i c t  of i n t e r e s t s  over t h e  a l i e n a t i o n  of labour ,  H i l l  
concludes that " P r o f i t a b i l i t y  within conventional c a p i t a l i s t  and 
s o c i a l i s t  econanies appears t o  d q e n d  on depriving employees of 
t h e i r  indenendence and ensuring t h e i r  subordination (Hi l l ,  1981, 13). 
Later, i n  t h e  context  of an argument (which w e  consider  i n  more 
d e t a i l  be low)  about t h e  poss ib l e  embodying of "control" i s s u e s  
within t h e  development of new technology, he  comments t h a t  managerial 
values  "embody a c e n t r a l  f e a t u r e  of conventional capitalist product- 
i on ,  t h a t  con t ro l  i s  one sondi t ion  of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  '' (1981, 122). 
I t  i s  important to note ,  of course,  t h a t  for Hill t h i s  is  only "one 
condition",  bu t  never the less  t h e d r k t i o n  of t h e  r e l a t ionsh ip  between 
con t ro l  and p r o f i t a b i l i t y  (and indeed. whatever t h e  o the r  "conditions" 
of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  are supposed t o  be) remains clear. Reminiscent of 
t h e  Steedman argument on t h e  labour theory of va lue  (see Chapter 3 ) ,  
" p r o f i t a b i l i t y "  i s  only a l l w e d  to emerge, as i t  w e r e ,  f r an  t h e  
production process  after c e r t a i n  l i m i t i n g  condi t ions  (which, i n  
S t e d a n ' s  case. inc lude  t h e  weather) have been overcme.  The role 
of t h e  ove ra l l  phjeetive of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i n  s t r u c t u r i n g  t h e  na tu re  
of t h e  labour process, and t h e  p a r a l l e l  de f in ing  f e a t u r e  of labour  
within capitalism of producing g r e a t e r  than i t s  own value,  are 
overlooked. 
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In c o n t r a s t  w e  maintain that  the  patterns of work organisation wi th in  
the  capitalist  labour process, such as assembly-line or conveyor-belt 
flows of production, detailed systems of work measurement, and 
standardised working methods, are a c t u a l l y  constructed by the r e q u i r e  
ments of capitalism rather than being "control techniques" devised 
i n  order to subdue worker r e s i s t ance  and t h u s  i n  s o m e  convoluted way 
permit p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  The task of malcing a p r o f i t  is, indeed, far 
too c r u c i a l  to be left to such roundabout methods - or a t  least 
this is  t r u e  of late capitalism w i t h  the realsabordination of labour.  
I t  has to  be guaranteed r i g h t  i n  t h e  heart of the labour process 
through techniques which are -red unremitt ingly towards the maXimum 
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour. 
"Bureaucratic control" and the place of Indus t r i a l  Relations 
However, t he  associated ar-ent that worker r e s i s t ance  is  confronted 
by management as a c o n s t r a i n t  on p r o f i t a b i l i t y  must be considered. 
I t  i s  no part of the present  argument to attempt to dawnplay the 
role of worker res i s tance .  What  w e  would wish to focus on, as w e  
have reiterated t h r o u g h u t ,  is  w h a t  the re s i s t ance  is  =..If t h i s  
can be understood, then 90 can t h e  role of "control". 
In fact w e  would argue that i s s u e s  w h i c h  have t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been 
placed under the  heading of " indus t r ia l  r e l a t ions"  are c e n t r a l  to the 
management of the labour process, r a the r  than as has cormaonly been 
supposed a separate category. Once again, unwillingness to allow 
anything but a u t h o r i t y  r e l a t i o n s  and ques t ions  of job content i n t o  
the a n a l y s i s  of t h e  labour process has allaved a cur ious  reversa l  
i n  which w h a t  are i n  fact managerial strategies directed towards 
iswes surrounding the  terms of conditions of employment are 
gathered under the rub r i c  of "control" i n  the sense of au thor i ty .  
As w e  have argued above, John Storey ' s  wide-ranging list of "control'! 
i s s u e s ,  i n  a t h e o r e t i c a l  context  i n  which "control" c l e a r l y  means 
a u t h o r i t y  r e l a t i o n s ,  i s  an example of t h i s .  So i s  t h e  concept of 
"bureaucrat ic  control". flav, then, can w e  relate worker r e s i s t a n c e  
within our own argument to t h e  p a t t e r n s  of work organisa t ion  c i t e d  
above a s  being ordained by t h e  .d r ive  tcwards i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour? 
AS w e  noted i n  Chapter 1, t h e r e  has  been a cur ious  m i s s i o n  f r o m  t h e  
accounts of worker r e s i s t a n c e  within t h e  "labour process debate" 
of t h e  s t rugg les  around piecework norms, overtime and o ther  pay 
i s s u e s  which i n  f a c t  are an everyday chal lenge t o  management within 
t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  labour process .  Alongside t h i s  s i l ence ,  t he re  has  been 
a s imi l a r  re luc tance  t o  explore t h e  processes involved i n  workers' 
own gras s roo t s  forms of organisa t ion  around these  i s s u e s ,  eg t h e  
s ign i f i cance  of shop steward representat ion.  Such areas are normally 
assumed to f a l l  ou t s ide  t h e  province of t h e  "labour process  debate" 
and t o  belong, as w e  have s a i d ,  to t h e  sphere of " indus t r i a l  re la t ions" .  
However, t o  r e l e g a t e  i s s u e s  surrounding t h e  terms and condi t ions  of 
employment, such a s  pay, bonus, overtime, job evaluat ion and j o b  
grading, and aspects r e l a t i n g  t o  employment l e v e l s  and employment 
s e c u r i t y  i t s e l f ,  to a sphere separate from t h e  labour process  i s  to 
ignore t h e  c e n t r a l i t y  to it. Conf l i c t  over such i s s u e s  permeatesthe 
labour process  ( f a r  more so, i n  p r a c t i c e ,  than c o n f l i c t s  over j o b  
con ten t ,  worker autonany or managerial danina t ion)  and i t  is t h e  
organisa t ion  of workers around them which conc re t i s e s  t h e  capital- 
labour antagonism i n t o  real bas t ions  of organised r e s i s t a n c e  c o n s t i t -  
u t i n g  an obstacle t o  the smooth implementation of managerial ob jec t ives  
i n  t h e  labour process. Both these  aspects of eveqrday'lreality" wi th in  
t h e  labour  process arise i r o m  t h e  ex is tence  of bas i c  con t r ad ic t ions  
within t h e  value-producing process under capi ta l i sm,  m o s t  notably 
exploitatinn, which no m w n t  of " a l t e r n a t i v e  forms of managerial 
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s t ra tegy"  can prevent  from i n t e r m i t t e n t l y  surfacing. 
"erhaps one reason why these  areas of c o n f l i c t  have not  received as 
much a t t e n t i o n  wi th in  the deba te  a s  t h e i r  prevalenge would s e e m  t o  
deserve i s  t h a t  issues which may be considered appropr ia te  sub jec t s  
f o r  bargaining or negot ia t ion  are seen a s  "bureaucratic" and as n o t  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  revea l ing  the  social undercurrents  which opera te  within 
t h e  labour process. We have a l r eady  t r i e d  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  way i n  which 
such i s s u e s  re t h e  undercurrents  - do provide the  main focus for 
concern by workers i n  t h e  most g ra s s roo t s ,  informal way. Hwever, i t  
i s  perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  one of the  few t h e o r e t i c a l  attempts t o  
confront  t h i s  t op ic  within t h e  labour process  deba te  has been placed 
under t h e  heading of "bureaucrat ic  control" .  
In t h e  3rd part of h i s  %stage a n a l y s i s  of con t ro l ,  Richard 
Fdwards (Fdwards. 1979) cons iders  t h e  employment strategies t y p i c a l l y  
adopted by l a r g e  corpora t ions  such as Polaroid.  Here " incorpora t i  st" 
elements such a s  preordainted pay grading s t r u c t u r e s ,  agreed r u l e s  
for promotion, job s e c u r i t y  and s e n i o r i t y ,  and beyond t h i s  an i n s t i t -  
u t i o n a l i s e d  and emasculated role for t r ade  unions within t h e  company, 
a r e  emphasised by Edwards i n  terms of ye t  another,  s t i l l  more e f f e c t i v e  
"control" s t r a t e g y  beyond t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  unsophis t icated means afforded 
by " technical  control" .  
We have a l r eady  indica ted  why w e  do n o t  consider  t h e  above t o  be 
"control" i s s u e s  i n  t h e  "authori ty"  sense normally i m p l i e d  i n  t h e  use  
of t h e  term. Ilmever. Fdwards' implicit i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of explo i ta t ion-  
based i s s u e s  wi th  exac t ly  t h i s  "authority"-centred dynamic allows 
t h e  employer strategies which he groups under t h e  term "bureaucrat ic  
cont ro l"  to be regarded pu re ly  i n  terms of their r o l e  i n  suppressing 
worker r e s i s t ance .  In t h i s  way, as w e  have noted above, such s t r a t e g i e s  
a r e  located within a perspec t ive  of t h e  labour process "control" 
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i n  which t h e  very work itself "has been organised.. . to contain 
c o n f l i c t "  (see p9). And f u r t h e r  such s t r a t e g i e s  when taken to  t h e i r  
bureaucra t ic  extreme are seen as being p o t e n t i a l l y  capable of resolving 
the  whole problem of c o n f l i c t  a t  work: "...for a t i m e  bureaucra t ic  
control  appeared t o  have resolved t h e  whole problem of con t ro l  - 
it  w a s  t h e  f i r s t  system without cont rad ic t ions"  (Edwards, 1978, 123) .  
h%at t h i s  argument f a i l s  to recognise i s  t h a t  t h e  whole system referred 
to by t h e  term "bureaucrat ic  control"  - one of scph i s t i ca t ed  negot ia t -  
ing  systems, agreed procedures,  pre-planned and presecr ibed working 
methods ax1 pay gradings - i s  one which i s  on cont rad ic t ions .  
"Hureaucratic cont ro l"  r ep resen t s  an attempted accanmodation and thus  
i m p l i c i t  r e c o y i t i o n  of the  inherent  antagonisms involved in 
explo i ta t ion .  I n  t h i s  way t h e  exigencies  of p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  through 
the  r e l a t i o n  of exp lo i t a t ion ,  once more can be seen t o  s t r u c t u r e  
p a t t e r n s  of "control". The very m r k e r  organisa t ion  which corporate 
s t r a t e g i e s  set out  t o  cc-opt, arises and i s  sustained by p r e c i s e l y  
t h e s e  con t r ad ic t ions  a t  t h e  hea r t  of t h e  capi ta l - labour  r e l a t i o n ;  
and these  con t r ad ic t ions  in t u rn  are embodied i n  t h e  whole substance 
of t h e  capitalist labour process  as a profit-making a c t i v i t y .  
Tn t h i s  sense t h e  more scph i s t i ca t ed  " indus t r i a l  r e l a t ions"  procedures 
- indeed sane of t h e  more workaday o n e s  as w e l l  - represent  an 
i m p l i c i t  recogni t ion that pxplo i ta t ion  and i t s  effects cannot be 
el iminated,  and the re fo re  some provis ion must h e  made for them. Con- 
f l i c t  i s  thus  to a c e r t a i n  ex ten t  " in s t i t u t iona l i s ed" .  i n  t h e  s e n s e  
of acknowledging i t  as i r r educ ib l e .  In t h i s  way managerial s t r a t e g i e s  
a r e  not  simply at tempts  at  imposing a u t h o r i t y  but  workable procedures 
aimed a t  extracting maximum p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  context of an 
acknowledged antagonism. 
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In t h e  above w e  have argued f i r s t l y  t h a t  i s s u e s  surrounding "ext r ins ic"  
aspects of work such as pay must be regarded as part of the  labour  
process i n  t h e  sense t h a t  t h a t  p rocess  i s  centred on explo i ta t ion .  W e  
went on to argue t h a t  s t r a t e g i e s  developed to dea l  with t h e  ensuing 
c o n f l i c t  and i t s  organisa t ion  are not  u se fu l ly  def ined as "control" 
s t r a t e g i e s  if t h e s e  are understood i n  t h e  sense of subordinating t h e  
workforce t o  managerial au thor i ty .  Rather,  t h e  c e n t r a l  requirement of 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  which de f ines  t h e  capitalist labmr process  orda ins  
s t r u c t u r e s  and procedures which have to  be c rea t ed  i n  order  to aeal 
with t h e  a n t m i a s  inhe ren t  i n  operat ing that requirement. In t h i s  
sense  w h a t  "po l i t i ca l "  aspects of labour process r e l a t i o n s  which may 
be i d e n t i f i e d  must be recognised as stemming frm much m o r e  c e n t r a l  
and fundamental econunic cons t r a in t s .  
(ii) The Capitalist Meaning of "Efficiency" 
In the  above w e  have attempted t o  show how s p e c i f i c  p a t t e r n s  of 
work organisa t ion  under capitalism, for example t i g h t l y  measured and 
atomised " t i m e  and motion" procedures,  can be regarded as d i r e c t l y  
s t ruc tu red  by t h e  ongoing need for capitalism to reduce s o c i a l l y  
necessary labour t i m e  and thus  increase  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and competitive- 
ness .  In this concluding sec t ion  w e  want to argue t h a t  t h i s  relates to 
a specific, q u a n t i t a t i v e  meaning of e f f i c i ency  under capitalism. The 
r e l a t i o n  between t h i s  view and theo r i e s  of "control" i s  use fu l ly  
brought out  i n  t h e  article by David Gordon (Gordon, 1976) descr ibed 
earlier. W e  s a w  above (p12) that f o r  Gordon t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of a 
production process under capitalism i s  a c t u a l l y  defined i n  terms of 
i t s  e f f i cacy  i n  reproducing t h e  class r e l a t i o n s  of a mode of  production 
- i n  o t h e r  words i n  overwhelmingly political terms. Thus, for Gordon, 
whi le  "In general ,  a production process i s  quantitatively (most) 
e f f i cnen t  i f  i t  e f f e c t s  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p o s s i b l e  use fu l  phys ica l  output  
from a given set of phys ica l  i n p u t s  ... I n  class societies, a production 
i s  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  e f f i c i e n t  if it b e s t  reproduces t h e  c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s  
of a mode of production ' 1  (1976, 22) . 
This  argument has t w o  implicat ions.  The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  a l l  modes of 
production have sought t h e  maximisation of output;  t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  
"natural"  or "real" meaning of e f f i c i ency .  The second i s  t h a t  t h e  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of a class-specific notion of e f f ic iency  e n t a i l s  the  
i n t e g r a t i o n  of p o l i t i c a l  aspects of t h e  "reproduction" of w h a t  Gordon 
terms " ru l ing  c l a s s  dominance". Both of these  impl ica t ions  run counter 
to t h e  argument w e  are t ry ing  t o  develop here  on capitalist "efficiency'l. 
-
F i r s t  of a l l ,  as w e  have t r i e d  t o  show, maximisation of output on t h e  
basis of a minimisation of i npu t  ( s o c i a l l y  necessary labour t i m e ) ,  
Gordon 
indeed p r e c i s e l y  t h a t  q u a n t i t a t i v e  aspect which i d e n t i f i e s ,  i s  what 
i s  specific to  capi ta l i sm as a market and canmodity-producing economy. 
I t  i s  n o t  a "natural".  ongoing or a h i s t o r i c a l  c r i t e r i o n  of e f f i c i ency .  
I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  i n  e a r l y  t r a n s i t i o n a l  socialist societies encountering 
opposi t ion and competition from c a p i t a l i s t  states such quan t i a t ive  
elements have remained t h e  criteria for product ive e f f i c i ency ,  bu t ,  
a s  Gordon himself argues later, such would n o t  be t h e  case i n  a fu l ly-  
develcped s o c i a l i s t  economy, and i t  c e r t a i n l y  would n o t  appear to have 
been  t h e  case within subs is tence  e c o n a i e s  such as feudalism. Thus 
f a r  from s p e c i f i c a l l y  capitalist  criteria of e f f i c i ency  being defin- 
able i n  "qua l i ta t ive"  terms i n  Gordon's sense,  it i s  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
ob jec t ives  of production which uniquely express t h e  logic and require- 
m e n t s  of capitalism. m a l i t a t i v e  e f f i c i ency  i s  i n  fact t h e  other s i d e  
of t h e  equation - t h e  kind of "real" ef f ic iency  t h a t  could be gained 
ahrough workers' f u l l  involvement i n  planning and organisat ion of 
production. 
The po in t  about a s p e c i f i c a l l y  capitalist meaning of e f f i c i ency  i s  
w e l l  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  an example fran t h e  second case study presented 
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i n  t h i s  t h e s i s  (see Chapter 7) .  Here what w a s  ob jec t ive ly  an extremely 
i n e f f i c i e n t  l o r r y  de l ive ry  se rv ice  run by a p r i v a t e  company w a s  sub- 
jected t o  prof i t -or ien ted  time-study criteria which reduced t h e  
schedules i ssued  to d r i v e r s  to what w e r e  i n  practice impract icably 
t i g h t  l eve l s .  The poor de l ive ry  record a c t u a l l y  itself arose from t h e  
shortage of d r i v e r s  which i n  i t s  turn  w a s  encouraged by a payment system 
a l a r g e  element of which w a s  overtime. Roth management and d r i v e r s  
prefer red  to keep s t a f f i n g  l e v e l s  l o w ,  i n  t h e  f i r s t  case to save money, 
i n  t h e  second to make it .  The only "way out" t h e  company could see from 
these  con t r ad ic t ions  w a s  to t i gh ten  t h e  screw on t h e  d r i v e r s '  de l ive ry  
timesa;to impossibly high l eve l s .  Thus t h e  "eff ic iency" ex to l l ed  i n  
p r i v a t e  indus t ry  under capitalism a c t u a l l y  came down to ex t r ac t ing  
maximum l e v e l s  of labour i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  from the  m r k e r s ,  a s t r a t e g y  
to which, given t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of t i g h t  s t a f f i n g  combined with overtime 
imposed by t h e  profitability/exploitation nexus, t h e r e  w a s  no real 
a l t e r n a t i v e .  
I s  "Control" hilt i n t o  Technology? 
We have t r i e d  t o  show i n  t h e  above t h a t  under capi ta l i sm "eff ic iency" 
i s  no t  a matter of repression and domination, but  of g e t t i n g  t h e  m o s t  
vmrk poss ib l e  out  of t h e  least working t i m e .  N o t  w, but  how much; 
no t  e, but  how quickly,  have been the criteria of success within t h e  
c a p i t a l i s t  labour process .  In our concluding remarks w e  examine f i r s t l y  
why capi ta l i sm adopts  w h a t  are "objectively" or "natural ly"  i n e f f i c i e n t  
methods and secondly whether production technology i s  s t ruc tu red  r a n d  
t h e  i s s u e  of I!control" or simply faster output.  
CM t h e  f irst  i s s u e ,  Cressey and MacInnes are of course c o r r e c t  i n  
m i n t i n g  cxlt t h a t  "There i s  no ...p hys i ca l  law...that proves t h a t  a 
sharp hierarchy,  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of funct ion,  and d ivorce  and concen- 
t r a t i o n  i n  a few of t h e  producers  of conception, and d i r e c t i o n  as 
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Opposed to  execution, i s ,  t echn ica l ly  speaking, more ' e f f i c i e n t @ . l l  
(1977, 287-8) I<owever, as w e  have pointed ou t ,  t h e i r  own ana lys i s  
makes capitalist strategies inexpl icable .  We show i n  t h e  case study 
chapters  how managerial lack of i n t e r e s t  i n  or awareness of what w e r e  
i n  f a c t  important aspects of worker knowledge (a managerial  m i s s i o n  
comnounrld by workers' own f e e l i n g s  t h a t  work organisa t ion  w a s  "not 
our job") caused s i g n i f i c a n t  con t r ad ic t ions  and holdups i n  t h e  product- 
ion process. Far f r o m  a s i t u a t i o n  of management e l i c i t i n g  worker 
co-operation. i t  w a s  a case Of management beinq unconcerned with 
worker behaviour or a t t i t u d e s  beyond t h e  bas i c  i s s u e  of "performance", 
and c a l c u l a t i n g  and imposing production norms i n  which the l a s t  con- 
s ide ra t ion  w a s  worker "c rea t iv i ty"  or p o t e n t i a l  f o r  more e f f e c t i v e l y  
organis ing t h e  labour process.  Such negligence (which of course has  
been m o d i f i e d  r ecen t ly  with t h e  in t roduct ion  of techniques l i k e  
q u a l i t y  circles) w a s  not due t o  the  kind of d r i v e s  towards h ie ra rch ica l  
a u t h o r i t y  implied i n  Cressey and ElacInnes' ana lys i s ,  bu t  t o  t h e  over- 
whelmingly q u a n t i t a t i v e  criteria of e f f i c i e n c y  i n  organis ing t h e  labour 
process which daninated managerial thinking. F ina l ly  w e  turn to  t h e  
meaning of "efficiency" as embodied i n  t h e  development of new tech- 
nology under capitalism. Given t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  logic which w e  have 
descr ibed a s  governing t h e  organisat ion of t h e  l a b m r  process, i t  can 
be assumed t h a t  t h e  same des ide ra t a  of maximising p roduc t iv i ty  would 
apply to  the develqxnent of new manufacturing techniques. However, t w o  
au thors  who consider  t h i s  quest ion have i n j e c t e d ,  again,  a t 'control ' f  
element i n t o  t h e  ana lys i s  of such development. Thus David Noble has 
devoted much of h i s  work t o  shnwing how " the  social r e l a t i o n s  O f  
production shape t h e  technology of production as much as t h e  o the r  way 
round" (Noble, 1979, 50) while  Stephen H i l l  a rgues more t e n t a t i v e l y  
t h a t  although p r o f i t a b i l i t y  can be seen t o  be a fundamental element 
i ~ n  t h e  in t roduct ion  of new production techniques,  "What a r e  important 
-~ 
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a r e  t h e  i n t e r n a l i s e d  design values  and unconscious assumptions about 
what c o n s t i t u t e s  'progress' which managers and Pngineers br ing  t o  
hear when' 6hey apply s c i e n t i f i c  and technica l  knowledge t o  indus t ry  '1 
( H i l l ,  1981, 122).These va lues  are s a i d  t o  focus on t h e  sa l ience  of 
control as "a c e n t r a l  f e a t u r e  of conventional capitalist production." 
Thi.s argument of Hill's relates t o  h i s  bas i c  t h e s i s  t h a t  the  c l a s h  
of interests a t  t h e  hea r t  of t h e  capi ta l - labour  r e l a t i o n  r equ i r e s  
inpu t s  of managerial con t ro l  a t  a l l  l e v e l s  t o  suppress resistance. 
a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  however, H i l l  recognises t h a t  whi le  "(he way of 
improving p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i s  t o  create a production process  which 
prevents  t h e  c o n f l i c t s  of i n t e r e s t  i n  i ndus t ry  from hindering accum- 
u la t ion"  never the less  " t h i s  i s  by n o  means t h e  only impetus towards 
new techniques ' ' ( H i l l ,  1981, l l 2 b  Y e t  aga in ,  Braveman i s  u n j u s t l y  
( i n  our view) a l l eged  t o  "overestimate t h e  ex ten t  t o  which con t ro l  
i s  i n  fact achieved t h r m g h  t h e  design of new methods" (112) . 
respite t h e  importance of "control" i n  h i s  argument, then, Hill allows 
some recogni t ion of o the r  f a c t o r s  which may inf luence  technological  
development, p r o f i t a b i l i t y  apparent ly  being chief among these.  The 
argument of Noble, i n  c o n t r a s t ,  i s  dedicated t o  showing t h a t  " c m t r o l "  
ob jec t ives  a r e  embedded i n  t h e  develwment of new production techniques,  
both as a motive f o r  t h e i r  ac tua l  i n s t i g a t i o n  and i n  terms of a 
subsequent "monitoring" funct ion a t  work. 
The notion of a "choice" of technologies i s  c e n t r a l  t o  Noble 's  t h e s i s  
t h a t  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  path of develmment of technology i s  shaped n o t  
by SMP indmendent  driving-force within t h e  technoloqy i tself ,  but  
by t h e  social s t r u c t u r e  surrounding i t .  The example of t h e  development 
of numerically-controlled machine tools i s  used t o  demonstrate t h i s .  
I n  no t ing  t h a t  t h e  earlier pro to type  of "record-playba&",which involved 
recording the  craft s k i l l s  of t h e  operator  i n  making t h e  tape ,  w a s  
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abandoned i n  favour of a system using numerical codings represent ing 
each d e t a i l  of t h e  re levant  work p a t t e r n ,  Noble argues t h a t  t h i s  
choice i s  i l l u s t r a t i v e  of t h e  inf luence of social r e l a t i o n s  on tech- 
nology i n  c u t t i n g  cut elements of worker d i sc re t ion .  S imi la r ly ,  
the  dec is ion  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  "dr ive for t o t a l  automation" which Noble 
i d e n t i f i e s  on t h e  p a r t  of management,and the  way i n  which t h i s  
"ideology of engineering ... mir ro r s  the  an tagon i s t i c  social relations 
of c a p i t a l i s t  production" (Noble, 1979, 30). 
Noble i s  accura te  i n  i den t i fy ing  a "dr ive  f o r  t o t a l  autanation" (1979, 
3) a s  the  fo rce  behind t h e  development of new production techniques 
i n  l a t ?  capi ta l i sm.  !Vhat needs t o  be inves t iga t ed  i s  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  
behind t h i s  "drive",  which Noble appears  to d e f i n e  once again i n  terms 
of  a u t h o r i t y  r e l a t i o n s :  "There i s  no quest ion but  t h a t  management 
s a w  i n  h./c t h e  p o t e n t i a l  to enhance t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  over production 
and se ized  on i t ,  d e s p i t e  ques t ionable  cost-ef lect iveness"  (1979, 34). 
I t  i s  unquestionable t h a t  capitalists a i m  a t  to ta l  consis tency,  pre- 
d i c t a b i l i t y  and s tandard isa t ion  i n  t h e  u s e  of t h e i r  labmr-pauer.  R u t  
whether such ob jec t ives  are a matter of managerial au tho r i ty  a sp i r a t -  
ions i s  less clear. Labour which i s  m a c h i n e l i k e  - measured, ta rge t -  
o r ien ted .  sus t a inab le  over a long per iod - is  c l e a r l y  considerably 
more product ive than human labour which i s  va r i ab le ,  i n t e r m i t t e n t ,  
unable cons i s t en t ly  to adhere to maximalist t a r g e t s .  The less human 
in te rvent ion  (as i n  t h e  case of "record-playback'' versus  N/C) t h e  less 
i n t e r r u p t i o n  of a smooth,  mechanised f l o w  process. And indeed t h e  very 
technology of  numerically-controlled tapes ,  based on be minute d i s -  
sec t ion  and numbering of elements of human labour ,  represents  t h e  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  r a t i o n a l e  of capitalist production, which. r a t h e r  than 
more whenera1 aspects of "authori ty"  r e l a t i o n s ,  i s  what i s  in t eg ra t ed  
i n t o  t h e  design and operat ion of t h e  machine. 
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Conclu sim s 
Thus w h i l e  issues of " a u t h o r i t y "  are p r e v a l e n t  i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of 
t h e  capitalist  l a b o u r  p r o c e s s  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  management (and t h e  
workforce)  c l e a r l y   se^ s m e  areas, and n o t  o t h e r s , ' a s  t h e i r  prern- 
g a t i v e  (cff n77) w e  must be c a r e f u l  n o t  t o  i d e n t i f y  such "political" 
aspects of i n t e r g r o u p  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  an o v e r r i d i n g  r a t i o n a l e  governing 
t h e  o v e r a l l  o p e r a t i o n  of t h a t  process .  I n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  we have tried 
to s h m  hcm t h e  meaning of " c o n t r o l " ,  a concept  c l e a r l y  c e n t r a l  to 
t h e d e b a t e  b u t  a s  y e t  i n a d e q u a t e l y  t h e o r i s e d ,  h a s  been overwhelmingly, 
if a t  t i m e s  i m p l i c i t l y ,  d e f i n e d  i n  t e r m s  of r e l a t i o n s  of d a n i n a t i o n  
and s u b o r d i n a t i o n  whi th in  t h e  l a b o u r  p r o c e s s .  These " r e l a t i o n s "  have 
i n  t h e i r  t u r n  been s h a m  to be conceived as p u r e l y  "social", i e  
u n s t r u c t u r e d  by s p e c i f i c  material aspects of t h e  m o d e  of product ion .  
Tn t h i s  s e n s e  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  on t h e  l a b o u r  process i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e  
iise of t h e  term "cont ro l"  h a s  been argued t o  be profoundly ahistorical; 
to have s u b s t i t u t e d  for an  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  capitalist 
process of product ion  t h e  image of a "pure" l a b o u r  p r o c e s s  i n w l v i n g  
i n  p r i n c i p l e  t h e  " c r e a t i v e "  p r d u c t i o n  of use-values ,  on to which 
h a s  been superimposed by t h e  p r i m a r i l y  political o r d i n a n c e s  of 
cani ta l i sn  a set of d i s t o r t i n g  r e l a t i o n s  of d a n i n a t i o n  and subord- 
i n a t i o n .  
T t  i s  hoped t h a t  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  through t h e  use of some c o n c r e t e  
examples a s  w e l l  as argument, w e  have begun to e s t a b l i s h  t h e  v a l i d i t y  
of an  a l t e r n a t i v e  concept ion  which, l i t e r a l l y ,  " r e v o l u t i o n i s e s "  t h e s e  
p o i n t s  of view on t h P  labour process; t u r n s  them on t h e i r  head by  
i n d i c a t i n g  that ,  i n s o f a r  a s  t h e  concept  of '!control" i s  u s e f u l  a t  a l l ,  
i t  can b e  understood as i n d i c a t i n g  p a t t e r n s  of work o r g a n i s a t i o n  which 
a r e  s t r u c t u r e d  b y  t h e  requirement of p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  n o t  v i c e  versa .  
T h i s  n o i n t  of view i s  a r r i v e d  a t  by  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  l a b o u r  process under 
can i t a l im  p r i m a r i l y  i n  terms of i t s  o v e r r i d i n g  o b j e c t i v e  of valor-  
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i s a t i o n  which cons t ruc t s  t h e  whole i n t e r n a l  organisa t ion  of t h e  
labour process. I t  i s  t o  t h i s  i s s u e  of valorisation t h a t  w e  n m  turn.  
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CHAPTER THRFE 
The Capitalist Labour Process 
In the last chapter w e  were concerned t o  show tha t  ceTtain f o n s  of the 
organisation of work, grouped under the  t i t le  of "control" by labour 
process theoris ts .  w e r e  i n  f ac t  created and structured by the overall  
requirement of p ro f i t ab i l i t y  of t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  mode of production. I n  
going on t o  examine, i n  t h i s  chapter, the specific character of the cap- 
i t a l i s t  labour process, w e  s h a l l  explore t h e  operation of t h i s  requirement 
wi th in  the labour process itself through the use of t h e  Marxist concept 
of valorisation. W e  shall then discuss how the related process of 
exploitation both constructs worker response and indicates  a centra! l ink  
between the  labour process and the overall  c a p i t a l i s t  mode of production. 
In the  analysis  of exploitation w e  emphasise the twin aspects of hbour 
intensif icat ion and subsistence. 
Valorisation 
This conept w i l l  be made central  t o  the analysis of the specif ical ly  
c a p i t a l i s t  labour process fo r  two reasons. F i r s t l y ,  because it pinpoints 
an area of Marx's w r i t i n g s  on the  labour process (mainly i n  t h e  section 
of -1 Volume 1 (Marx, 1976) en t i t l ed  "Results of the Imediate Process 
of Production") which appear t o  have been unjustly neglected by labour 
process theoris ts .  This would, of course, be insuf f ic ien t  j u s t i f i ca t ion  
withmt the second reason, which i s  that the concept and i t s  accanpanying 
analysis locate  s t ructures  and processes which continue t o  decisively 
influence the day-t-day operations of the labour process w i t h i n  modem 
manufacturing concerns. Considering the concept of "valorisation" w i l l ,  
w e  hope, enable u s  t o  bring i n t o  sharper focus the relationships between 
p ro f i t ab i l i t y  and "control" s t ra teg ies  which w e  attempted t o  out l ine i n  
the l a s t  chapter. 
mrx*s theory of valorisation brwWdavn into four areas: 
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i) The "simp'le" explanation a s  t o  the expansion of valuewithin the labour 
process; 
ii) The uni ty  of labour process and valorisation process i n  the c a p i t a l i s t  
mode of production; 
iii) The ro le  of labour i n  i t s  in te r re la t ion  with capi ta l  ( the crucial  
"reversal" thes i s )  ; 
i v )  The location of p r o f i t  generation within the sphere of production 
rather than circulation. 
W e  shall d i s c u s s  these aspects of the analysis one by one, &ring which 
w e  hope the i r  relevance will become clear. 
i )  Fqansion of Value 
We have cal led t h i s  argument "simple", but i n  fact i t  contains within 
itself the whole def in i t ion  of both "capital" and capitalism. Leaving t h i s  
aside for  a manent, however, w e  need to consider the basic  meaning of the 
term "valorisation". 
Valorisation i s  simply the expansion of a given quantity of value i n t o  a 
larger quantity,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n  a context of cap i ta l  and wage l a b w r .  
C a p i t a l ,  i n  i t s  most abstract  form, i s  money ( the  ultimate logic of the 
quant i ta t ive logic  of capitalism referred t o  i n  the last chapter) and the 
process of valorisation can be defined as that of increasing a given sum 
of money i n t o  a larger  sum. However, money, a s  Marx points  out, i s  only 
poten t ia l ly  capi ta l ,  and i t  i s  only capi ta l  that i t  can become pa r t  of 
the process of valorisation. In other words, money, or exchange value, i s  
advanced w i t h i n  the c a p i t a l i s t  process of production i n  order t o  create more 
money: " In  itself t h i s  sum of money may only be defined a s  capital i f  i t  
i s  employed, spent, with the a i m  of increasing it..." (~9761.  
However,the very form i n  which t h i s  process takes place, the apparently 
"Dure" and abs t rac t  transformation of money i n t o  more money, disguises,  
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a s  Ffarx recognises, t h e  &, t h e  "real procedure by means of which x 
i s  changed i n t o  x+Ax (I 
wage labour. The 
(p976).The essent ia l  element is, of course, 
aspect of the labour i s  emphasised because i t  is  
crucial  tha t  a cer tain amount Of t h e  or iginal  sum of money has t o  be 
allocated t o  precisely t h i s ,  i e  the "means of labour". If not for  the 
f ac t  tha t  a specified amcant of value has t o  be set aside t o  purchase labour, 
or rather labour-power, it would be impossible for a surplus of value 
beyond t h i s  t o  be created and measured within the production process. 
But of course i t  i s  t h i s  surplus, which "is nothing but t h e  production of 
surplus labour, the appropriation of unpaid labour i n  the course of the 
actual process of production" (p978), which is  the additional increment 
of value involved i n  the valorisation process. 
I n  t h i s  sense labour is  central  t o  the valorisation process, which 'n 
i t s  turn is  i n t r i n s i c  t o  the whole def ini t ion of capital. Marx makes i t  
clear tha t  t h i s  integration of labour i n t o  valorisation takes place within 
a "real" production process ra ther  than belonging, as t h e  po l i t i ca l  
econanists of h i s  day ( a s  w e l l  a s ,  perhaps, s o m e  of the labour process 
theor i s t s  of ours) assumed, t o  the sphere of circulation. I t  i s  t h i s  unity 
of t h e  concrete process of production, or labour process, and the overall 
objective of valorisation, t ha t  w e  nav go on t o  consider. 
ii) Unity of Labour Process and Valorisation Process 
A s  many labour process theorists have pointed out,  Marx is  clear that 
"The work i s  not done twice over, once t o  produce. ..a use-value...and a 
second t i m e  t o  generate 
(p991).In other words, there is  on ly  one labour process, and tha t  process 
is  concrete and product-specific. Where the  issue gains complexity is  i n  
the analysis  of the 'twofold form" of labour, and this a t  first returns 
us to the basic defini t ion of Walorisation" contained i n  (i) above. 
and surplus value, t o  valor ise  value '' 
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There i t  was pointed out that  the surplus involved i n  valorisation is only 
quantkfdable i n  r e l a t i o n e  a specific proportion of the or iginal  value 
which is  set as ide  ta purchase labour  p e r  (ie "variable capital").  
However. t h i s  still leaves open the question of exactly how extra value 
is  gfmerated by labour w i t h i n  the production process. The key element i n  
the explanation of this is 2, which as w e  s a w  i n  Chapter 2 is a crucial  
pract ical  issue i n  considering organisation of and worker response to the 
labour process. In terms of the generation of value, w h a t  t h i s  means is 
that if the  work, as Naxx puts  i t  ( ~ 9 9 2 ) .  "stops short" a t  the point a t  
which the amount that has been produced is equivalent to the amount of 
(any) conwodities that make up the w r t h  of the  wage, then no extra value, 
c lear ly ,  has been obtained fmm thewrker.  I t  is only when the l abour  
process has been extended beyond the time i n  which the m r k e r  produces 
the  wage-equivalent that e*ta value can be generated. 
How, though, can an equivalence be drawn between a quant i ta t ive element 
such as t i m e  and the concrete,  varied content of the worker's labour? 
The answer is  to be found i n  j u s t  this quant i ta t ive aspect of the labour 
- i n  other words, as w e  noted i n  Chapter 2, not w h a t  thewrker is  making, 
but how much - not how, but how quickly. W e  see below that the development 
of the labour process under capitalism has incorporated a change from the  
extension of the working day (absolute surplus value) to the intensification 
of labour within the working day ( r ea l t i ve  surplus value) a s  s t ra teg ies  for  
the maximisation of t h i s  surplus..Wlt either way the labour is  judged i n ,  
terms of whatever social ly  necessary, or soc ia l ly  average, amount is  needed 
t o  create a surplus a t  a given level  of technical ckvelopent. Thus the 
concrete labour invested inthe labour process is judged as a guantity 
of social ly  necessary labour, which i n  turn transforms the labour pracess 
i n t o  a valorisation process insofar as that quantity represents "an 
excess over the amount contained i n  w a g e s "  ( ~ 9 9 2 ) .  
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The calculation of surplus value i n  terms of an amount (measured as time 
x output) of undifferentiated, quantifiable labour allows us t o  understand 
the crucial  abs t rac t  dimension i n  the twofold character of labour. We w i l l  
be saying more about abstract labour later, a s  w e  w i l l  about the issue of 
its in tens i ty  i n  t h e  discussion of "real subordination of labour". What 
mrx labels "socially necessary" or "socially averagc" labour is  clearly 
w h a t  he refers t o  elsewhere as abstract labour, and is  the aspect which 
he contrasts  with "concrete labour i n  the use-values mf the . tY" 
(p992) i n  h i s  description of labour's dual form. 
But how can the same labour have two di f fe ren t  aspects - the concrete, 
use-value-creating form and t h e  undifferentiated form i n  w h i c h  i t  can be 
calculated solely i n  terms of value? The crucial  p o i n t  here is  that tht 
domination of the useful labour process by the objective of valorisation, 
the overriding purpose of the process as a w h o l e  of the production of value, 
conditions the purpose, meaning and treatment of useful labour. mrx sees 
this dis t inct ion between useful and valorising labour as ar i s ing  within the 
labour process itself: "It is  no longer w e  who make it; instead i t  is 
created i n  the p-ss of production itself "(9933),Here Marx refers t o  
the relation between objectified (use-value) labour and objectifying 
(va lo r i s ing )  labour within the  labour process. The exis t ing use-values 
used as  means of production, materials etc. can only increase the i r  value 
by the  addition of l iv ing  labour within the a c t i v i t y  of the labour process, 
so that this l iv ing  labour is  both considered as value-creating ac t iv i ty  
and is  itself measured in  terms of value, ie money. 
On the one 
c a p i t a l i s t  production as defining the process: T h e  production of surplus 
- value...appcars therefore as the determining purpose, the driving force 
and the f i n a l  resu l t  of the c a p i t a l i s t  process of production, a s  the means 
hand, then,  Elam emphasises the purpose and result of 
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through which the or iginal  value is transformed i n t o  capital" (~9760. 
01 the  other, he shows more prac t ica l ly  e this overriding purpose 
actual ly  reverses the relationships pertaining i n  the "natural"  labour 
process. It is this reversal which w e  go on t o  consider i n  looking a t  
the th i rd  aspect of valorisation. 
iii) Interrelat ion of Labour and capital 
mrx refers a t  several po in ts  i n  h i s  arguwnt  to the not ion of capi ta l  
as "absorbing" or "sucking in" l iv ing  labour, and indeed this metaphor 
seems t o  express the  essence of the process of valorisation. We shall see 
i n  a moment how t h i s  "absorption" func t ion  creates a relationship i n  
which the  worker, rather than employing the means of production, is  as 
i t  w e r e  anployed by than - the  well-knaun concept of thewrker as the 
"tool of the machine", but expressed i n  t h i s  analysis  more f u l l y  as part 
of thevhle transforming role of production relat ions as such. 
F i r s t  of a l l ,  hcwever, it is  important to understand the MtUe of 
the in te r re la t ion  between capi ta l  and labour, w h i c h ,  despite the 
apparently passive nature of labour 's  "absorption" assumes i n  Marx's 
analysis  a highly 
in" t o  the means of production during the canbined labour and valorisation 
process is  seen as playing almost a f e m m t i n g  role i n  act ivat inq "dead 
labour": '%y incorporating l iv ing  labour-power i n t o  the material con- 
s t i t uen t s  of cap i ta l ,  the latter becomes an animated monster and it 
starts to act 'as if consumed by love' 
at  the end of Part 1 of Chapter 7 on the  1abourFocess: T h e  labour process 
is a process between things the c a p i t a l i s t  has purchased, things which 
belong to him. Thus the product of this process belongs to him j u s t  as 
much as thewine  which is  the  product of the pmcess of fermentation 
going on his cellar '1 (Mi=, 1976, p292)- 
act ive fonn. The "living labour" which is  "sucked 
(~1007). mrx makes the same p o i n t  
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There is  thus, i n  principle,  a symbiotic interrelat ionship between capi ta l  
and labour - a "creative" interconnection which  belies the notion, considered 
below (px)) tha t  the  labour theory of value can be understood i n  terms of 
static portions of "emhxiied labour t i m e " . . A s  the twin aspect to the 
"absorbing", "evouring" role of capital i n  re la t ion to labour (which mrx 
colourfully i l lustrates  with his description of Whe means of production" 
a s  "no more than leeches drawing off as large an w u n t  of l iv ing  labour as 
they can" - p988) there i s  also the positive, almost l i t e r a l l y  "life-giving" 
potent ia l  of labour for creating value. 
This posi t ive,  creat ive aspect of labour  i s  apparently drawn at tent ion 
to i n  Cressey and M3cInnes' argument as described i n  Chapter 2 (p15). 
However, fo r  these authors the creat ive aspect of labour is  seen en t i r e ly  
i n  terms of its function i n  the production of use-values. The valoesa t ion  
aspect, which is  w h a t  here defines  the creativity of labour for Man, is 
ignored. Similarly, the description of the ac t iv i ty  of labour i n  the 
valorisation process sheds a d i f f e ren t  l i g h t  on another issue taken up 
by labour process w r i t e r s ;  the transformation of labout-paver i n t o  laboui. 
In the argument w e  have j u s t  examined, t h e  creation of value by labout, 
rather than being a process which i s  itself problematical, is again part 
of the def ini t ion of the production process under capitalism. 
of course, to cite the Marxist argument itself is  to beg the question as 
to whether aspects of worker response do not i n  fact in te r fe re  w i t h  t h i s  
very process of valorisation. Marx's conception of the "real subordination 
of laboi:P, itself an expression of the logic of the valorisation objective, 
has bo th  been criticised for refusing to deal w i t h  the issue of worker 
resistance and inaccurately described as relat ing solely t o  issues  of power 
and domination in the labout process. This question w i l l  be dea l t  w i t h  
fur ther  belm. For the moment, it i s  important to make the point that 
w h i l e  labour i n  its relation t o  capi ta l  is  'kreative" i n  the sense that 
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it expands value, which presupposes that some level of surplus value will 
be generated, t h i s  "creativity" is n o t  a free capacity. but i s  subordinated 
to  and defined by thedaaands of valorisation: IThe worker treats the hide 
he is tanning simply a s  the object of his creat ive activity...If w e  consider 
production j w s t  as a labour process. the worker consumes the means of 
production as the mere mans  of subsistance of labour. But  production is 
a l so  a process of valorisation, and here the c a p i t a l i s t  devours the  
labour-paver of the worker, er appropriates h i s  l i v ing  labout as the life- 
blood of capitalism '' (~1007). 
So the objective of valorisation as it w e r e  cCmMnds the labour of 
the worker, provides an overriding imperative which overwhelms the 
subjective, use-valuecreating aspect of the labour process. In this way 
the "absorbingf' or "devouring" role of capital i n  re la t ion to labout 
assumes an almost concrete presence i n  confrontins the worker as an 
object i f ied s t ructure  w h i c h  reverses the tllogical" relationship between 
a worker and h i s  o r  her means of labour. This, of course, is not sane 
theoretical  process but a real s i tuat ion i n  which the means of production 
confront labour not only "in the  context of the capitalist process of 
valorisation i n  general ( i n  the role of the mans  of production as devourers 
of l i v ing  labout)" but also "in the developlllent of the specif ical ly  
c a p i t a l i s t  mode of production ( in  which machinery, etc., becaaes the real 
master of l iv ing  labout) ." (p983) 
- 
In other words, the overall objective of valorisation comes to be 
expressed in  the form of advanced machinery and technology, and t h i s  is 
the logic  of the "re1 subordination of labout" which w e  discuss below. 
Finally, hanrever, w e  need to define the dynamic behind this reversal 
i n  which the means of production render the  worker the i r  object. Once 
again, w e  find a strange parallel here between the political economists 
c r i t i c i s ed  by Mrx. and modem theorists of the labout process, i n  that 
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both fasten on a specific agent to explain t h i s  objectification. For the 
political cconaalsts, the means of production are capi ta l ;  the things 
actual ly  used i n  the process of production take on the properties of w h a t  
is actual ly  a social relat ion,  and "act" as capital. In other words, 
cap i t a l  is fc t i sh ised  i n  these assumptions. 
-
For labour process theoris ts ,  on the other  hand, the  subordination of 
workers t o  the means of production is caused by the p o l i t i c a l l y  or 
id&logically-inspired wish of capitalists to daninate the workforce. 
This view, and i ts  implications, have been well documented above 
(Chapter 2) .  The crucial  argument of Irtsrx which can be used i n  rebut ta l  
of either of these views is that it is  the re la t ions  of production of 
capitalism, the relat ion between capi ta l  and wage-labour i n  which 
production i s  based on surplus value, which brings about the transformation 
of labour f ran  subject to object. Rather than the means of production 
tcthcmselvesf' taking on the paver to draw labour f r o m  t he  worker, or 
c a p i t a l i s t s  i n  person d i r ec t ly  imposing t h e i r  dr ive for  domination on 
the workforce, i t  is  the relation between the  means of production and 
theworker which have undergone a transformation, or reversal, with 
t h e  onset of cumnodity production. 
I t  is precisely this reversal, and the cconanic relationships w h i c h  
construct it, to which w e  tried t o  draw a t tent ion i n  the argument that 
the requirement of p ro f i t ab i l i t y  s t ructures  "control" rather than vice 
versa, and it is this a n a l y s i s  which makes the concept of valorisation 
50 important for an understanding of the c a p i t a l i s t  labour process. 
i v )  Surplus value is  produced within the Labour process 
'he final area of the valorisation argument is  i n  SMBc ways the most 
fundamental. Star t ing again with the impact of the overall  purpose of 
valorisation on the st ructure  and organisation of the labour process 
("Since the labour process is only the instrument and actual  form of 
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the  valorisation process, ie since its purpose i s  t o  employ the labour 
materialised i n  wages...to create surplus-value..." ~ 1 0 0 9 )  MIX w s  
on to state that "the crux of the e n t i r e  process is  the exchange of 
object i f ied labour for l i v ing  labour, of less object i f ied labour for more 
l iv ing  labour" (~1009).  
There are two points  here: f i r s t l y  that this exchange of "less" for %ore", 
ie the value 
fo; an extra amount of value beyond this supplied by the worker's labour, 
- i s the process of creating surplus value; and secondly that this exchange, 
this process, takes place within the labour process. 
represented i n  the worker's w a g e s  and means of production 
Capi ta l i s t s ,  workers, political economists alike. Mrx argues - a l l  those 
who "fetishist" Capital - are unable to understand the nature of this 
exchange, because to than it appears that  the labour, once "bought", 
is simply another form of capi ta l ,  a value-creating substance added to 
the value already seen as "naturallyll embodied a s  capital i n  the means of 
production. In other words it  is assumed that a cer ta in  quantity of labour 
i s  bought outside the labour process, i n  the sphere of circulat ion through 
the  payment of wages, and that no fur ther  exchange of more value for less 
takes place w i t h i n  the process of production itself. In this way "the 
exchange process that takes place between variable capi ta l  and labour 
p e r "  outside the labour process, is  ident i f ied  w i t h  "the process i n  
which l iv ing  labour finds itself sucked up and absorbed by constant 
cap i ta l  (~1009). 
Thus the same fetishisation w h i c h  trs*tg useful labour purely as value- 
creating substance, because of the overriding requirement of p ro f i t ab i l i t y ,  
is  that which fails  to understand the actual productive process i n  which 
the quant i ty  of use-values represented i n  the worker's wawis  exceeded 
by the  quant i ty  of useva lues  produced w i t h i n  the working day through the 
-77- 
extension of unpaid beyond paid labour t i m e .  The spec i f ic i ty  of the 
capitalist labour process is  lost i n  a perspective which assumes that 
I t c a p i t a l "  i s  embodied i n  the physical means of production of any labour 
process ( j u s t  as, i n  the emphasis by labour process theo r i s t s  purely on 
the use-value-creating function of labour, a l l  labour processes are 
subsumed under an ahistorical category of simply %&ing things"). 
In fac t  the spec i f ic i ty  of capitalism lies i n  its requiranent of sulpEus 
value, and the-generation of t h i s  within the labour process, and the 
recognition of t h i s  has two important implications. The first, as w e  
have suggested, is  fundamental for the  w h o l e  understanding of capi ta l ivn 
as a mode of production; put very br ief ly ,  i t  is  that capitalism is  pre- 
dicated on the existence of wage labour. If not for the payment o f ?  wage, 
there would be no surplus. liDre to the point for  our own analysis,  this 
means that the c a p i t a l i s t  labour process is  based on exploitation, a 
relationship of which Warx's political economists were n o t  aware (under- 
standing, a s  they did, labour within the labour process simply as a resource 
unrelated to the price paid for labour paver) and which it would appear from 
the writ ings of many of today's labour process theor i s t s  that they prefer 
to ignore. W e  shall discuss exploitation,and its relation fn t h i s  respect 
to subsistence issues  within the  labour process, i n  more detail a t  a l a t e r  
stage i n  this paper. 
The second point is  again more di rec t ly  related to discussion of the labour 
process as such. I t  is  t h a t  i f  w e  accept the point that  value is  created 
within the c a p i t a l i s t  labour process, and that the labour process under 
capitalism is  organised 
t o  the reduction of social ly  necessary labour time, the intensif icat ion 
of labour and ultimately the "abstraction" of labour become central  t o  
our considerations. It is  these issues  which w e  go on to  explore i n  looking 
a t  Marx's theory of the "Real Subordination of Labour". 
a value-creating process, then issues  re la t ing 
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R e a l  Subordination of Labour - Mechanisation and Abstraction 
RSL, a s  w e  shall now term it, is  considered here par t ly  as bringing out 
the log ic  of Egrx's theory of va lo r i sa t ion  i n  the context of the develop- 
ment of the labour process, and par t ly  i n  order t o  fur ther  define the 
issues of intensif icat ion of labour, etc., referred to above. It also 
serves, however, to locate some significant differences i n  emphasis and 
approach between Marx and curremt labour process theoris ts .  This section 
w i l l  therefore be divided i n t o  three areas: Recent theoretical  responses 
to the concept of RSL; the theory itself i n  the context Of Marx's overall  
analysis  of the labour process; and f ina l ly  and most importantly t h t  way 
in  which the R S .  manifests itself within today's labour process. 
(i) RSL w i t h i n  the labour process debate. 
The response of many present-day theor i s t s  to the notion of the RSL is  
that i t  somehow eliminates worker resistance and should be c r i t i c i s e d  for 
th i s .  For example, Littler and Salaman argue tha t  "In general it is  
d i f f i c u l t  to avoid the conclusions of Friedman and Cressey and EgcInnes 
that t h e  6SL (formal subordination of labour)/RSL d is t inc t ion  c o n s t i t u t e s  
an inadequate theorization of the relat ion between capital and labour a t  
the p o i n t  of production" and they note sympathetically that Tfiedman i n  
fact suggests discarding the... dist inct ion altogether if it is  going to lead 
people away from dealing w i t h  class relations and c l a s s  struggle within 
modern capitalism" (L&S, 1982, ~253). 
If this is  an attack on the  w h o l e  v i ab i l i t y  of the theory of R S L ,  the 
"defence" (which i n  fact precedes mst of these criticisms )takes place, 
paradoxically, along almost the same l ines .  Thus the Brighton Labour Process 
Group, i n  a 1977 paper w h i c h  aims to theorise the specif ical ly  capitalist 
labour process, begains its analysis  of RSL with the rousing phrases: 
"capital must create capitalist labour process. I t  must have p e r  i n  the 
very heart of production itself so that it can have a so l id  material basis 
for  i t s  overriding objective: 
Similarly, having described the way i n  which machinery allows "capital 
t o  break through the  l imi t s  represented by the speed with which labour 
could perform these functions" 
a s  t h e  "real p e r  of control" of capi ta l  and ask how this 'rpower" is  used 
to achieve valorisation, answering the i r  cam question w i t h  the  s ta tement  
that "The col lect ive worker of machinofacture allcws the imposit ion of 
the au*hori ty  of capi ta l  (plZ).The section concludes, indeed emphasises, 
that: "....the c a p i t a l i s t  labour  process is  that specific form of the  
col lect ive worker based on machinofacture i n  w h i c h  capital, having a 
monopoly of howledge and power over the relat ions between labour and the 
means of production,uses this pwer, this real domination, i n  order to 
enforce the  objective of valorisation 'I (BFLG, 1977, p13)r 
!Ir (BPLG, 1977, p9). 
(plZ),the w r i t e r s  go on to refer to this 
In t h i s  way, rather than R S L  being understood as i n  itself the vehicle ot 
st ructure  of valorisation, i t  is  seen i n  terms of a relationship of "paver" 
which i s  used t o  "enforce" valorisation. This is a crucial  s h i f t  of 
emphasis from the YarxLst perspective, and i s  of course echoed i n  the 
later criticisms of the concept,  the  au tho r s  of w h i c h  see R S L  ( w h i c h  is  i n  
fact translated as real subsumption of labour i n  the Mandel edit ion of 
Capital)  i n  e x a c t l y  those terms of re la t ions  of paver and domination w i t h  
w h i c h  they a r e  themselves preoccupied, and thus as invoking an implausibly 
to t a l  picture  of the purposive dmination of capi ta l  over labour. 
(ii) MIX'S Theory of RSL 
Interestingly,  M a n  h i m s e l f  expl ic i t ly  rejects interpretat ions of the  
i n i t i a l  "takeover" of the l abour  process by capi ta l  put i n  terms of 
political daeination: "subordination i n  t h i s  case (appropriation of 
surplus labour) a r i s e s  from the specific content of the sale - there  is  
n o t  a subordination underlying it...determined n o t  j u s t  by money...but, 
let  us say, by political constraints...There i s  no fixed political and social 
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relationship of supremacy and subordination " (~1025). 
W h a t ,  then, const i tutes  the real subordination (or real subsumption) of 
labour  for Flarx? A s  might be imagined from the foregoing, the concept of 
valorisation is  crucial  i n  a r t icu la t ing  the argument. R e a l  subordination 
of labour i s  the expression of the way the capitalist l abour  process has 
developed i n  order to f u l f i l l  more adequately the  prevail ing objective of 
valorisation. . 
The developent  of real from formal subordination of labour under capitalism 
i s  predicated on two related conditions: a level of mass production 
suff ic ient  to operate capitalism on a social  rather than individual scale, 
and the  t r a n s i t i o n  fm absolute to r e l a t ive  s u r p l u s  value, i e  from the 
maximisation of surplus l a b u r  based only on an extension of labour t i m e  
t o  one based on the more intensive or productive use of labour time. Both 
these features a r e  related by N a r x  to spec i f ica l ly  capitalist forms of 
production: "The enlargement of - scale const i tutes  the real foundation on 
which  the specif ical ly  capitalist mode of production can arise...." (~1022)  
and W i t h  t h e  production of re la t ive  surplus value the en t i r e  real form of 
production is  altered and a specif ical ly  c a p i t a l i s t  form of production 
comes i n t o  being ( a t  the technological level  too) 1' (p1024).Within this 
development of techniques for r e l a t ive  increases i n  surplus value, essent- 
i a l l y  based on t h e  continual, canpetition-inspired, d r ive  to reduce 
social ly  necessary labour time, a l l  the mechanical, technological and 
eventually organisational techniques for the  intensif icat ion of labour 
gathered under the title "real subordination of labour" come i n t o  the i r  
cwn. 
Thus w h i l e  the i n i t i a l  takeover by capi ta l i sn  of the exis t ing labour 
process applied i n  production brings about no instant ,  dramatic change 
i n  the concrete form of that labour process, the transformation i n  
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re la t ions  of production located i n  that takeover carries with it a logic  
the ultimate r e su l t  of w h i c h  i s  that ' W i t h  the real subswnption of labour 
under capitalism a complete...revolution takes place i n  the mode of 
production, i n  the  productivity of workers and i n  the re la t ions  between 
workers and capitalists." (~1035) 
W h a t  brings t h k  about? The point is  that a l l  the tendencies for real 
subordination lie w i t h i n  the transformed re la t ions  of production which 
frame the formal subordination of labour. I t  is  n o t  that some natural  
property of wapi ta l"  imposes itself on labour, changing its content, 
but that the primrity under capitalism of the extraction of surplus value 
operates t o  develop these tendencies tauards a system of production 
adequate for the objective of maximisation of s u r p l u s  value. The tendencies 
involved here are those of accumulation with its accompanying increase 
in  the s a l e  of production, competition which forces the  reduction of 
social ly  necessary labour time, the development of the forces of production 
(machinery, technology) which i n t e r a c t  w i t h  and ensue f r o m  both these 
tendencies. Thus w e  again have the dr ive tmards valorisation as the 
ca ta lys t  for developwnts which have either been seen as inhering i n  the 
Watural" properties of %spital" o r  as ensuing from the otherwise un- 
explained desire  of capitalists t o  dominate the labour process. As w e  have 
t r i e d  to explain, "real subordination" a s  expaunded by Elarx denotes neither 
of these but the way i n  w h i c h  the  re la t ions  of production under capitalism, 
centred on the production of surplus-value, develop i n  a direction which 
most f u l l y  expresses the requirements of t h i s  central  function. 
. 
(iii) Intensification and Abstraction of Labour under RSL 
As w e  have seen, the t rans i t ion  to RSL is  defined cent ra l ly  i n  terms of 
the extraction of relative (as opposed to absolute) surplus value. 
"Relative" is  used i n  relation t o  a. Thus, i n  the extraction of absolute 
surplus value, the amount of value i s  the maximum t h a t  can be provided given 
the standard provision of l abour  within the l i m i t s  set by the length of the 
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working day. The on ly  way to increase  the amount of value avai lable  t o  
the c a p i t a l i s t  a t  this stage was t o  increase the number of hours worked - 
a strategy w i t h  built-in l imitations,  even for Victorian taskmasters. As 
Mrx expresses it, re la t ive  surplus-value "arises when the  individual 
c a p i t a l i s t  is  spurred on to seize the i n i t i a t i v e  by the fact tha t  value= 
the social ly  necessary labour-time object i f ied i n  the product and that 
therefore sulplus-value is created f o r  him as soon as the individual 
value of his product falls  below its social value and can be sold accord- 
ingly a t  a pr ice  above its individual value." (p1023-4) 
. 
-
How can this "fa l l  i n  value" of the product come about? By a reduction 
i n  the time taken by the worker t o  produce it. Thus the drive t o  reduce 
labour t i m e ,  bringing w i t h  it an overall  reduction i n  social ly  average or 
socially necessary labour time, becomes a central  force operating within 
t h e  capitalist labour process. I t  does not, of course, mean an easier l i fe  
for  the worker - though it does allow for an extension of l e i su re  hours. 
What it  does mean i s  an intensif icat ion of labour during the time spent 
a t  work - an immense increase i n  the r e l a t ive  potent ia l  of each hour spent 
a t  work for the production of value. 
Mechanisation and m e r i e n c e  of the Labour Process 
An important d i s t inc t ion  between the labour process of Warx's day and 
that of the present i s  revealed i n  the fact that Mrx s a w  w h a t  he termed 
Ycachinofacture" as the major vehicle of this overall  reduction of labour 
time. The era of "scient i f ic  management", of detailed at tent ion t o  and 
breaking down and measurement of workers' actual work patterns,  had not 
y e t  dawned as W ~ r x  developed h i s  theory of the real SUbordiMtiOn of 
labour. Thus the development of machinery involved i n  large-scale production, 
w h i l e  bringing about "objectively", as it  w e r e ,  a massive intensif icat ion 
of labour i n  terns of the reduction of labour t ime,  w a s  not a function 
of production aimed di rec t ly  a t  systematising pat terns  of work organisation 
a s  such i  
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Leaving aside for  the moment, then, the impact of techniques aimed 
d i rec t ly  a t  w h a t  might be called the "software" of the labour process 
on the experience of the wrker, w e  can divide Egrx's cmnnents on the 
mct of RSL on workers' experience of the labour process i n t o  two 
areas: 
a )  The object i f icat ion of the  means of production. T h i s  can be dealt with 
f a i r l y  briefly,  as much has already been said above (p-), i n  discussing 
the in te r re la t ion  between labour and capi ta l ,  on t h i s  issue. However, 
i t  may be worth reminding ourselves of the l i nk  Egrx draws between 
"the c a p i t a l i s t  process of valorisation i n  general" and "the development 
of the  s p e c i f i c a l l y  c a p i t a l i s t  mode of production ( in  w h i c h  machinery, 
etc., becomes the real master of l iv ing  labour)" (p983) a l ink  which 
ant ic ipates  the l a t e r  argument on the real subordination of labour. In  
other words, the reversal of the producer means of production relationship 
ult imately assumes, on the basis of a scale of production w h i c h  can 
d i r ec t ly  apply "the sciences, of mechanics, chemistry etc., f o r  specific 
ends, technology, etc." (p1024), a highly def in i te  and material shape 
i n  the form of machinery which direct ly  confronts t h e  worker as the 
consumer of his or her labour. 
%e experience of the worker, then, i n  t h e  face of widespread mechanisation, 
is one i n  w h i c h  the organisation of the labour process, the labour process 
a s  object,  has l i t e r a l l y  been taken out of her or his hands. The worker's 
labour i s  dominated by the object i f ied forms of capital. I t  thus becomes 
w h a t  can be argued t o  be, even i n  experiential  terms, abs t rac t  labour. 
b) The abstraction of labour. This immanence of abs t rac t  labour as 
an actual aspect of the organisation and experience of the labour process 
becomes, as we shall see be low,  even more pronounced a t  a later stage of 
cap i t a l i s t  development than that typif ied by mechanisation. Nevertheless, 
mrx's awn description in  the Grundrisse of the impact of mechanisation 
- ,  , 
-04- 
on the worker express pcwerfully the abstraction of labour itself w i t h i n  
t h i s  structure.  
“In the machine...the use  value, i e  the material qua l i ty  of the means of 
labour, is transformed in to  a n  existence adequate to...capital as such.... 
The workerls ac t iv i ty ,  reduced t o  a mere abstraction of ac t iv i ty ,  is  
determined and regulated on a l l  sides by the memdnt  of the machinery, 
and not the opposite...The production process has ceased to be a labour 
process i n  the sense of a process dominated by labou? as its governing 
unity. Labour appears, rather, merely as a conscious organ, scattered 
among the individual l iv ing  workers a t  numerous points  of the mechanical 
system....” ( luBrx,  1973, p693). 
Later i n  t h e  same passage, luBrx  makes t h e  point that “the production 
i n  enormous mass quant i t ies  which is posited with machinery destroys 
every connection of the product w i t h  the  direct need of the  producer, 
and hence w i t h  direct use value; i t  is  already posited i n  the form of 
t h e  product’s production and i n  the relations i n  which i t  is  produced 
that i t  i s  produced only as a conveyor of value, and i t s  use value enly 
as condition to that end ‘’ (Marx, 197% p694). 
In this way the posit ion of labour viewed purely as value-creating, 
as abs t rac t  labour, is applied d i rec t ly  t o  the labour process itself. 
mrx makes clear the connections between the  valorisation objective 
and the abstraction of labour i n  the Resultate: “Complete and t o t a l  
abstraction is made...fran its par t icu lar  u t i l i t y ,  i ts par t icu lar  n a t u r e  
and kind insofar as i t  is  reckoned as value-forminq e l w e n t  and the 
c d i t y  is  reckoned as i t s  objec t i f ica t ion”  (Dragstedt, 1976, p94-5). 
W e  n m  go on to examine the concept of abstract  labour mre closely 
as a possible aid i n  understanding today‘s labour process. 
Abstract Labour 
The concept of abs t rac t  labour, par t icu lar ly  when applied d i rec t ly  
t o  the  labour process, has been viewed with suspicion by many w r i t e r s  
w h o  see i t  a s  negating t h e  constructive conten t  of labour. However, 
there have been some who have w r i t t e n  i n  defence of t h i s  idea. Lucio 
Colletti, for e%uaple, has used it t o  make a l ink  between the discussion 
of al ienat ion i n  the ear ly  work of Karx and a materialist analysis  of the 
c a p i t a l i s t  mode of production based on valorisation. Thus he argues that 
"in the r ea l i t y  of the world of cormoodities...individual labour powers 
a r e  equalised precisely because they are treated as abstract  or separate 
f r o m  the real empirical individuals t o  whom they belong...'Abstract 
l abour ' ,  i n  short, i s  alienated labour, labour estranged or separated 
with respect t o  man himself'' (Colletti, 1969, p84). 
Geoffrey Kay, a more recent w r i t e r  some of w h o s e  criticisms of the notion 
of abs t rac t  labour w e  w i l l  be discussing fur ther  below, has also expanded 
on the concept on an earlier, less critical article. Agreeing with Marx 
that "The exploitation of labour by capi ta l  ... is much more than the 
appropriation of surplus production through the free exchange of 
rorrnnodities. I t  i s  no less than  the mode of production itself", (Kay, 
1976, p4) Kay asserts of the process central  t o  t ha t  mode, "The very 
process of value production i s  itself.. . .the real process through which 
labour becomes abstract"  
the c a p i t a l i s t  labour process under machinofacture, Kay concludes, 'I... 
whereas in  manufacturing the content and organisation of the labour process 
starts from the specific concrete capaci t ies  of the  workforce, modern 
industry abs t rac ts  these capacitkes and starts from tne technical Imper- 
a t ives  of the machine".(Kay, 1976, p4) 
(Kay, 1976, pl) .  Relating this "real process" t o  
In  this way the same cent ra l i ty  of w a g e  labour and exploitation to the 
c a p i t a l i s t  mode of production which w e  pointed au t  above ( p l l )  is  used 
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to demonstrate the rationale of abstract  labour for the c a p i t a l i s t  
labour process. A s  w e  shall see below, Bravennan draws even more specific 
connections between the drive for p ro f i t ab i l i t y  and the approximation 
towards abs t rac t  labour i n  the labour process of l a t e  'capitalism. 
Not a l l  w r i t e r s ,  hwever, are so sympathetic. Kay himself ,  i n  a lat-r 
change of mind. feels forced to admit i n  the context of a sp i r i t ed  
defence of the labour theory of va lue  against  Marx's major critic bhn- 
Bawerk that "To posit abstract or general human labouf i s  apparently ... 
t o  advance an abstraction which has no more content thanthe category of 
general u t i l i t y  that Bohn-Bawek's criticism implies." (Kay, 1980, p54) 
For Kay, Marx's categorisation of abs t rac t  labour a s  wnera l  'productive 
expenditure of human muscles, nerves, brains etc." (Kay, p55) is as 
unrea l  a logical  deduction as bhn-Bawerk's reduction of use-value 
a common property of a l l  objects  (whereas the w h o l e  theory of exchange- 
value i s  based on the  fact that caranodities are qua l i ta t ive ly  d i f fe ren t ) .  
However, i n  re ject ing on these grounds the notion of "abstract labour" 
iwhile being prepared t o  accept the formulation of "socially necessary 
labour") Kay fails  t o  engage with the w h o l e  area of the nature of the 
labour process itself i n  which the atomisation. etc., of work can indeed 
be seen a s  an  approximation i n  r ea l i t y  t o  the valuedefined concept of 
"abstract labour". 
to 
I t  is exactly this issue,  however, which is made central  t o  the analysis  
of the labour process by David G l e i c h e r .  I n  contrast  to Kay, Gleicher 
argues that "the problem of abstract  labour is logical ly  pr ior  to  that  
of socially-necessary labour" (Gleicher, 1983, p98).This is because the 
measurement of the value of cormnodities i n  terms of amounts of socially 
necessary labour presupposes that this labour i s  measurable i n  un i t s  of 
some qual i ta t ive ly  canparable substance, ie abstract  labour. Gleich-r 
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therefore proposes "the rendering of an ontology" of abs t rac t  labour. H e  
begins by c i t i ng  the need for an h is tor ica l  approach i n  which "abstract 
labour is  taken to be actual (concrete) labour that has become independent 
of, and hence homogeneous across, various use-values, and w h i c h  comes in to  
existence ... only w i t h  the advent of capitalism" (Gleicher, 1983, p107). 
Gleicher proceeds t o  examine this, as i t  w e r e ,  historical development of 
abstract  labour i n  terms of the developing tendencies of capitalism. 
-ever. for our purposes the crux of h i s  argument comes when he begins 
to discuss the exact nature of the "abstractedness" of abs t rac t  labour i n  
noting t h e  "f luidi ty  of labour" which capitalism develops. Returning t o  
the problem Kay has already referred to,  that of the se t t ing  up of a logical 
cons t ruc t  "abstract labour" a s  though it w e r e  a concrete r ea l i t y ,  he 
rejects the "solution" proposed by the Rubin school that this real essence 
of an abstraction can "appear h is tor ica l ly  as t h e  social form, money" 
(pll2).This, Gleicher argues, locates the understanding of abs t rac t  labour 
in  the sphere of circulat ion,  whereas "to the contrary, i t  is through the 
development of c a p i t a l i s t  relations of production that labour - which is  
otherwise abstracted from the technical aspect of the labour process only 
i n  thought - b e c o m e s  the  substance of value; ie, a real social phenomenon" 
. 
(P113). 
Significantly,  Gleicher goes on almost immediately to quote from Braverman's 
reference t o  how Taylorism and similar work organisation techniques "bring 
to l i f e  the mrxist concept of 'abstract  labour' '' (Bravenoan, 1974, ~181). 
Within t h i s  perspective, Gleicher can now go on t o  locate specif ical ly  how 
the analyt ical  concept of abs t rac t  labour "comes t o  l ife" a s  it w e r e  within 
the actual  organisation of labour under real subordination. 
Gleicher himself takes as central ly  s ignif icant  the "Babbge principle" which 
argues for the divisionof labour i n t o  its simples elements, which are then 
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d i s t r i b u t e d  among the mrkforce, not on ly  on the grounds of efficiency b u t  
a l so  because such a division depresses w a g e s  by deskill ing.  Leaving aside 
the wage issue for the  moment (this issue w i l l  recur i n  t h e  discussion of 
e q l o i t a t i o n  below) for our present purposes the significance of the 
pr inciple  i s  its transformation of work i n t o  "detail  labour, no longer 
being the production of a use-value." (p115) 
I t  is  t h i s  breakdown, t h i s  atomisation of labour as such i n t o  a series 
of minute units which can be adapted to  produce any usbvalue  t h a t  i n  our 
view const i tutes  the r ea l i t y  of "abstract labour" w i t h i n  the everyday 
workings of the c a p i t a l i s t  labour process. A s  Cleicher concisely sums up 
the i s s u e  earlier i n  his article: "Abstract labour, then, is subjective 
ac t iv i ty  of producing U-value that is not specific t o  the production 
of any s ingle  use-value, but w h i c h ,  t o  the  contrary, represents t h e  
poss ib i l i ty  of producing a wide variety of use-values" 
isat ion,  he later notes, "deepens" this process through extending the 
implementation of detail labour throughout the hierachy of skills so tha t  
labour power %ecomes, f o r  t he  first t i m e  historically, capable of be ing  
anployed across industr ies  i n  the proportion dictated by t h e  rate of 
prof i t "  
labour i s  thus again linked i n  with the development of abstract  labour. 
Hawever, it is  the detai led breakdown of working m e t h o d s  and techniques 
under "scient i f ic  management" which is perhaps the fur thest  refinement 
of t h i s  tendency, one charted in  full by Braveman. 
(p107).Mechan- 
(plll).The role of mechanisation i n  the real subordination of 
Braverman's €aments on the real isat ion of abs t rac t  labour within the 
labour process itself have already been alluded to, and it w i l l  perhaps 
be useful to see a t  this point w h a t  more he has to say on the slbject. 
In the conclusion to his chapter on "The Scientific-Technical Revolution 
and the  Worker" in  which he has already noted, as the prelude to a detailed 
discussion of Taylorisn, that "The reduction of the  wrker t o  the level 
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of an ins t rument  i n  the production process is  by no means exclusively 
associated w i t h  machinery", (Braverman, 1974, p172) Braverman w r i t e s :  
"It i s , f i n a l l y ,  worthy of no te  that i n  management's eyes as w e l l  a s  i n  
t h e  pract ice  i t d i c t a t e s ,  the more labour is  governed by classif ied motions 
which extend across the boundaries of trades and occupations, the more it 
resolves i t s  concrete forms i n t o  the general types of work motions..This 
mechanical exercise of human facul t ies  according t o  motion types which 
are studied independently of the par t icular  kind of work being done, brings 
to l i fe  the M d s t  conception of 'abstract  labour'. We see that this 
abstraction from the  concrete forms of labour - the  simple 'expenditure 
of human labour in  general' i n  Marxs phrase - w h i c h  Marx employed as a 
means of c la r i fy ing  the value of caomodities...is not  something that 
ess t s  only in  the pages of the  first chapter of Capital, but e x i s t s  as 
w e l l  i n  the mind of the cap i t a l i s t .  the  manager, the indus t r ia l  engineer. 
I t  is  precisely their effort and m e t i e r  to visual ise  labour n o t  as a 
t o t a l  human endeavour, but t o  abstract from a l l  its concrete q u a l i t i e s  
i n  order t o  comprehend it as universal and endlessly repeated motions.. . 
Labour i n  the form of standardised motion pat terns  i s  labour used as an 
interchangeable part, and i n  t h i s  form comes ever closer to  corresponding, 
i n  life, to the abstraction employed by Mam i n  a n a l y s i s  of the c a p i t a l i s t  
made of production." (Braverman, 1974, p181) 
. - 
Thus, w h i l e  Braverman was not primarily concerned w i t h  demonstrating the 
r e a l i t y  of the pr inciple  of abs t rac t  labour, his whole  analysis of t h e  
labour process i n  terms of the separation of conception and execution leads 
logical ly  t o  the integration of abs t rac t  labour within t h i s  analysis. The 
pract ical  expression of the separation of conception and execution is, 
h is tor ica l ly ,  "sc ien t i f ic  management". and w e  now turn t o  the examination 
of this and its impact on workers' experience of the c a p i t a l i s t  labour 
process. 
Although Mrx could not have been aware of the development of scientific 
management, i ts pr inciples  i n  fact extend and develop t h e  implications of 
the valorisation objective for  the content of the labour process which he 
identified i n  m e c h a n i s a t i o n .  The aims of s c i en t i f i c  management are a s  f a r  
a s  possible t o  systematise and quantify the methad and t iming of jobs 
(as  w e l l  a s  ra t ional is ing plant  layout, the progressing of components 
through the production process, the machine/wurker relationship through 
ergonomics, etc.). Its focus, then, i s  the w h o l e  area,of t h e  organisation 
of work, an  area i n t o  which capitalism is  forced to extend its gr ip  once 
the requirements of p ro f i t ab i l i t y  can no longer suf f ic ien t ly  be m e t  by 
advances i n  mechanisation alone. The pr inciples  of work organisation i n  
t h i s  area a r e  normally presented for prac t ica l  purposes as "time and motion 
study". 
I t  may be useful to br ie f ly  distinguish between the two elements of "time" 
and "motion". Of the  two, the latter perhaps more clearly deserves the 
label of "scientific".  "Motion study" a s  such was most  f u l l y  developed 
by the Gilbreths, working i n  t h i s  f i e l d  a t  roughly the s a m e  time a s  F.W. 
Taylor. Their a n a l y s i s  of movements i n  work w a s  based on films of workers' 
a c t iv i ty  which w e r e  slaved dawn 50 that the motions used i n  work could be 
analysed in to  fractions of a second. These were then reconstituted 50 
that t h e  smoothest, most un in te r rupted  f low of work could be achieved i n  
t h e  least possible time and with maximum "efficiency". Thenotion of a 
minimisation of effort and fatigue on the part of the worker 
by work study prac t i t ioners  takes its meaning from t h i s  attempt to maximise 
the effect ive inter l inking of work motions ra ther  than from any relaxation 
in  the intensif icat ion of labour - i n  fact qu i t e  the reverse. 
as endorsed 
The uni t s  of labour isolated by the Gilbreths are a t  the m e  time used as 
the basis for t i m e  study. Here a t i m e  i s  allocated to the performance of 
each movement (usually a fract ion of a second) and the times b u i l t  up t o  
~~ ~ 
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c a l c u l a t e  t h e  expected tperformancet' for t h e  range of ac tua l  jobs on the 
shops floor. Such t i m e  s tudy is  almost inva r i ab ly  l inked  i n  w i t h  an  
incen t ive  system of payment meaning that any worker who achieves more 
than 'performance", ie works a t  a faster rate than e s t ab l i shed  i n  t h e  
s tandard times, earns a bonus. The timed u n i t s  of motion used as a basis 
for such schemes (often referred to as "time-measured uni ts")  are a clear 
expression of the f l e x i b i l i t y  and a d a p t a b i l i t y  of a basic substratum of 
worker a c t i v i t y  which can only be referred to as "abstract labour". . 
In tens i f ica t ion , -and  labour  time, indi f fe rence  and exp lo i t a t ion  
W e  have gone on from o u t l i n i n g  Karx's theory of abstract labour as 
embodied i n  h i s  a n a l y s i s  of v a l o r i s a t i o n  and the p r a c t i c a l  expression of 
t h e  va lo r i sa t ion  ob jec t ive  i n  the  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  labour  process  i tself ,  
to showing hav through t h e  development of t h e  logic of i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of 
labour  i n  t h e  techniques of s c i e n t i f i c  management t h e  worker 's  experience 
of work becolpes, almost l i t e r a l l y ,  "abstract"; work becomes a r o u t i n e  
series of detailed movements which for both  t h e  worker and t h e  work s tudy 
technician are to a l l  i n t e n t s  and purposes interchangeable  as t h e  worker 
moves from job to job. Here w e  are t a l k i n g  about semi-skilled d i r e c t  
production jobs i n  manufacturing indus t ry ,  bu t  t h e  point  covers  a w i d e  
area. The impl ica t ions  of t h e  experience of work i n  jobs which have been 
atomised, "synthet ical ly"  measured or time-studied, rou t in i sed  and cast 
i n  a set series of pre-planned movements w i l l  n m  be explored. 
I n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour  
HDW, then, does t h e  worker experience work, i f  i t  is no t  in terms of its 
q u a l i t a t i v e  conten t?  The anwer is p r e c i s e  i n  terms of those q u a n t i t a t i v e  
aspects to  which F a n  has drawn a t t e n t i o n  i n  h i s  exposi t ion of t h e  
measurement of value,  s o c i a l l y  necessary labour  time. For Fan .  "soc ia l ly  
average labour" & "abs t rac t  labour"; bu t ,  e w c t l y  as such, it is  judged, 
no t  i n  terms of i t s  usefu l  content ,  bu t  i n  terms of its quan t i ty ,  which, 
when t h e  l i m i t i n g  factor is time, becomes its i n t e n s i t y .  The cont inual  goal 
of capitalists is  to maximise t h e  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour ,  meaning tha t  
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when the  e q a n s i o n  p o t e n t i a l  of machinery and technology i n  t h i s  regard 
reaches i ts  temporary limits, a t t e n t i o n  is switched to the a c t u a l  organis- 
a t i o n  of labour  itself. 
For t h e  workforce i n  s tandard manufacturing concerns this is clearly 
experienced i n  terms of an overwhelming pressure  towards speed and 
effort; if no t  direct physical  effort, then an  i n t e n s i t y  of concentrat ion 
and p res su re  of app l i ca t ion  which means that t h e  experience of work comes 
as close a s  is feasible to t h e  consis tency,  con t inu i ty  and p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  
that would be expected of a machine. The comments of two workers quoted i n  
Ww Beynon's book Working For Ford sum up this poin t :  "I j u s t  c a n ' t  get 
going on n ights .  Y e t  you've always got the same t i m e s :  Ford's t imes . . . "  
"They decide on t h e i r  measured day how fast  
forget w e ' r e  no t  machines y'knav...f' (Beynon, 1973, ~135) .  
. 
w i l l  work .  They seem to 
There are count less  other examples of t h i s  expression of semi-skilled 
workers' experience,  as w e l l  as managers' matching preoccupations. Such 
empirical "evidence" w i l l  be discussed a t  more l eng th  i n  our next  chapter, 
as w e l l  as i n  the case s tudies .  Meanwhile w e  need to ask: If workers i n  
t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  do n o t  respond to  t h e i r  work p r immi ly  i n  terms of i t s  
q u a l i t a t i v e  content ,  i n  w h a t  terms - do they  respond? 
Indi f fe rence  to  content ,  concern w i t h  reward 
Marx is q u i t e  clear as to t h e  lack of concern sham by workers under the 
real subordinat ion of labour  to t h e  content  of the i r  work, both i n  terms 
of the specific task itself and the branch of indus t ry  i n  which he or she 
works: "Just as capital...views w i t h  i nd i f f e rence  the  p a r t i c u l a r  phys ica l  
guise i n  which labour  appears i n  t h e  labour  process...so too the worker 
looks upon the p a r t i c u l a r  conten t  of his labour  w i t h  equal ind i f fe rence .  
His work belongs to capital, it i s  only the use-value of the commodity 
that he has sold, and he has only so ld  it to acqui re  money and, w i t h  the 
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money, t h e  means of subsistence...If h i s  indifference t o  the par t icu lar  
content of h i s  work does not give h i m  the  power to vary h i s  labour-power 
to order, he w i l l  express h i s  indifference by inducing his replacements, 
the r i s ing  generation, to move from one branch of industry t o  the next, 
depending on the state of the market." (~1013) 
The requirement of industry fo r  f l e x i b i l i t y  and malleabili ty of labour, 
then - f o r  labour that is 'Mved around" a s  required for the objective of 
v a l i r i s a t i o n  - i s  reflected i n  the lack of concern of thesemi-skil led 
worker over the actual work done and her focus, instead, on the sale and 
price of labour-power. I t  is this interaction between the sale of labour- 
power, taking place t h g h  i t  does "outside" the labour process, and worker 
response w i t h i n  the labour process itself, which inour view forms a crucial  
focus for the study of the labour process w i t h i n  late capitalism. 
. 
A useful way of approaching s o m e  of these in te r re la t ions  i s  through the i r  
treatment i n  a paper entitled '2abour The, Work Measurement and the 
Commensuration Of Labour" by P.S. Taylor. While it is  gratifying to see 
at tent ion being paid to the i ssue  of labour-time i n  the analysis of the 
labour process, Taylor's treatment itself reflects a familiar preoccupation 
with the use-value aspects of labour. In  h i s  analysis of worker response t o  
Taylorist  work measurement schemes, Taylor attacks Sohn-Rethel's contention 
that uni t  times under such schemes have an  objective sc i en t i f i c  va l id i ty ,  
through the argument that t h e  timing of jobs i s  always "a process of 
mutually conditioningcalculation on the part of those being timed and those 
undertaking the timing" (Taylor, 1979, p27).Taylor uses t h e  undoubted 
existence of such "workers' measurement" of work as a basis for  emphasising 
the qua l i ta t ive ,  concrete aspects of work i n  the worker's experience, and 
quotes Mxxls dictum that "the work is not  done twice over" (see above, 
p3) to  prove his point. 
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To t a l k  about %workers' measurement" i s  not,  i n  fact, t o  demonstrate 
convincingly that there i s  no "scientific" component i n  the systema+ic, 
standardised measurement of work times by management. Y e t  even on the 
"workers' side", Taylor's exposition can be taken t o  prove exactly the 
opposite of w h a t  he i s  arguing; that workers' "physicaltt knowledge of 
their jobs, w h i l e  undoubtedly far more i n t i m a t e  than that of mangement, 
is n o t  judged and valued 5 concrete, specific labour ,  by i t s  pract i t ioners ,  
but i n  terns  of ways around the job which can be turned t o  the i r  advantage 
when bargaining with management. 
-
. 
The concrete content of work, then, i n  terns of famil iar i ty  w i t h  materials, 
tools,  working methods. is not the  content of some worker experience w h i c h  
reflects an in t r in s i ca l ly  different approach to work from tha t  of 
management, but i s  e, j u s t  as management uses i t ,  i n  a monetary 
calculation. Workers subjected to routine and undifferentiated work patterns,  
in which the intensif icat ion of labour as value-creation is the prime 
perspective of management, w i l l  out of the  eaperience of that intensif icat-  
ion and abstraction see the i r  labour not primarily as concrete and useful 
but a s  an element i n  a value calculation which i n  t h e i r  case re l a t e s  t o  
the  value of the i r  subsistence. Andit is t h i s  dual conditioning of worker 
response to the labour process by the objective of valorisation and its 
corol lary i n  the purchase of labour power - i n  the endemic s t r u g g l e  between 
effort and reward - that the relationship of exploitation, t o  w h i c h  w e  now 
turn,  f inds its expression i n  the heart of the labour process. 
Exploitation and the Labour Theory of Value 
The understanding of "exploitation" on which w e  have progressed so farl 
and which w e  shall cont inue  to uphold, is  one which is  premiss& on an 
analysis  of production of surplus value within the c a p i t a l i s t  labour 
process. This i n  turn b l d s  two fur ther  implications for the management 
or experience of the  labour process : the  extraction of effort on the one 
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hand and t h e  s t rugg le  for subsistence on t h e  o ther .  The concept of "surplus 
value" is, hcwever, itself cont rovers ia l ,  and therefore before t u r n i n g  to 
m e  theor i e s  of exploitation i t  w i l l  be necessary to  take  a brief excur- 
s ion i n t o  the  defence of t h e  labour  theory of value.  
What has been quest ioned by critics of t h i s  theory, l eav ing  the  more 
complex t e c h n i c a l i t i e s  behind, is  f i r s t l y  t h e  l ack  of canmensuration 
between exchange values ,  as measured i n  terms of embodied labour  time, and 
secondly t h e  w h o l e  notion that labour  should or can be considered as t h e  
sole "determinant" of value.  
. 
The first criticism can be approached v i a  Mam's ccmment on classical 
political economy that "it has never once asked t h e  ques t ion  why...labour 
i s  expressed i n  value,  and why the measurement of labour  by its dura t ion  
i s  expressed i n  t h e  magnitude of t h e  va lue  of t h e  product" 
Ricardo's not ion of embodied labour  t imes as t h e  measure of exchange value 
provides  no room for t h e  concept of upaid labour  time as t h e  basis of 
surplus value and for t h e  concept of s o c i a l l y  necessary labour t i m e  
( r a t h e r  than actual labour  t i m e s )  as a standard for t h e  measure of t h e  
amount of surplus value necessary for firms to surv ive  under condi t ions  of 
c a p i t a l i s t  competition. Along t h e  Same l i n e s ,  Ricardo made no d i s t i n c t i o n  
between labour  and labour  power. For h i m  labour  w a s  j u s t  labour - bought 
by t h e  capitalist as such and embodied i n  specific timemeasured segements 
of production. There is  no recogni t ion i n  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  of labour ' s  po ten i  
t i a l  to produce more value than i s  required for the reproduction of labour- 
power, or of t h e  way i n  which t h i s  p o t e n t i a l  is e s t i m a t e d  according to the  
given l e v e l  of development of t h e  forces of production to r e s u l t  i n  a 
corresponding s o c i a l l y  average rate of surplus value. I t  is t h i s  static, 
concre te  view of labour which leads N?.m to  camnent that Ricardo ' I . . . .  
does n o t  examine t h e  form - t h e  pecu l i a r  characteristic of labour that 
creates exchange-value or manifests  itself i n  exchange-value - t h e  na tu re  
(Marx, 1976, p174). 
In o t h e r  words, 
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of t h i s  labour" (Elarx,  1969, p164). 
I t  is through the examination of this 'pecul iar  characteristic", as 
h e l w e i t  and Mohun shw, that the problem of the "lack of canmensuration" 
between exchange-value and p r i ces  can be overcome. cnce it is emphasised 
that su rp lus  value is  produced w i t h i n  the process of production itself, 
through the unique "use-value" of labour power, as opposed to simply being 
realised through exchange, then the l i n k  between t h e  two elements i n  t h e  
re la t ion between value and pr ice ,  social ly  necessary labour time and paid 
labour t i m e ,  can be understood in  the framework of c a p i t a l i s t  competition. 
Different cap i t a l s  w i l l  attempt to compensate for higher than socially 
necessary labour t i m e s  through the pr ice  mechanism, but at  the same time 
the attempt to equate paid labour  times through the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of 
labour takes place within the production process itself. 
(1978) 
The Same significanceand uniqueness of the use-value or labour i n  the 
creation of surplus value can be invoked i n  challenging the second 
criticism mentioned above, that there i s  no basis for "privileging" labour 
a s  the sole determinant of value. An example of t h i s  is  the argument of 
Cutler et a l ,  cited by Olin Wright (cf Steedman, 1981) that a number of 
variables including the socio technical conditions of production, the 
financial  a c t i v i t i e s  of capitalists, and even the weather, play equally a s  
important a part as labour i n  "determining" whether o r  n o t  p ro f i t s  w i l l  be 
produced. However, such conditions come i n t o  a d i f fe ren t  explanatory 
category than the "surplus value" which is  listed alongside them; they 
can only be "determinants" (possible excluders, or necessary conditions) 
and no t  sources of prof i t .  Obviously there are a range of conditions which 
have to be fu l f i l l ed  i n  order for p r o f i t s  t o  be produced, of which labour 
can be said to  be only one; &ever, the specific ro l e  of labour ha- t o  
be understood i n  terms of its unique capacity to create more value than 
i s  required for i t s  C*VD reproduction. To overlook the difference between 
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these  categories i s  once again to relegate labour  to t h e  s t a t u s  of a 
quan t i ty  of embodied labour  time which can be added on to  o the r  equiva- 
l e n t  c o n s t i t u e n t s  to produce (or not ,  i f  one of t h e  "conditions" is  absent )  
the  f i n a l  r e s u l t ,  profit. To do t h i s ,  a s  w e  have tried to shau, is  to 
misunderstand the  unique character of labour  i n  i ts i n t e r a c t i o n  with 
c a p i t a l  as t h e  c re tor  of value  and surplus-value.(For t h e  s t r and  of this 
argument r e l a t i n g  to t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between labour-power and labour ,  see 
P.7ff above, also ch. 2) .  . 
The Cormnodity S t a t u s  of Labour 
The theory of t h e  unique surplus-value c r e a t i n g  func t ion  of labour ,  then, 
far from being undermined by t h e  argument that labour  is no more e s s e n t i a l  
to va lue  production than any o t h e r  "factor" of production, is  i n  fact 
e s s e n t i a l  to an  understanding of capitalism as d i s t i n c t  from o t h e r  modes 
of production. The fundamental role of surplus-value production is, hauever, 
i n i t s  t u rn  condi t iona l  on another  dimension of the  r e l a t ionsh ip  equal ly  
i n t r i n s i c  to t h e  w h o l e  opera t ion  of capi ta l i sm;  w a g e  labour,  e q r e s s e d  i n  
the commodity s t a t u s  of labour.  As a pre lude  to examining the na tu re  of 
exp lo i t a t ion ,  i t  is necessary to a t  least b r i e f l y  touch on this concept 
( i ts  more polit ical  imp l i ca t ions  regarding w o r k e r  response are discussed 
i n  t h e  next  chapter). 
The concept of the c d i t y  s t a t u s  of labour ,  whi le  accepted without  
much comment by many w r i t e r s  wi th in  t h e  labour  process  debate ,  has recent ly  
undergone some questioning. The major t h e o r i s t s  w h o  appear to have se r ious ly  
criticised t h e  concept are John FlacInnes 
and H e r b e r t  a n t i s  and Samuel Bowles (1981). The main argument behind t h e  
' t y ,  but is criticism is that labour  i s  i n  fact not l i k e  any o t h e r  conrmodl 
(1984). W i l l i a m  Lazonick (1983). 
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c r u c i a l l y  d i f f e r e n t ,  no t  indeed i n  i ts capac i ty  to generate  surplus 
value, bu t  i n  i t s  "belonginess" to human beings,  ie  people who are a )  
open to ideologica l  in f luences  from family, school and state and b) 
l i a b l e  to resist and oppose t h e  use  of t h e i r  comoodity. 
Much of t h i s  ground bas a l r eady  been gone over i n  t h e  d iscuss ion  of 
t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between labour-power and labour ,  bu t  t h e  quest ioning of 
the s t a t u s  of labour as  a commodity represents  an even s t ronger  attempt 
by t h e o r i s t s  to remove i s s u e s  surrounding t h e  organisa'tion of an response 
t o  the  labour  process  o u t  of t h e  economic sphere a l toge the r .  Thus G i n t i s  
and m l e s  remark towards t h e  end of t h e i r  article: "...by banishing 
politics and c u l t u r e  from t h e  w r k  place, t h e  r ep resen ta t ion  of labour  
as t h e  use-value of labour  power promotes a technological  view of t h e  
labour process ,  thereby undermining the  c r i t i q u e  of the  au thor i ta r ian ism 
of c a p i t a l i s t  everyday l i fe .  Further ,  i n  t h i s  view i t  i s  t h e  proper ty  
re la t ionship ,  no t  t h e  mare i n c l u s i v e  domination of t h e  labour  process, 
which assumes t h e  c r u c i a l  ana lya ica l  role. C l a s s i c a l  m r x i a n  economics 
thus comes close to the  neoc lass ica l  compet i t ive model i n  which, as 
Samuelson a p t l y  observes,  'it makes no d i f f e rence  whether t h e  capitalist  
h i r e s  t h e  worker, or t h e  o the r  way around'." ( G i n t i s  and -le*, 1981, pi") 
The conception of labour-power as a commodity, i n  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  as i n ,  
say, Lazonick's, is supposed to  remove a l l  considerat ion of response or 
r e s i s t ance  from t h e  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  labour  process. But to understand t h e  
r o l e  of labour p e r  as a commodity i s  to perceive t h e  very opposite of 
th i s .  The sale of labour  power i s  p r e c i s e l y  seen to be not "interchangeable" 
between capitalists and workers i f  w e  understand t h e  r e l a t ionsh ip  between 
the  amount of value paid o u t  i n  w a g e s  and t h e  generat ion O f  su rp lus  value 
i n  t h e  labour process. Even more important ly ,  to understand t h e  role of 
wage-labour as a commodity i n  t h e  workings of capitalist soc ie ty  i s  to 
understand first of a l l  tbat workers have to  sell t h e i r  labour  power and 
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secondly, and c r u c i a l l y  for our  understanding of t h e  labour  process, that 
they have to defend and f i g h t  for its p r i c e .  Resistance wi th in  t h e  labour  
process is  therefore  based on p rec i se ly  those grounds - defence of t h e  
p r i ce  of labour  power, or subsis tence,  on t h e  one hand, ex t r ac t ion  of 
max im surp lus  va lue  on  the o t h e r  - which surround t h e  commodity s t a t u s  
of labour .  The commodity s t a t u s  of labour  i s  thus  i n t r i n s i c  to exp lo i t a t ion ,  
which i n  our  argument i s  submitted to be c e n t r a l  to worker r e s i s t a n c e  i n  
the  capitalist  labour  process. 
Exploi ta t ion 
In those theo r i e s  which have been developed concerning explo*tion itself, 
however, w e  again f i n d  a re luc tance  to confront any economic rationale f o r  
anage r i a l  s t r a t e g y  and worker response i n  t h e  labour process .  Thus while  
w e  have argued that surp lus  value i s  i n t r i n s i c  to exp lo i t a t ion ,  Geoff 
W g s o n  has argued i n  an e a r l y  p i ece  on exp lo i t a t ion  that "Under feudalism 
and s lavery ,  for example, exp lo i t a t ion  can take  place without  su rp lus  value" 
(Hodgson, 1976, p3) and this is  developed to  provide a theory cent red  on 
"appropriation" r a t h e r  than exp lo i t a t ion .  
In t h i s  way i n  later vers ions  of his argument Hodgson extends h i s  "non- 
labour-theory-of-value" d e f i n i t i o n  of exp lo i t a t ion  (1982, Ch.18) to embrace 
four  ca tegor ies :  corporeal, a u t h o r i t y ,  class and, i n  "pre-contractual" 
r e l a t i o n s ,  bargaining exp lo i t a t ion .  To look a t  the  concept i n  t h i s  way 
i s  of course to e l imina te  t h e  not ion of t h e  value-producing aspects of the  
c a p i t a l i s t  labour  process;  a n d  i n  fact Hodgson replaces t h i s  with a 
conception of exp lo i t a t ion  a s  t h e  appropr ia t ion  of su rp lus  value by t h e  
dominant class, which can occur i n  any class-divided m o d e  of production. 
Fxplo i ta t ion  is thus  "criticised" on grounds of its contraventionc.of 
bourgeois ideals of justice and fairness: "The labourer  provides  than 
an appropr iab le  object. But, according to bourgeois ' j u s t i c e ' ,  t h e  
c a p i t a l i s t  rece ives  a reward for providing an appropriable  object" 
(HodgsOn, 1976, ~ 1 5 ) .  
The concept of explo iaa t ion  is thus  l if ted o u t  of t h e  context of production 
and value-creat ion and removed to the sphere of political and ideologica l  
relations a s  an i s s u e  of t h e  inequ i t ab le  appropr ia t ion  of property.  
A similar view of exp lo i t a t ion  a s  "appropriation" of surp lus  P a b w r  and thus  
a s  i n d i c t a b l e  p r imar i ly  i n  moral or " rad ica l"  grounds r a t h e r  than i n  terms 
of an inherent  cont rad ic t ion  wi th in  capitalism, can be found in-i:the work 
of John E. Roemer. Roemer begins  wi th  a complex excursion i n t o  var ious  . 
imaginary "models" which purport  to  show that exp lo i t a t ion  occurs  even 
where t h e r e  i s  no system of proper ty  ownership, no su rp lus  and no i n s t i t u t -  
i o n  f o r  labour  exchange. In thus  moving towards t h e  goal of a "general" 
theory of exp lo i t a t ion ,  he p re sen t s  t h e  argument that exp lo i t a t ion  can be 
so le ly  defined as  the expropr ia t ion  of labour  (in an economy with 2 
producers, if ' fMr i works more than b, and Ms j w o r k s  less than b, 
then j i s  exploitAng i? and that this must "force a reconsiderat ion of 
the classical Marxist claim that exp lo i t a t ion  takes place pr imar i ly  i n  t h e  
labour market and i n  t h e  ex t r ac t ion  of su rp lus  labour  a t  t h e  p o i n t  of 
production" (Roemer, 1982, ~ 2 5 8 ) .  
For R o e m e r ,  exploitation is a simple r e l a t i o n s h i p  pos i t ed  pure ly  i n  terms 
of "a d i f fe ren t ia l . -ownersh ip  of t h e  means of production" which can enable 
one producer,  even i n  an  economy without  a labour  market, to extract a 
more than equiva len t  share of social labour  from a fellow producer. 
However, i n  order to  modify t h i s  "general" m o d e l  towards what Roemer 
conceives of as t h e  mrxist theo re t i s a t ion  of exp lo i t a t ion  and class, s o m e  
notion of coercion is seen a s  necessary.  I t  i s  on t h e  basis of t h i s  that 
Roemer both ( c o r r e c t l y )  locates such coercion a t  t h e  l e v e l  of t h e  economic 
compulsion involved i n  maintaining proper ty  relations a t  t h e  l e v e l  of t h e  
market and ( i n c o r r e c t l y )  dismisses labour  process a n a l y s i s  for making 
such coercion c e n t r a l  to  t h e  task of "ext rac t ing  surp lus  lakour d i r e c t l y  
from t h e  worker". 
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With  t h i s  second argument Koemer has i d e n t i f i e d  a pos i t i on  which sees t h e  
labour process  as c e n t r a l  to exp lo i t a t ion  wi th  one which p resen t s  "coercion" 
a s  equal ly  c r u c i a l  to  acheiving exp lo i t a t ion  within the  labour  process. 
Although K o e m e r  i s  perhaps j u s t i f i e d  i n  t h e  content  of t h e  c u r r e n t  labour  
process  debate i n  imputing such a pos i t i on ,  t he re  i s  i n  fact no  necessary 
connection between t h e  two arguments. I t  i s  q u i t e  poss ib l e  to argue,  as 
Karx does,  that t h e  labour  process  i s  t h e  site of t h e  production of fu rp lus  
value and also to agree  with Roeaer that such producticn does n o t  depend on 
d i r e c t  coercion which r a t h e r  exists i n  t h e  form of economic compulsion a t  i 
the  l e v e l  of the  exchange of labour  power. Roemer himself, however, appears 
t o  have as i t  w e r e  t h r a m  o u t  t h e  w h o l e  of t h e  labour  process  perspec t ive  
w i t h  the  notion of coercion. This  dismissal  of t h e  labour  process a s  c e n t r a l  
to exp lo i t a t ion  i s  i n  its turn  possible for Roemer only  because of h i s  
p e r s i s t e n t  conceptual isat ion of exp lo i t a t ion  as the  appropr ia t ion  :>f surplus 
labour.  H e r e  t h e  r e t en t ion  of "labour" r a t h e r  than va lue  as t h e  conten t  of 
the appropr ia t ion  i s  perhaps mre fundamentally s i g n i f i c a n t  even than t h e  
implicat ions of t h e  term ' 'appropriation" itself. I t  is l o g i c a l  i n  view of 
his r e fusa l  to take t h e  a n a l y s i s  beyond t h e  surrender  of labour  to t h e  
c rea t ion  of value that  Koemer should now 90 on to pose w h a t  he himself 
descr ibes  as the "venerable" ques t ion  of why "mrxists choose labour  power 
as t h e  numeraire commodity for def ining va lue  and explo i ta t ion"  ( K o e m e r ,  
1982, ~ 2 7 3 ) .  
In arguing that "Labour power as a conaodity is no t  unique i n  its magical 
property of producing more value than i t  embodies" (p273) Koemer misses t h e  
po in t  t h a t  labour i s  t h e  sole a c t i v a t i n g  (va lo r i s ing )  force for all forms 
of c a p i t a l  and tha t  it is p r e c i s e l y  i n  t h i s  that the endemic con t r ad ic t ions  
between capital and labour,  e m b o d i e d  i n  exp lo i t a t ion ,  lies. R o e m e r  i s  forced 
to look r a t h e r  for such s t range  se l f - ju s t i fy ing  'purpose(s )  of a theory of 
explo i ta t ion"  as t h e  need for MvBndsts to explain and j u s t i f y  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  
phenomenon of 'poor workers f i g h t i n g  r i c h  c a p i t a l i s t s "  (Roemer, 1982, ~ 2 7 5 ) .  
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Once a g a i n ,  a theory which de f ines  exp lo i t a t ion  simply i n  terms of t h e  
appropriat ion of surp lus  labour  has failed to locate exp lo i t a t ion  as t h e  
site of an inherent  cont rad ic t ion  i n  capitalist  r e l a t i o n s  of production. 
Subsistence as Contested wi th in  t h e  Labour Process 
In our  own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, a dual  approach to t h i s  
cont rad ic t ion  i s  developed i n  which no t  on ly  t h e  incessant  d r i v e  to 
maximise surplus value  through the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour  is emphasised 
but also t h e  pressure on workers' subsistence i n  terms of t h e  expansion 
of paid i n  relation t o  unpaid labour  t i m e .  
. 
It is important to acknowledge not  only t h e  maximisation of unpaid as 
opposed to paid labour  t i m e  i n  terms of t h e  increased p roduc t iv i ty  of 
labour v i a  machinery, technology, work organisa t ion  e t c ,bu t  also t h e  
processes  whereby t h e  value of labour  power is  a c t u a l l y  lavered i n  abso lu t e  
terns i n  two ways: f i r s t l y  i t s  "cheapening" v i a  d e s k i l l i n g  and seco?dly 
mre d i r e c t  a t tempts  to reduce w a g e s  through c u t t i n g  pkerates, reducing 
overtime etc. 
In drawing a t t e n t i o n  to  t h e  cheapening of labour power through d e s k i l l i n g  
w e  do no t  maintain that c a p i t a l i s t s  have introduced techniques which 
d e s k i l l  labour  wi th  t h e  primary purpose of reducing wages; w e  adhere 
ra the r  to  t h e  argument put  so far  that such techniques are introduced i n  an 
attempt t o  reduce s o c i a l l y  necessary labour  time and increase  product iv i ty .  
However, the  effect of such developments i s  that a smaller proport ion of 
c a p i t a l  i s  devoted to t h e  purchase of labour  power, both i n  t h e  wnse  that 
purchased labour  is more product ive of surp lus  and also that, i n  absolu te  
terms, s e m i - s k i l l e d  and unsk i l l ed  labour  is worth less on t h e  labour  
market. This  process is  thus  c l e a r l y  a v i t a l  aspect of t h e  continued potent-  
i a l  of capitals to generate  profit  and i s  r i g h t l y  emphasised by Gleicher  
(1983, ~115). 
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The second po in t ,  however, is more c e n t r a l  to  our  cu r ren t  argument. In 
s t rugg les  over reward within the  workplace itself, whether i n i t i a t e d  by 
workers or management, t h e  i s s u e  of subs is tence  can be a r w e d  to  be brought 
d i r e c t l y  i n t o  t h e  labour  process a s  such. With t h i s  suggestion, important 
to our  awn t h e s i s  as a w h o l e ,  w e  can be s a i d  to  go f u r t h e r  than W i n ,  w h o  
no tes  i n  passing that "These means of subs is tence  themselves form no p a r t  
of t h e  labour  process, which, apart from t h e  presence of e f f e c t i v e  labour 
paver, r equ i r e s  nothing but  t h e  materials and means of labour  '' (Man, 1970, 
1004) . 
. 
A t  t h e  s a m e  time it is, as w e  have seen, c r u c i a l  to t h e  w h o l e  argument 
about va lo r i sa t ion  that Wken w e  look a t  t h e  process  of capitalist 
production as a whole and n o t  merely a t  t h e  immediate production of 
comnodities, w e  f i n d  that al though t h e  sale and purchase of labour  F e r  
... i s  e n t i r e l y  separate from t h e  immediate production process,  and indeed 
precedes it, ye t  it forms the  abso lu te  foundation of capitalist  production 
and is an i n t e g r a l  merit wi th in  it." (~1005) 
-
A s  t h i s  "absolute foundation", t h e  l e v e l  of subs is tence  is cont inua l ly  
contested wi th in  capitalism, and one important expression of t h i s ,  w e  w l d  
sutmit, i s  the endemic s t r u g g l e  over t h e  relation between effort and reward 
which actually takes place wi th in  the labour  process itself. Clear  examples 
of t h i s  are t h e  p re s su res  on piecework norms and overtime oppor tun i t i e s  which, 
as our  case s t u d i e s  show, d a i l y  threa ten  w o r k e r s '  l i v i n g  s tandards as an 
inmediate aspect of t h e i r  i n t e r a c t i o n  with t h e  production process.  
There are two ways i n  which t h e  "subsistence" s t rand of exp lo i t a t ion  d i r e c t l y  
affectsworkers '  experience of and response to t h e  labour  process: 
(i) Workers' va lua t ion  of t h e i r  labour as t h e  substance of a commodity 
W e  have a l r eady  discussed, i n  looking a t  t h e  ccxmnodity s t a t u s  of labour ,  
t h e  way i n  which workers'response to t h e  labour  process is based c e n t r a l l y  
on r e s i s t a n c e  around and defence of t h e  price of l a b o u r  paver. More 
immediately i n  terms of the  rationale and meaning of work as a d a i l y  
experience, it can be sa id  that for workers engaged d i r e c t l y  i n  producing 
surplus this i s  seen overwhelmingly i n  terms of subsis tence,  of "working 
for money". This c e n t r a l  conception of work i n  terms which relate to the  
market has an i m p a c t  evenuhere subs is tence  i s  no t  d i r e c t l y  tied i n  wi th  
the  organisa t ion  of t h e  labour  process itself; workers a t  Ford's, for 
example, who w e r e  pa id  on a day r a t h e r  than a piecerate, w e r e  never the less  
so disenchanted by t h e  company's a t t i t u d e  towards p a r i t y  and o the r  pay 
i s s u e s  that c m i t m e n t  to t h e  work itself dropped sharply (Beynon, 1973); 
similar r e l a t i o n s h i p s  are shown i n  Edwards and S c u l l i o n ' s  (1982) study. 
(ii) Pay as an "incentive" 
Nevertheless,  it is wi th  t h e  direct use of pay as  a sanct ion within t h e  
labour process  - as an "incentive" - that  w e  are m o s t  concerned. While 
PEirx again s p e c i f i c a l l y  rejects t h e  s i g n i f i t a n c e  of piecework - t h e  piece- 
wage i s  nothing but  a converted form of t h e  time wage"(p692) - it i s  clear 
from our  case s tudy  examples (chapters  4-7 passim) that the  use  of piecework 
and o t h e r  forms of bonus, a s  w e l l  as overtime payments, p l ays  a crucial role 
i n  t h e  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour.  A s  maximiserstof t h e i r  OWD subsis tence,  
workers c l e a r l y  have a motive for cont inuing i n  such practices; a s  a worker 
i n  our  f irst  case s tudy  comnented, "They (management) don't  like lw 
performance, t h e  people on t h e  floor don ' t  like low performance e i the r . "  The 
ob jec t ives  of management and workers are here inherent ly  cont rad ic tory ;  
they can be expressed as t h e  maximisation of on t h e  one hand unpaid and  
on t h e  o t h e r  paid labour  time. But, wi th in  t h e  reward/effort nexus 
in t eg ra t ed  i n  t h i s  way i n t o  t h e  labour  process itself, t h e  two c o n f l i c t i n g  
ob jec t ives  c r u c i a l l y  i n t e r a c t  and form an  edemic basis for c o n f l i c t .  A s  
such t h e  s t rugg le  over subs is tence  i s  brought d i r e c t l y  i n t o  t h e  h e a r t  of 
t h e  l a b o u r  process itself and i n t e r a c t s  w i th  t h e  capitalist o b j e c t i v e  of 
va lo r i sa t ion .  
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In t h i s  prior sec t ion  on exp lo i t a t ion  w e  have attempted to  locate t h e  
cont rad ic t ions  inherent  i n  t h e  production of surp lus  va lue  and to expand 
the  a n a l y s i s  i n t o  t h e  h p c t  of exp lo i t a t ion  on workers no t  only i n  terms 
of the  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of t h e i r  labour  but  also i n  r e l a t i o n  to t h e i r  
s tandards of l i v i n g .  W e  CJO on to examine hcw t h i s  fundamental structure 
of exp lo i t a t ion  may a c t u a l l y  surface,  or be 'phenmenalised",  i n  t h e  d a i l y  
experience of the  worker. 
W e  conclude, then, by looking a t  t h e  way i n  which t h e  con t r ad ic t ions  
discussed may emerge i n  the experience of t h e  m r k e r ,  focussing on t h e  
question: Can workers perceive exp lo i t a t ion?  Clear ly ,  a l though workers 
of ten refer to a d i s t i n c t i o n  between %y t i m e "  and " the company's t i m e "  
(see case s tud ie s )  t h e  d iv id ing  l i n e  between t h e  amount of va lue  represented 
i n  w a g e s  and t h e  surplus value  produced beyond t h i s  is  no t  one which can be 
"perceived" i n  t h e  course of a working day, even by t h e  most c lass-conscious 
worker. 
The "phenomenalisation" of exp lo i t a t ion  i n  t h e  experience of t h e  worker 
does no t ,  then, l i e  i n  t h e  any direct percept ion of t h e  ex t r ac t ion  of 
unrecompensed value,  bu t  i n  t h e  expression of t h i s  process  i n  terms -f an 
endemic s t rugg le  w i t h i n i t h e  labour  process  over factors themselves 
e x t r i n s i c  to t h e  conten t  of work itself, t h e  amount of effort required of 
the  workforce and t h e  l e v e l  of reward received by them. To pose t h e  
material expression of exp lo i t a t ion  i n  terms of t h i s  effort/reward nexus 
is to reeall t h e  concept of t h e  "effort bargain" developed by Baldamus (1961) 
i n  the  50s and now enjoying s o m e  renewed a t t e n t i o n  as a perspec t ive  on t h e  
labour powerjlabour quest ion.  However, Baldamus' conception of t h e  effort 
bargain conta ins  no a n a l y s i s  of c o n f l i c t ,  concentrat ing r a t h e r  on t h e  
%argain" side of the managerial problem of t h e  incomplete contract between 
gnployer and employee. By c o n t r a s t ,  our  argument, whi le  emphasising t h e  
expression of exp lo i t a t ion  a s  a s t rugg le  which embraces both effort and 
reward, invokes an inherent  cont rad ic t ion  and thus  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  c o ? f l i c t  
between t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of labour  and cani ta l .  
An i n t e r e s t i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e  a t tempt  a t  a phenomenalisation of exp lo i t a t ion  
i s  made by S r i k  Olin Wright (cf Steedman, 1981, p67) i n  h i s  ca tegor ica t ion  
of d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t a  of labour  time and t h e i r  r e l a t ionsh ip  to “forms of class 
struggle“.  The s igni f icance  of Wright’s complex d iv i s ion  of t h e  working day 
in to  many more l e v e l s  than are implied by t h e  simple d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
paid and unpaid labour  t i m e  lies no t  50 much i n  any a t tempt  to invoke worker 
perception of such d i v i s i o n s  a s  i n  the  argument t h a t  battles over labour  time 
can once again be l inked  to t h e  “ v a r i a b i l i t y ”  of labour  and thus  to managerial 
problems of “control”.  Thus Wright’s later argument appears to suggest that 
the  s t rugg les  over the l eng th  of rest breaks,  etc., which obviously do go 
on a t  the  po in t  of production, are a t  t h e  c e n t r e  of the  s t rugg le  to extract 
s u r p l u s  value.  In t h i s  way emphasis i s  l a i d  on t h e  at tempt  to minimise non- 
productive t i m e  r a t h e r  than on the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour  during product- 
i ve  t i m e  i n  order to maximise surplus value.  In fact t h e r e  is a buil+-in 
l i m i t  to t h e  ex ten t  that managerr.ent can con t ro l  t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  of labour  
p e r  by i n s i s t i n g  that as many product ive hours as possible be worked, 
and t h i s  is the l i m i t  to which Marx drew a t t e n t i o n  i n  h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  
between abso lu te  and r e l a t i v e  surp lus  value.  The real nub of t h e  s t rugg le  
over exp lo i t a t ion ,  then, must be seen i n  t h e  at tempt  to minimise pa id  
labour t i m e  wi th in  production, by decreasing s o c i a l l y  necessary labour  t i m e  
through t h e  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour ,  r a t h e r  than by l i m i t i n g  non- 
productive t i m e .  Part of t h i s  s t r u g g l e  onthe  workers’ side is  also t h e  
attempt to maintain or inc rease  reward or, i n  a d i f f e r e n t  formulation, to 
maximise t h e  amount of paid labour  t i m e .  
Exploi ta t ion,  consciousness and r e s i s t a n c e  
One objec t ion  to t h e  perspec t ive  w e  have tried to  o u t l i n e  i n t h i s  chapter  
is that i t  assumes t h e  ex i s t ence  of exp lo i t a t ion  and t h i s  i t s  i m p a c t  i n  
s t rugg le  whether or no t  workers are conscious of t h e  fact that they are 
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exploi ted.  m p l o i t a t i o n ,  as w e  have a l ready  pointed ou t ,  cannot be 
'perceived" as such, bu t  our argument does no t  depend on t h i s  perception. 
A s  Cutler et a1 c o r r e c t l y  p i n t  o u t ,  "kBrx does no t  make t h e  class s t rugg le  
dependent on consciousness of exp lo i t a t ion"  (Cutler et a l ,  1977, p469. The 
way i n  which class experience and thus  consciousness i s  m e d i a t e d  by t h e  
underlying r e a l i t y  of exp lo i t a t ion  w i l l  be examined more c lose ly  i n  a 
moment. Meanwhile w e  90 on to explore  t h e  impl ica t ions  of c e r t a i n  ways of 
presentinq! t h e  a n a l y s i s  of exp lo i t a t ion .  
A s  an example, w e  have s o m e  d e f i n i t i o n s  by Erik Olin Wright i n  an earlier 
p a r t  of t h e  art icle discussed above. Wright observes: " C l a s s  s t r u g g l e s  do 
not d i r e c t l y  affect surplus-value and exp lo i t a t ion ,  bu t  operate through 
effects on t h e  socic-technical condi t ions  of production ... and on t h e  real 
w a g e  of workers...In capi ta l i sm,  p rec i se ly  because the  performance 0.9 
surplus %abour i s  disguised through t h e  exchange process and t h e  organis- 
a t ion  of production as a capitalist  labour  process, class s t rugg les  are never 
over surplus labour  assuch" (Steedman, 1981, p54).Gf course,  assessment of 
t h i s  argument depends p a r t l y  on the def in i t ionof  "class struggle". But ,  
if i t  is  extended to include everyday r e s i s t a n c e  by workers wi th in  t h e  
capitalist labour  process, evenif  class s t rugg les  are n o t  "over" exp lo i t a t ion  
they can be regarded as  a funct ion of i t  (and thus,  i n  tu rn ,  as "affect ing" 
i t).  W h a t  Wright i s  doing here  is tak ing  t h e  "obscuring" or mystifying 
of exp lo i t a t ion  a s  t h e  basis for t h e  assumption that the re fo re  t h e r e  is 
no r e l a t ionsh ip  between exp lo i t a t ion  and class s t rugg le .  Workers do not  
perceive t h e i r  exp lo i t a t ion  ( e i t h e r  i n  r e a l i t y  or conceptual ly) ,  t he re fo re  
t h e i r  s t rugg le s  can have nothing t o  do wi th  i t .  
In c o n t r a s t  to  t h i s  w e  are concerned to s h w  that i t  is t h e  underlying 
s t r u c t u r e  of exp lo i t a t ion  which has t h e  immanent effects wi th in  t h e  capitalist  
labour process which workers resist. In t h i s  sense w e  have to  ask: w h a t  i s  t h e  
meaning of exp lo i t a t ion  for t h e  mrker? This  way of posing t h e  quest ion is 
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provoked by another  formulation of exp lo i t a t ion ,  t h i s  time put  by G.A. 
Cohen. Cohen argues (on t h e  basis of a "reduced" def in i t ionof  exploitation 
s t a t i n g  simply that workers rece ive  less value than they create) that "The 
labour theory of surplus-value is, then, unnecessary to the  moral claim 
Wmists make when they  say that capitalism i s  exp lo i t a t ive .  I t  does no t  
matter what exp la ins  the d i f fe rence  between t h e  va lue  t h e  worker produces 
and t h e  value he rece ives .  W h a t  matters is j u s t  that t h e r e  i s  t h a t  d i f fe rence  
between t h e  value the  worker produces and t h e  value he receives .  W h a t  matters 
is  j u s t  that the re  i s  that d i f f e rence .  (Cohen, 1981, p208) But the  
explanation, or the  reason, for "that d i f fe rence"  does matter i n  that i t  is 
the incessant  d r i v e  to extract surp lus  value,  w i th  its consequent a s s a u l t  
on workers' l i v e s  and l i v i n g  s tandards,  which cons t ruc t s  t h e  experience of 
l a r g e  numbers of, i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  semi-skilled workers. When asking whether 
i t  mat te rs  f o r  moralists, s o c i o l o g i s t s  or philosophers ,  i t  would perhaps 
not be o u t  of p l ace  to a sk  whether it matters f o r  t h e  working class. 
-
In concentrat ing on workers' experience of exp lo i t a t ion  through t h e  a n a l y s i s  
of its expression i n  t h e  effort bargain and s t rugg les  around labour  t i m e , w e  
have no t  on ly  sought to locate t h e  a n a l y s i s  of explo i ta t ion  i n  surplus-value 
production but  have also, through t h i s  l oca t ion ,  presented a content  of 
worker r e s i s t ance  which is p r imar i ly  Ileconomistic"- concerned wi th  pay, 
a l loca t ion  of jobs,  job timings,  j ob  s e c u r i t y  - r a the r  than cen t r ing  on 
i s sues  related to t h e  use-value-producing aspects of t h e  labour process.  
The impl ica t ions  of a theory of exp lo i t a t ion  based on t h e  production of 
surplus value wi th in  the c a p i t a l i s t  labour  process are thus  two-fold. On 
the one hand i t  i n d i c a t e s  a l e v e l  of i n t e r n a l  cont rad ic t ion  wi th in  capitalist 
r e l a t i o n s  of production which, it is argued, is  more fundamental and thus  mre 
generat ive of continued r e s i s t a n c e  than t h e  moral incons is tenc ies  which are 
highl ighted by a conception of exp lo i t a t ion  as "appropriation". On t h e  o the r ,  
it focusses  on t h e  need to examine the  material impact of t h e s e  contradict-  
ions wi th in  the d a i l y  operat ion of t h e  capitalist labour  process  and i n  t h i s  
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l i g h t  to reasses t h e  conten t  and l i k e l y  t r a j e c t o r y  of worker r e s i s t ance .  
W e  thus  a r r i v e  a t  an ana lys i s  which t u r n s  t h e  problematic,  so to speak, 
the  o t h e r  way round - f r o m  t h e  
to consciousness and r e s i s t ance  by workers, r a t h e r  than f r o m  t h e  l e v e l  of 
mnsciousness  implied by an assumption of o v e r t  r e s i s t a n c e  to t h e  develop- 
ment of the  labour process  as such, to the  Wontrol 'Lbased r e s i s t a n c e  which 
i s  predica ted  on that consciousness. Notions of s t rugg le  wi th in  t h e  labour 
process  centred pu re ly  on t h e  a r t i c u l a t i o n  of "power" r e l a t i o n s  between 
management and t h e  workforce must be re-evaluated i n  the contexl  of an 
ana lys i s  which locates an endemic l e v e l  of confl ic t  i n  econmnic cont rad ic t -  
i o n s  r a t h e r  than ideologica l  s t ruggles .  
of experience i n  c a p i t a l i s t  r e a l i t y  
The response within i n d u s t r i a l  sociology to  c o n f l i c t  a t  the  po in t  of 
production has veered from por t ray ing  shop-floor s t rugg les  as irredeemably 
parochial  and r e s t r i c t e d  to present ing  them as  revolut ionary examples of 
"workers' control".  The la t ter  i s  obviously far from t h e  t r u t h .  Nevertheless 
it is worth quest ioning t h e  c u r r e n t  preoccupation w i t h  ideological categories 
i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  labour  process and explor ing t h e  poss ib l e  political 
implicat ions of t h e  more pragmatic s t ru- les  focussed on in the above. These 
ques t ions  w i l l  be d e a l t  wi th  a t  more leng th  i n  the next  chapter .  
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The "Real World" of Workers 
1 Introduct ion 
In  t h e  ana lys i s  M far w e  have both criticised t h e  cu r ren t  "labour 
process  debate" for p l a c i n g  too l i t t l e  emphasis on t h e  material consider- 
a t i o n s  underlying both "control" and " res i s tance"  within the l abour  Frocess 
and a l s o ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  last chapter. presented an  a n a l y s i s  of the  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  c a p i t a l i s t  labour  process  which locates worker r e s i s t a n c e  i n  
the fundamental economic cont rad ic t ions  a t  the hea r t  of t h a t  process. From 
both of these p o i n t s  of v i e w  w e  have a r r i v e d  i n  effect a t  a oonception of 
worker response to the labour process as pr imar i ly  economistic; and i t  is 
t h i s  conception which w e  now set o u t  t o  defend. 
A defence i s  required,  for the notion of %conomisml', first identified 
by Lenin, i s  no t  a popular one. The response of most t h e o r i s t s  
either to condemn economistic a c t i v i t y  on t h e  part of t h e  working class as 
"incorporat ionis t"  or "labouris t" ,  or simply to pretend tha t  it does no t  
e d s t . . I n  this chapter I set out  first of a l l  to  show that worker response 
- is l a r g e l y  economistic, and secondly to b r i n g  o u t  the political implications 
of this very economism i n  terms of the fol lowing three points:  
(i) llKcOnanistic" s t r u g g l e s  by workers, i e  those surrounding pay and 
other terms and condi t ions  of employment, are based on fundamental contradict-  
ions  within production which inf luence and characterise the capitalist 
system as a w h o l e .  
(ii) The na ture  of emnomistic r e s i s t ance  is n e i t h e r  as static or as 
inherent ly  l imi t ed  as much of t h e  literature has sugges ted .  EcOnOruistiC 
a c t i v i t y  by workers i s  not only endenic, becasuce of t h e  con t r ad ic t ions  
referred to above, it is  also dynamic and explosive - movanmts based on 
ecamic demands can much fu r the r  than t h e  demands themselves. F ina l ly ,  
has been 
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the  role of economistic s t ruggles  i n  undermining the p o l i t i c a l  and ideological  
hegemony to which r e c e n t  writers have dram a t t e n t i o n ,  should be recognised. 
(iii) Spontaneous outbreaks of r e s i s t ance  by workers which are t r iggered  by 
the  cont rad ic t ions  w i t h i n  the  capitalist labour  process may themselves be 
t r a n s i t o r y  (as many of t h e  examples below s u g g e s t )  but they c o n t r i b u t e  to 
t h e  bui lding up of Working c l a s s  organisat ion,  w h i c h  itself has political 
ramif icat ions and may l e a d  to widespread a c t i o n  i n  defence of that organisat ion 
wi th  t h e  po ten t i a l  to chal lenge the  capitalist state. 
In eqxnd ing  on t h e s e  th ree  p o i n t s  the  argument w i l l  engage no t  on ly  with 
the  approach to  worker response presented most r ecen t ly  w i t h i n  t h e  labour 
process  debate, but also with the much w i d e r  l i t e r a t u r e  on "class conscious- 
n e s s "  which has captured the  a t t e n t i o n  of t h e o r i s t s  over  much t h e  Same period 
a s  t h e  large-scale d e v e l o p e n t  of mass product ion and apparent d e c l i n e  i n  
revolutionary a c t i v i t y  
s ince  i t  is wi th  t h e  labour  process itself that we are c e n t r a l l y  concerned, 
w e  begin by looking more c lose ly  a t  w h a t  the  labour process debate has had t o  
say about worker response. 
by the  working class, ie the  post-war years .  W e v e r ,  
2 Workers and the  Labour Process: A "Front ier  of Control"? 
In  earlier chapters, e spec ia l ly  Chapter 1, w e  attempted to spec i fy  the main 
f ea tu res  of the  position within t h e  labour  process debate on worker response, 
which, as w e  a w ,  w a s  pinpointed by many writers as t h e  major ormoission of 
Braverman's ana lys i s .  Three key areas w e r e  picked out: worker r e s i s t a n c e  to  
desk i l l i ng ,  resistance to  the  transformation of labour m e r  i n t o  labour,  and 
a dyaamic of class struggle/managerial domination i n  which the main i s s u e  Of 
con te s t ,  if any, i s  the r e l a t i o n s  o f  production themselves. 
Htwever, none of t h e s e  three areas give us a very p r e c i s e  description of the 
actual na ture  of w o r k e r  r e s i s t ance  on a d a y - t e y  basis wi th in  t h e  labour 
process,  p a r t i d r l y  given the  insistence of many w r i t e r s  that struggle 
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continues under the  real subordination of labour  (a p o i n t  w h i c h ,  as w e  have 
t r i e d  to s b ,  n e i t h e r  F l a n  nor Brave- would wish to deny). The most 
specific references to  t h e  ac tua l  na tu re  of wor@lace s t rugg les  seem m 
appear once again under t h e  heading of "control", t h i s  time discussed from 
the  Workers '  side". W e  s h a l l  therefore  b r i e f l y  survey t h e  examples of 
"control" which a r e  presented as e i t h e r  aspired t o  or exercised by workers 
within t h e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  and gu on t o  relate these  to t h e  conception, cur ren t ly  
enjoying a popular r ev iva l ,  of a " f r o n t i e r  of control". 
(he area i n  which a clear spec i f i ca t ion  of "control" objectives by workers 
i s  a r t i c u l a t e d  appears  to  be that of d r i v e s  towards worker "discret ion" or 
tlautonomyt*. Here a d e f i n i t e  focus on job content  i s  marked o u t  by the  
argument. L i t t l e r  and Salaman, for example, quote  Bendix i n  po in t ing  out  
t h a t  "'...there exists an exercise of discretion inpor t an t  even i n  r e l a t i v e l y  
menial jobs. ...'I* to which they add: 'Whi ls t  such zones of discret ion may be 
squeezed by Tay lo r i t e  employer s t r a t e g i e s  or by the  in t roduct ion  of new 
technology, it never i s  reduced to zero. Thus workers are s t i l l  raced with 
a l t e r n a t i v e  courses of action when presented with a piece pass ing  by on t h e  
assembly l i n e "  ( L i t t l e r  & Salaman, 1982, p262).The same rather marginal 
degree of worker choice over the  outcome of t h e  labour process is  referred to 
i n  W o o d  and Minwaring 's  notion of "Vacit skills" (cf Wood and Wainuaring, 1984) 
Writers like Hill  (1981) and Storey (1983) have also a t  times defined 
mnt ro l  on the part of workers i n  te rms  of discretion and autonomy; Hill  
i n  con t r ad i s t inc t ion  to the strategies 0l.ployed my ~MMgers to +in control :  
The concern to restore creativity and mtrol is a reaction aga ins t  
those -+rial strategies described ear l ie r . .Al thouph ... n e  campanies 
hsve learnt that an acceptable degree of managerial control Can mr be 
maintained without t o t a l l y  denying shopfloor discretion...the control 
issue...brings into the open the fact that p r o f i t a b i l i t y  has depended on 
denying autommy and crea t iv i ty ."  (Hiill, 1981,131)- 
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Storey again directly re la tes  the two issues  of autonomy and control 
(on the workers' part), emphasising the "importance of preserving sane 
scope for autonomous regulation, the need for  some measure of control. 
I t  is hard to imagine a 100 per cent  production standard being maintained 
precisely as ordained without s o m e  attempt being made to vary the routine. 
mually,  other forms of res t r ic t ion  of output cannot be equated wi th  this 
drive for autonomy " (Storey, 1983, 169). 
As sham belcw, it i s  theoretically possible to analyt ical ly  distinguish 
a drive for "control** per se on the part of workers. -ever, the problen 
i s  tha t  both inpract ice  and as t h a t  practice is reflected i n  t h e  comnents 
of the theoreticians,  such issues  are rarely separated from w h a t  are, 
i n  terms of the quest for  "wntrol", the  much muddier waters of workers' 
general defensive strategies a t  the point  of production. -ugh a 
theoretical s l e igh t  of hand, rather similar to that involved i n  the analysis 
of management, a conflation ocams between these rather  more down-to-earth 
ac t iv i t i e s  and an assumed overarching objective of "controlp1. 
Thus d i rec t ly  after d e f i n i n g  c o n t r o l  i n  terns of a n  immediately jot+ 
related autonomy. Storey provides on the next page as an example of a 
control struggle by workers the response of the Solihull  Rover shop 
stewards to the planned closure of their plant. Earlier, a list of exanples 
of worker resistance ranges from the halt ing of the BL Metro Line because of 
speed-up, through the miners' reversal  of the p i t  closures plan 
to the defeat of the Industrial  Relations A c t .  While these are indeed a l l  
examples of worker resistance, they cannot be presented i n  an undifferentiated 
fashion a s  instances of the managerial d i f f icu l ty  w i t h  transforming labour 
parer i n t o  labour, as is the case i n  Storey's argmemt. 
i n  1980-1 
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A s i m i l a r  conflation i s  evident i n  Paul Thanpsonrs (1983) presentation 
of a number of d i f f e ren t  arguments by labour process writers on the 
i s sue  of tocontrol" by workers. Thus Thcmpson, having aligned t h e  
arguments of Friedman on "responsible autonomy" a long  w i t h  those of 
mrawoy and Edwards i n  making the po in t  t h a t  the concentration of 
capital itself  pushes managers to grant or concede levels of discretion 
to the  shop floor", refers to the major empiriral example i l l u s t r a t i n g  
Friedman's thesis, the car i ndus t ry  i n  Coventry. i n  which the p r i n c i p l e  
of muta&lfty has long been a key f e a t u r e  of worker arganisa t ion .  In this 
way ques t ions  of the %tidiscretion" or "autonomy** of workers on the shop 
floor are d i r e c t l y  tied i n  with w h a t ,  when looked a t  closely, is a hard- 
nosed and extremely effective example of workers organising round 
pr imar i ly  eomcnuic issues.  *lE+rtuality" is  defined i n  this very a r g m e n t  
as process of m u t u a l  determination of piecewDrk p&ccs, and of the 
introduction of new methods w h i c h  would affect these prices, between tbe 
mrkforce and managaacllt. A r e  we then to  conclude that the notion of "control" 
boils dam to no more than the paruckid1 and piccsacal bargaining over 
effort and revard which i n  the past, as  pointed out i n  Chapter 2. has beem 
regarded as being ou t s ide  the territory of the l abour  process debate? 
If this is indeed the case, the l i t e r a t u r e  shavs l i t t le recoqiition of it. 
The a m f l a t i o n  between thc kind of defensive pxuduction-related activity 
which can plaus ib ly  be glven the titic of "job amtrols" and the far 
b d & r  and more elevated objective of "wrkers' control" i s  i n c i s i v e l y  
demonstrated by Jean Wmds (1976) i n  his critique of the argmmts of 
labour h i s t o r i a n s  such as Wmtpomery. Stone ud Hinton. Y e t  Thmpson 
again glosses over the crucial differences between these two areas when 
he writes that  ~y;oodrich~s classic study of workshop politics shaved har 
rorkers countered ranagerial p e r  by extending their om 'frontiers of 
control '  wi th  respect to organisa t ion  of rrork. changes i n  tcchnolosly, and 
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methods of payment. Demands f o r  workers' con t ro l  were an ex tens ion  of the  
degree of job  con t ro l  a l ready exercised" (Thompson, 1983, 59). 
The i r o n y  i s  t h a t  Goodrich, author both of t h e  book and of the  phrase,  "The 
Frontier of Control", which has r ecen t ly  gained such popu la r i ty  among the- 
o r i s t s  of the  labour process,  ca r r i ed  out  extremely pa ins tak ing  attempts t o  
d is t inguish  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  between the  d i f f e r e n t  impl ica t ions  of t h e  term 
"control". He was well  aware of i t s  ambiguity: "Nor i s  con t ro l  so simple and 
d e f i n i t e  a thing.. . in a c t u a l  re ference  t o  t h e  f a c t s  of  i ndus t ry  i t  breaks up 
in to  a bewlidering v a r i e t y  of r i g h t s  and claims..." Shor t ly  a f te rwards  he 
quotes a contemporary r epor t  i n  po in t ing  o u t  t h a t  "It i s  essent ia l . . . to  d i s -  
entangle a s  f a r  a s  poss ib l e  the  economic and non-economic f a c t o r s "  (Goodrich, 
1975, 18). 
No such caut ion as t o  d e f i n i t i o n  appears t o  a f f e c t  t h e  l a t t e r - d a y  users  of  
the concept, a s  demonstrated i n  Edwards and Scu l l ion ' s  The Soc ia l  Organisa- 
t ion  of I n d u s t r i a l  Conf l ic t  (1982), a s tudy i n  the  " i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t ions"  
school whose conten ts  we s h a l l  be examining more c lose ly  below. The authors  
introduce t h e  concept of "control", and i t s  f l u c t  a t i n g  na ture ,  by s t a t i n g  
t h a t  "...the f r o n t i e r  o f  cont ro l  has been s h i f t e d  more i n  t h e  shopf loor ' s  
favour i n  the  two Company B p lan t s  than i n  any of our o t h e r  f a c t o r i e s .  Shop 
stewards played a c r u c i a l  r o l e  i n  a l l  a spec t s  of the wage-effort  bargain, 
having a SUbstant ia l  r o l e  i n  t h e  planning of work, being a b l e  t o  prevent... 
the  movement of workers between Jobs, and c o n t r o l l i n g  r o t a s  f o r  overtime 
themselves" ( ~ 2 2 ) .  
"Control", then, i s  d i r e c t l y  i d e n t i f i e d  he re  w i t h  the  "wage-effort bargain". 
Yet both Goodrich's own arguments, and t h e  a c t u a l  use of t h e  term "control" by 
labour process t h e o r i s t s ,  a r e  testimony t h a t  i t s  impl ica t ions  go f a r  beyond t h i s .  
On pp36-7, f o r  example, Goodrich s t a t e s  t h a t  "control  i s  a p o l i t i c a l  word" and 
then notes:  " ' P o l i t i c a l ' ,  t h a t  is, in t ho  wide sense of  being concerned with 
au thor i ty  r e l a t ionsh ips . "  Goodrich's own discussion of  t h e  "front ier"of  cont ro l  
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(as  opposed to "control" itself) can be related to another aspect of 
Edwards and Scullion's approach (and indeed that of others  who have used 
the concept); the assumption that the "frontier" of control is  a kind of 
marker indicating h w  much control workers and stewards may have w i t h i n  
the labour  process a t  any one t ime .  "Control". indeed (rather l i k e  value 
i n  the cap i t a l i s t  perspective) appears to be regarded as an undifferentiated 
substance of which the question to beasked is  not w b t  i t  is about, but 
hav much of it  there is. 
-
Qessey and McInnes have remarked on his "quantitativett approach to control 
i n  their -ent t ha t  "Judging by the use of concepts like a f ront ie r  of 
control...it (control) appears to be a zero-sum concept. That is to say,  
i t  makes sense to think of a dis t r ibut ion of control,  w i t h  the impl ica t ion  
t h a t  what one side gains the other loses 
Wever. they use this as a basis for  arguing their am -se for a n  
integrative perspective on control ra ther  than attempting to eqlore (despite 
their  r ecop i t ion  t h a t  it is  '%oefully inadequately theorised") w h a t  control 
i s  a l l  about. 
(Cressey & MacInnes, 1877, ~280) .  
Gmdrich himself uses the notion of a f ront ie r  of control i n  two ways. 
While the usage to which -st current authors refer, that of the f l e x i b i l i t y  
and dynamic nature of the balance of parer between workers and management, 
is undoubtedly intended, Goodrich actual ly  introduces the concept i n  tenus 
of a dividing line or "borderline" between thc  amcems which are seen as 
qmpriate t e r r i t o ry  for ra rkers  and for managment. As be asks i n  beginning 
his chapter: Where does the issue ODme i n t o  the open? A t  w h a t  point  d a s  the 
employer say - beyond t h i s  there shall  be no disatssion, the rest is my 
business alone?" (Qxdrich. 1975. ~ 5 6 ) .  
Ihc difference between th is  and thc conception of 'Ifrantier of cantrol" 
purely i n  terns of struggle. of %nntested terrain",  is that  the attunpt to 
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locate the '*borderlinet' engages w i t h  t h e  issue of w h a t  ficontroltv is about. 
me discussion s h s  convincingly tha t  t h e  areas ident i f ied i n  coiietiw 
agreements, etc., as exclusively the sphere of the employer are 
consistently referred to  as those of "discipline and management". 
Diff icul t  though these terms are thenselves to prec ise ly  define, it seems 
clear that they denote spheres the aspiration to which by workers might 
plausibly C Q ~ Q  under the heading of the demand for control per se. 
Y e t ,  p a ~ d o l d ~ a l l y ,  the more deserving of the t i t le of "control", the 
less such demands seem to be either aspired to or achieved by workers. 
Defining thau as ~ ~ l i t i c a l t ~  demands, coodrich d i s t i n w i s h e s  between 
"the damand not to be controlled disagreeably, the demand not to be 
controlled a t  a l l ,  and the demand to take a hand i n  acmtroll ing~t and poes 
on: 'The first runs through a l l  trade union ac t iv i ty .  The second i s  less 
widespread.. .% third - the desire for a share i n  the job of running 
things - is real but less hed ia t e  ' 1  (p37).And in the subsequent chapter 
on Control, Goodrich answers his own question 'What degree of control do 
the trade unions exercise Over the t e la t ions  of man to man in  
tho employment and discipline relationships; and over the re lat ions of man 
to the work itself - to the plans, process, and techniques of industry?" 
w i t h  the confession that t*Thc first and obvious answer is - di rec t ly  and 
expl ic i t ly ,  very l i t t l e  'I ( ~ 5 5 ) .  
industry - 
Yet this recoqtit ion of the lack both of aspirat ion towards and 
achievement of what can unapbi~rously be termed "control" by workers need 
not be used as the bods for a cynical dismissal of such objectives. 
Rather, both i n  Goodrich's analysis  and i n  the currat arwnent, such 
recornition can be used to locate the sigrificance of workers' underlying 
r c m t m e n t  a t  being denied discret ion md d i m i t y  i n  their work. With 
Goodrich, we m assess this on&ng anhsi ty  as a b r e a d i n p m  for 
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more expl ic i t  conflict ra ther  than a focus for Overt conflict b itself; 
as the  source of dislocation and a l i e n a t i o n  f r a n  the  perspective of the 
employer ra ther  than an explicit ground for  organisation a w i n s t  that 
employer. Goodrich distinguishes c lear ly  between the +licit. 'political" 
demand for control and t h i s  more widespndd resentment: 
"The demand for personal freedan w i t h i n  industry is not  identical  w i t h  
the demand for political paver w i t h i n  industry; the one begins as a 
desire for no government, the other is  a desire for a share i n  self- 
government *' (p34).Yet t h i s  vaguer need for 'personal freedom" is  
recognised as underlying much more specific confl ic ts :  "...the occashm 
or f o m a t e d  issue of a strike, as of a mar, is  only a part of its &se 
or of the emotions tha t  are &led out; surely a part of the emotion that 
gathers around any i d s t r i a l  struggle is that of servant against  master. 
I t  is i n t h i s  sense that Mr Straker (Miners' Federation leader) calls 
' the s t ra ining of the w i l l  of man to be free' the  root cause of labour 
unrest!'(p33). 
A dialectical relationship is thus indicated between fundamental %mtrol" 
mr iab le s  and the more pressing needs that ac tua l ly  propcl workers i n t o  
struggle - a relationship that w i l l  be returned to when we  examine the 
dynamic betweem worker aaquiescence and resistance in Chapter 5 bel-. 
Meanwhile, t h i s  insight  that a conscious, explicit fornulation of 
grievancesp or programes built  around -se grievancesp is not a 
necessary feature of struggles which i n  fact do draw much of their 
strength fmm such grievances, leads us to the final point w e  wish to 
d r a w  fraa Coodrich's analysis. 
This is that, first of all, workers on the w h o l e  do not see, or wish 
to see, their needs and dmnands as e a t i n g  i n  the same sphere as 
those of management. Not only does the enployer not  wish organised 
workers to take par t  i n  the d c c i s i m n g  process regarding investment; 
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most workers, t radi t ional ly  a t  least, would see this as "not t he i r  
business". This p o i n t  i s  fur ther  pursued when w e  look, again i n  chapter  
5 ,  a t  mworth and mmsie's notion of the separate 'kniverses" of management 
and labour. 
Second, and more germane to our present argument, the sphere that workers 
do, of necessity, regard as cent ra l ly  their "business" is, of course, that 
of subsistence, both initself and i n  its relation to  effort.It is thus that ,  
as acknowledged by Goodrich and i n  practice, most workgroup ac t iv i ty  
referred to by a term, llcontrol", which w e  have seen to have considerably 
wider implications, i n  fact relates to j u s t  this primarily lleoOnamistic" 
dynamic. In Goodrichls w o r d s  %ost of the complicated forms of control are 
themselves merely elaborate saf-rds of the standard of living" ( ~ 2 0 ) .  
To make th is  p o i n t ,  havever, i s  not to a&pt the mechanistic posit ion that 
no interact ion w i t h  "control" variables per se i s  indicated i n  workers' 
struggles, or that 'Workers' control" is not a concept that workers can ncw 
or could ever relate to. I t  i s  to emphasise, strongly, tha t  such struggles 
which raise the potential  for w i d e r  "control" deutands themselves spring 
from, are rooted in ,  basic econamic contradictions as expressed a t  the p o i n t  
of production i n  the relat ion between effort and reward. As w e  shall see 
later, to maintain that workers' struggles a r e  i n  fact d s t i c  is  not  
to i n s i s t  that they are thereby l i m i t e d .  
recoplised that the relationAyetween workers' cconamistic cknands and a wider 
p o l i t i d  wnciousness is a wntxadictory, explosive, dynamic one rather than  
a smooth progression 48s implied by Thaapson p6). Richard Hymn expresoes the 
nature of this relationship c l ea r ly  i n  his introduction to Goodrich's book, 
which also remg-iises the primarily defensive nature of wrker  act ivi ty:  
Y e t  a t  the same tine i t  has to be 
"(Goodrich) makes clear that the forms of *orkersl control then i n  evidence 
were typica l ly  reactive or protective i n  intent ,  a -s to defend specific 
material i n t e r e s t s  rather than am assertion of the principle  of indus t r ia l  
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democracy as an end i n i t s e l f .  He shows that the boundary between 
workers' control as a means and as an end i s  by no means inflejrible; 
actions and s t ra teg ies  which are primarily defensive may spill over i n t o  
demands for posi t ive control over the direction of industry...it (viii, 
Goodrich, 1975). 
It  becxmes important, then, i n  nnderstanding the nature and dynamic of 
worker resistance,  to examine its i n  w h a t  we  have argued are econanic 
issues,  and their articulation w i t h  the non--econamic, rather than embracing 
the w h o l e  area i n  the inherently ambiaous CategDry of ltcontrol". In  order 
to explore sane of these ar t icu la t ions ,  therefom, w e  ncm take a step i n t o  
w h a t  may be called the "real world" as documented in a number of 
sociological and industr ia l  re la t ions  case studies. 
3 The R e a l  World 
'Ib go dawn i n t o  'Ithe real world" i s  to ask w h a t  the kind of %ontrol" 
struggles amply referred to, but not often empirically documented i n  the 
l abour  process literature, are actual ly  s. W e  have already referred 
(chapter 2) to the unfortunate division which seems to exist i n  the study 
of work between "labour process" and "industrial re la t ions"  approaches, 
i n  t h a t  the latter, w h i c h  might be expected to engage w i t h  the M t u T e  and 
content of shop floor struggles which reflect V o l l e c t i v e  bargaining'' issues,  
does not appear to be drawn on to substantiate the theo*tical work of the 
fonoer. (Interestingly,  the relationship does appear to work the other m y ;  
indus t r i a l  relations,  as w e l l  as organisbtional theory,appear to have been 
expensively influenced over the last few years by radical labour process 
approaches centring on "control"). 
MI& recent w r k  in  the i ndus t r i a l  re la t ions f ield has been  preoccupied w i t h  
the effects of recession and political change on levels of shop steward 
o r e n i s a t i o n ,  a focus which i n  its turn reflects the  overall concern w i t h  
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shop steward/member and shop stewardhnanagement r e l a t i o n s  in terms of the  
measurement of power. A recent  study which usefu l ly  (and, a s  we have suggest- 
ed, unusually) combines labour process  and i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  approaches, 
Edwards and S c u l l i o n ' s  The Socia l  Organisa t ion  of I n d u s t r i a l  Confl ic t  (1982) 
a l so  seeks t o  e s t a b l i s h  l e v e l s  of c o n f l i c t  and the degrees  of "control" sur- 
rounding these  r a t h e r  than s e t t i n g  o u t  t o  a s ses s  the  conten t  of such conf l i c t .  
Nevertheless,  because i t  provides a wide range of examples perhaps even more 
de t a i l ed  than those of  o the r  recent  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  cont r ibu t ions ,  the  
study provides some usefu l  empir ical  ma te r i a l  f o r  explor ing  t h e  na ture  and 
content  of worker res i s tance .  We t h e r e f o r e  begin our survey of  the  " rea l  
world of workers" with t h i s  book. 
The Socia l  Organisat ion of  I n d u s t r i a l  Conf l i c t  i s  a s tudy of f i v e  p l an t s  
within two i n d u s t r i e s ,  engineering and c lo th ing ,  i n  t h e  contex t  of which a 
number of examples of  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  "problems" such a s  turnover, ab- 
senteeism, t h e  e f f o r t  bargain and j o b  a l l o c a t i o n  a r e  examined. Again i n v i t -  
ing  comparison with the  r e a l  world, few of these  forms of worker/management 
i n t e r a c t i o n  appeared t o  develop i n t o  dramatic ins tances  of i n d u s t r i a l  con- 
f l i c t .  Following Goodrich, we can perhaps d i s t i n g u i s h  between a 'begat ive" 
avoidance of managerial s t r u c t u r e s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  on t h e  one hand and a 
"posi t ive"  a s s e r t i o n  of workers' needs and i n t e r e s t s  on t h e  o ther .  However, 
the  d i f f e rence  between t h i s  and an "author i ty"- re la ted  pe r spec t ive  i s  t h a t  
i n  t h e  examples given both sets of responses  represented p o s i t i o n s  on a 
spectrum of e f f o r t  and reward. T h i s  "time and money" contex t  f o r  a range of 
l eve l s  of worker response and r e s i s t a n c e  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  c l e a r l y ,  f i r s t  of 
a l l ,  i n  the  example of "ear ly  leaving". 
T h i s  problem was a t  i t s  most apparent  i n  one of the engineer ing p lan ts ,  the  
Large Metals Factory,  which had the  s t r o n g e s t  t r a d i t i o n  of workplace organi- 
s a t ion  and i n  which the re  had r e c e n t l y  been a switch from piecework to  meas- 
ured day work. In Edwards and S c u l l i o n ' s  words: "Put crudely,  a s h i f t  to day 
work had removed any incent ive  t o  work harder ,  and workers now sought increased 
l e i s u r e  instead" (Edwards and Scul l ion ,  1982,  137). 
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The point  a b u t  a shift tcnvards e f fo r t  (or r e s t r i c t ion  of it) from reward 
w i t h i n  the effort bargain is made a t  many other po in t s  i n  the analysis. What 
emerges most c lear ly  i n  this example is  that w h i l e  e a r l y  leaving as an 
a c t i v i t y  w a s  d e a r l y  a kind of worker behaviour which management found 
problenmtic, it was not seen by the workers concerned as part of a 
%pearhead" of invasion i n t o  mnagerial prerogatives. Rather it w a s  iiimpiy 
a spontaneous response to the d e t a b n t  of reward fran ef for t ,  combined 
with obvious aversion to the work itself and the logical position that 
"as several pointed out, they had &ne their work and management had no 
reason to keep them inthe plant" (p13B). The actual p o i n t  of conflict 
related to management's attack on the practice, w h i c h  w a s  resisted as 
const i tut ing a threat to organisational strengths and r ights  which had 
been b u i l t  up by the workers over the years as an essent ia l  defence of their 
in te res t s .  s i q i f i a t l y ,  even this w a s n o t  taken up as a point of principle  
i n  a vacuum, i n  which, d e a r l y ,  it could have no pertinence, but i n  the 
context of a dispute about overtime. 
This d i s p u t e ,  w i t h i n  the Large Metals Factory, began when a foreman 
discovered t h a t  only w of a group of four w e l d e r s  w h o  4 ~ 0  =-sed to be 
doing overtime were present. He threatened to sbp the pay of the two absent 
workers, a t  which the two w h o  w e r e  in the shop walked ou t .  The irmmediate 
problen was settled through the convenor agreeing to i n  f u t u r e  formally 
rutmit a list of names of those doing overtiw,.Wwever, the i s sue  resurfaced 
sbort ly  afterwards when management t m k  the ini t ia t ive of demanding docking 
cut a t  the end of the ~ a t u r d a y  morning overtime period. The convenors s a w  
this as an attadc on long-established custanary rights and hnod ia t e ly  
cal led an overtime ban, which surprised Panagemat  with the extent of its 
support. 
The point  here i s  that this dispute was not about  "control" i n  terms of 
a rebell ion by t h e  workforce expressd through leaving early i n  o r  o u t  
of wertime periods, but about the realities of effort and production. The 
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customary pract ices  b u i l t  up by the w r k e r s  and stewards were not defended 
simply as posit ions won i n  the battle over cont ro l ,  but as representing 
material advances i n  the terns fo r  the sale of labour F e r .  The 
achievement of such advances, such as regular ovettime. w a s  located by 
the shop stewards i n  the context of a more realistic approach to production 
which would take account of woikers' in te res t s :  "If managers wanted 
production the best way to get i t  was to t r y  to w e p e r a t e  w i t h  the shop 
floor on the basis  of customary understandings" (~140). This simultaneous 
acceptance of and undermining of managerial perspectives i l l u s t r a t e s  a 
central ly  important feature of worker response which w i l l  be more closely 
examined bel- under mrds and Scullion's heading of "non-directed c 
conflict". 
While, therefore, "early leaving" might appear to be a prime example of 
"control't-centred resistance to managerial discipl ine and the  alienation 
of labour, a closer  examination reveals the ar t iculat ion of e f fo r t  and 
reward issues fundamental to the organisation and corresponding impact of 
the l abour  process. In this case the dynamic was i n  terms of the r d r t i o n  
of reward to effort rather than the reverse. b!dMgement had done away With 
piecework i n  order to canbat earnings d r i f t ;  the twrkforce, i n  response, 
developed a s t ra tegy of enhancing their earnings through w h a t  were usually 
" f a l s e t t  l eve ls  of overtime. 'Ihis involved a self-org?inisat ion of the labour 
pmcess by theworkforce which included e s t i m t i n g  the amount of labour time 
necessary'tfor production", i n  other words, for  the firm to procbrce and 
compote r ea l i s t i ca l ly  i n  terns  of the prevailing social average. A t  the 
same time an "incentive" for  accepting w h a t  were i n  fact restricted earnings 
W r t u n i t i e s  w a s  imposed a t  a "customMDd-practice" l eve l  i n  terns of 
worker-imposed absenteeism which on the one hand afforded the workforce 
increased l e i su re  time and on the  other took i n t o  account the "necessary" 
production l eve l s  referred t o  above..It should be noted that the wrkers '  
op t inpout  i n  terms of hours did not necessarily have iaplications for 
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t h e i r  l e v e l s  of effort w h i l e  a c t u a l l y  a t  t h e  workplace, although Edwards 
and Scul l ion imply t h a t  these,  too, w e r e  v i t i a t e d  by a general  l a c k  of 
sa t i s f ae t ion  itself connected with t h e  d r a s t i c  d e c l i n e . i n  earn ings  
suffered by t h e  workforce: "...workers had l o n p s t a r d i n g  gr ievances about 
w a g e s  and what they s a w  as general managerial incompetence, and the c u r r e n t  
s i t ua t ion  merely increased these feelings. Workers felt  d i sg run t l ed  and 
plodded through t h e i r  work tasks ,  looking for reasons to stop work whereas 
normally they were eager to  f i n i s h  as qu ick ly  as poss ib l e  (under piecework)" 
( ~ 1 4 2 )  - 
The apparent ly  f u t i l e  attempt by management i n  th is  f ac to ry  to s h i f t  t h e  
balance of t h e  effort-reward r e l a t i o n s h i p  p o i n t s  to sane of t h e  cont rad ic t ions  
between worker i n t e r e s t s  and managerial ob jec t ives  which c l e a r l y  undermine 
any l a s t i n g  attempt to a t t a i n  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  effort "bargain". In  the 
components f ac to ry  belonging to Company A of the s tudy ,  for -le, w h i l e  
t h e  "reward" end of the  spectrum w a s  comparatively stable, given the small 
proportion of total earnings represented by the tonus and t h e  stewaras' 
sense that they had won a useful  series of recent  v i c t o r i e s  on t h e  i s s u e  of 
earnings,  i t  w a s  t h e  problem-,of i ncen t ive  i n  r e l a t i o n  to effort w h i c h  w a s  
nav becoming t h e  main concern of  management: 
"hnage r s  i n  Canpany A w e r e  concerned n o t  about t h e  usual problem of 
p i e c e m r k  such as a drift  away from standards and t h e  growth of l e a p f r o g g i n g  
claims by m i l i t a n t  stewards but about t h e  problem of motivation. With t h e  
gradual rise i n  day work r a t e s  as a propor t ion  of average earn ings  it was 
felt that the  incen t ive  element had been lost" 
of t h i s  over t id ing  mncern about production on the  part of s e n i o r  management 
tha t  the  uneasy balance t h a t  had so far been a t t a i n e d  between effort and 
reward was, the au tho r s  feel, i n  imninent danger of being upset: 
(p181) .hd i t  w a s  i n  terns 
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"....senior managers, who are more concerned than w e r e  shop managers 
with labour costs and prof i tabi l i ty . . .may then act to alter the system, 
which may w e l l  set off a cyc le  of renewed shopfloor-level conflict". 
A similar process  was, i n  f a c t ,  developing i n  the much less w e l l  o r p n i s e d  
Underwear Factory i n  which the "simple and d i r e c t  con t ro l  which was based 
on the abso lu te  r i g h t s  of management Qo manage, w a s  fel t  by a self- 
consciously modernising management to give i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  precise cont ro l  
over piece-rates on p a r t i c u l a r  jobs and w a s  being replaced by a more 'rational '  
system. This system m i g h t  be eqected to bring conflict more i n t o  the  open 
as t h e  process of rate-fixing becomes more open to negot ia t ion" (~1%). 
E&S note  that "the case eemplifies the poin t  made earlier that any system 
of con t ro l  tends to c rea t e  problems for those managers most d i r e c t l y  
concerned wi th  costs, ef f ic iency ,  and t h e  consis tency of appl ica t ion  of 
the payment system. R e f o r m s  may w e l l  g i v e  a new impetus to irmnediat-2 
confl ic t  a t  shopfloor leve l"  (~197) .  
The po in t  illustrated i n  this, as i n  the previous example, is that 
managanent's i n a b i l i t y  to  ''leave w e l l  alone", to p e r m i t  a n  indulgency 
p a t t e r n  w h i c h  would allow r e l a t i v e l y  conflict-free r e l a t i o n s  i n  the 
fac tory ,  is fue l l ed  c e n t r a l l y  by p res su res  of cost and e f f i c i ency .  
S imi la r ly ,  the Wycle of conf l i c t "  which Wards and Scu l l ion  accura te ly  
describe as  renewed by such "mrrective" action, w h i l e  no doubt fue l l ed  
by workers' i r r i t a t i o n  a t  ensuing new forms of managerial oppression, 
i n  practice centres on the economic areas where such d i f f e r e n t  sets of 
i n t e r e s t s  c lash head-on, rather than on t h e  underlying resentment itself. 
Such i n t e r a c t i o n s  are again i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  the f i n a l  example from Edwards 
and Scul l ion ' s  s tudy,  t h e  d i s p u t e  i n  t h e  -11 Metals Factory- 
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A series of problems started i n  t h i s  f ac to ry  when a worker was taken "off 
the  clock" for fefusing to move to another  job. This  w a s  seen by t h e  
stewards as a p r o w c a t i v e  managerial ac t ion  s i n c e  job mobili ty w a s  
customarily subjec t  to shop steward agreement. In  fact higher management 
did n o t  approve of the a c t i o n ,  but s tuck by it, as i n  the  above example, 
as  part of their "broad aim of r a t i o n a l i s i n g  r e l a t ionsh ips"  ( ~ 2 4 0 ) .  
The d i spu te  then took on a different  dimension, i n  tha t  management became 
concerned a t  t h e  frequency of shop steward meetings called t o  d i s c u s s  
these and other problems. The effect on production w a s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  acute 
i n  the  inspect ion department, where the original "off t h e  clock" episode 
had occurred, as  here workers  had banned a l l  mobi l i ty  of labour as a 
p r o t e s t ,  t h u s  no longer  providing the usual cover  for the steward. As a 
r e s u l t ,  management decided to  s top  the  inspec t ion  shop steward's pay for 
any time that  he was absen t  from his sec t ion ,  and i n  response t h e  whole 
shop stewards' committee left the p l a n t  and i n v i t e d  management to stop 
t h e i r  pay. However, management did no t  take up t h i s  opportunity t o  start 
a strike, and the stewards w e r e  a t  this p o i n t  equa l ly  r e luc t an t  to escalate 
the  d ispute .  The push i n t o  more drastic sanc t ions  Came from a decision by 
management to c u t  dam overt ime l eve l s ,  thus ove r r id ing  a n  "overtime buffer"  
which had been fought for and secured by the stewards a few ywrs previously 
to p r o t e c t  workers a g a i n s t  t h e  continuous threat of short time working. 
'Ihe decis ion  w a s  thus  seen by both  stewards and workers as a conscious 
attempt by management to pile on pressure,  and they responded w i t h  a tatal 
overtime ban and, after consider ing and r e j e c t i n g  other sanct ions,  a po l i cy  
of Working to  the hour". 
In t h i s  example, then, also. t h e  crux of the d i s p u t e  seemed to revolve 
around an attempt by management to ' p u l l  back" t h e  organisat ion of the 
labour  process i n t o  some sort of shape conforming to their criteria of 
eff ic iency,  w h i l e  workers' defence of their ovn i n t e r e s t s  both disrupts 
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t h i s  o b j e c t i v e  and cons t ruc ts  forms-of organisdt ion w h i c h ,  i f  challenged 
by management, respond w i t h  s t rong  defensive ac t ion .  Thus workers both 
resist attacks by management on the  " s t a t u s  quo" they have b u i l t  up. and 
bui ld  up this s t a t u s  quo through an ongoing w a r  of a t t r i t i o n  which d i r e c t l y  
reflects their c l a s s  i n t e r e s t s  as workers. The con t r ad ic t ions  for management's 
avn o b j e c t i v e s  which emerged through t h i s  "react ivat ion" of conf l ic t ,  and 
their outcome i n  a n  unof f i c i a l  p o l i c y  of "f i ref ight ing",crop up alx, i n  my 
avn case s t u d i e s  and are examined i n  more d e t a i l  there. 
A clear p i c t u r e  emerges i n  the a n a l y s i s  as a w h o l e  (despite its somewhat 
divergent  theoretical objectives) of c o n f l i c t  as structured along 
dimensions Of effort and reward, whatever t h e  immediate cause or underlying 
antagonism i n w l v e d .  The demand for output  on the  managerial s ide  and the 
corresponding necess i ty  to defend s tandards of l i v i n g  on the  part of those 
s e l l i n g  t h e i r  labour  paver c o n s t i t u t e  an i r r educ ib l e  framework i n  terms of 
which confl ic t ,  whatever i t s  more "humanistic" or "political" aspects, is 
a s  it w e r e  forced i n t o  expression. That this takes place whatever the 
ideology or conscious motive of those involved i s  demonstrated i n  the f i rmly  
product ion-ar ientated o u t l o o k  of the  shop stewards i n  Wards and Scul l ion ' s  
study (see page 13) w h o s e  own a c t i o n s  i n  defence of t h e i r  membership 
never the less  undermined p r e c i s e l y  those object ives .  This contradictory and 
i ncons i s t en t  r e l a t i o n  between a c t i o n  and consciousness is one which  w e  eaplore 
i n  more detail belm. Meanwhile. some of the more q u a l i t a t i v e  and subjec t ive  
s t u d i e s  which have appeared over  the l a s t  few years w i l l  IMW be surveyed i n  
order to supplement our "evidence" as to the a c t u a l  concerns of w o r k e r s .  
€ V e r i e n t i a 1  Evidence 
Such "observer-participation" t rea tments  as Ruth Cavendish's Women On The 
- Line, Anna Pollert's G i r l s ,  W i v e s ,  Factory L ives  (Pollert, 1981) and Sallie 
Westwood's A l l  Day Every Day (1984) ( t h e  p r inc ipa l  three to be mnsidered  
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here,  though o t h e r  s tud ie s  w i l l  be re fer red  to) provide  us with a v iv id  
p i c t u r e  of t h e  subjec t ive  experience of rout ine  semi-skilled work which 
might be expected to emphasise aspects such as b o r e d o m  or "al ienat ion" 
( in  t h e  sense i n  which it is misconceived by Robert Blaun er). Nevertheless,  
while such f e a t u r e s  do emerge, t h e  overwhelming impression once again is one 
of the  remorseless twin p res su res  of e f f o r t  and reward. The message of s l c h  
desc r ip t ions  of fac tory  l i fe  under t h e  real subordination of labour is  that 
i s sues  of and a s p i r a t i o n s  tcwards "control" are, simply, i r r e l e v a n t  to such 
workers' q e r i e n c e .  N o t  on ly  may w r k e r s  i n  these circumstances no t  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  want to th ink  abou t  vtcontrol",  they also, q u i t e  l i t e r a l l y ,  
-9 c a n ' t -  t h e r e  i s  n e i t h e r  t h e  t i m e  n o r  the opportunity.  The quest ion,  in 
condi t ions  of atomised, rou t in i sed ,  pre -s t ruc tured  labour ,  simply does 
not  arise. 
-
W e  shall now attempt t o d a s s i f y  t h e  experience of t h e  wrkers portrayed 
i n  these  s t u d i e s  under some of t h e  same headings a s  w e r e  used i n  the  
previous chapter to analyse real subordination of l abour ,  ie  a b s t r a c t i o n ,  
i n  t e n  sif ica t i o n ,  exp lo i t a t ion  etc. 
(i) Abstraction of Labour as sham i n  t h e  case-studies 
In Wmen 0-1 t h e  Line, desc r ib ing  t h e  in t ense  pressure of timed work patterns 
on the "girls", Ruth Cavendish w r i t e s :  
"Differences between the  jobs w e r e  minor i n  comparison with the  speed 
and d i s c i p l i n e  which the  l i n e  imposed on us all." krl ier ,  positively, 
she  has descr ibed jobs which w e r e  part of an assembly-line "chain" as " l i k e  
being one large collective worker ' 1  (Cavendish, 1982, p41). More e x p l i c i t l y  
and more general ly ,  b u t  still  i n  direct relation t o  the workers she s tudied  
in G i r l s ,  Wives, Factory Lives ,  Anna Follert makes the same point :  
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"The women a t  Churchmans, as i n  factories a l l  o v e r  t h e  world, w e r e  
producing commodities. They happened to be handling tobacco - but  l i fe  
would have been much the same had they been making c h o l a t e  mints,  
cardboard boxes, or s i l i c o n  chips.  For work was e s s e n t i a l l y  unski l led ,  
boring, r epe t i t i ve .  a l i e n a t e d  - something to be endured fo r  t h e  sake of 
the wage packet a t  the end. And to t h i s  ex ten t  meaningless work, work for 
p r o f i t ,  feels t h e  same whether i t  is  done by a man or a m a n q t  ( P o l l e r t ,  
1981, p75). 
Fullert herself r e l a t e d  this "conmodified" s t r u c t u r i n g  of labour directly 
to  i t s  parallel expression for the  worker i n  terms of viewing h i s  or her 
am l abour  m e r  as a conrmodity: (Quote f r o m  h y  i n  Paul W i l l i s '  
Learning to Labour) "It's j u s t  a fucking way of earning money. There's  
that many ways to do it...Jobs a l l  achieve the same, they make you money, 
nobody does a job for t h e  love of a job" (p75). 
The view of labour as an  undi f fe ren t ia ted ,  "fluid" substance, t h e  
ac tua l  content of which is irrelevant i n  terms of t h e  firm's objec t ives ,  
i s  powerfully confinned i n  Pollert's luc id  uncovering of the r a t i o n a l e  
behind Churchman's job evaauation scheme, the  alleged " s c i e n t i f i c  
ob jec t iv i ty"  of which i n  fact represented l i t t le  more than a soph i s t i ca t ed  
device for the  cheapening of labour paver. Thus when W i t h  t h e  impressive 
r e s p e c t a b i l i t y  of numbers, judgements of value  are t r ans l a t ed  i n t o  
judgements of quant i ty"  (p67), such concrete d i f f e r e n c e s  a s  &st between 
jobs disppear before the  imperative of "grading"; y e t  there appeared 
t o  be l i t t l e  d i f fe rence  between the value-creating capacities of tobacco 
workers and, say, c iFr -making  machine operatives that would ob jec t ive ly  
j u s t i f y  the placing of the former i n  a lower pay grade than the latter. 
me a r t i c u l a t i o n  of pay grading and labour time/output i s  examined more 
c lose ly  i n  t h e  following sec t ions .  Meanwhile. hauever, the p o i n t  has been 
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made that t h e  e s s e n t i a l l y  undi f fe ren t ia ted  and thus "abstractedti  nature 
of the  work itself precluded any immediate concern by workers with control  
over i ts  organisa t ion ,  content and methods. 
(ii) The In t ens i f i ca t ion  and "technical s t ruc tur ing"  of l a b o u r  - i t s  
r e l a t ion  to "control". 
The Same pervas ive  p re s su re  on workers which made more ephemeral 
considerat ions of "control" inconsequential  is shown still more t e l l i ng ly  
i n  the  desc r ip t ions  of effort levels  and output  targets which dominate the  
s tudies .  Ruth Cavendish shavs lxw "control" cons idera t ions  were eliminated 
by t h e  technical  s t r u c t u r i n g  of t h e  "line": 
"The women ranthe l i n e ,  but w e  w e r e  also j u s t  appendages to it. Its 
d i s c i p l i n e  w a s  imposed automatical ly  through t h e  l i g h t ,  t h e  mnvewr  
belt and the bonus system. We j u s t  slotted i n  like cogs i n  a w h e e l .  Every 
movement w e  made and every second of o u r  time was con t ro l l ed  by the l ine ;  
the  chargehands and supervisors d i d n ' t  have t o  t e l l  us when to get on.... You 
couldn ' t  r e a l l y  oppose the orcymisation of t h e  work because it operated 
mechanically. ..the supervisors '  j ob  w a s  r e a l l y  done for them" ( ~ 1 0 7 ) .  
As w e l l  as demonstrating t h e  absence of any cen t r a l  need for "bossingft, 
t h e  ana lys i s  p o i n t s  to fhe second-by-second maintenance of effort bu i l t  i n t o  
the labour process. This w a s  made eminently clear by t h e  fact that the l i n e  
ran, as described above, a t  a pre-set speed which was i n  fact t h e  "top" 
speed, so that  i t  represented the m a d m u m  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of  labour - 
workers simply could not work any faster: "It i s  impossible to p u t  over i n  
wr i t i ng  the speed of t h e  l i n e ,  t h e  pace of work, and the  f idd l ines s  of t h e  
jobs w e  had to repeat a l l  day long, as t r a y  follared t r a y  dcnn the l ine .  
W e  were phys ica l ly  geared up, s t r a i n i n g  to  get i t  done as fast as w e  
could,  and t h e  atmosphere was f r an t i c "  ( p l l l ) .  The pace and pressure of t h e  
l i n e  in~pcsed relentless r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  terms of time: 'We couldn't do the  
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t h ings  you would normally n o t  think twice about,  l i k e  blauing your nose or 
f l ick ing  hair o u t  of your eyes - t ha t  cost valuable seconds - it  m s n ' t  
included i n  the layout  so no t i m e  w a s  allaued for it" ($1). 
The Same in tense  pressure  on workers i n  terms of time and output  targets 
is documented by Pollert: " T i m e  and theuork-study man w e r e  t h e  mastersl'ltl). 
Pollert shows how the pay grading system, dried i n  more d e t a i l  i n  the 
next section, interacted wi th  the  production goals set by the  f i r m  to 
produce a n  exact measurement and allocation of every movement: "The 
(grade) dictated t h e  exact rate for doing a job. To keep up demandec? 
perfect 'economy' of movement; i n  other words. not using one nerve,  
muscle or limb w h i c h  was n o t  d i r e c t l y  necessary to do t h e  job. I t  meant 
keeping p a r t  of t h e  body s t i l l ,  and turn ing  arms, w r i s t s ,  hands and 
f i n g e r s  i n t o  a high-speed machine" (p62). 
In t e re s t ing ly .  w h a t  Pollert calls t h i s  'Onminute hold of t h e  labour  process  
over  t h e  girls" (p61) can be compared wi th in  the study to  the  prev ious  
system of ''normal" piecework within which a measurable "sleek" i n  effort 
had been iden t i f i ed  by management and supervis ion:  
"It was an accepted fact  that  you d id  a f a i r  day ' s  work for a fa i r  
d a y ' s  pay. But to t h e  worlcpeople, a fair  day ' s  work was about a 7CR 
day, the other Jm, of the day was spent going forwards or badwards  
to breaks, or g e t t i n g  ready tci go hane or something" (Supervisor) (p61). 
Such quan t i f i ca t ion  of effort i l l u s t r a t e s  c l e a r l y  the poin t  that the 
problem for management is n o t  t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  of labour  power i n t o  
l abour  per se, but its i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  to  a degree which can match 
the  maximalist targets imposed by the  requirements of p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  
The i m p a c t  of th is  maximisation on the everyday experience Of workers 
is reflected i n  the title of "The Minutes" given by the sanwnt  workers 
i n  Westwood's All Cay Every Day t o  the i r  measured d a y  work system; and 
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the preoccupation with and corresponding p res su re  on workers of time 
is  v iv id ly  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  a number of desc r ip t ions  of the sub jec t ive  
e v e r i e n c e  of work, such as  Linhar t ' s  The Assembly Line  ("the speed of 
the l i n e  dictates everything, without respite...* could I have imagined 
that they could have sto%en one minute from m e ,  and t h a t  t h i s  theft would 
cause m e  more pain and hu r t  than the most sordid of crimes?" (Linhart ,  
1981, p33) and Richard Pfeffer's Working for Capitalism (Pfeffer,  1979). 
Ultimately, as ind ica t ed  i n  h l ler t ' s  poin t  above ( ~ 2 1 )  about the 
"economy of movement11 required by the p l a n t ' s  new "Pay and Productivity" 
system, managerial requirements of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and the desired 
organisa t ion  of the labour process came together i n  the projec t ion  of 
the worker i n t o  a machine; cons is ten t ,  p red ic t ab le ,  measurable and 
reliable. Such a goal i s  reflected i n  management's criteria for the 
organisa t ion  of the labour process i n  terms of the maximum technically 
possible Output, as sharn i n  the camnent of a manager quoted i n  I-~Iw 
mynon's Working For Ford: 
WO: 1 may be naive over this but  I can't see that at  all. Minapewnt 
don't set difficult work standards. All w e  w a n t  is madppum use or the 
plant..  . .All w e  want then is  the plant 461 produce the number of cars 
that w e  lcmv it can produce - we're s inply  ask ing  for good continuous 
effort" (HE'S emphasis). 
?he manager uses t h i s  'Qbjective" criterion (the number of cars the 
p l a n t  E produce) to measure w h a t  is  described as a ttreasonable" 
level of effort ("The unions...seem to think that increased e f f i c i e n c y  
means we're asking the men t o  sweat blood. We're not doing this a t  
all. W e  aim to set standards t h a t  can reasonably be met") (P134) - Y e t  
the impact on the workforce i s  experienced i n  terms of the attempt to 
turn them i n t o  machines, reflected i n  the p r e c i s e l y  calculated units 
of output measured by the work study department: 
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t h e  preoccupation with and corresponding pressure  on workers of 
is v iv id ly  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  a number of d e s c r i p t i o n s  of the  sub jec t ive  
e w e r i e n c e  of work, such as L inha r t ' s  The Assembly Line (" the speed of 
the  l i n e  dictates everything, without respite...Mw could I have imagined 
t h a t  they could have s t o l e n  one m i n u t e  from m e ,  and that t h i s  t h e f t  w u l d  
cause m e  more pain and h u r t  t h a n  the  most sordid of crimes?" (Linhart ,  1981, 
p33) and Richard P f e f f e r r s  Working fo r  Capitalism (Pfeffer, 1979). 
Ultimately, as indica ted  i n  Pollert's po in t  above (p21) about t h e  
"economy of movement" requi red  by the p lan t ' s  new '*Pay and Product ivi ty"  
system, managerial requirements of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and t h e  desired 
organisat ion of the  labour  process cane together  i n  t h e  pro jec t ion  of 
the w r k e r  i n t o  a machine; cons is ten t ,  predictable, meaarable and 
reliable. Such a goal is reflected i n  management's criteria for t h e  
o r p n i s a t i o n  of the  labour  process i n  terns of the m-un t echn ica l ly  
possible output,  as shawn i n  the conrment of a manager qu,ted in Huw 
Beynon' s Working For Ford: 
"No: I may be naive over t h i s  but  I can ' t  see that a t  all. Mamyanent 
don ' t  set d i f f i c u l t  w o r k  standards.  All w e  want is  maxhuln use of the 
plant. . .All  we want then is  t h e  p l an t  t o  produce the number of a r s  
that w e h w  i t  can produce - we're simply a sk ing  €or 
effort" (m's emphasis). 
continuous 
The manager uses t h i s  "objective" c r i t e r i o n  (the number of cars t h e  
p l a n t  
l e v e l  of effort ("The unions...seem to th ink  that increased e f f i c i ency  
means we're asking the men to  sweat blood. We're n o t  doing this a t  
a l l .  W e  aim to set standards t h a t  can reasonably be mer") (~134). Y e t  
the impact on the workforce i s  experienced i n  terns of the attempt to 
turn  them i n t o  machines, reflected i n  the  p r e c i s e l y  calculated u n i t s  
of output  measured by the work study department: 
produce) to measure w h a t  is described a s  a ''reaSOMble" 
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"They say that t h e i r  t imings are based on w h a t  a n  'average man' can  do a t  
an 'average time of the  day ' .  That ' s  a load of nonsense that. A t  the  
beginning of t h e  shift it 's a l l  r i g h t  bu t  later on i t  &ts harder...Yet 
you've always got t h e  same t i m e s :  Ford's times. I t 's  this numbering again.  
They th ink  that if they number u s  and number the job everything i s  fine". 
"They decide on 
forget that we're not  machines you know. The s tandards  ihey work t o  are 
excessive anyway. They expect you to work the 480 minutes of t h e  eight 
hours you're on the  clock..." (quotes f r o m  two assembly l i n e  workers) (~135) .  
measured day hcxv fast w e  w i l l  work. They seem to 
The i n t e r a c t i o n  of "work-studied" output  targets, t h e  drive towards t h e  
reduct ion of necessary labour  t i m e ,  and t h e  corresponding r e l e n t l e s s  
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour ,  is  clear i n  t h e  accounts  of t h e  everyday e p e r i e n c e  
of t h e  workers i n  these s t u d i e s .  A s  w e  argued i n  Chapter 2, i n s o f a r  as t h e  
notion of "control" i s  meaningful, i t  is  examplified i n  the  operation of 
such q u a n t i t a t i v e  goals which structure both the organisation of the  labour  
process  and its impact on workers. PoUert notes  that ' 1 . .  .behind t h e  ' f r i e n d l y  
r e l a t i o n s '  the  girls had l i t t l e  more freedom or control Over t h e i r  l i v e s  than 
i n  t h e  days  of the i r o n f i s t e d  boss. They did n o t  need to be bossed, because 
they had t h e i r  hands tied anyuay...Paver and d e c i s i o n s  were somewhat 'ou t  
t he re ' ,  never i n  the  fac tory ,  l e t  alone the sbop floor" (p61).  
Pollert herself relates this "perlessness" a t  least p a r t l y  t6 the 
incorporat ion of the  Churchman workers' union, b u t  t h e  lack of "control" ,  
or a t  least its ralience as  a n  ob jec t ive  for the workforce, was also c l e a r l y  
hilt i n t o  the  r e l a t ion  between labour process and reward system f o r  t h e  
workers. It is to this a r t i c u l a t i o n  between pay and effort and i t s  
in t eg ra t ion  of pay issues i n t o  the workings of the labour  process  *hat 
w e  n m  tu rn .  
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( i i i )  Time and k n e v  - the  exp lo i t a t ion  nem5 
In making t h e  p o i n t , a t e d  above, that the kind of strategic decision- 
making recanmended by for example Cressey and PacInneq as a "control" 
s t r a t egy  for workers was remote from t h e  very conception of work a t  
Churchman's, Pollert goes on to note  that w r k e r s  t h e r e  w e r e  a l s o  
"hamstrung a t  another ,  very immediate level' ' (p61) - t h e  operat ion of t h e  
new payment scheme, embodying a grading s t ruc tu re ,  and i t s  impact on the 
organisa t ion  and in t ens i f i ca t ion  of labour.  Churchman's, i n  fact, w a s  
unique among the case s tudies  i n  opera t ing  a combined system of work 
measurement and j o b  evaluaakon rather than t h e  mre t r a d i t i o n a l  piecework. 
The scheme, introduced i n  t h e  m i d - 6 0 s ,  w a s  known as PPS (prof ic iency pay 
scheme). This divided jobs i n t o  fou r  categxies, each of which re ta ined  a 
c e r t a i n  l e v e l  of s t a b i l i s e d  pay related t o  performance, which could be 
varied both through "job plusages" (a form of grading) and s o m e  opportuni ty  
fo r  "prof ic iency pay". Failure to a t t a i n  performance was also sanc t ioned ,  
havever, so that "the 'stick' w a s  i n  fact a s  important as the 'carrot' i n  
s o m e  types of jobs" (p55)-  
The "performance standards" which had b e e n  set by t h e  work s tudy department 
w e r e  t i g h t l y  maintained through t h e i r  in tegra t ion  i n t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  grade, 
supported by r e l a t e d  sanct ions.  If a worker's output  fell below the precise 
amount required over the four-week "reference period" s h e  would be warned, 
then dcnvngraded, and would rece ive  t h e  lower rate of pay  for the w h o l e  Of 
the  next  month, even i f  she subsequently improved. Thus i n  some cases t h e  
company could be receiving standard perfonmnce from a p a r t i c u l a r  worker a t  
belw w h a t  had been assessed to be t h e  price of her  labour  p e r .  
What Pollert calls t h e  "minute hold of the labour process  over the g i r l s "  
e f f e c t i v e l y  secured by a system i n  which 'This t h r e a t  of demotion hung over 
every g i r l  and secured her  more t i g h t l y  to her  job than  the strictest 
supervisor.  I t  guaranteed s t a b i l i t y  of output to the  m p a n y ,  s t a b i l i t y  of 
earnings to those who~could keep up and s t a b i l i t y  of grading to  those who 
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could n o t .  This w a s  the c l a s s i c  i r o n  fist beneath the ve lve t  glove" (p62). 
Again the  implicat ion of a lack of any need for a n  in te rpersonal  F e r  
re la t ionship  between management and t h e  workforce is  clear. 
The major po in t  here  is  that of the ex tens ive  a r t i c u l a t i o n  between pay and 
the organisat ion of the l a b o u r  process. Effor t  and reward are almost 
inext r icably  l inked ,  tothe exten t  tha t  a d e f i n i t e ,  quan t i f i ed  - and m a x i m u m  
- amount of labour  i s  tied i n  w i t h  an equal ly  p rec i se  l e v e l  of reward. Drop 
the effor t /output  below a c e r t a i n  l e v e l ,  and the reward drops too. There  
appears to be no escape for t h e  worker from t h i s  tredmill. 
In her chapter "Cp a g a i n s t  the  Minutes" Sallie Westwood p r e s e n t s  an  equal ly  
overwhelming portrait of the unremit t ing pressures  of time-measured payment 
systems on the labour  process. "The minutes" w a s  t he  t i t l e  given by t h e  
workers to the  MYA system used i n  the  fac tory .  A s  a t  Churchi l l ' s ,  the  system 
related pay to a specified l e v e l  of pe r fonance ,  rather than al lowing a 
var iab le  l e v e l  of performance to determine pay as w i t h  piecework sch-es. 
The workers were graded i n t o  seven bands linked to l e v e l s  of performancej 
if an operator's performance fe l l  below t h e  l e v e l  specified i n  her bnd,  
she would be downgraded. It w a s ,  havever, s t i l l  poss ib le  to  earn a bonus 
by producing more than t h e  given w u n t  i n  the time. Workers w e r e  assessed 
on performance once a month a t  a meeting of management, supervisors and trade 
union representa t ives .  
A system i n  which, as w e  have argued in Chapter 2, a profit- r e l a t e d  and 
thus  e s s e n t i a l l y  quan t i f i ed  conception of e f f i c i ency  meant t h e  split-second 
fragnentation of jobs w a s  monitored w i t h  equal prec is ion  by the women, o f t e n  
a s  the basis of a s i m r i n g  resentment: 
"I'm supposed to  make a dozen tee-shirts, sides and s l eeves  i n  10.47 
minutes and produce 55 dozen a day as a n  A grade, and Shanta, as a star 
grade has to produce 50 dozen and 10 a day. I t ' s  r id icu lous .  Every time 
the minutes are given they get worse, they  want more f r o m  u s  every  t i m e .  
Well, I t  w n ' t  work. I c a n ' t  do the target': (Westwood, 1984, p51). 
Thus while  t h e  pay grades remained t h e  same, new l e v e l s  of output  were 
imposed with  each new job, i n  w h a t  amounted t o  a class example of  managerial 
ra te-ut t ing - t h i s  time fromtfie effort end of t h e  spectrum. And this was i n  
i t s  turn  c l e a r l y  and angr i ly  r e l a t e d  by theworkers  to reward: 
"You knau... t h e  minutes are so hard now that the company can save money. 
They give o u t  such high minutes that a l l  t h e  girls are g e t t i n g  dmngraded, 
50 i t ' s  cheaper to employ them to  do w h a t  an A grade used to  do. It 's not  
f a i r .  It 's n o t  r i g h t  t h a t  they should treat people like this" (p55). 
The ex tens ive  a r t i c u l a t i o n  of effort and reward with in  t h e  labour  process 
itself, t h e  use  of a range of payment systems - bonus schemes, measured day 
work, "Pay and Productivity" - i n  t h e  same "carrot andstick" fashion to 
ordain the madmum i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour ,  would n o t  of c o u r s e  be 
re levant  or possible w e r e  i t  not  for t h e  central importance of pay to the  
m r k e r s ,  t h e  in t eg ra t ion  of their very "means of life" i n t o  "the minutes" 
or " the  bonus". Ruth Cavendish desc r ibes  the drect connection between 
production, money and time for t h e  workers: 
"The extra or missing p e n n i e s  represented d i r e c t l y  that we'd been very 
hard pushed or that a hold up had a f f e c t e d  the bonus...bney w a s  w h a t  you 
were the re  for, and i t  was up to you to decide if you could  a f fo rd  a couple 
of hours off...In comparison, a monthly s a l a r y  (made) the r e l a t i o n  between 
t ime  and money (seem) very obscure" (~133). 
The c loseness  to  basic subsis tence of many production uorkers' w a g e s  is  i n  
itself a major factor i n  t h e  imnediacy of the effort/-rd relationship. 
As Cavendish describes her ~ u n  experience i n  wing from a mmfortable  monthly 
sa la ry  t o  "wages": T h e  i n t e r e s t  and emotion aroused by a few pennies and 
pounds may seem odd to someone w h o  has never uorked on t h e  shopfloor.. .My 
a t t i t u d e  changed completely as a r e s u l t  of being i n  the Same s i tua t ion .  The 
minutiae of wage set t lements ,  bonus rates, and overtime pay w e r e  not t r i v i a l  
issues  i n  the leas t . . . there  w a s  50 l i t t l e  money that you had t o  make Sure you 
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received every penny you w e r e  e n t i t l e d  to, because i t  r e a l l y  did mun t"  (~131) .  
CONCLUSIONS 
The p i c t u r e  presented i n  t h e  account go far may appea r . t o  be of somewhat 
powerless and bemused workers, unaware of t h e  e x t e n t  of t h e i r  e x p l o i t a t i o n  
or a t  least unprepared to  do very  much about it. In fact, to take up ou r  f i n a l  
point  about the  workers' own conceptions of t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n p y  and 
labour t i m e ,  t he re  appeared to be a su rp r i s ing  (given t h e  imposs ib i l i t y  
of "perceiving" exp lo i t a t ion )  degree of  awareness about  the difference between 
paid and unpaid labour t i m e :  
( V e r a  from G i r l s ,  Wives, Factory Lives): "Once you've done your work for 
your grade, that's it. What you do over,  the  f i r m  hes...But you c a n ' t  c g  
home, n o t  till t h e  buzzer goes. So you've pt tu sit and work for nothing" 
(P175) -
Ruth Cavendish draws a similar d i s t i n c t i o n  between "our time" and " t h e i r  
time": "....the f i g h t s  over  c locking off w e r e  of more t h a n  symbolic 
importance - they were real attempts by them to encroach on our  time, ard 
by us, to  resist such enc roachmen t s . . .W munted  t h e  minu tes  between 4.10 
and 4.15 i n  lost WDs" ( ~ 1 1 7 ) .  
I t  w a s  r e s i s t ance  t o  t h e  restriction of t h e  (apparent )  opportunity to "work 
fo r  yourself"  which had existed under piecework that  pushed the  wmen a t  
Chuckman's i n t o  a dogged, though u l t imate ly  unsuccessful ,  f i g h t  a g a i n s t  t h e  
operation of t h e  grading s t r u c t u r e .  S imi la r ly ,  the f i n a l  dispute  a t  S t i t c h  
( the  f a c t o r y  described i n  A l l  Day, Every Day) exploded as a d i r e c t  result 
of t h e  workers' percept ion of t h e i r  exp lo i t a t ion ,  triggered off by t h e  
imposit ion of a p a r t i c u l a r l y  impossible target on a b a t c h  of baby clothes: 
"Take t h e  minutes. I ' m  no t  kidding, while  I 've  been here  i n  the  last f o u r  
years they've #me down and down. They get t i g h t e r  and t i gh te r  and you c a n ' t  
get t h e  target out...The mnpany i s  swindling us by making t h e  minutes lower 
and lauer which means w e  c a n ' t  get the target 50 w e  are downgraded, 50 they 
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have to pay u s  less t o  do t h e  Same amount as w e  w e r e  doing l a s t  year f o r  more 
money"(p56f. 
The "explosive" na tu re  
contradict ion w i l l  be considered i n  mre d e t a i l  i n  chapter 5. I n  the  above 
arguments w e  have been most mncerned to  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  a r t i c u l a t i o n  between 
labour time, pay and e f f o r t  a t  t h e  h e a r t  of t h e  labour  process ,  and t h e  role of 
t h i s  i ne rac t ion  i n  e f f ec t ive ly  orda in ing  the  r e q u i s i t e ,  or close to t n e  
r e q u i s i t e ,  l e v e l s  of i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour  from t h e  workforce. In the  
next chapter  w e  93 on to examine hcw t h i s  por t raya l  of t h e  experience of t h e  
labour  process i n  e s s e n t i a l l y  economic terms can be used to challenge theore t ica  
approaches which emphasise t h e  ideo log ica l  incorporat ion of t h e  mrking 
of worker r e s i s t a n c e  and i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  to 
class. 
CMPTER FIVE 
The Political S ide  of Economisn 
The last chapter  set o u t  t ockmns t r a t e ,  i n  some detail. that the  pressures  
on, and a c t i o n s  and motivations of, workers are overwhelmingly economistic 
i n  nature .  But having "proved" this, it  may w e l l  be asked how much f u r t h e r  
w e  have q t .  For there  exists a considerable,  i f  no t  dominant, body of opinion 
that sees economistic s t ruggles  by workers either as  themselves "incorporation- 
ist", binding workers to the  verysystem t h a t  oppresses them, or a s  i r r e l e v a n t  
straws i n  the wind before an ove r r id ing  ru l ing  class hegwmny. 
Both s t r ands  of this approach have d i s t ingu i sed  forbears. In  t h e  case of 
the f i r s t ,  Lenin, who first  brought the term "economism" i n t o  prominence 
i n  t h e  context  of a polemical debate d t h  fel low Social Democrats, places 
the  a n a l y s i s  i n  the context of a call for revolu t ionary  leadership. In t h e  
second, the emphasis on political and ideological "overde ten ina t ions"  a s  
part of a c r i t i q u e  of economic determinism can be i d e n t i f i e d  wi th  Althusser ,  
al though that a u t h o r  would himself ascribe much of his argument on class 
consciousness to  the influence of G r a m s c i .  As w e  shall see, the theories 
of G r a m s c i  taken overa l l  do n o t  e n t i r e l y  favour this in t e rp re t a t ion .  
In this sec t ion  w e  shall undertake a brief survey of the&velopment, and 
impl ica t ions  for curren t  theory, of both  sets of ideas. following i n  the 
next w i t h  a c r i t i q u e  based both on a l t e r n a t i v e  theories and the ac tua l  na tu re  
of w o r k i n p c l a s s  res i s tance  - 
i) From "econamism" to "instrumentalism". 
The debate on econmimt i s  almost as old a s  i t s  s u b j e c t  - a c t i v i t y  by 
workers cent red  on the terms and w n d i t i o n s  of employment, and the alleged 
l i m i t s  of such a c t i v i t y  i n  terns of a t t a i n i n g  any w i d e r  socialist 
consciousness. The term *'economim'l itself stems from a debate e n t e r 4  
i n t o  by Lenin over the  alternative s t r a t e g i e s  of r evo lu t iona r i e s  confronted 
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with such s t rugg les .  Since Lenin appears  to have been t h e  first t h e o r i s t ,  
socialist or atherwise,  to have begun to explore  the connect ions between 
"trade union" and "soc ia l i s t "  consciousness ( i n  his own words, the " re la t ion  
between consciousness and sponteneity") his w r i t i n g s  are an appropriate  p l ace  
to begin d iscuss ion  of the  i s sue .  
Lenin's c r iq ique  of economism is on  t h e  surface a s t ra ightforward polemic 
with a contemporary tendency wi th in  t h e  Social  Democrats who, as t h e i r  name 
suggests. favoured t h e  path of a n c r i t i c a l  support for workers' "purely 
economic" s t rugg les .  -ever, i n  tak ing  t h e  %conomists" to t a sk  i n  What 
Is To Be Done? (Lenin, 1902) Lenin appears to considerably beyond the  
r e l a t i v e l y  uncontroversial  argument that socialists ought  to be t ry ing  to 
take such s t rugg les  on tD a more political leve l .  Rather, Lenin argues that 
n6t  only can trade union s t rugg les  themselves provide no opening for socialist 
ideas, but that  they a c t u a l l y  impose a "bourgeois politics" on t h e  working 
class; that by itself the working class can only spontaneously achieve this 
"trade union ' 1  l e v e l  of consciousness; and t h a t  it fo l lows  that only a 
socialist p a r t y  p a r t l y  made up of elements from the  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  can provide 
t h e  necessary socialist inpu t  i n t o  working C l a s s  COnsCiOUuleSS. 
-
This somewhat extreme pos i t i on  can i n  s o m e  ways be modified by considering i t s  
contemporary contex t .  I t  seems clear f r o m  the arguments Lenin used i n  WITBD 
that t h e  Ecomrnists themselves took a t  t h e  t i m e  an absurd ly  "tailist" stance; 
Lenin quotes  them a s  arguing i n  t h e i r  paper that "the economic basis of t h e  
movement i s  eclipsed by the effort never  t o  f o r g e t  t h e  political idea". Fur ther ,  
the  Economists' slogan of "The workers for the workers" reflects another 
s tance to  which Lenin was understandably opposed. namely that Social Democrats 
should restrict t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to the struggle a g a i n s t  t h e  Tsa r i s t  gJvernment, 
with resistance to capitalism itself being led by workers backed up, presumably, 
by "Economist" support .  
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This a p a r t ,  however, Lenin's  pos i t i on  that tsocial-Democratic consciousness.. . 
can only be brought to  t h e  workers from without" and that t h e  "trade union 
consciousness" spontaneously developed by the  w o r k i n g  class a u l d  only lead 
t o  i t s  "becoming subordinated to bourgeois ideology" appears to  exclude any 
connections between the material experience of workers and t h e  meaning and 
relevance of socialist ideas .  Brought to the  workers, as Lenin emphasises, 
"from without", and as  a "choice" which e l imina tes  any vest ige of trade union 
consciousness, socialism is presented a s  a r i s i n g  "s ide  by side" with w o r k e r s '  
s t ruggle ,  r a t h e r  than as rooted i n  or connected wi th  it; "Each arises out 
of d i f f e r e n t  premises" (Kautsky's words, quoted approvingly by Lenin). 
As Paul Thompson has pointed o u t ,  this pos i t ion  has provided t h e  basis for 
an " i d e a l i s t  formulation" of consciousness which has been extended by later 
writers such as  Poulantzas to argue  for the  total domination of  working class 
a c t i v i t y  by bourgeois ideology. The aspect of Lenin'a argument i n  WITBD which 
al lows such r e i f i c a t i o n  of working class consciousness i s  the dichotemy drawn 
between the character of working class a c t i v i t y  i n  response to material 
condi t ions and a socialist a n a l y s i s  which can locate these condi t ions i n  a 
general c r i t i q u e  of capitalism. A t  this po in t  i n  Lenin'6 a r w e n t  t h e r e  is  
no conception of any  dialectical connection between "spontaneous" responses  
to t h e  r e a l i t y  of exp lo i t a t ion  and the  triggering of revolut ionary conscious- 
ness - a re l a t ionsh ip  whoch Lenin himself f i n a l l y  adcnowledged, as w e  see 
below, i n  t h e  l i g h t  of his am experience of t h e  1905 and 1917 revolut ions.  
I t  may seem a long way from Lenin and pre-revolut ionary Russia to  the  more 
prosa i c  pas tu re s  of Luton and the attempt by t h e  B r i t i s h  sociologists 
Goldthorpe. Lockwood et a1 to debunk t h e  myth of "embourgeoisment" which had 
g r a m  up i n t h e  wake of the  much-vaunted "affluence" of the 50s and e a r l y  60s. 
Nevertheless,  Coldtharpe and Lockwood's conclusions reflect many of the Same 
preoccupations and, d e s p i t e  their praiseworthy dissection of earlier 
sociological complacencies, some of the  same somewhat static and mechanistic 
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assumptions aC Lenin's  argument. 
Like Lenin, Goldthorpe and Lockwood (Goldthorp, Lodcwood et a i ,  The Affluent 
Worker, 1968) confront t h e  r e a l i t y  of 'kxonomisticif or i n  t h e i r  tens 
t t instrumental t~t  a c t i v i t y  by workers; l i k e  Lenin they  re fuse  t o a d m i t  t h e  
poss ib i l i ty  of any r e l a t i o n s h i p  between Such a c t i v i t y  and the p ro jec t ion  
i n t o  political awareness. In  Goldthorpe and Lockwood's case, w h a t  they w e r e  
faced w i t h  w a s  a working class very d i f f e ren t ,  admit tedly,  from that of 
Lenin ' s  Russia; a working class w o r n  down by seve ra l  decades of d i s i l l u s i o n -  
ment and also newly provided w i t h  a comparatively comfortable standard of 
l i v i n g .  Newrtheless, w h i l e  the quest ion of revolu t ion  was c l e a r l y  n o t  on 
t h e  agenda, Goldthorpe and Lockwood's a n a l y s i s  reflects i n  m i n i a t u r e ,  as i t  
w e r e ,  many of t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  b u i l t  i n t o  the argument of What  Is To Be Done? 
Thus, i n  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of a "new", p r i v a t i s e d  stratum of the working 
class, and the c o n t r a s t  between this and the " t rad i t iona l"  and "solidaristicff 
working class of t h e  older i n d u s t r i a l  regions,  Goldthorpe and Lodovood Can be 
argued to  throw o u t  t h e  baby with the t h e o r e t i c a l  bathwater. These new 
p r i v a t i s e d  workers 
their older t r a d i t i o n a l  forbears - -, preoccupied as they w e r e  w i t h  
home f i tments  and consumer durables, they w e r e  no longer  suitable revolution- 
a r y  or even strike material. Similar ly ,  the authors '  research p o l i c y  of 
l e t t i n g  t h e  workers' cum a t t i t u d e s  largely d e f i n e  the s i tua t ion  being 
looked a t  misfires on t h e i r  one-dimensional and mechanistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  
of "(work)mates are not  friends" statements and those f o r w e a r i n g  t r a d i t i o n a l  
union loyalties. Lacking i n  "solidary"-ness, t h e  Luton workers must also be 
incapable  of s o l i d a r i t y ;  c y n i c i n  about the union i s  taken as prec luding  any  
s ig- t i f icance to the mrkers of t h e i r  own shop-floor organisat ion.  
the  "sdlidary" bonds and trade union idealism of 
As Robin Blackburn p u t s  i t  i n  his c r i t i q u e  of Goldthorpe and Lockwood 
i n  The Incanpa tibles (Blackburn and Cockburn. 1967). "Wrely can a 
sociological s tudy such as t h i s  have been so c r u e l l y  put  to the test'' (p48). 
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Scarcely a m n t h j a f t e r  the publ ica t ion  of The Aff luent  Worker, i n  October 
1966, a massive strike involving "near r i o t  condi t ions"  broke o u t  a t  
Muxha l l t s .  B u t  even if events  had n o t  d e a l t  such a resounding raspberry 
to Goldthorpe and Lodouood's conclusions,  t h e  imp l i c i t i ons  of their a n a l y s i s  
would st i l l  demand inves t iga t ion  i n  r e l a t i o n  to broader theories of class 
consciousness. 
In fact t h e  assumptions behind Goldthorpe and Lockwood's almost reproving 
allegation of t h e  lack of "true" trade unionism a t  Vawhallts  are c l e a r l y  
brought ou t  i n  much of t h e  work on class consciousness which follmed i n  the  
wake of "The Aff luent  Worker". The usefu l  body of work d n g  under the 
heading of Workers' images of s c i e t y "  w i l l  be examined i n  more detai l  
i n  the  next s ec t ion ,  but some of the more mainstream indus t r i a l /po l i+ ica l  
t heo r i s ing  carried Out  by for example m n n  and Giddens is r e l evan t  i n  this 
con text. 
A s  M o o r b u r  p o i n t s  ou t  i n  h i s  c r i t i q u e  of these two writers (Moorhouse, 1976) 
the  t h r e e f o l d  "classification" of class consciousness provided by Goldthorpe 
i n  a concluding paper t o t h e  Aff luent  Worker study bears remarkable similarit- 
ies to those of Giddens (1973) and Mann (1970). While, for Goldthorpe, class 
consciousness rewires 
(i) a n  awareness of s imi l a r  s i t u a t i o n s  and i n t e r e s t s  
(ii) a d e f i n i t i o n  of these i n t e r e s t s  as i n  fundamental c o n f l i c t  with those of 
another  class, and 
(iii) a conception of class as permeating the total i ty  of e x i s t i n g  social 
r e l a t i o n s  and as c r u c i a l l y  determining t h e  f u t u r e  social order, 
Giddens and E.Bnn a s k  for, respec t ive ly ,  class i d e n t i t y ,  c o n f l i c t  consciousness 
and revolut ionary consciousness. and class i d e n t i t y ,  Class opposi t ion,  class 
t o t a l i t y  and "an a l te rna t ive" .  
Such three- or four- fold c a t e g s r i s a t i o n s  of the "conditions" for class 
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consciousness appear to p resen t  a m o d e l  of a c h  awareness a s  e x i s t i n g ,  
a s  i t  w e r e ,  "on high" - a t  a pinnacle  of ideologica l  p u r i t y  towards which 
only t h e  most determined and purposive w r k e r s  c a n  hope to  reach. Any not ion 
of a wider consciousness as  a t t a i n a b l e  i n  terms of a re l a t ionsh ip  wi th  a c t i o n  
is absen t  from t h i s  sterile perspective, which isolates "class consciousness" 
as a desideratum on an e n t i r e l y  separa te  plane from that of workers' am 
humdrum and everyday s t ruggles .  
Despite i ts r i g i d i t y ,  however, the  unquestioning d ismissa l  of "instrumental" 
or "econmis t i c "  a c t i v i t y  cont inues t o  inf luence  c u r r e n t  thinking on class 
and i n d u s t r i a l  issues .  While t h e  theo re t i ca l  preoccupation with "class 
consciousness" a s  such appears  to have d ied  o u t  i n  t h e  ' x ) s ,  more recen t  
debates ,  mainly on t h e  lef t ,  concerning the  political s ta tus  and d i r e c t i o n  
of t h e  labour movement, cont inue to  p ro jec t  a d isparaging  dismissal of 
"labourism". In cont r ibu t ions  wi th in  t h i s  tendency such as those of Hobsbawm 
(1983) and W11 (1983). hcwrever, t h e  influences of ' W e s t e r n  Marxism" are also 
s t rongly  apparent ,  50 that t h e  theo re t i ca l  circle between Lenin and Al thusser  
i s  nau complete. 
ii) Al thusser  - The Charmed C i r c l e  
Al thusser ' s  work, w h i l e  p ioneering i n  many respects, can be placed i n  t h e  
historical context  of  a reac t ion  aga ins t  t h e  economic determinism and 
mechanis t ic  b@andun embodied i n  S t a l i n i s t  regimes. S i m i l a r l y ,  a reac t ion  
a g a i n s t  w h a t  w a s  seen as t h e  +*econmic determinism" of Lenin is t  conceptions of 
class consciousness became part of the  annoury of B r i t i s h  M r x i s t s  i n  their 
search for explanat ions of working class acquiescence; and this re su r rec t ion  
of t h e  ideological and political as of equal weight w i t h  the economic i n  the 
determination of class consciousness has drawn much of its theorettcal sustenance 
f r o m  the work of Althusser.  Although Al thusser ' s  theories are WO canplex to be 
adequately explored here, those of most relevance t o  our c ~ v n  concerns can now 
be b r i e f l y  summarised. 
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For A l t h u s s e r ,  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  Of hBrx, particularly i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
experience of S ta l in i sm and the  consequent crisis of the left, w e r e  
dominated by two opposing errors; on t h e  one hand the economism/Stalinism 
t r ad i t i on  to which the 'Wew Left"  i n  B r i t a i n  was a l s o  opposed, b u t  on the  
other t h e  "humanism" and emphasis on the e a r l y  wr i t i ngs  of mrx which many 
of t h a t  grouping embraced as a response. In fact, to Althusser ,  Stal inism 
was i t s e l f  a combination of economism and humanism. 
I n  response to  these errors Althusser  emphasises, f i r s t l y ,  the  r e l a t i o n s  
between base and supers t ruc ture ,  and t h e  i n t e r n a l  character of these  r e l a t ions ,  
and second, t h e  a b s t r a c t i o n  of c e r t a i n  examples of these r e l a t i o n s  f r o m  the 
social f o m t i o n  as a w h o l e  as "instances" - ins tances  of, for e q l e ,  
the r e l a t ion  between the economic and t h e  political, t h e  ideological and t h e  
j u r i d i c a l .  me reason for t h i s  i s  to make the p o i n t  that t h e  social f o m t i o n  
cannot be analysed as one i r r educ ib l e  whole, i n  terms of humanism, econanism 
or any o the r  v a r i a n t  of Marxism; r a t h e r ,  t h e  var ious conjunctures  within t h e  
social formation have to  be "thought" or conceptualised d t h  the aid of a l l  
the Marxist tools of a n a l y s i s  a v a i l a b l e  to US. I n  o the r  words,  society i s  a 
"complex unity" each aspect of w h i c h  has to be understood rather t h a n  simply 
invoking the automatic  app l i ca t ion  of a determinis t  m o d e  of a n a l y s i s  seen as 
"explaining" s o c i e t y  en bloc. For our purposes,  however. t h e  most relevant  
aspect of this argument is  i ts  presenta t ion  of ideology as, far  f r a  a mere 
supers t ruc tura l  a b s t r a c t i o n ,  an i r r educ ib l e ,  even material element i n  soc ie ty .  
As Richard Johnvon p u t s  i n  i n  his article (Johnson, 1979) "Three F'roblematics: 
elements of a theory  of working-class cul ture" ,  i n  which he capares otthodox 
FBrxism, k u l t u r e "  theory and a l thusse r i an  s t ructural ism: "Ideology is  so far 
from being d ispensable  that i t  is  t h e  medium i n  which people, i n  a l l  societies, 
l i v e  t h e i r  a n d i t i o n s  of ex is tence ,  experience their wor ld" .  Ideology, a super- 
s t r u c t u r a l  factor, reflects itself i n ,  re inforces ,  and most importantly 
reproduces the base. 
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This  tota1 integrationof ideology with c a p i t a l i s t  soc ie ty ,  t h i s  
ovemhelming dominance, again calls f o r t h  pessimistic conclusions on class 
consciousness.  If workers are faced on t h e  one hand w i t h  an economic base which 
has a s  i ts  e s s e n t i a l  condi t ion  t h e i r  exp lo i t a t ion ,  and.on the o t h e r  with, equal 
e s s e n t i a l  to the cont inuat ion and reproduction of t h a t  system, supers t ruc tura l  
factors such as ideology, politics, *&e l a w ,  w h a t  r o u t e  exists for them to  
escape such a system? The answer perhaps could be, as  Johnson p o i n t s  ou t ,  
though even for Althusser  this does no t  always follow, that  "ideology i s  an 
important and necessary site of political struggles; that the re  is, indeed  a 
class s t rugg le  i n  ideology" ( ~ 2 2 6 ) .  
This  po in t  
i n  the labour process debate, to  support their argument that ideology pervades 
a l l  l e v e l s  of s t ruggle ,  r i g h t  down to t h e  p o i n t  of production; t h a t  i t  is, 
a t  this l e v e l ,  of equal weight w i t h  economic cons idera t ions  i n  working o u t  
the "effort bargain"; that, contrary to earlier a r w e n t s ,  the capi ta l / labour  
r e l a t i o n  can never be seen as a naked "cashnexus".  Michael mrawoy has perhaps 
taken t h i s  argument f u r t h e s t  within the labour  processdebate w i t h  his 
i n s i s t e n c e  that "any work context  involves  a n  economic dimension (production 
of th ings)  a political dimension (production of social r e l a t ions )  and an 
ideologica l  dimension (production of an experience of those r e l a t i o n s  '' 
(wlrawoy, 1979, p16). The ideologica l  and political are thus in t eg ra t ed  
i n t o  production itself. Some of the impl ica t ions  of t h i s  and t h e  Althusserian 
a n a l y s i s  as a w h o l e ,  i n  terms of a charmed circle from which workers cannot 
hope to break, are examined inmore d e t a i l  i n  the next sect ion.  F ina l ly ,  
hcurever, w e  turn to  another  theore t ic ian  w h o  has e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y ,  if 
posthumously, been aQpted by ' W e s t e r n  Marxists" - Antonio G r a m s c i .  
has indeed been taken up  by more recent  theorists, for example 
The Althusser ian concept of " re l a t ive  autonomy", which i s  used to  challenge 
the alleged mrxist c r u d i t y  that the base f ' de t en ines"  the supers t ruc ture ,  
i s  seen as f i n d i n g  a clear p a r a l l e l  i n  G r a m s c i ' s  theory Of state hegemony. 
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In not ing  t h e  c u l t u r a l ,  ideologica l  and p o l i t i c a l  complexities of " c i v i l  
society"  a s  in te rpos ing  between economic causes  and political effects, 
G r a m s c i  w a s  c e n t r a l  i n  chal lenging the mechanistic bhrxj.sn then emerging 
wi th in  t h e  Second International. The counterva i l ing  emphasis on the  need 
to p e n e t r a t e  the  consensual hegemonic formation w i t h  socialist ideas  
appears  to  lend powerful support  to  the Al thusser ian  emphasis on the  
supe r s t ruc tu ra l .  
However, as w e  shall see below, G r a m s c i  was able to  grasp i n  a far more 
complex and s u b t l e  way than t h e  Althusser ians  t h e  cont rad ic tory  r e l a t ionsh ips  
between economistic s t rugg les  and ideological r e s t r i c t i o n s .  To concentrate ,  
i n  recognis ing t h e  importance of ideology, almost e n t i r e l y  on its implicat ions 
i n  terms of t o t a l i t y ,  w h i l e  a t  t h e  same t i m e  d e p i c t i n g  the  economic base 
exclus ive ly  i n  terms of "determination", i s  to overlook t h e  c r u c i a l  role of 
economic factors i n  both express ing  the  con t r ad ic t ions  inherent  i n  the base 
and, through t h i s  very process ,  cont inual ly  undexnininS.,the supers t ru2ture .  
These aspects of cont rad ic t ion ,  of dynamism, and  Of t h e  d i a l e c t i c  are 
explored i n  our next section. 
Underminings 
(i) The "Gap". 
W e  begin this sec t ion ,  perhaps oddly, by looking a t  an absence; a t  w h a t  
working class consciousness is  no t  about. W e  have a l r e a d y  discussed w h a t  
worker resistance is about (making a l i v i n g )  and to s m e  extent  w h a t  it i s  
no t  about  (job content,  the a l i ena t ion  of labour ,  capitalist r e l a t i o n s  of 
production as such). Here w e  want t o  observe a "gap" which  has been noted 
i n  w h a t  w e r e  called, i n  the s t u d i e s  (mainly of the ' 7 0 s )  which t r i e d  to  explore  
such i ssues .  'Workers' images of society". 
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The burden of many such studies, f e w  of them sympathetic to t h e  cause of 
t h e w r k i n g  class, has been to shckv that, beyond t h e  most immediate d a i l y  
e q e r i e n c e s ,  t h e  grasp of "the powerless" on general  social i s s u e s  i s  not  
only vague b u t  f requent ly  i n t e r n a l l y  i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  bo th  between d i f f e r e n t  
i s s u e s  and on the  same i s s u e  f r o m  one sentence to t he  next .  These f ind ings  
a r e  dup l i ca t ed  i n  study after s tudy,  including Howard Newby's survey of 
a t t i t u d e s  t o  class among farm workers, (Kewby, 1977), %ward Davis' 
comparative s tudy of c r a f t ,  steel and clerical workers, ( m v i s ,  1978) and 
many of t h e  articles i n  t h e  Bulmer co l l ec t ion ,  Working Class Images of 
Society (Bulmer, 1975). 
Perhaps the clearest w r y  of this t k h  is  Michael I*Bnn's article on 
"The Social Cohesion of L ibe ra l  Democracies" (btann, 1970) i n  which FPnn 
uses  the r e s u l t s  of surveys on workers' a t t i t u d e s  to argue that the o v e r a l l  
response of the working class to the ob jec t ive  i n j u s t i c e s  and i n e q u a l i t i e s  
of society is one of 'praqnatic acceptance". mnn a r g u e s  that, rather than 
p o s i t i v e l y  conforming to  ru l ing-c lass  values i n  the w a y  that previous 
s t u d i e s  have argued that they must do t o  consent,  workers are i n  fact 
i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  most such va lues  (such as "social j u s t i c e " ,  t tdmocracytt ,  
"peace"), which are seen a s  irrelevaat t o  t h e  d e t a i l s  of their everyday 
l i v e s .  Thus, r a t h e r  than an  e n t h u s i a s t i c  "value consensus" i n t e g r a t i n g  
beliefs about  t h e  ind iv idua ls '  own pos i t i ons  w i t h  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  to more 
general  social i ssues ,  w h a t  w a s  revealed w e r e  "schizophrenic" incons i s t enc ie s  
between the answers to ques t ions  or statements  l ike "Do you approve of 
Medicare?lt and 'We should r e ly  more on ind iv idua l  i n i t i a t i v e  ... and ?ot 
so much on government welfare programmes" ( t he  f 'concretef'  ques t ion  normally 
being answered in t h e  affirmative w h i l e  the general  statement w a s  disagreed 
with by the same respondent). 
This frpquehtly-revealed "gap" between w h a t  are p o s s i b l y  radical views on 
t h e  ind iv idua l ' s  own circumstances and what a r e  much more l i k e l y  to  be 
conservat ive on more a b s t r a c t  i s s u e s  combine t o  produce a s i t u a t i o n  i n  
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which, as Richard Howrt has graphica l ly  described it, %3en people feel 
tha t  they cannot do much about t h e  main  elements i n  t h e i r  si tuation.. .  
they adopt a t t i t u d e s  towards that s i t u a t i o n  which allow them to have a l iveab le  
l i f e  under i t s  shadow, a l i fe  without a constant  sense 'of  t h e  larger 
s i tua t ion"  (Hoggart, 1958, p92). A contrast is  thus  presented between t h e  
workers' 'pragmtic acceptance" of t h e i r  avn s i t u a t i o n  and t h e i r  alternate 
neglect  of, or conservative or incons is ten t  views on, l a ryr  i ssues .  
This "absence", t h i s  lack of a coherent i n t eg ra t ion  of ruling-class ideology 
i n t o  t h e  practical experience of the worker, has i ts  p a r a l l e l  within t h e  labour  
process  i n  t h e  absence of any p s i t i v e  acceptance of managerial ideology as  
the basis for worker acquiescence.  Thus t h e  need to work ("you have got to 
work .... really a man works because he knows i n  his aun heart  that he has 
got t o  work, i t  i s  a case of having to do itrq (Nichols and Synan ,  1977, 
~134)  i s  f a t a l i s t i c a l l y  acknowledged a s  p a r t  of t h e  b a r g a i n  s t ruck  wi th  
capital, a humdrum necess i ty  characterised by Y a r x  a s  "the d u l l  compulsion 
of labour". 
-
In t h i s  sense,  the  i n d u s t r i a l  worker within advanced CapiGlism accupies  
a p l a c e  wi th in  a s t ruc tu re  which presents  itself as m. The ob jec t ive  
pos i t i on  of m o s t  workers is n o t  such t h a t  they can readi l l .  take an overview 
of the s t r u c t u r e s  and s t r a t e g i e s  of capi ta l ism.  W h i l e  capitalists o n  i n i t i a t e ,  
an t ic ipa te  and t o  a c e r t a i n  degree plan t h e i r  product ion and i n v e s m - n t  
strategies, the view of labour  i s  of necess i ty  bo th  na r rm 'and  short-term. 
Such a perspec t ive  i s  c u l t u r a l l y  as w e l l  as economically constructed,  as i s  
shown by w r i t e r s  like W-rt and Paul W i l l i s  ( i n  his i l l m i n a t i n g  a n a l y s i s  
of t h e  opposi t ion of workers to "theory"). But from both poin ts  of view w e  
have t h e  opposi te  of the  vigorous and explicit "class st ruggle"  by workers 
against  the r e l a t i o n s  of production per se propounded by many of the labour 
process w r i t e r s  discussed above; or, indeed, the equa l ly  coherent endoresement 
of ru l ing -c l a s s  ideology evoked i n  theo r i e s  of "consent". 
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The a i f fe r ing  conceptual %niverse" of labour from that of the ru l ing  c lass  
i s  forceful ly  described i n  t h e  analysis of workersq response to multinational 
capital put forward by Haworth and Ramsey i n  Workers of t h e  World &tiedt*l 
(Harrorth and Ramsey, 1985).Lhder the heading, 'Labour &d International 
Capital: A Dif fe ren t  Departure" they argue, 'There seems no good reason 
for presupposing that t h e  universe of action and associated organisational 
pr inciples  for a multinational management, and those for col lect ive ?atour ,  
are t h e  Same o r  even similar (p8)". Developing this argument through an 
in te res t ing  analysis of t h e  relationship between abstract  andconcrete labour, 
the  posit ion of the 6nployer is seen as approximating far mre closely to the 
abs t rac t  imperatives of p ro f i t ab i l i t y  than thaf of the worker t i e d  to 
concrete labour: "For management purposes, t h e  task i s  to arrange and secure 
the  input of labour a s  a resource, adjusting sourcing and c o n t r o l  strategies 
to minimise the cost per uni t  of production. This view of labour as calculative, 
objectified,  impersonal aggregates is  l ike ly  to  become more dominant as 
the enterpr ise  gmws..." ( p l l ) .  
Such a perspective, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  its implications fo r  the gmwth of 
multinational and finance capital, "entails  a fur ther  distancing of t h e  logic 
of multi-national company ac t iv i ty  designed t o  maximise i ts  return from the 
t r a d i t i o n a l  terrain amprehended by labour i n  terms of the wages, conditions, 
productivity o r  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of a single plant...In this sense ,  labour and 
capital i n  WCs are n o t u e n  fighting i n  t h e  same dimension - out since the  
i n i t i a t i v e  is capi ta l ' s ,  labour's counter blavs simply find no t a n g h l e  
opponent o n  which to land" ( p l l ) .  
Wworth and Wmsey's argument, w n i l e  displaying a refreshing, and productive, 
appreciation of c u r r e n t  industr ia l  realities, nevertheless must be seem as 
perms over-uupbsising the "perlessness" end of the spectrum of capital- 
labour celatiars. Y e t  the absence of a cohercnt world v i m  on the part of 
vorkers, involving as it  docs a non-accsptpnce, i n  practice, of ruling-class 
views of hcw the world mrks, is  not without i t s  oum subversiv= or c e n  
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The same element of fear, on a more 'kicro", shopfloor level, i s  shavn 
by Pollert t o  d i s s ipa t e  the incipient resistance and so l ida r i ty  among thtj 
workers i n  her case study: "...they w e r e  stuck i n  a r u t  of fear - fear of 
lack of backing f r a n  the union, fear of lack of support f r o m  each other. 
The shop-floor was fraqnented by mistrust  and individualisn, i n  sp i te  of the 
importance of personal friendship and 'mucking in ' ' '  (Pollert, 1981, p181). 
A t  the  basis of this fear, a s  Pollert shows clearly, w e r e  the uncertainties 
attached to the grading system, carrying with than the cunstant fear of 
bcing downgraded, so that "Insecurity about proficiency performance standards 
had turned fomc women i n t o  compulsive workers11 (~182). 
Linhart locates the  same elcment of fear i n h  physical s t ruc ture  of the 
labour process itself: "Fear oozes out  of the factory because t h e  factory, 
a t  the most elementary, obvious level ,  constantly threatens the men it uses. 
When there's no boss i n  sight,  and we forget the informers, it's t h e  Cars 
tha t  are watching us through their measured progress, our rn tools tha t  
are threatening us a t  the s l igh tes t  inat tent ion,  the gears on the l i n e  t ha t  
are ca l l ing  us to order i n  brutual fashion. The dictatorship of the rners 
is exercised here i n  the first place by thc all-powerfulness of the 
objects" (Linhart, 1978, p65). 
Hdkever, despite the pressure on time, and despite the fear, Linhar t  does 
distinguish the beginnings of resistance, which for  him reside not only i n  
the t y p s  of IPW caused by the chopping off of a minute fran the break, ht 
also i n  "Attitudes, too. Holding yourself straight. Taking as much care as 
possible with ywr clothes". Linhart sees the clotkroap as an important 
centre of this fundamental resistance; here workers t r a n s f o m d  themselves 
from the d n b  lndliation of their ipagc i n  the factory i n t o  mart, 
iamaculate presences for vhrm there is 
Subjective though th is  form of response may seem, for Linhart *'It's here, 
i n  these minute si-s of resistance that I ob- every day, lore than i n  
hope of being ol lcd  'mister' .e* 
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political ana lys i s ,  t h a t  I find zeal reasons for hope. A t  the worst 
moments of exasperation there's still a vagm, almost unconscious, 
ce r t a in ty  that there's a subterranean paver q u i t e  near ,  and one day i t  w i l l  
break out" (p67-68). 
I t  is t h i s  "subterranean power", and the channels through which i t  does 
break out ,  which we now propose t o  examine. 
( i i )  A Me1 for class Consciousness? 
In c r i t i c i s i n g ,  as above, the straightforward i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of worker 
"acquiescence't w i th  acceptance of managerial legi t imacy and/or ru l ing -c l a s s  
ideology, w e  have attempted to indicate the other side of the -in to this 
"non-acceptance1f; the root ing  of r e s i s t a n c e  i n  eamomis t ic  struggles which 
themselves are untrainnelled by any ideological preconceptions. The i n s i s t ence ,  
i n s t iga t ed  by A l t h u s s r  and fellw "Western f.amst" writers, and propounded 
mst emphatically wi th in  the labour process debate by Burawy, that 
ideological and political s t r u c t u r e s  must be seen as "overde teminingt~  or 
integrated i n t o  the economic base, s p e c i f i c a l l y  denies  the p o t e n t i a l  afforded 
by the "absence*' of ideology for such struggles, which, when they  are 
considered at 111, are seen as embodying an inherent  incorporationism or 
"consent". kkwever, to regard any separa t ion  between base and ( r u l i n g )  
supers t ruc ture  as invoking a crude de te rmin i s t  model i n  w h i c h  the economic 
base shapes e x i s t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i s  to iplore the whole u n d e d n i n p  role 
of con t r ad ic t ions  a t  the base and their ocpression i n  the axmaaistic 
activity of workers. 
This emphasis on t h e  ideological itself i n  fact iprores sme aspects w l a t i n g  
to t h e  mots of class consciousness which, as Johsm arg.res i n  his 
caaanntary on Althusser, should have been included. 'We m i g h t  oqwct it 
(Althusser 's   ideological State Apparatuses. essay) to deliver an account of 
the forms of class struggle i n  ideology: the way i n  which u p i u l  and the 
agencies of the capitalist state seek to secure the r ep roduc t im of a w r k i n g  
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class i n  a form appropriaee t o  the requirements of accumulation and the 
ways i n  w h i c h ,  on the  basis of t he i r  own cconanic conditions of existence, 
proletarians struggle against  t h i s  process" (Johnson, 1979, p219) (my italics). 
In general ,  as w a s  suggested earlier, such argments oycremphasise the 
universal hold of ideblogy a t  the expense of any rccoqition of the w l a t i l i t y  
and sudden changes of consciousness w h i c h  can occur within the working class. 
Perhaps fortunately, w e  can p o i n t  to flaws w i t h i n  A l thusx r ' s  cnvn argument 
which reduce its force as a back-up to th is  %tatic" v i e w  of class 
consciousness. h e  example of these is the way i n  which the concept of 
"ideology" is conflated with ideological i n s t i t u t ions  such as schools and 
the family so that these become ideological constructs i n  t e rns  of which 
ideology i s  presented as a material force. In a similar ident i f icat ion 
of representation with actual i ty ,  the  reproduction of capi ta l  i s  presented 
as being carried out  & ideology rather than as a set of econanic relations 
d a t e d  by a capitalist state which may w e l l  use ideology as one of its 
weapons. 
Both these a r w e n t s  demonstrate a perspective in which ideology i s  
distortedly seen as a material force rather than a m e d i u m  through which 
ideas which j u s t i f y  the particular material basis of a society are conveyed. 
A s  such not only does Althusser's work suffer fran some basic conceptual 
errors; it also producer political mistakes which flaw fm these. In 
~~hnson's words: 'We are returned to a very familiar model of one-dimensional 
control i n  which a l l  sense of struggle or contradiction is lost" ( ~ 2 2 2 ) .  
Interestingly, the f a i l u r e  of Buraur~y i n  his turn to r m s e  the 
mle of contradiction ( in  fact elsewhere Le spc;rks of the "concrete 
c o e d i n a t i o n  of interests"  between labour and capi ta l )  i s  reflected i n  his 
-licit rejection of m y  conccption of a q x x i f i o a l l y  capitPlist labour 
process. crit icising w h a t  is yet a&n rlleged to  be Braverman's theory of 
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the separation of conception and execution in terms of -genal dos ina t ion ,  
he w r i t e s :  Were we shal l  pursue a s l ight ly  different  course, defining the  
labour process by the social re la t ions  i n t o  which men and -n enter  i n  order 
to produce useful things. I call these s o d a 1  r e l a t ions  between and among Worker: 
relations i n  production. These must be distinwised frcm the re la t ions  of 
exploitation between labour and sapital. Whereas the former refer to the 
organiaationof tasks, the latter refer to the r e l a t ions  through which 
surplus is  pumped out of the  d i r e c t  producer" (Burawoy, 1985, p13). 
In t h i s  way a separation is  invoked in  which "relat ions of exploitation" 
a s  par t  of the overall  re la t ions  of production, bemme w h a t  is politically 
specific to the capitalist mode of production and thus, 
relations,  require "reproducing" within the labour process itself: ' I . .  . 
we refer not 
c a p i t a l i s t  society. Once a notion of the labour process a s  the unity/ 
separation of conception and execution i s  replaced with a relational notion, 
thc emphasis shifts f r a u  a question of dunination to one of reproducinq 
social relations" (p14). 
political 
t o  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  labour process b u t  t o  t h e  l a b o u r  process in 
What  is  not apparent here is that, rather timn politics and ideology being 
integrated in to  the labour process under capitalism, the **imperatives'' of 
capitalism itself (prof i tab i l i ty ,  caapetitivmess, accumulation) a r e  
integrat td  i n t o  and s t ruc ture  the production process. There is no separatim, 
such as IUrawoy imagines, between relat ions of and relations i n  production; 
the first, as w e  t r i e d  to s h a ~  when examining "control" chapter 2, umstructs 
the second. In this way, production of surplus value (whether "obscured" or 
0theniSc)is the pivot around which managerial c o n s t r a i n t s  and workinw3ass 
resistance xwolve. 
To present relat ions w i t h i n  the capitalist labour process central ly  in 
terns of overt p o l i t i a  processes is to alar no scope for the conccptian 
of any relationship between the actual c c a d s t i c  resistance w h i c h  d s t s  
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the  labour process and a challenge to j u s t  those overall re la t ions  
of production which are placed foremost on the agenda by Ebrawoy and other 
writers. Father, political awareness ot "class consciousness" is left as 
sanething which w i l l  emerge, Athene-like, fnrn the heads of mrkers w h o  
suddenly apprehend (perhaps wided by i n t e l l e c t u a l s )  tha t  what they have been 
"reproducing" a l l  this t h e  is not the f i rm 's  product, but the r e l a t ions  of 
production. Such an ult imately mechanistic view of consciousness is rooted 
i n  i ts turn i n  a f a i lu re  to perceive the nature of the interact ion between 
superstructure and base. 
A similar view of the poss ib i l i ty ,  or necessity , of swrkers some* 
achieving a fully-fledged "class consciousness" i s  effectively dis-ted 
by Wrehouse  i n  his cr i t ique ,  referred to above, of the "typologies'' of 
Goldthorpe and Lockwood, Giddens and Fgnn. As he remarks: "The first p o i n t  
to  make about a l l  these elegant constructions is the  emphasis pu t  on 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  understanding as an apparently necessary precondition for a l l  
radical action. secondly, i t  should be noted that they seem to as- that 
a l l ,  and cer tainly a majority, of the working class should a t t a i n  'revolutionary 
consciousness' or 'grasp the alternatives' before any radical act ion is  
possible" (bo rhouse ,  1976, p471). 
And yet,  as hwrhouse shws i n  his avn survey of par t ic ipants  i n  a ren t  
strike, radical attitudes of ten exist amongst workers at, 80 to speak, a 
%ubliminal'\ d i s j o i n t e d  and fragnented level, activated and fue l led  by 
struggles which arise cpartaneaudy Out  of the material pressures w h i c h  
force workers to take action. The relationship between consciousness and 
action is, then, c lear ly  an interact ive o r  dialectical one i n  which practice 
or experience forms t'thcory" and vice versa - the unity to which G r a p l d  
q v e  the name t'praxislt. 
And w h a t  is it that begins this process, that provides the ca t a lys t  w h i c h  
may force workers, if only f o r  a t i m e .  o u t  of their "pramtic acceptance" 
amd a t  least raise the  questionof a challenge to the exis t ing structure? 
Over and over, both i n  major events of history and the smalldscale 
"subterraneant' unrest  of the c a p i t a l i s t  labour  process, class struggles 
have been shum t o  Irexplode" o u t  o f ,  to be triggered by, the contradictions 
within capitalism which have their da i ly  material impact on workers' l ives .  
For vivid i l l u s t r a t i o n  of this point w e  need look no fur ther  than our two 
sources on lteooncxnism" or "instnrmentalisn" referred to above, both of w h i c h  
were forced to a t  least pa r t i a l ly  eat their w o r d s  by events which follcnued 
their deliberations. In the case of Goldthorpe and Lockwood, as  w e  have 
seen, pract icalmfutat ion came hard on the heels of their dismissal of 
trsolidarity" for Vauxhall's car workers, i n  t h e  shape of an  a l l d u t  strike 
and "riot" over the  Z E %  recbrction i n  w a g e s  caused by a four-day week.  'Ihis, 
combined with profit f igures  which had recently been issued shaving General 
?&tors w e l l  ahead of Ford and "EX", spurred the two thousand strong workforce 
in to  %cenes...with men singing 'The Red Flag' and ca l l ing  'Str ing him up' 
whenever a director's name was mentioned" which "made yesterday's demonstration 
outside the executive offices seem mild" according to the contemporary - Times 
report. 
I\roimportant fea tures  emerge fmm an event Such as  this; its *kxplosive" 
character, and the emergence of underlying hos t i l i t y  against  management and 
'profits" which without a specific trigger re l a t ing  to h e d i a t e  problems 
of making a l i v ing  w k l l  tend to remain dormant. Mann, indeed, has recocpised 
t h i s  "exqldsiveness" point  w i t h o u t  a l l w i n g  it tis f u l l  implications in terms 
of an expression of underlying contradictions which  may take the ensuing 
struggle beyond its inmediate cause. To the credit O f  Goldthorpe and Loda*ood. 
"real evonts" d id  cause them to reconsider their original conclusions; as 
Westerwrd (1970) uannents. the study's "insufficient s ens i t i v i ty  to the 
contradictions of rorWng class wndwsness, and especial ly  to the nature 
of the l a t en t  potent ia l  for change suggested by those contradictions" (1973) 
gives way to "a rccoQlitim by the authors of just such an uncertainty, just 
c 
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such cont rad ic t ions ,  i n  the  prospects for the fu ture"  (131) i n  their 
third, post-strike 'Luton monograph". A t  thesame time Westerpard no tes  
c r i t i c a l l y  "the assumption - maintained from the ealier reports of the 
study - that  production r e l a t i o n s ,  the worker's employment s i t u a t i o n ,  are 
unl ikely to be a source of social tension or to engender more than localised 
and ' ins t rumental ly ,  directed conflict" ( ~ 1 3 2 ) .  
Any such assumption w a s ,  of c o u r s e ,  r a t h e r  more spec tacu la r ly  r e f u t e d  
by the 1905 wave of strikes and unsuccessful revolu t ionary  upr i s ings  a f e w  
years after the publ icat ion of What Is To Be Done. Lenin himself w r o t e  i n  
response to this corollary of "econmis t ic"  s t rugg les :  
'%e is s t ruck  by the amazingly rapid shift of t h e  movement from the 
purely cconaoic to the political ground, by the tremendous s o l i d a r i t y  and 
energy disp layed  by hundreds and thousands of p r o l e t a r i a n s  - and a l l  this, 
notwithLtandlng the fact that conscious Social Democratic influence is 
lacking or is  but s l i g h t l y  evidentV(Lenin, 1962, 92-3). 
Later, on the eve of the 1917 revolut ion,  hedeveloped  this pos i t i on  still 
further:  "A spec i f i ca l ly  p r o l e t a r i a n  weapon of struggle - the strike - was 
the p r i n c i p l e  means of br inging  the resses i n t o  motion. - . M y  strugPe 
e&cates t h e  exploited class...The econanic s t r u g g l e ,  the struggle for 
inmediate and direct improvement of condi t ions,  is alone capable of mus ing  
the most backward strata of the ucploited masses...." (Lenin, 1964, p239-42). 
t i i i )  Grapscian Caeplexities 
Such concre te  events,  as w e l l  as theoretical m n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  can provide us, 
then, w i t h  a more complex view both  of the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between econamistic 
struggles (which as w e  have !seen are i n  reality the major form of struggle of 
thc w r k i n g  class) and broadar political structures. and, as w e  see below, 
the cyclical in t e rac t ion  between prarsroots spon tene i ty  and refornisn. 
Few can have expressed such complexi t ies  .ore s u p e r l a t i v e l y  than G r a m s c i .  
despite the fact that his r e u x m i t i o n  of "the automatic  t h rus t  due to the 
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econoroic factor" appears to have been l a r g e l y  ignored by those more 
in te res ted  i n  an a l l -enc los ing  "hegemony'!. 
Some of G r a m s c i ' s  most pene t ra t ing  remarks on the actual na ture  of 
workinpclass  consciousness came i n  the sec t ion  of the  prison Notebooks 
e n t i t l e d  "The Study of Philosophy" i n  which he first discusses the notion 
of ~*canwn sense" i n  a manner reminiscent of t he  'pragnatic acceptance" 
noted by our '70s sociologists. While r e c o m i s i n g  that such *philosophical" 
a t t i t u d e s  "contain an i m p l i c i t  i n v i t a t i o n  to resignation and patience" 
Gramsci nevertheleks a rgues  t h a t  "the most important poin t  is rather the 
inv i t a t ion  to people to reflect and to realise f u l l y  that whatever happens 
is rational and must be confronted as such..." (Grarnsci, 1971, 328) .  
In this way G r a m s c i  d r a w s  a connection between workers' lack of impetuous 
"radicalism" and t h e i r  r e c o w i t i o n  of economic r ea l i t y ,  a po in t  w h i c h  was 
discussed on page 38 above. -ever, e x i s t i n g  "philosophies" are shaun to 
by no means relate unprobliematically to action: 
"Various philosophies or conceptions of the rrorld exist, and one always 
makes a choice between then. HW is this choice made? Is it merely an 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  event, or is i t  sanething more mmplex? And is  i t  not 
frequently the case that there i s  a cont rad ic t ion  between one's i n t e l l e c t u a l  
choice and one's nude of conduet? Which therefore  would be the real 
conception of theworld: that l o g i c a l l y  affirmed as an i n t e l l e c t u a l  choice? 
or that which .lerges from the red1 a c t i v i t y  of each man, which i s  implicit 
i n  his mode of action?" (Gramsci, 1971, p326). 
The %mtrao t  betwen thought and action" thus arwd is shown, where  it 
m a r s  i n  "the l i fe  of g r e a t  masses" to be the expression of the more 
fundamental amtmsts, between ideology and experience, which exist within 
the d a l  system itself. In this way Vt  ugrifies that the social group 
i n  question m y  indeed have its cun concrption of the rarld, even i f  only 
embryonic; a concoption which manifests itself i n  action, hut occasionally 
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and i n  flashes...But this Same group has...adopted a conception w h i c !  is 
not its own bu t  is  borrcwed from another group; and i t  affinns this conception 
verbally and be l i eves  itself to be following it, because this i s  the  
conception w h i c h i t  follows i n  'normal times' - that is  when its conduct 
is not independent and autonanous, bu t  sutmissive and subordinate') (~327) .  
Ihe con t ra s t  which G r a m s c i  d r a w s  between periods of s t ruggle  by workers 
(and these can be extremely "parochial", as both my own and o t h e r  case 
s tudies  shcNI, y e t  still create this p r i s i n p a a y  from accepted frameworks) 
and V~oxmal times" is i n  itself il luminating. Harever, as a direct corollary 
of his recognition of the in t e rmi t t en t ,  "flashing" na tu re  of working-class 
resistance and consciousness (recognised i n  similar tems by Anna Fullert: 
%eneath the general  l u l l  i n  the factory, i n t e r e s t  f lashed  ou t ,  then died 
dam, j u s t  l ike  phosphorus" (Pollert, 1981, p212). G r a m s c i ' s  apprec ia t ion  
of the e s s e n t i a l l y  cont rad ic tory  na tu re  of such consciousness i s  even more 
pertinent:  
"The active man-in-the-mass has a p r a c t i c a l  a c t i v i t y ,  bu t  has no clear 
theore t fca l  consciousness of his p r a c t i c a l  a c t i v i t y ,  which none-the-less 
involves understanding the world inso fa r  as it  t r a n s f o m s  it. His theoretical 
consciousness can %ndeed b historically i n  opposition to  his a c t i v i t y .  h e  
m i g h t  almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one 
contradictory consciousness) : one w h i c h  is  implicit i n  his a c t i v i t y  and which 
i n  r e a l i t y  unites him with a l l  his fellas-workers i n  the p r a c t i c a l  
transformation of the real world; and one, supe r f i c i a l ly  aplicit and verbal, 
which he has i n h e r i t e d  from the past and u n c r i t i c a l l y  absorbed') (~3%). 
'Ihis poin t  is crucial to our am a r w t .  If i t  i s  reuxmised that the 
'practical a c t i v i t y t t  of the worker, itself fuelled by objective circumstances 
and as ouch not the p d c t  of any -licit '~consciousness", a n  undermine 
and undercut those omcept ions  of the world imposed by the daninant hegemmy, 
w e  can r e t a i n  a mdti-dioensional, open-ended view of class struggle i n  w h i c h  
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t h e  experience of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  a t  t h e  base can be seen  to have t h e  
poten t ia l  of pushing workers through the ideological barrier. 
A p r a c t i c a l  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of the con t r ad ic t ions  to w h i c h  G r a m s c i  refers i s  
afforded by the shop stewards i n  the Edwards and -Scul l ion s tudy d iscussed  
earlier. Here,while t h e  stewards f u l l y  accepted t h e  managerial 
(and capitalist)  goal of 'production", their m actions i n  defence of their 
ambers  cont inua l ly  undermined that goal. A s  the a u t h o r s  put  it: "There was, 
as  i t  w e r e ,  an unconscious fom of r e s i s t a n c e  whereby stewards' everyday 
prac t ices  challenged managerial r i g h t s  i n  many ways eventhough their 
a r t i c u l a t e d  ideology involved & b e n t  to the same aim ef producing large 
numbers of hi-uality products"  (Edwards and Scullion, 1982, p198). Thus 
the acceptance of managerial noms, l i k e  t h e  agreement w i t h  broad areas of 
rul ing class ideology, i n  no way implies a coherent  course of a c t i o n  i n  tune  
w i t h  such conceptions. 
Conclusions 
We have been concerned, i n  t h i s  chapter ,  to show first  of a l l  t h a t  worker 
res i s tance  i n  the labour  process i s  %cancanistic" (rather than cen t r ed  on 
the depand for con t ro l )  and secondly t h a t  such econanistic a c t i o n  need not 
be dismissed as i n c o r p o r a t i m i s t  ht has dynamic, subversive and cha l lenging  
implications. Such r e s i s t ance ,  moreover, is not  the r e s u l t  of an  explicit 
rejection of ruling-class ideology but of the impact of cont rad ic t ions  which 
mifest themselves w h a t e w r  the apparent strength of state hegemony. 
In this sense w e  arrive at an a n a l y s i s  which i n  fact has more far-reaching 
"radical" implications than one  r e ly ing  on a ful ly-f ledged appreciation by 
workers of political forms of domination, coupled with a mherent struggle 
for cantml. Were these the condi t ions  for breaking through the e x i s t i n g  
impasse, there m u l d  indeed be gIounds for the assumption which w e  have seen 
as implicit i n  Althusser  that there is  no m y  out, or at least none w h i c h  can 
be i n i t i a t e d  by workers. Ihther, we Imve tried to p o i n t  to the positive 
r 
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implication of everyday working-class s t ruggles  for c l ea r ing  away, even 
for a short time, the  mys t i f i ca t ions  of r u l i n w l a s s  ideology. 
In doing so w e  have emphasised contradiction, and t h e  pressures which push 
workers i n t o  s t ruggle  as a r e s u l t  of these cont rad ic t ions .  W e v e r ,  such 
struggles are important not only  i n  expressing t h e  d a i l y  impact of the cap i t a l -  
labour r e l a t i o n  on workers, b u t  also i n  themselves generating forms of 
organisation and experience which provide an ongoing material s t r u c t u r e  
for the defence of working-class i n t e r e s t s .  As Ruth Cavendish describes the 
aftermath of the strike a t  UMX: 
T h e  whole th ing  wasn't a complete f a i lu re .  Cur stewards were much better 
and eventually might have some way on the Works Gxmittee. It gave us g r e a t e r  
strength on the shopfloor *o have more of them. People got to knw each o t h e r  
better and w e  fe l t  much closer to workers i n  otherparts of the factory who 
had supported US. I t  marked a breakthrough i n  w h a t  the wawnck?ed &...Next 
time, they would make sure everyone stuck it ou t  together to the bitter end" 
(Cavendish, 1982, p155). 
Recognising that working-class s t rugg les  might i n  themselves be t r ans i to ry ,  
Wrx made the same po in t  regarding the *ins i n  terms of organisation: "Nw 
and then the workers are v ic to r ious ,  tut only for a time..The real frui t  of 
the battle lies, not i n  the M a t e  results, bu t  i n  the cver-expanding 
union of the wrkers" (Wrx, 1933, p235). 
m i s  po in t  regarding the process of struggle, i n  terms of its creation of 
w o r k i n M a s s  ideas, experience and organisation, has two impxtant implicit- 
ions. The first is  that battles by workers cannot and are not fought on ly  
on the  gxvund of ideas. Organisation is a crucial dimension i n  the dwelop- 
ment of consciousness, and organicration cannot be built around ideas alone; 
it has to have .ow practical target, aane material sanction such as the 
wi t l -d rawa l  of labour or rent. 
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The second po in t  relates to w h a t  has to be recognised as the outcome of 
most such struggles i n  terms of accommodation and compromise. Working class 
s t rugg les  bui ld  working class organisations,  and these have not t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
been concerned to challenge t h e  system. Y e t  theprocess of s t r u g g l e ,  the 
impetus towards organisa t ion ,  continue to create their own independent 
b t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of t h e  w o r l d .  
This po in t  is recognised by Richard Hyman, who,  with G r a m s c i ,  characterises 
reformism or trade union consciousness as a n  e s s e n t i a l l y  ambivalent response 
to the need by the working class to f i g h t  for, and have represented, i ts 
cwn i n t e r e s t s .  Questioning Lenin is t  assertions on the limits of  spontaneous" 
trade union consciousness, Hyman sets o u t  a more open, dialectical perspective 
i n  which trade union struggles, hwever " e c d s t "  may never the less  alert 
wrkers' m i n d s  fb f u r t h e r  questioning of the type of society they l ive in .  
Ihe two s ides  of this crucial ambivalence most explored by G r a m s c i  w e r e  
f i r s t l y  the tendencies tamrds in t eg ra t ion  and bureacra t i sa t ion  always 
inherent  i n  trade unionism, and secondly its positive cont r ibu t ion  to working 
class cohesion, organisa t ion  and confidence. 
The success of trade unions i n  winning real refoms for the  working class 
has been oeen by scnne revolu t ionar ies  as a fatal block to  the growth of 
revolutionary consciousness among thevorking class; here, Hyman argues,  
the crucial question is  E these reforms are achieved and how workers see 
the gains  made. W uses Lenin's -le of the %read" to shcnv this: 
"In a s m a l l  working-class house in... Petrograd, dinner i s  being served. 
The hostess p u t s  bread on the  table.  The host says, 'Look w h a t  f i n e  bread. 
l lhoytt  dare not give us bad bread naw.. . l
"I was .mazed a t  this class appmsal of the A l y  days...As for bread, I, who 
had not kKwn want, did not give it a thwght...This member of the oprressed 
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class, hauever,...takes the b u l l  by the horns with that as tonish ing  simplicity 
and straightfonvardness...from which w e  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  are as remote as 
the stars i n  the sky... 
" 'We squeezed Vhem" a bi t ;  9 h e y "  won't &re to lord it  over u s  as they did 
before. W e ' l l  squeeze again - and chuck them ou t  a l toge the r ' ;  that's hau 
t h e  worker thinks and feels" (Lenin, 1917, ~ 1 2 0 ) .  
However, Hyman also recognises the  other elements i n  trade unionism which, 
centring as they do around mutinism and accaamodation and a t r a d i t i o n  of 
"defence not defiance", tend to fa l l  i n t o  the gap between consciousness which 
may be raised by concrete struggles,  and any  fur ther  ac t ion .  While acknowledp 
ing such l i m i t a t i o n s ,  w e  conclude by emphasising t h e i r  in te rvening  role i n  
"heading-off" or d i s s i p a t i n g  working class struggles, rather than preventing 
such s t ruggles  a t  the outse t .  Grams& expresses the same poin t ,  as i t  w e r e ,  
i n  reverse: 
"....mass ideological factors always l a g  behind mass economic phenomena, 
and... therefore, a t  c e r t a i n  mOments, the automatic th rus t  due to the eoonaaic 
fac to r  is slaved down. obstructed or even momentarily broken by t r a d t i o n a l  
ideological elements - hence...there must be a conscious, planned s t ruggle  
to  ensure t h a t  the  e d g e n c i e s  of the  econanic pos i t ion  of the masses...are 
understood" ( G r a m s c i ,  1971, ~ 1 6 8 ) .  
The impetus required to a c t u a l l y  challenge the "nonorrpal", to overthrcw 
w h a t  i s  and always has been the worker's framework of existence, i s  
enonnous. Nevertheless to ac)oxwledge that hegepony has continued to 
triumph " f r o m  the top", reinforced by the vWorking-class 
refonnisn, must not be to assume that hegmony is s t ruc tu red  in to  the 
mots of workinMass  -rience. Thesubversive p o t e n t i a l  of "cconamistic" 
struggles continues. 
ideology" of 
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C " E R  SIX 
Case Study Cme 
Before present ing  the first of two case s tud ie s ,  it w i l l  be useful 
to review the theoretical concerns w h i c h  w e r e  subjected to empirical 
test. 
Theoretical Concerns 
The thesis so far has focussed on three areas; 
1) C r i t i c i s m  of the "control" perspec t ive  which has doninated theory on 
work and the labour process pre and post-Braverman. 
I t  w a s  suggested (chapter 2) that the use of "control" as a c e n t r a l  
concept i n  analysing the labour process rested on an assumption that 
social r e l a t ionsh ips  between management and theworkforce are a primary 
factor defining the na ture  of the labour process, s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n  terms 
of domination and subordination. This i n  its tu rn  rested on a conception 
of the  workforce as fundamentally r e s i s t i n g  the a l i ena t ion  of its labour 
and therefore requi r ing  "subordination" i n  a political sense i n  order  to 
coerce it i n t o  surrendering labour. Both assumptions w e r e  criticised as 
ignoring the material basis for managerial objectives and worker response 
within the labour process. 
2) The advance of an alternative theory of exp lo i t a t ion  as the c e n t r a l  
focus of s t r u c t u r e  and response within the capitalist labour process. 
It w a s  argued (Chapter 3) that the organising p r i n c i p l e  of the  c a p i t a l i s t  
labour process should be seen as cent r ing  on t h e  need to extract surp lus  
value a t  social ly  competitive rates, This has the following consequences: 
a )  a continual drive by management to shorten necessary labour t i m e s .  
b) a corresponding impact on workers i n  terms of the  increased 
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour. 
c) Labour can be wst usefu l ly  understood wi th in  t h i s  framework as 
abstract labour, ie labour of which the guan t i ty  expressed as time/output 
- 1 C 7  - 
i s  more important t h a l h  its q u a l i t y .  
3 ) ~ s m i n i n g  the content and impl ica t ions  of worker response/ r e s i s t ance  
 mm a review of e x s i t i n g  case studies (chapter 4) i t  w a s  concluded 
that worker re s i s t ance  (both covert and o v e r t )  revolves pr imar i ly  
around economic i ssues .  AlienMion of labour i n  itself w a s  no t  a focus 
of res i s tance .  Surrendering of labour w a s  seen as  an acceptable part of 
the employment bargain ( " w i l l i n g e s s  to work") though above a c e r t a i n  
level i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour would be resisted for a number of reasons 
including simple incapac i ty  6s w e l l  as economic factors such as the 
maintenance of piecework norms). While re s i s t ance  was an expresuon  of 
inherent  cont rad ic t ions  wi th in  the labour process and w a s  p r imar i ly  
ewnomistic,  it evoked political impl ica t ions  r e l a t i n g  to these contrad- 
i c t i o n s  and to i s s u e s  of class mbd ownership. 
In r e l a t i o n  to  these theoretical concerns the empir ica l  research sought 
to test the following hypotheses: 
a )  Management would be pr imar i ly  concerned with material factors such 
as labour cost/ labour time reduction, rather than w i t h  the  political task 
of maintaining domination over the wrkforce. 
b) Workers w o u l d  experience the labour process primarily i n  terms of 
quan t i ty  zather than q u a l i t y  of labour 
c) Resentment/resistance would occur pr imar i ly  over economic i s s u e s  
centred on the effortlreward re la t ionship ,  no t  issues O f  llcontrol". 
These hypotheses and the i r  theoretical framewurk embrace four  major 
variables: reduction of labour t i m e ,  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour,  abs t r ac t ion  
of labour and the s t r u c t u r a l  determinants of res i s tance .  These are 
pursued within the t h r e e  main sec t ions  of the  case study report; 
mnagement Objectives, Worker Experience of the Labour Process, and 
Worker Resistance. 
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Overall, i n  the l i g h t  of our c r i t i que  of some of the key themes i n  the 
labour process debate, and t h e  a t tenpt  to establish an a l te rna t ive  
analysis centred on exploitation, the research set out  t o  assess 
a )  therelat ive importance for wrkers of "control" variables such 
as "discretion", "autonomy", influence on working methods etc. and 
the issues  of reward and effort on which our theoretical approach has 
centred 
b) w o r k e r s '  a t t i t udes  to the al ienat ion of their labour  and whether 
or n o t  t h i s  was i n  itself a focus of resistance; i f  no t ,  w h a t  were the 
t r iggers  of wert c o n f l i c t  
c) for mana-ent, the re la t ive  importance of consideraions of "control" 
i n  terms of relat ions w i t h  the wrkforce and their possibly repressive 
function, as opposed to considerstions of cost and prof i tab i l i ty .  
Research a t  Landis and Gyr 
1) Research se t t i ng  
The research w a s  carried out  i n  the  London plant  of Landis & Gyr, a 
B r i t i s h - b a s e d  multinational dnufactur ing e l e c t r i c i t y  m e t e r s ,  ceptral 
heating p r o g d n g  controls,  and same telephone equipment. The London 
plant employed mughly 450 of whom 240 w e r e  the direct production 
manual workers on w h a o  the research was focused. The plant  manufactured 
most of its wm parts for assembly i n t o  the finished product, and the 
factory floor w a s  therefore divided i n t o  manufacturing and assembly 
areas, the former w i t h  a predominantly male workforce and the latter 
predominantly fanale. The production process began w i t h  bakelite p e l l e t s  
being melted davn and moulded i n t o  meter and prograormer uni t  cases i n  
the moulding shop. The m e t a l  p a r t s  for  the products, including most 
screws, cogs etc. w e r e  produced i n  the adjacent Press shop, then plated 
and finished. I n i t i a l  assembly w a s  carried out  i n  the Light Machine Shop 
and f ina l  assembly i n  the assembly area, which was divided in to  peter, 
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d i a l  and programming departments. The main difference between the 
manufacturing and assembly areas w a s  t h a t  work i n  the former w a s  machine- 
based whereas the assembly w a s  carried out almost en t i r e ly  'With handsf*. 
The management s t ructure  i n  the factory w a s  f a i r ly  complex, w i t h  both 
l i n e  and staff functions w e l l  represented. An overall  Works Director 
presided over two superintendents. one manufacturing and one assembly, 
each of whom had both foremen and chargehands supervising the i r  separate 
departments. Gn t h e  staff side w e r e  a production cnntrol manager, a work 
study manager (as w e l l  a s ,  temporarily, a work study consultant w h o  had 
been involved i n  the  recent job re-measurement exercise), a personnel 
manager, qua l i ty  control manager, production engineering manager and 
factory accountant. There w a s  also a post known as Cperations Executive 
occupied by the man w h o  had been supplanted by the new Works Director, 
and who  was ncw effect ively his deputy. 
2) Interviewing schedule 
Over a period of approximately 6 weeks 44 interviews w e r e  carried out ,  
14 of which w e r e  with management, 2 with foremen, 3 w i t h  shop stewards and 
25 wi th  the direct workforce. Among management, the Qual i ty  Control 
Manager, Assembly Superintendent and Personnel Manager w e r e  interviewed 
twice. A l l  the major management representatives w e r e  interviewed, two out  
of six direct  production foremen, seven out  of fourteen shop stewards and 
22 out of about 200 direct  production workers (more w e r e  spoken to during 
observation). A comparatively s m a l l  number and proportion of foremen and 
shop stewards w e r e  interviewed because t he i r  position w a s  seen as less 
central  to the concerns of the research. 
In  addition to internixwing, informal "observation" took place m the 
shop floor, a f h r d i n g  aany opportunities for '2cmuents f r o m  workers 
which  are reproduced b z l w  ( i t  is indicated whether a m e n t s  w e r e  recorded 
i n  observation o r  interview). h r i n g  the  period of the research I attended 
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one management meeting and, during the tw>-week dispute which began 
two weeks after the start of the research, three s t r i k e  meetings. 
3) Recent History and Current Situation 
The s i tuat ion i n  the factory a t  the t i m e  of the research w a s  daainated 
by the i s s e  of "performance", ie the number of u n i t s  a worker w a s  
scheduled t o  produce i n  a set t i m e  under thework measurement system 
(m o r  Methods-Time Measurement. The d e t a i l s  of the system a r e  discussed 
i n  s ec t ion  2 be low) .  The exis t ing performance s tandards  w e r e  the resu l t  
of a widespread "remeasurement exercise" on job t i m e s  which had been i n  
progress i n  t h e  factory over a number of years and had only recently 
been completed. T h i s  exercise had been preceded in  1975 with the 
introduction of a new job evaluation system and had culminated i n  agree- 
m e n t s  over the last two years (1982 and 1983) which traded detailed 
productivity provisions for specific percentage increases. Th i s  approach 
had been i n i t i a t ed  by the new Works D i r e c t o r ,  brought i n t o  the company 
i n  ear ly  1981 as pa r t  of a management shakeup. The 1983 agreement which 
he had co-ordinated was par t icu lar ly  controversial because of its 
introduction of the ooncept of "job families". This integrated job 
f l e x i b i l i t y  i n t o  the s t ructure  of the  labour process through acceptance 
of the principle that workers could be moved f r o m  one to the other of 
a range of purportedly interchangeable jobs. 
Three s ignif icant  changes had thus taken place over the  previous eight  
years i n  t he  factory: 
i)  The introduction of a new job evalua*ion scheme and grading 
s t ructure  
ii) The remeasurement and consequent "tightening" of t i m e s  on a l l  
d i r ec t  production jobs; the introduction of "job families". 
iii) The inst igat ion of a new and more aggressive top management With 
an exp l i c i t  policy of incorporating productivity ta rge ts  i n to  pay 
negotiations. 
These changes w e r e  the r e su l t  of: 
i) An overall  deterioration i n  the company's competitive posit ion 
ii) A loss of control by management over work  &gets and bonus 
equivalents. 
These factors  w i l l  be examined i n  more detail i n  the analysis  of 
managerial objectives and a t t i tudes .  
4) MMgement Responses 
The analysis  begins by presenting the expressed objectives of management, 
which f a l l  i n t o  two main categories, technical functions and cost 
reduction. W e  then go on to probe the underlying implications of 
management's professed attitudes i n  the section on "control", which 
also takes up the linked issues of labour flexibility and 'performance". 
Finally, the obstacles to the attainment of managerial objectives, and 
management's response to these obstacles. are discussed. 
i) lvanagerial objectives, as management sees them. 
Before beginning th i s  section, i t  is pert inent  t o  add a brief note  
on the concept of managerial strategy, w h i c h  has become a focus of 
debate over the last few years. This debate appears t o  have centred on 
the question of w h e t h e r  there exists the poss ib i l i ty  of s t ra teg ic  choice. 
In  the s i tuat ion prevail ing within the factory, i n  which harsh 
axnpetitive pressures appeared t o  inwke an overwhelming imperative of 
cost reduction, the  idea of any such choice appares largely irrelevant. 
-ever, this point need not ru le  out any conception of a strategy. I t  
can be said tha t  managerial strategy - the lonpterm and m e d i u m - t e r m  
plans within the coropany - w a s  directed a t  achieving a highly specific 
goal i n  the most effect ive way. Thus, although the term managerial 
objectives is  used as relat ing more d i rec t ly  to the  managers' dlyn 
conceptions of those objectives,  it is  not meant as a rejection Of the 
notion of managerial strategy. Rather, such objectives are seen as 
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occurring within an exis t ing construct of overall  s t ra teg ic  choice 
determined a t  a higher level  of s t ra teg ic  planning such as that 
involved i n  choosing markets, etc. 
Secondly, i t  has been seen as valuable to express managerial objectives 
as the managers themselves s a w  than, from the  point of view that w h a t  are 
viewed a s  p r i o r i t i e s  by managers are most l ike ly  to govern managerial 
behaviour, whether or not such perceptions accurately reflect the 
feas ib i l i t y  of achieving the objectives ( in  the l i g h t  of factors to 
which the managers devoted re la t ive ly  l i t t l e  at tent ion,  ie aspects of 
worker response). Thus i t  i s  argued tha t  it is  goals or targets, 
specif ical ly  of a quant i ta t ive nature, rather than more qual i ta t ive  
f e a t u r e s  of everyday experience, which pr incipal ly  s t ructure  managerial 
behaviour and which are seen and expressed as objectives by those 
managers. W h i l e  R i c h a r d  iiyman i s  correct to argue t h a t  such "determin- 
a t ions"  of strategy "are themselves contradictory" ( m n ,  1984, p4) the 
fact that managenent fails  t o  
shaping the  actual behaviour of managers and i ts  consequent impact on 
the workforce. 
W e  now go on t o  look a t  how managers defined the i r  objectives. 
the contradictions is  impor tan t  i n  
B)rTechnical"Functions 
Mos t  managers i n i t i a l l y  responded t o  the question 'What do you see 
as your main role as a manager?" i n  tenus of t he i r  QYT~ specif ic  
"technical" function. By "technical" w e  mean functions which are 
defined without reference to management/wsrker relations, i n  purely 
productive terms. Responses included: 
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"I work towards an ideal s i tuat ion - the  monthly build programme - 
w e  aim to match a l l  customer orders w e e k  to w e e k  to delivery dates" 
- Production Control Mnager. 
'Work study includes two discipl ines ,  w o r k  measurement and method 
study" (followed by a technical eq lana t ion  of both discipl ines)  - 
Work Study Mnager. 
"1 supervise and am responsible for the assembly and test of meters 
and cent ra l  heating controls, a s  w e l l  as the cardphone" - Assembly 
Superintendent. 
'Wmaging the production uni t ,  t h e w o r k s  division. Quantity, m i x  of 
products and qual i ty ,  a l l  to be realised a t  cer ta in  cost levels" - 
Works D i r e c t o r .  
A l l  nine managers d i r ec t ly  questioned on their objectives i n i t i a l l y  
replied i n  these technical terms. Such a functional def ini t ion of 
objectives, w h i l e  perhaps predictable, is  s ignif icant  i n  showing that 
managers did n o t  see the i r  role irpmediately i n  terms of  social relation- 
ships w i t h  the workforce. Workers themselves w e r e  i n  fact s e l d o m  mentioned, 
even by the personnel manager, except as a n  undifferentiated cormnodity, 
"labour", and as a cost. The response also shows that production is  
seen by manacpment as primarily "neutral" and technical, rather than as 
a battle for control i n  which a m a j o r  p r i o r i t y  is the suppression of a 
reca lc i t ran t  workforce. However, when a supplementary question w a s  asked 
as to fur ther  managerial functions, the  technicis t  approach w a s  found 
to front  a problematic of *'cost" and competition. 
b)Cost Reduction 
 he Ysecond-order" definit ion of objectives w a s  given, again almost 
uniformly, i n  terms of costs. 8 out  of 9 managers mentioned reduction 
of costs as their prime goal, as opposed to function. The p r io r i t i s a t ion  
of cost factors over and above more ''human" aspects of management w a s  
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p a r t i c u l a r l y  noteworthy i n  the case of themrk study and personnel 
managers, both of w h o s e  roles related d i r ec t ly ,  though i n  d i f f e r e n t  
ways, to the c e n t r a l  p o i n t s  of conflict  wi th in  the factory. Thus the 
work s tudy  manager gave as the d e f i n i t i o n  of his department 's  overall 
objec t ives :  'We're t r y i n g  to determine the most cost-effective methods 
i n  order to achieve p r o f i t a b i l i t y  for the company - to minimise the  
manufacturing costs involved...The w h o l e  c o s t i n g  s t r u c t u r e  of the 
m p a n y  i s  geared to  work standards." The personnel manager, d i scuss ing  
the  progress of the 'perfonaance"-related incen t ive  scheme, displayed a 
similar outlook: "(The scheme) i s  worth it because the a s t  of the 
s a l a r y  is  offset by w h a t  t hey ' r e  producing - the  canpany ga ins  more by 
a higher level of performance - t h e  more that's produced the lower the 
poport ion of costs...we're now i n  t he  stage of tak ing  money off them." 
What i s  notab le  about  both these s .e tements  i s  no t  50 much the 
presumption of the  scheme's success  ( i t s e l f  remarkable i n  view of the 
large minori ty  of workers still f a i l i n g  to achieve performance) bu t  
the  "absence" of the workers w h o  w e r e  actually s t rugg l ing  to produce 
to these work s tandards.  The impact of the scheme was assessed sole ly  
i n  terms of a cost-benefi t  c a l c u l u s  rather than being seen as a vehicle 
of managerial t'control". This  attitude, everyday enough i n  hardheaded 
management circles, never the less  belies some of the preoccupations 
attributed to management i n  labour  process theory. 
The p r i o r i s a t i o n  of "cost" w a s  affirmed by both the l i n e  managers, the 
assembly and manufacturing superintendents .  The assembly superintendent  
pu t  i t  most clearly:  "Getting the product on l i n e  a t  the r igh t  t i m e  
w i t h  a l l  c o s t i n g  ... It's co-ordination - giv ing  guidance to foremen - 
e f f i c i ency  can become slack, for example, on timekeeping. Also going 
i n t o  costs - t r y i n g  to  c u t  down on costs." Th i s  included "Cutting indirect 
time down to the minimm - for example wa i t ing  time, machine breakdown, 
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parts no t  avaizable etc." The manufacturing superintendent,  logical ly  
for one i n  charge of a machine-based department, w a s  more concerned 
with p l a n t  investment and its r e l a t i o n  to the competitive pos i t i on  
of t h e  company: 
W y  long-term ob jec t ives  on the p l a n t  side are to do w i t h  investment 
planning f i v e  years ahead...In investment planning you t r y  to  go w i t h  
the t i m e ,  be as up to date as poss ib l e  i n  equippent i n  order to be 
cmpetitiw - there's fierce competition i n  t h e  market." 
Staff IIIaMgerS reinforced the "cost" perspec t ive  from t h e  standpoint 
of t h e i r  own p a r t i c u l a r  specialisus. For example, en larg ing  on the 
def in i t i on  of his overall ob jec t ives  a s  "to produce i n  the most 
e f f i c i e n t  manner a t  the  least possible wst" the production engineering 
manager went on: "Each employee should earn his am s a l a r y  by wst 
reduction. Can you e l imina te  a worker operation altogether? Can you 
wmbine one operation wi th  another - get the operator to do two th ings  
a t  once? T h i s  i s  &ne through m e t h o d s  improvement. Or, can you improve 
it by using d i f f e r e n t  j i g s  or tools? Provide a j i g  50 that a g i r l  
can use two hands, dri l l  two holes at  once.. .?'I 
This interview w a s  conducted during a two w e e k  strike which had occurred 
over a threat  to dismiss WO workers for l o w  performance, yet  the 
manager's analysis w a s  presented e n t i r e l y  i n  terms of cost criteria, 
w i t h  no mention of worker response. S imi la r ly ,  i n  an interview wi th  the 
fac tory  accountant which w a s  also carried o u t  during t h e  strike, the  
manager referred to labour only as a "cost": "For any part of the 
product, w e  establish the  standard cost of manufacturing, like i f  you 
take  a prog-er case...We know how much powder, how much l a b o u r  content 
g w s  i n  to  make up a standard cost per case." Tabour" w a s  no t  only 
correlated w i t h  'pcwder" as a cons t i t uen t  of the  product, bu t  w a s  also 
subjected to  the same standards of m s u r e m e n t :  We use  the materials 
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i n  stock to start w i t h  to make standard values -when w e  issue the  cost, 
w e  s t i c k  to the standard. When i t 's  labour, w e  stick to s tandard  hours - 
this goes through a t  standard labour costs, a l l  through the factory.'' 
Despite the emphasis on measuring and monitoring rather than d i r ec t ly  
influencing production levels ,  the accountant's department could be 
seen as central  to the issues of conflict within the  factory. The 
department worked t o  cost standards, of which s tandard  labour hours 
(the measured level of "performance") w e r e  a cen t r i r  component; i t s  
job w a s  t o  monitor these and report variances to higher management. 
Thus the accountancy department was central ly  involved i n  the criteria 
by which the work rates of the 'people upstairs" w e r e  judged; i t  attached 
the crucial  variable, cost, to the standards established by the work 
study department. Any f a i lu re  t o  m e a s u r e  up to these standards had its 
correlate i n  pounds and pence. As the  accountant himself concluded: 
We get the financial  side on to production systems - w e  need production 
control knavledge, work study hauledge,  w e  have to hang money on to 
a l l  the systems and procedures that they work to". 
The last thing the factory accountant w a s  consciously concerned about 
was the  issue of workers' experience of and response to the  labour 
process, yet the work of his department had a central  impact on that 
process. Th i s  echoed a paradox prevailing throughout management i n  t h e  
factory. The single-minded emphasis on quant i ta t ive and measurable 
criteria regarding "labour" is  n o t  taken t o  preclude any w i d e r  
managerial ideology al locat ing a subordinate political position to the 
workforce. The point  is  that this w a s  how management s a w  their E. 
Their da i ly  ac t iv i ty  consisted cent ra l ly  i n  carrying out the pract ical  
outcomes of an overwhelming imperative of cost reduction. The s t r u c t u r e  
of control over thewrkforce, if a s s u c h  i t  should be seen, itself 
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stennned en t i re ly  f r o m  this imperative. There appeared lbot to be a 
largescale ideological determinant either i n  management's ac t iv i ty  
or their expressed opinions which carr ied with it a specific goal 
of subordinating or exercising authori ty  over thewrkforce. 
Finally, although the emphasis w a s  mainly on the reduction of 
costs i n  order simply to keep afloat i n  the competitive struggle, 
this w a s  c lear ly  connected to an overall  goal of prof i tab i l i ty .  The 
Works D i r e c t o r  linked the two issues: 
'The job of management is  to use a l l  avai lable  resources, including 
human, etc., but a l l  resources for  the main objective - pro f i t ,  w h e r e  
it a l l  comes from." The production engineer, too, w a s  clear that 
the efficiency he w a s  trying to pranote w a s  n o t  an end i n  itself, 
but would "depend on w h a t  output you want" - ie the state of the market. 
W e  have seen t h a t ,  as hypothesised, the managers interviewed expressed 
or sought to engage with w o r k e r  response. This w a s  paradoxical, since 
the defined objectives i n  fact re l ied  on factors centring on worker 
response such as "perfomnce". However, i t  is  supgested that, 
f i r s t l y ,  the p r io r i t i s a t ion  of economic goals steimned from the real 
mmpetitive pressures prevail ing i n  the world outside the c m p n y ;  
and,secondly, it w a s  the managerial def ini t ions of the s i tuat ion stermning 
from these, rather than worker response, which structured how the 
labour process w a s  actual ly  managed, i e  w i t h  a view to the maxirpum 
intensif icat ion of labour. 
ii) "Control", Performance, F lex ib i l i ty  
In  t h i s  section w e  attempt to 93 beyond managers' own rather restricted 
defini t ions of their objectives to the nature of the p r i o r i t i e s  which 
determined the i r  a c t i v i t i e s  and ha# these interacted with their relat ions 
w i t h  workers. 
a)  "Control" 
In order to a r r ive  a t  some connections between the "'tost" problematic 
and the  related area of worker response which management was i n  fact 
forced to confront, the research tested managerial a t t i t udes  towards the 
concept of "contmlff of w h i c h ,  as set out  above,& thes is  as a w h o l e  is 
critical. A limited number of responses w e r e  obtained w h i c h  dealt purely 
w i t h  t h i s  issue ( in  reply to a 'knultiple-choice" question w h i c h  asked 
managers t o  choose between various aspects of management): 
"1 would go for oc-ordination rather than c o n t r o l .  There's Dot a problem 
of exercising control....who goes on w h a t  job - that should be and i s  
management's function. Old-fashioned 'work hard*-type control i s  
irrelevant" - the manufacturing superintendent. 
On the relationship between c o n t r o l  and authority,  the as-bly 
superintendent said, "I don't deal w i t h  the  day-to-day running of 
work - i t 's  the  foreman's job to maintain authority over the  workforce. 
There 's  no real control function. ... Y e s ,  I agree manaqment has a r igh t  
to  manage - that's w h a t  i t 's a l l  about...managenent's job is long-tern 
planning, overall  long-term strategy, making Sure t h i s  is  the r ight  way 
of doing things." 
Insofar as there w a s  any activity of "controlling" workers t o  ensure 
that they surrendered the right amount of labour, then, t h i s  w a s  
relegated dawn to supervisory level.  W e  shall see below (section iii) 
tha t  the foreman did not see their main role as the coercion of the 
workforce. In any case, it w a s  clear from the  manager's comments 
that t h i s  w a s  not a central  area of "overall long-term strategy". 
b s t  managers responded t o  the  question on "control" obliquely, 
w i t h  a m e n t s  like (Works Director): "Control over people? They're 
one v i t a l  resource, I treat them a l l  the Same way" or the manufacturing 
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superintendent 's  response i n  terms of job a l loca t ion  and f l e x i b i l i t y .  
' W e l l ,  I have o v e r a l l  cont rb l  over manpcnver - w e  haven't got a surp lus  
of manpower - I have to a s s s s  how many w e  should have, how many w e  need". 
The area i n  which theconcept came most i n t o  its own w a s  i n  discussion 
of the h i s t o r y  and r a t i o n a l e  of t h e w r k  measurement changes. H e r e ,  
several managers spoke spontaneously i n  terms of a dynamic of  control'^: 
"The t i g h t e r  rate system w a s  introduced because people queried the  t imes  
a lo t ,  t h e  w e a k e r  management gave i n ,  times gJt ou t  of con t ro l ,  they were 
far too generous, people w e r e  earning lots of money for l i t t le  return" 
(manufacturing superintendent).  
"The company w a s  l o s ing  money - the  times w e r e  ou t  of cont ro l  - there 
was no incent ive  - people w e r e  being paid for no effort" (Qual i ty  
Control Mnager) - 
"Far too many jobs w e r e  being queried,  the system w a s  grinding to a 
standstill. . .There w e r e  effects on ove ra l l  e f f i c i ency  - w e  w e r e  paying 
more money ou t  than w e  w e r e  g e t t i n g  back as regards output. I t  w a s  moving 
ou t  of ou r  hands...We w e r e  gradually lo s ing  cont ro l  of m e  of the work, 
because w e  couldn't  con t ro l  and plan it, because w e  were g e t t i n g  large 
amounts of unmeasured work...People wouldn't pu t  i n  reasonable effort 
on queried and unmeasured work." ( w e r a t i o n s  EXecutive) . 
The Quality Control manager enlarged on the dynamics of the s i t u a t i o n :  
"Management j u s t  didn't have a system. The union had driven a w e d g e  through 
it ,  w i t h  leapfregging etc. Managenent lost con t ro l  rather than the 
workforce gaining it. Management lost  cont ro l  through t h e i r  own i n e r t i a .  
Remeastummentwasn't an attempt to break worker r e s i s t ance ,  bu t  to get 
the system back." 
Managers' responses to  ques t ions  on Itcontrol" pr imar i ly  i n  terms of the 
work measurement system demonstrated that their de f in i t i ons  of the concept 
w e r e  located i n  w h a t  w a s  itself an econaaic rather than political dynamic 
-180- 
of the r e l a t i o n  between bonus and output. I t  w a s  this managerial approach, 
rather than any more abstract notion of domination over t he  workforce, 
w h i c h  both determined and reflected the organisation of the  labour 
process. There w e r e ,  then, two main p o i n t s  regarding this s e t t i n g  for 
"control" relationships: f i r s t l y  that the s i t u a t i o n  seemed to be less 
one of the  workforce gaining con t ro l  than of management gradually l o s i n g  
it; and secondly that the  overwhelming use of the  term "control" w a s  i n  
r e l a t i o n  to labour time. I t  w a s  no t  the wrkforce, the i r  response and 
res i s tance ,  t h a t  w a s  o u t  of cont ro l .  bu t  t he  speed and measurement of 
output. Thus the  management and timing of w o r k  i s  seen as a crucial 
aspect of the re t en t ion  of management con t ro l s ,  w h i c h  i n  their turn  
are an ecomic rather than a political necessity:  "banagement's right 
to manage i n t e r r l a t e s  wi th  c u t t i n g  costs" (Assembly Superintendent). The 
notion of "control" w a s  m e d i a t e d  through t h e  s e t t i n g  and imposition of 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  targets for worker "performance", rather than by any 
reference to not ions  of worker r e s i s t ance  or consent. 
b) Performance. The issue of "performance" d iv ides  i n t o  two areas: the 
m e t h o d s  and approach used i n  ca l cu la t ing  performance targets, and the 
significance of the targets for company wls, the s t r u c t u r i n g  of the  
labour process, and management-worker re la t ionships .  This latter inc ludes  
managerial approaches to and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of the problems of "lau 
perfdrmance". 
The ca l cu la t ion  of performance targets w a s  the  job of thevork study 
department, w h o s e  opera t ions  w e r e  divided i n t o  work measurement and 
m e t h o d  study. Although m e t h o d  study w a s  c l e a r l y  re levant  to the o v e r a l l  
a i m  of reducing t i m e , d t h i n  the system adopted by the work study 
department i t  was mainly carried o u t  at  t h e  production planning stage, 
since the  department itself worked mainly to "synthetic" times ca l cu la t ed  
according to the wrk measurement system k n m  as MIM ("Methods-The 
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Measuaement") . The elements from which times i n  this "pre-detemined 
motion-time system" w e r e  ca l cu la t ed  w e r e  known as W s  - time-measured 
u n i t s  - each of w h i c h  represented .ooO1 of an hour. A number of these 
w o u l d  go i n t o  the measurement of a basic motion such as reach, grasp, 
t r a n s f e r  etc., any one of w h i c h ,  or a canbination, could be used i n  an 
undi f fe ren t ia ted  range of work tasks. "Per fomnce"  w a s  then ca l cu la t ed  
on t he  basis of t h e  standard time for a job based on adding together a l l  
the TMls contained i n  the  basic motions that went i n t o  making up that job. 
If an operator carried ou t  t h e  job within that time, she would be said to 
have achieved 100, or "performance"; i f  she d i d  the job more quickly,  she 
would q u a l i f y  for a bonus; i f  she took more t i m e  over i t  than the standard, 
she would still earn the basic w a g e ,  bu t  would be open, a t  Landis and Gyr, 
to the  first steps i n  the  "low performance procedure". This key i s s u e  of 
performance raises a number of po in t s ,  both theoretical and research-related, 
which are examined i n  the following sections.  
Abstraction of Labour. The microscopic elements i n t o  which labour w a s  
divided i n  the MTM system appeared symbolic of the tendency towards 
a b s t r a c t i o n  of labour w h i c h  i s  discussed below i n  the ccinments on worker 
response. Examination of the MTM tables reveals 
a d i s sec t ion  and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of basic work motions which robs labour 
of any specific use-related content.  Precise c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  in to ,  for 
example, G r a s p :  regrasp, transfer grasp, object jumbled wi th  other objects, 
etc., not  only subject labour to  such detailed measurement as to i n d i c a t e  
an overwhelming preoccupation w i t h  labour time bu t  also, p a e c a l l y ,  
rob labour of any i d e n t i f i a b l e  content by making it al l  reducible to the 
same interchangeable components. 
Counterposing of mathematically ca l cu la t ed  work standards to actual 
worker performance. The work standards which w e r e  ca lcu la ted  within the 
MrM system had a twin r a t i o n a l e  for the company: f i r s t l y ,  they w e r e  t he  
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standards of performance and output the company required to be 
competitive; secondly, they represented the maximum theoretically 
possible extraction of surplus value. For bo th  of these reasons, the 
MTM standards stood as an unchallengeable representation of "paper" 
production imperatives set by the company. A t  t he  same time, they ignored 
both the actual complexities of the  labour process and any considerations 
of worker response. W e  examine the relation of these imperatives t o  
compaay goals and to the structuring of the labour process. 
Significance of the Targets f o r  Company Goals 
The workstudy manager himself had pointed out  that "the whole costing 
s t ructure  of the company is geared t o  work standards",  b u t  the Personnel 
manager, speaking during the strike, put the point more expl ic i t ly:  
"The times are the basis of the costing s t ructure ,  the costing s t ructure  
i s  the basis of prof i t s .  You're n o t  j u s t  measuring jobs, you're making 
s u r e  that you have an accurate basis f o r  mstings...The i s s u e  of 
efficiency is about imposing efficiency through changes i n  work design, 
new machinery, changes i n  work performance. If w e ' r e  not prepared to b i t e  
the bul le t ,  w e  
market, El0 per i t e m .  The Japanese put i n  €7. A t  E10 w e  make no p ro f i t ,  
a t  €7 w e  lose it  - w e  missed the order. The difference is  labour costs, 
a substantial  amount of that difference i s  worker perfonoance..." 
down...For example, w e  put a tender i n  the  Hong Kong 
This ,  then, w a s  the imperative behind the se t t i ng  of the performance 
targets, but invoking i t  could  not overcome the fact that these targets 
w e r e  not, or a t  least not uniformly or consistently,  being m e t .  This w a s  
the general problems of "low performance" w h i c h  was then dominating the  
factory. Before looking i n  detail a t  managerial responses t o  this 
problem, however, w e  examine a more fundamental theoretical issue, the 
role played by the se t t i ng  of the targets i n  drawing Out the maximum 
amount of surplus value from the potent ia l  offered by the workforce. 
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The Structuring of the Labour Process 
The works director  spelt this out ,  first i n  his adcnowledgement of the 
lack of pract ical  realism i n  the targets: 
Wur output projections a ren ' t  based on MIX standards - these assume 
that theory l i v e s  up to practice.  In pract ice  there 's  a l o t  of disruption. 
Fmn one s ide MIM i s  very impor tan t  for the w a g e  s t r u c t u r e ,  for budget 
estimates, from the other  w e  use i t  to calculate  a ro l l ing  average fo r  
production over the quarter ,  month etc...If you look from the theoretical  
side you imply a l l  waste w i l l  be eliminated...The budget sets a target  - 
i t ' s  a reference. The pract ical  figures may or may not match. Budget 
forecasts are needed t o  take decisions - for da i ly  management, forget  
it." 
W h a t  then w a s  the p o i n t  of using the standards? The wrks director 
went  on to say: 
"In the opinion of t h e  experts the times are accurate - I feel they're 
accuratewithin S%. By se t t ing  targets you improve by 10% anyway. The 
difference between having MM and having no objectivefi i s  %." 
W i t h  this calculus the works d i rec tor  indicated clear ly  the impact of 
quantified performance targets  on the st ructur ing and organisation of 
the labour process. Quantitative,  "scientificallyt '-calculated work 
s tandards  defined what w a s  expected of the workforce by providing measured 
output goals amund which the  labour process was b u i l t  and txwards which 
the workers struggled. I t  was MTM t ha t  w a s  the  slavedriver, not management 
or the foreman. 
magement and ' L u v  Performance" 
Few other  managers shared the clear-eyed perspective of thewrks  
director .  FPst e i the r  assumed that the work standards were an 
acceptable and normal aspect of production ("The times axe then issued 
to the shop f loor  and people work t o  them" -work study manager) or treated 
t h e  problems as a minor  i r r i t a n t :  
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"It's a day-to-day event for people t o  query times - it  causes minor 
i n t e r r u p t i o n s  i n  production, means discussing the matter with the operator, 
the  representative etc. I n  the long term i f  they see they c a n ' t  j u s t  
query things for the sake of it they ' l l  j u s t  get on with the job." 
Mnufacturing Superintendent. 
The problem,then, w a s  t o  s o m e  extent seen as inevitable.  "ever, 
opinions differed as to whether i t  had its mots i n  structure or a t t i t ude ,  
and the best way of dealing with it. W e  conclude this section by looking 
a t  s o m e  of these issues. 
Mnagerial a t t i t udes  t o  the problem of low performance 
The problem of low performance was formally, if tac i t l y ,  adolowledged 
i n  the plant  through the operation of a Low Performance Procedure, 
which consisted i n i t i a l l y  of the issuing of a warning letter to any 
employee w h o s e  average performance over a month had f a l l e n  below 100. 
Such a letter would ins t iga te  a three-month investigation period, a t  
the end of which, i f  the operator w a s  considered responsible for t h e  
low performance, discipl inary action might be taken. Any warning would 
"last" fo r  6 months, although an improvement i n  performance to 100 or 
above would be expected within two, and continued low performance would 
lead t o  I t a  second and a th i rd  w r i t t e n  warning and ultimately dismissal 
from the ampany". 
-ever, the procedure had i n  effect a purely discipl inary role, ra ther  
than indicating any concern t o  engagedth the problems leading to low 
performance. f.Imagers present a t  a meeting t o  discuss a s l igh t  revision 
i n  the procedure revealed a simple perspect i ve  of "operator failure": 
" A l l  the  conditions are there t o  pesfom - i f  they don't make 100, the  
operator must be to blame. W e  can only afford t o  have a f e w  of those 
around, or w e  won't make any money." 
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t'Rlaming t h e  operator", where t h i s  pos i t i on  on worker response w a s  
pursued, could only  lead to a root ing  of t h e  problem i n  a f a i l u r e  of 
worker a t t i t u d e s :  
"It i s n ' t  an  ideal system - t h e r e ' s  too many loopholes. A f t e r  they've 
been here  a w h i l e  they know haw many they have to do, they pace themselves. 
They're reaching w h a t  they want, no t  g iv ing  the maximum" ( P r e s s  Shop foreman). 
The works director, too, when i t  came to a n a l y s i s  of t h e  problem and i ts  
possible so lu t ions ,  abandoned his earlier more sober assessments for a 
r h e t o r i c  of moral exhortation: 
"If you measure an ind iv idua l  job, they can e a s i l y  do 130 i n  an 
hour." (Workers later chal lenged t h i s  w i th  t h e  argument that "I can 
run f r o m  my house to  my car, bu t  I c a n ' t  keep that speed up for 20 m i l e s " ) .  
"People must realise t h e y ' r e  no t  paid for at tendance,  bu t  for effort. W e  do 
have a problem of people  no t  working hard enough. I t ' s  a ques t ion  of 
organisa t ion  - w e  do have to e l imina te  bad parts, etc. o rgan i sa t ion  can 
g ive  them an excuse - t h e  reasons must be e l imina ted .  This i s  t h e  job of 
supervis ion.  Low performance must be overcome by 'preaching'  to people - 
t h e  p o i n t  of t h e  low performance programme i s n ' t  to make people redundant, 
but to eliminate t h e  causes  of bad performance." 
Ult imately,  then, l a v  performance w a s  seen as a ques t ion  of "at t i tude",  
to be overcme by "preaching". I n  practice, however, such CNdading 
f e r v o u r  w a s  a r a r i t y ,  even for t h e  Works D i r e c t o r .  Basical ly ,  t h e  i s s u e  
of worker response w a s  n o t  taken s e r i o u s l y  by management. Phi losophis ing 
about such i s s u e s  as "not ivat ion" w a s  a luxury, an occasion for product ion 
of knowledge of "Theory X 1' and "Theory Y", b u t  n o t  a process on which 
a n a l y s i s  and a c t i o n  w a s  based. These w e r e  confined to t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  
of w h a t  l e v e l s  of perfQnnance w e r e  needed, n o t  w i th  whether they could  
be achieved. 
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A s  opposed to t h i s ,  however, t h e r e  w a s  s o m e  understanding of t h e  
sa l i ence  of s t r u c t u r a l  factors i n  inf luencing worker performance. The 
D i a l  Assembly foreman dismissed t h e  warning letters i ssued  under t h e  
low performance procedure as po in t l e s s :  
"Cn that  d i s c i p l i n e  - I ' ve  been giventwo"(1et ters)  "this morning - I 
j u s t  don ' t  feel j u s t i f i e d  i n  g iv ing  letters to people wi th  o t h e r  problems. 
I t  won't do them any g o d .  W e  a r e n ' t  j u s t i f i e d  i n  i s su ing  people w i t h  
warnings. The letters themselves have got to t h e  stage of being meaningless 
- they a l l  knm they ' r e  no t  earn ing  100 performance. .. 
A t  the  moment w e ' r e  n o t  pushing people to work harder because w e  know 
t he re  are so many o u t s i d e  problems. A f t e r  q u a l i t y ,  l ayout ,  method i s  so r t ed  
out  w e ' l l  then say, now you can make performance. Jigs, f ix tu re s ,  etc., 
t h e y ' l l  a l l  a problem. The l ayou t ' s  t o t a l l y  wrong, jobs are bouncing 
around a l l  over the place.  I n s u f f i c i e n t  con ta ine r s  for p a r t s ,  no one to 
f e t ch  and c a r r y  th ings ,  bad q u a l i t y  parts. These th ings  are more important  
than l a c k  of motivation. They ( t h e  operators) th ink  that if they get 
s tuck  i n ,  somewhere along t h e  l i n e  t h e y ' l l  h i t  a snag." 
There w a s  a mixture here  of "attitUdiM1" factors and t h e  m y  i n  which 
these i n  turn ,  j u s t i f i a b l y  according to the foreman, w e r e  affected by 
the s t r u c t u r a l  inadequacies of work organisa t ion .  There was no p o i n t  i n  
t h e  workers t ry ing  to work to the required l e v e l  - sooner or later they 
would be brought up a g a i n s t  an  obstacle which w a s  n o t  t h e i r  f a u l t .  A t  the 
same t i m e ,  despite t h i s  more tolerant view born perhaps of his c loseness  
to the production process, t h e  foreman still i n s i s t e d  that  the MIM targets 
w e r e  -u l t ima te ly  attainable. In h i s  view t h e  key to  this w a s  t ra in ing:  
'With t r a in ing ,  t r a i n i n g ,  t r a i n i n g  you get t h e r e  i n  t h e  end. Is i t  counter- 
product ive to set high numbers? N o t  if you have back-up - workstudy, q u a l i t y  
con t ro l ,  t r a i n i n g  etc. Same of these  jobs are impossible without  basic 
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t r a i n i n g  - w e  need someone to shav t hese  girls  w e ' r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  them 
g e t t i n g  performance." 
This foreman appeared to  have a view Of workers as a kind of "tuneuppable" 
machine - i f  t h e  process w a s  repeated of t en  enough, they m u l d  eventua l ly  
perfoman adequately and predic tab ly .  The Assembly Superintendent also 
shaved some awareness of the  importance of s t r u c t u r a l  factors, though 
seeming almost resigned to an i n e v i t a b l e  s h o r t f a l l  i n  performance i n  h i s  
department, which, as t h e  most labour- intensive i n  t h e  f ac to ry ,  w a s  
c u r r e n t l y  recording only 76% "achieved hours". Pushing the  workforce 
was i n  f a c t  seen as counterproductive: 
"There's a continuous s t r u g g l e  to get more effort o u t ,  w e ' d  l i k e  to be 
always pushing up effort, or th ings  get slack, costs go up. W e  c an ' t  go 
tdo hard,  or they start r ebe l l i ng .  The s t r u c t u r i n g  of t h e  w r k  is more 
important.  If t h e r e ' s  a c o n s i s t e n t  f law of work, the workers are more 
motivated, there's a n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e  i n  output .  If w e  keep pushing t h e  
workforce you may get a limited increase ,  bu t  then  t h e y ' l l  ctdck vu... 
Mnagement's r i g h t  to manage i n t e r r e l a t e s  w i t h  c u t t i n g  costs. If you 
push them along,  c o n t r o l  them, you get motivation because the work i s  
cont inr ia l ly  going along.  There ' s  a f law of work. The operators a r e n ' t  
paid to solve problems." 
There w a s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  a s s imi l a t ion  he re  between t h e  func t ions  of 
management, t h e  organisa t ion  of work, and t h e  motivat ion of t h e  wrkforce. 
The job of management, even its "rigtht to manage", w a s  no t  seen as "control" 
i n  t h e  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  sense b u t  as t h e  s t r u c t u r i n g  of production i n  such a 
way that a flaw of work w a s  achieved which i n  its tu rn  would motivate  
the  workforce by providing them wi th  a meaningful work p a t t e r n  and a 
clear oppor tuni ty  to enhance earnings.  This  s t r u c t u r i n g  of work, overcoming 
of problems or hiccups i n  t h e  smooth pa th  of theproduction process, w a s  
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managementts funct ion (and no t ,  i t  w a s  emphasised, t h e  w w b r s t ) .  
There w a s  c e r t a i n l y  no p r inc ip l ed  attempt to  impose managerial au+hor i ty  
for its own sake - i n  fact if anything t h e  reverse:  
"If t h e  job changes, you get r e s i s t a n c e  - so changes are introduced 
as  l i t t le  as possible - if you're g e t t i n g  e f f i c i ency ,  don ' t  touch it. 
Not  because the w r k e r s  are s t rong ,  bu t  because d i s rup t ion  upse t s  
everything. If there i s n ' t  a necessary cost reason for change, w e  won't 
d i s r u p t  .If 
Here a problematic of "efficiency" and "cost" w a s  e x p l i c i t l y  subs t i t u t ed  
for one of managerial a u t h o r i t y  and the suppression of worker res i s tance .  
To sum up, then, "control" for management a t  Landis and Gyr w a s  mediated 
through 'Iperformance",which itself w a s  seen s t r i c t l y  i n  materialist 
terns rather than as an  aspect of any kind of power struggle. 
' 
Fina l ly ,  w e  consider  another  dimension of t h i s  pattern of work r e l a t ionsh ips ,  
f l e x i b i l k t y ,  which can be seen a s  itself a f u r t h e r  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of the 
abs t r ac t ion  of labour  implicit i n  the M1M system. 
c) F l e x i b i l i t y  of Labour 
A general  goal of management, f lexibil i ty had recen t ly  taken a highly 
specific shape wi th in  Landis and Gyr through t h e  "job families" system 
included i n  the June 1983 pay agreement. This  w a s  t h e  culmination of 
a -genera l  w a r  on "custom and practice" and s i m i l a r  obstacles to  f u l l  
managerial con t ro l  over wrk organisa t ion  w h i c h  had been ua@ by t h e  
Dutch mrks director s ince  his in t roduct ion  to  the company two years  
previously.  Immediately s t ruck  by t h e  lack of f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  the 
workforce, h i s  first move w a s  to  e l imina te  t h e  customary 1C% leve! of 
guaranteed overtime, follaued by the in t roduct ion  of fixed-tern temporary 
labour  c o n t r a c t s  to deal w i t h  peaks i n  orders. The manager then, on the 
basis of f u l l  implementation of the  still only  half-completed work 
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measurement programme, introduced i n  t h e  1982 agreement t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
of t r ad ing  a waran teed  l e v e l  of 'performance" for percentage increases .  
In 1983 t h e  p r i n c i p l e  w a s  extended to t h e  specific measures contained i n  
t h e  concept of "job f a m i l i e s " ;  
We asked t h e  union: 'Do you ag ree  that if a person knows haw to  p u t  
screws i n ,  he can do i t  for any type of screw - a small one, large one, 
black or green one?' They agreed t h e  p r inc ip l e ,  and w e  said, 'Okay, w e  
w i l l  b r ing  toge ther  a l l  t h e  jobs t h a t  w e  t h ink  r equ i r e  t h e  same t r a i n i n g  
and t h e  same skills." 
In  fact this innocuous-sounding "pr inciple"  brought i n  i ts  t r a i n  a 
considerable  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour ,  made worse by t h e  abrupt  reduct ion 
i n  t r a i n i n g  allowance based onthe alleged s i m i l a r i t y  of new jobs to t h e  
old.  The impact on t h e  workforce of sudden switches to "new jobs" w a s  
considerable,as w i l l  be considered i n  more detail below. 
Nevertheless,  that t h e  scheme w a s  conceivable and a t  least i n  part 
workable is  testament to exac t ly  t h e  l a c k  of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  between 
jobs suggested i n  t h e  "same t r a in ing ,  sme skills" concept to which t h e  
manager referred. This  kind of total job f l e x i b i l i t y .  total interchange- 
a b i l i t y  between jobs ,  can be a funct ion only  of a labour  process t o t a l l y  
given over  to t h e  production of value,  not  use. Indeed, t h e  d i f fe rence  
between jobs  which workers cited as making t h e  achievement of performance 
impossible w e r e  d i f f e r e n c e s  of speed, no t  j ob  content ,  mainly a t t r i b u t a b l e  
to t h e  lack of t r a i n i n g  on new, i f  no t  e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t ,  jobs. The D i a l  
Assembly foreman had drawn a t t e n t i o n  to t h i s :  "One week a person 's  doing 
a job - 1x) performance - next  week they ' re  t r a i n i n g  - back on the ( low 
performance) l ist . . . .Supervision w a s  supposed to t r a i n  people up on t h r e e  
jobs b y Christmas - they c a n ' t  get performance on one, l e t  a lone  three." 
The kind of f l e x i b i l i t y  of labour  shown i n  t h e  job families programme 
i s  o f t e n  seen as a f u r t h e r  instrument of managerial c o n t r o l ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
i n  terms of overcoming s o m e  worker con t ro l s  wi th in  t h e  labour  process  
such a s  j o b  demarcation. Indeed, t h e  system of j o b  families w a s  e x p l i c i t l y  
launched i n  order to remove demarcation and thus  fill i n  some of t h e  pres 
i n  t h e  labour  process: "....an employee w h o s e  job i t  w a s  to i n s e r t  screws 
might re fuse  to t r a n s f e r  t o  another ,  very  similar job. Supervision had to 
spend a l o t  of t i m e  t r y i n g  to get people to move to o t h e r  work when t h e i r  
jobs w e r e  stopped...The employees prefer red  to be booked on wai t ing time 
- they d i d n ' t  want to mow." 
Whether t h e  in t roduct ion  of f l e x i b i l i t y  between jobs is  used a s  a means 
of r e in fo rc ing  managerial a u t h o r i t y  i s  hmever  a d i f f e r e n t  matter. The 
manufacturing superintendent ,  e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  welcoming t h e  job families 
scheme as " rea l ly  planned f l e x i b i l i t y " ,  presented it i n  a neu t r a l  and 
"technical" l i g h t  a s  an aspect of t h e  specification of work wi th in  t h e  
job eva lua ted  grading s t ruc tu re :  "People know w h a t  i s  t h e  range of work 
for which they  get paid." What i s  more, he claimed ( inacoura te ly ,  as it 
turned o u t )  that "People are completely co-operative i n  changing round wi th in  
grades." The scheme w a s  c l e a r l y  n o t  seen a s  having as its specific 
purpose a s t rengthening of managerial au tho r i ty .  
The use of  labour f l e x i b i l i t y  a s  a mangerial weapon  wi th  which to 
f u r t h e r  subordinate  t h e  workforce is, then, questioned i n  this ana lys i s .  
W h a t  i s  emphasised i s  i t s  use to f i l l  i n  the "pores" of t h e  labour  process  
and thus  gain more continuous production, and also its roots i n  t h e  
abs t r ac t ion  of labour.  Managerial "controls" are c e r t a i n l y  here  counterposed 
to worker "controls" bu t  i n  both cases t h e  con t ro l s  are aspects i n  Ile 
exp lo i t a t ion  r e l a t i o n s h i p  and are no t  pr imar i ly  weapons i n  a power struggle. 
In its examination of t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between expressed managerial 
ob jec t ives  and a possible hidden agenda of Wontrol",  t h e  research sbWed 
- 19 E- 
that any "control" considerations on the pa r t  of management w e r e  
a r t icu la ted  through a framework of l a b o u r  t i m e  and performance. Evenwhen 
focussing on the latter issue,  which w a s  a major area of w n f l i c t  i n  
the factory a t  the t i m e ,  there w a s  l i t t le  spontaneous discussion of 
worker response and no apparent managerial perspective w h i c h  had the 
crushing of worker resistance a t  its centre. Although, f ina l ly ,  the 
latest proposals concerning p e r f o m n c e  had a specific effect i n  increasing 
labour f lexibi l i ty ,  the overall  purpose w a s  again conceived as ashortening 
of l abour  time. 
I n  our th i rd  sec t ion  on managerial responses,  w e  go on to look a t  
hav successfully these trperfo;rmancett-related objectives were carried 
out  with regard to their imposition on the workforce, and how management 
d e a l t  w i t h  any  obstacles to  the i r  objectives i n  t h i s  respect. 
iii) Objectives and O b s t a c l s  
Obstacles to managerial objectives have often been assumed i n  the 
l i t e r a t u r e  t o  consist  of organised wrker resistance and associated 
'kontrols" to w h i c h  managwent responds w i t h  a set of s t ra teg ies  centred 
on the subordination of theworkforce. A t  Landis and Gyr it  w a  found 
that w h i l e  the  introduction of fo r  example job families had had the 
effect of lessening w h a t  worker discret ion existed within the labour 
process, i t  was, i ronical ly ,  management's disregardinq of issues  of 
worker response which brought about s o m e  of the  more significant obstacles 
i n  the way of management objectives. These clustered around two sets 
of contradictions centred on, respectively, performance and work 
organisation. 
Performance 
W e  have already dealt with many of the issues surrounding the 
managerial attitude to performance. Here w e  Zocus on the  implications 
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of managenent's f a i l u r e  to confront the response of m r k e r s  faced 
w i t h  theoretical ,  numerically ca l cu la t ed  noms of w r k  performance. 
This managerial evasion of workers' feelings about the labour process 
took two forms: 
a) The disputes p roceduredch  had been set up to deal w i t h  specific 
complaints about  work rates w a s  ineffective.  
b) The agreements, par t icu lar ly  the most recent, w h o s e  p rac t ica l  
effect was a s ignif icant  increase i n  labour intensif icat ion,  had been 
forced through without an assessment of t he i r  potent ia l  for confl ic t .  
a )  The disputes  procedure.Because of the structurinq of the labour 
process towards mathematically calculated targets as opposed to any 
assessment of productivity based on empirical examination of the actual  
labour process, the workers' own experience was not only discounted 
but was in Pract ice  helpless i n  the face of management's def ini t ion 
of the s i tua t ion .  Thus the disputes procedure which w a s  supposed t o  
be set i n  motion when a worker queried a rate was i n  r e a l i t y  a d e d  
letter, meaning usually a period of two to three months before anyone 
from the  Work Study department would c o m e  to look a t  the  job. The post 
of Trade Union representative on timings, as w e  shaw later, w a s  similarly 
meaningless, s ince  the  mrker's own experience of the job w a s  useless 
i n  the face of the work study calculations. Paradoxically, haxever. t h i s  
relentless imposition of managerial def ini t ions created another obstacle 
to the achievement of performance, in terms of a loss O f  worker 
motivation. Talking about the rates disputes procedure, the Press Shop 
foreman said: 
*This causes a problem because they expect an imoediate reply, I have 
t o  90 through the work study department, and i f  they don't get service 
a s  soon as possible they get discontented. There's no stoppaw of the 
job no matter w h a t  the  query, the time on the job w i l l  stand and they ' l l  
work to that, otherwise w e ' l l  u s e  the discipl inary procedure ... Production 
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carries on, the only t rouble  is  kametimes they feel t h e  time i s  
not  going to be changed - ' I ' m  n o t  going to reach the time so I ' l l  
j u s t  get by." 
b)  Problems wi th  t h e  agreements. Because of t h e  overwhelming sa l i ence  
of t h e  profitability/performance imperative for the company, management 
was unable to face up to the p o s s i b i l i t y  of and basis for a worker 
response which conf l i c t ed  wi th  t h i s  imperative: 
"I cha l lenge  them to  prove I'm no t  r i g h t  - if people don ' t  want to 
perform w e ' r e  back to t h e  o r i g i n a l  s i t u a t i o n  wi th  the company threatened 
with shutdawn..." - works director.. 
Unfortunately, this perspec t ive  left  t h e  same manager, when he d i d  
pronounce on t h e  sub jec t ,  unable to provide more than a c a r i c a t u r e  of the 
na tu re  of worker response and resistance: 
"1 t h ink  some workers are t h e r e  on ly  to f i g h t  management. Evenif you 
say you are going to double t h e i r  s a l a r y  they reply,  ' W e  don ' t  accept 
i t ,  and if you g ive  it to us w e ' l l  strike!'" 
In t h e  long t en  t h e  refusal  to confront  and understand t h e  na ture  
of worker response and r e s i s t ance  led t o  a " f i re f igh t ing"  approach 
which could be said to  be countexproductive i n  terms of t h e  ob jec t ive  
of c o n s i s t e n t  and predictable l e v e l s  of output .  A s  t h e  assembly 
superintendent  p u t  i t  during t h e s t r i k e ,  t a l k i n g  about t h e  agreement 
mbcdying "job families" which w a s  a t  t h e  root of t h e  dispute:  "If 
they'd rejected it, i t  could have been renegoi ta ted i n  more detail, w e  
could have reached a compromise. As it  is, t h e  i s s u e s  are being fought 
ou t  now r a t h e r  than being negotiated." 
Thus t h e  imposit ion of targets over which t h e r e  could i n  fact have 
been 'kxxnpromise" w a s  accepted as l ead ing  to t h e  occasional  e rupt ion  of 
c o n f l i c t ,  r a t h e r  than being modified to  f i t  i n  wi th  t h e  real condi t ions  
of the labour  process. Indeed, t h e  manager abandoned h i s  brief concession 
to t h e  workers' p o i n t  of view for refuge i n  the quantitative cereaifities 
of capitalism: 
"Is conflict inev i t ab le?  W e l l ,  people have got  to understand a l o t  
more of t h e d e t a i l e d  side of f inance and cos t ings  ... In  t h e  end w e  
are g o i n g  to say W e l l  OK you know about it, you accept it  or - It ' l l  
make us less competitive wi th  o t h e r  companies if w e  c a n ' t  get performance." 
Obstacles to  Object ives  i n  Work Organisation 
This p e r s i s t e n t  conf l i c t  between a necessary,  from t h e  managerial po in t  
of view, i n s i s t e n c e  on quan t i aa t ive  targets and the q u a l i t a t i v e  conten t  
and experience of t h e  labour  process is echoed i n  thesphere of t h e  
technical organisa t ion  of work itself. Here t h e  problems can be classified 
i n t o  two areas, production engineer ing and q u a l i t y  cont ro l .  
a )  Production Engineering. The o v e r a l l  ob jec t ives  of t h e  production 
engineer ing department w e r e  those of monitoring the  design of products  
and machinery, developing more e f f e c t i v e  production methods and improving 
job design. These w e r e  a l l  c r u c i a l  to t h e  1onFtex-m pos i t i on  of t h e  
company as an i n t e l l i g e n t  i n v e s t o r  and c o m p e t i t i v e  u n i t .  Hawever, such 
higher-order ob jec t ives  w e r e  r a r e l y  obtained because, i n  t h e  Production 
Engineer 's  words, We spend -50% of  our  t i m e  'trouble-shooting' . I t  
This problem w a s  caused, fundamentally, by l i n e  management's f a i l u r e  
to use  m r k e r  knowledge as a way of s o r t i n g  out  everyday production 
problems which cropped up on t h e  shop floor: "The reasons? Supervision 
relies on production engineering to  he lp  t h e m s r t  o u t  t h e i r  problems.... 
parts are never going to go smoothly. A s l i g h t  change i n  material may 
need a change i n  temperature, etc. The operator w i l l  see the  problem, w i l l  
te l l  the  supervisor  b u t  won't have t h e  knmledge to p u t  it r i g h t .  I t  
probably would  help i n  some i n s t ances  for t h e  operator to have more 
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knowledge...then he could deal wi th  the  problem a t  the  g r a s s  mots 
r a t h e r  than c a l l i n g  on US." 
b) Q u a l i t y  Control.  The Contradict ions suggested i n  the  Production 
Fngineer 's  account appeared i n  a s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  form i n  the sphere  
of q u a l i t y  con t ro l ,  w i th  t h e  major o b j e c t i v e  of improving q u a l i t y  
cons t an t ly  f r u s t r a t e d  by the emphasis on output .  This  w a s  expressed i n  
tens both  of the r e l e n t l e s s  managerial p re s su re  for production and 
of employees' avn concern for t h e i r  bonuses: 
"Not g e t t i n g  rejects i s  very  difficult  - you have three problems: 
first of a l l ,  i f  you s t o p  t h e  job because of bad q u a l i t y ,  i t  affects 
output ;  secondly, t h e  too l ing  of t h e  machine may be inaccura te ;  and 
t h i r d l y  t h e  operators themselves a r e n ' t  that q u a l i t y  conscious because 
of the b0nus.f' There was a f u r t h e r  conf l ic t  between t h e  manufacturing 
workers '  "bashing ou t "  of pa r t s ,&iven  on by t h e  bonus, and the  ensuing 
poor q u a l i t y  of the parts passed on to t h e  assemblers. Underlying these  
problems w a s  a basic worker distrust of management, which made them 
r e l u c t a n t  to cooperate i n  t h e  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  campaign because of its 
implications for t h e i r  workload ( i n  fact, according to workers I spoke to 
later, they simply did not  have t i m e  to c a r r y  o u t  t h e  monitorin g requi red  
i n  t h e  campaign). T h i s  mistrust  found its endors 'ement i n  t h e  low 
opinion by management of workers' capabilities: "You would need 
reasonably i n t e l l i g e n t  people wanting tia be involved i n  work. The main 
factors for workers are money and social life.. .They haven't W t  
technical reasoning overall - they don ' t  h o w  why i t  goes together  
or w h a t  happens" ( t h e  assembly super in tendent ' s  response to t h e  
suggestion of ' 'qual i ty  circles"). 
The"mistmstrfof management by t h e  workers and managerial re luc tance  
to g i v e  up t h e i r  monopoly on information which marked the i s s u e s  
discussed above can be seen as  typical of t h e  overall antagonism of 
i n t e r e s t s  which existed a t  a s t r u c t u r a l  (no t  necessa r i ly  personal )  
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l e v e l  i n  t h e  factory.  Other roots, and expressions,  of this fundamental 
antagonism w e r e  found of course i n  t h e  related areas of work measurement, 
f l e x i b i l i t y  of labour ,  bonus and "performance". Paradoxically,  hawever, 
a central po in t  emerging from our s tudy  of managerial a t t i t u d e s  was that 
managers d i d  no t  i d e n t i f y  t h e i r  tasks, funct ions  or o b j e c t i v e s  i n  terms 
of t h e  need to deal wi th  a ( p o t e n t i a l l y  or a c t i v e l y )  r e s i s t a n t  workforce. 
In fact mamgenent w a s  n o t  i n t e r s t e d  i n  worker c-peration, or worker 
response of any kind. The i s s u e s  around which t h e  labour  process revolved, 
for them, w e r e  t h e  technical  and "cost" imperat ives  ou t l ined  abve wi th in  
which labour  remained, however awkward  and unpredictable ,  e s s e n t i a l l y  a 
oomnodity. 
i v )  Conclusions on Management Response. 
We can sum up our f ind ings  on management response i n  terms of t h e s e  
u l t ima te ly  q u a n t i t a t i v e  ob jec t ives  and their detachnent f r o m  any 
problematic of "control". Bearing i n  mind our o r i g i n a l  hypothesis about 
the  managerial procuupation wi th  material i s s u e s ,  w e  conclude that: 
L m n a g e r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s  and ob jec t ives  w e r e  c l a s s i f i e d  by them i n t o  
th ree  main groups: monitoring/reducing costs, reducing labour t i m e  
(achieving "performance") and increas ing  labour  f l e x i b i l i t y .  These a l l  
reflected a conception of management which w a s  p r imar i ly  economic 
(concerned with q u a n t i t i e s  of output )  r a t h e r  than political (concerned 
with r e l a t i o n s  of subordination and domination). 
2,'There w a s  a pazadox between t h i s  problematic on t h e  part of 
management and t h e  f a i l u r e  to explore  t h e  causes  for t h e  p reva i l i ng  poor 
performance record which c lashed  wi th  t h e  "costs" obgective.  Thus whi le  
t h e  ob jec t ives  themselves w e r e  being undermined by aspects of worker 
response, management l a r g e l y  f a i l e d  to engage wi th  such response, even 
when it erupted i n  t h e  fonn of a s t r i k e .  
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3.The emphasis on q u a n t i t a t i v e  factors (hinv much, how qu ick ly )  i n  t h e  
organisa t ion  of the labour  process led to a neg lec t  of factors l i k e  
productqual i ty  and machine too l ing ,  wi th  t h e  r e s u l t  that t h e  o v e r a l l  
objectives of t h e  company i n  tens  of an  e f f i c i e n t l y  produced and 
saleable product  w e r e  i n  themselves con t inua l ly  f r u s t r a t e d .  This  involved 
aspects of worker response - worker knwledge and t h e  need for co-operation 
- which management, i n t h e i r  preoccupation wi th  economic targets, appeared 
to see as i r r e l e v a n t .  
W e  nau go on to examine t h e  response of theworkfo rce  to  the  s i t u a t i o n  
a t  Landis and Gyr. 
2. Worker Responses 
Worker responses are discussed  under t h r e e  headings, which i n  
d i f f e r e n t  ways refer to t h e  consequences of the managerial d r i v e  
towards t h e  reduct ion of labour  t i m e  for workers' experience of t h e  
labour  process. The first of these  d i scusses  workers' own preoccupation 
with q u a n t i t a t i v e  aspects of t h e  labour  process ,  inc luding  the  impact of 
increased labour  f l e x i b i l i t y .  The second covers the area' of worker 
response to working methods, q u a l i t y  etc. The third covers  i s s u e s  of 
acquiescence and r e s i s t a n c e ,  examining first of a l l  t he  i s s u e  of "wil l ing-  
n e s s  to work" and going on to look a t  workers' attitudes towards t h e  
d e s i r a b i l i t y  and f e a s i b i l i t y  of o v e r t  r e s i s t ance .  Thissec t ion  inc ludes  
a brief account of t h e  strike. 
The f i rs t  two M t hese  ca t egor i e s  of worker response can be l inked  
wi th  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  i s s u e s  of t h e  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  and a b s t r a c t i o n  
of labour ,  w h i l e  t h e  third provides SOme empirical background regarding 
t h e  conten t  and impl ica t ions  of worker r e s i s t ance .  
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i)  Quant i ty  not q u a l i t y .  
The f i rs t  po in t  to be made here  i s  the  pr ior i tywhich  workers i n  both 
manufacturing and assembly gave to q u a n t i t a t i v e  factors,when asked a general  
ques t ion  on t h e i r  " fee l ings  about work". Of t h e  45 workers spoken to i n  
interview or observat ion,  33 r a i sed  t h e  "performance" i s s u e  spontaneously 
as  t h e i r  f i rs t  po in t ,  and 5 as  t h e i r  second. Few workers of t h e i r  own 
accord prioritised factors such as job  ccn ten t ,  skill l e v e l ,  worker 
autonomy/discretion or l e v e l s  of managerial d i s c r e t i o n ,  although two 
workers i n t h e  moulding shop concentrated t h e i r  i n i t i a l  interview comments 
around t h e  i s s u e  of supervision. Four o u t  of t h e  17 d i r e c t  production 
workers interviewed 
' q u a l i t a t i v e "  i s s u e s  listed above, bu t  t h e  bulk of t h e  interview material 
tended to c e n t r e  on i s s u e s  of MTM/performance. The meaninq of t h e  work 
w a s ,  for these  workers, effort, "performance", output .  In examining t h e i r  
comments w e  focus on th ree  categories, though these  f requent ly  overlap: 
whether or no t  the  worker a c t u a l l y  makes performance, or a tonus; hau hard 
they worked, i n  e i t h e r  case; and t h e  i m p a c t  of job  families. W e  p re fac  e 
these  comments, however, with an a n a l y s i s  of some of t h e  firm's Own 
statistics on performance. 
d i d  make an  i n i t i a l  comment regarding the more 
These f a l l  i n t o  t h r e e  groups: a comparison of bonuses between d i f f e ren t  
departments for 2 w e e k s  i n  1983/84, a p e f o m n c e  summary for four  w e e k s  
i n  1983, and d i f f e rences  betweenachieved and measured hours i n  1983. 
O f  these ,  t h e  first shows that bonuses 
i n  a l l  t h e  departments listed, both manufacturing and assembly, tended to fal: 
between w e e k s  12 of 1983 and 1984. The second i t e m  shows genera l ly  higher  
performance averages among manufacturing workers, though some, for 
example i n  the  p r e s s  shop, ba re ly  m a k e  performance d e s i p t e  t h e  b u i l t  i n  20% 
machine allowance. Performance rates w e r e  genera l ly  high i n  the l i g h t  
machine shop, butwhen w e  reach t h e  assembly area the f i g u r e s  drop: 8 
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o u t  of 19 workers i n  dial assembly, for example, made less than 100 
performance-in t h e  second week. The t h i r d  set of t a b l e s  shcms t h e  
percentage of achieved a g a i n s t  measured hours,  i e  t h e  e x t e n t  to  which 
workers achieved performance as measured under MIM, 'to be between 80 and 
W% i n  meter assembly, 60-8W0 i n  WWB (programmers) and only  6cX i n  dial 
assembly, as opposed to 110-2070 i n  t h e  l i g h t  machine shop and j u s t  over 
10% i n  t h e  moulding and  press shops. The average for t h e  f ac to ry  as a 
w h o l e  w a s  j u s t  over  90%. The o v e r a l l  message of t h e  f i g u r e s  i s  t h a t  
while t h e  major i ty  of workers d i d  achieve performance or a bonus, a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  minori ty  did not .  From my own discuss ions  w i t h  workers, t h i s  
proport ion i s  estimated a t  20-2s. %me t yp ica l  c m e n t s  w e r e :  
"For t h e  majori ty ,  people a r e n ' t  a b l e  to do t h e  number s i n c e  i t  W ~ S  
retimed, They're probably g e t t i n g  the  q u a n t i t y  but  no t  t h e  q u a l i t y  
s ince  b m "  (Meter Assembly worker, i)  .("i" i n d i c a t e s  comments obtained 
&r ing  interview,  "01' during observat ion) .  
"1 haven ' t  made performance for t h e  l a s t  two years  - I j u s t  get t h e  
basic, s ince  t h e  jobs w e r e  retimed...The number i s  too high. They have 
a number which I don ' t  th ink  any human could do" ( D i a l  Assembly worker, 
i). 
In general  i t  w a s  not  l ack  of wi l l ingness  to do the  work, bu t  t h e  
sheer  imposs ib i l i t y  of "making t h e  number" which w a s  cited: 
"They t r y  to make o u t  i t 's  our  f a u l t  w e  c a n ' t  make performance, but you 
w a n t  to  work, get your number up". ( D i a l  Assembly Worker, 0). 
For those w h o  could "make t h e  number", t h e  pressure  of sheer  hard work 
w a s  clear. Workers made t h e  following conunents on effort l eve l s :  
"You've got to work for it ,  norldoubt about it. If you don ' t  make 
performance, you get a warning letter. You go r i g h t  to i t ,  no quest ion 
of a brea ther .  I ' m  wiped o u t  a t  t h e  end of t h e  day" Press  Operator, i. 
 ay you don ' t  have time to go to t h e  l ava to ry  - i f  you lose f i v e  minutes, 
you c a n ' t  m a k e  it up. A l l  t h e  t i m e  you're checking you've done enough 
for one hour - looking a t  your watch every f i v e  minutes" Programming 
Assembly worker, 0. 
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"I always make 127. I set a goal for every hour - I l i k e  to work on 
t h e  clock - 22 an hour. I can do i t  because I never spend a penny, 
never once get up, never t a l k  or l i f t  my head till lunchtime. I think 
everyone works l i k e  that." Programming Assembly worker, i. 
The l e v e l  of i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour  and t h e  importance of labour  t i m e  
i n  t hese  workers' percept ion of t h e i r  work w a s  clear. I t  can also be 
seen that there w e r e  f requent  references to t h e  advantage of being on 
the  same job, or problems wi th  changing jobs.  The r e l a t i o n  between 
performance l e v e l s  and frequent  job changes wi th in  t h e  job families 
system w a s  exemplified i n  workers' cDmmentI that: 
"YOU have to  be l i k e  an octopus to do t h i s  job - it 's t h e s e  job families!' 
"You jump f r o m  job to job - w h a t  you make on one job you love on another.'' 
- b o t h  d i a l  assembly wowkers, 0. 
In fact i t  was by now becoming clear that i n  add i t ion  to the  10 p o i n t s  
which had a l r eady  been withdrawn on wai t ing  time ( ie  wai t ing  time w a s  
now to be paid a t  10 po in t s  be low t h e  operator's average performance) 
management had begun to "renege" on the  t r a i n i n g  provis ions  which had 
been included i n  the  job families agreement, or a t  least w a s  arguing 
that workers had no t  f u l l y  understood them. Thus, w h i l e  it had been 
implied i n  t h e  agreement t h a t  workers would be t r a ined  on up to 10 
jobs, t h i s  w a s  now being i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  for example 10 hours' t r a i n i n g  
for one job. E i the r  way, inaddi t ion  to t h e  f r u s t r a t i o n s  of t ry ing  to 
c a r r y  o u t  jobs  a t  speed for which they w e r e  untrained,  t h e  scheme 
was a f fec t ing  workers i n  terms of d r a s t i c  reduct ions i n  t h e i r  bonus. 
In t h i s  sense increased  labour  f l e x i b i l i t y  through t h e  job families 
system w a s  experienced by workers no t  as an inc rease  i n  managerial 
domination but  d i r e c t l y  i n  terms of t h e i r  own i n t e n s i f i e d  explo i ta t ion .  
The nexus between effort and reward, explored throughout t h e  t h e s i s ,  
can now be f u r t h e r  assessed as a c e n t r a l  facet of wcwkez. experience 
a t  Landis and Gyr i n  terms of t h e  areas now to be examined. 
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ii) E f f o r t  and Keward. 
W e  have seen that effort is an overwhelmingly 'p resent ing"  factor i n  
workers' percept ions of the  labour  process .  W e  now 90 on to look a t  
reward, and the  relationship between t h e  t w o  factors, a s  possible f u r t h e r  
dimensions of workers' "quant i ta t ive"  view of t h e  labour  process.  Two 
hypotheses have a l r eady  been proposed i n  this area i n  r d a t i o n  to the 
t h e s i s  as a w h o l e  and t h e  case s tudy  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  These are f i r s t l y  
that e q l o i t a t i o n  i s  the  c e n t r a l  r e l a t ionsh ip  i n  t h e  opera t ion  of t h e  
c a p i t a l i s t  labour  process;  and secondly that  workers i n  the casestudy 
s a w  t h e  labour  process  i n  terms of its quan t ih t ive  rather than 
q u a l i t a t i v e  aspects. Looking a t  w o j k e r s '  comments on the  i s s u e  of effort 
and reward helps  us to explore both proposi t ions.  
a )  " W i n g  money". One aspect of t h i s  is  t h e  ex ten t  to  which w o r k e r s  
- saw t h e  labour  process 
Thus j u s t  a s  management tended to see it  p r imar i ly  as a process  of 
producing va lue  rather than producing th ings  (cf the preoccupation wi th  
''costs"), so workers showed an  u n s e t t l i n g  tendency to i n t e r p r e t  "making" 
i n  terms of "riwney". A common experience was to ask a worker during 
observation w h a t  she  was making and to receive an answer l i k e  "Oh, I 
don ' t  make much on t h i s  job." Workers also f requent ly  subs t i tu ted  rldoing" 
for "rmking money" - for example "You could be switched around and not 
haw done anything" (by which he meant 'made any bonus") "all day because 
the rate is 50 high" (P res s  Cperator, i). 
a means, for them, of l i t e r a l l y  9naking money". 
b) "Mking for myself, making for them".. 
Workers s a w  t h e  job both i n  tens of "the number" and i n  terms of i ts  
earn ings  equivalent .  Both percept ions  precluded any major concern wi th  
its q u a l i t a t i v e  conten t  or process. Another example of t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  
between %aking" and %aking money" w a s  t h e  d i b t i n c t i o n  which large 
numbers of workers made between labour  t i m e  spent  producing t h e  amounts 
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specified under the MlM standards and labour t i m e  beyond this point ,  
which w a s  seen a s  time spent producing "for myself": 
" I ' m  not rea l ly  making anything f o r  myself - I might earn 115 on one 
job, then 70 on another. I ' m  working fo r  the company, not for  myself" 
Programming Assembly worker, i. 
"I'M putting in  the effort I should be putt ing in ,  no t  the nerve- 
wracking s t u f f .  Instead of myself, I ' m  making t h e  company happyfr 
(Light machine shop worker, i). This worker c lear ly  r ep rded  the level  
of e f f o r t  she would have t o  put i n  to make something "for herself" a s  
f a r  beyond w h a t  w a s  acceptable. A second Light Machine Shop worker was 
more sdnguine: ' ? I ' m  working fo r  the company and also fo r  myself, i t 's  
a job and I ' m  grateful for that - for the i r  interests and my i n t e r e s t s  
a s  w e l l . "  
I n  general, havever, the 'Working f o r  myself/working f o r  the company" 
dis t inct ion was the occasion for disgust a t  the r a w  deal the workers 
felt they w e r e  getting: 
"1 think you're working fo r  the company most of the  time, because you 
don't 9 t  nothing - i t ' s  disgusting - it would be nice t o  look a t  your 
payslip and t h i 4  ah, for working hard I got t h i s ,  but you get nothing" 
(P rogrming  Assembly worker, 0). 
Another worker was explosive about the minor concessions made on 
"perfonnance" a f t e r  thestrike: 
"The stewards say t h e  times are better but performances of 110 a d  
thereabouts are rubbish - you're slogging your guts out  f o r  f 3  a week 
and a l l  for  than - I 'd  rather take i t  easy..." (Meter Assembly wrker ,  0). 
The company/self dis t inct ion was fur ther  a r t icu la ted  by many workers i n  
a sharp awareness of the p r o f i t  motive: 
wm do you feel about the job depends on the t i m e s  - you know a t  the 
end of the day you're j u s t  producing for t h e  company's prof i t s ,  not fo r  
you - if i t  w a s  f a i r  you'd be doing a f a i r  d a y ' s  work f o r  t h e  company, 
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a fa i r  day ' s  work for you i n  t h e  sense of making a w a g e .  If you f ind  
you're n o t  making for yourself  some workers won ' tpush  themselves any 
f u r t h e r  to let t h e  company gain." 
c )  "mre work for less money". 
C x 1  t h e  whole, however, comments on bonus w e r e  intermingled wi th  those 
on effort and "performance" i n  a s t r a igh t fo rna rd  ( i f  genera l ly  dissatisfied) 
ana lys i s  of t h e  effort/reqard re l a t ionsh ip :  
"They want more work o u t  of you but  t hey ' r e  n o t  about to pay you gon 
i t .  These days they want more work for less money" Progrannbing Assembly 
Worker, 0. 
"The work is r e a l l y  veryhard - they expect too much for w h a t  they 
pay" D i a l  Assembly worker, i . 
"It's t h e  mney  makes m e  do t h e  number. 017 one week off this job, 
my bonus dropped. It 's r e a l l y  k i l l i n g ,  you don ' t  get i t  for nothing" 
Programming Assembly, i. 
A moulding shop worker posed t h e  r e l a t ionsh ip  i n  terms of a d e f i n i t e  
ca lcu la t ion :  
'They might g ive  you a 4% i nc rease ,  but  t h e y ' l l  take back 2-35? i n  terns 
of effort. Minagement i s  always pushing for more and more effort." 
A f u r t h e r  aspect of t h e  d iscontent  expressed by many workers w a s  t h e  
f e e l i n g  that condi t ions  had become much worse over t h e  last few years  
i n  t h i s  respect. A s  a D i a l  Assembly worker p u t  it: 
"It's a l l  changed s ince  ( t h e  works D i r e c t o r k  came here.  They've made i t  
harder for t h e  working class. I used to earn a bonus, b u t  s ince  w e  w e r e  
retimed I ' v e  found i t  impossible to  earn  mney." 
"Things have now got  very hard - I don ' t  have a minute to  turn  - f i v e  
minutes can make a b i g  d i f fe rence  to t h e  w a g e s .  I used to earn E T )  
bonus - I worked hard b u t  got something for i t .  NOW I ' m  working harder 
and g e t t i n g  less" m e t e r  assembly worker, i. 
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In t h e i r  p r i o r i t i s a t i o n  of labour t i m e ,  labour  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  and pay as 
primary f ea tu res  of t h e i r  experience of t h e  labour  process, workers i n  
effect evoked exp lo i t a t ion  as def in ing  t h e  na tu re  of. that experience.  
This w a s  clear both i n  the  c e n t r a l i t y  of t h e  i s s u e  to t h e i r  comments on 
work and t h e  number of comments which spontaneously addressed t h i s  facet 
of t h e  labour  process. 
Whatever t h e  evidence that both management and workforce saw t h e  
labour  process p r imar i ly  i n  terms of va lue  production, however, i t  i s  no t  
the  i n t e n t i o n  to argue that t h e  labour  process, even under capitalism, 
a c t u a l l y  is  or could be a one-dimensional a c t i v i t y  of 'pure'' va lue  
production. The po in t  i s  that i t  is  the domination of t h e  capitalist  
labour  process by t h e  imperat ives  of value production that causes  
con t r ad ic t ions  between these  imperat ives  and t h e  ac tua l  requirements of 
t h e  concre te  production process.  Some of these  con t r ad ic t ions  are evident  
i n  t h e  comments of workers on working methods, q u a l i t y  etc., looked a t  
below. 
iii) Working methods, worker knowledge, q u a n t i t y  versus  q u a l i t y .  
There werefrw s t rong  f e e l i n g s  on t h e  i s s u e  of working methods, most 
workers repor t ing  tha t ,  as one put  it wi th  a d o c i l i t y  that would have 
pleased Taylor, 
"I do t h e  job t h e  way I w a s  t r a i n e d  i n  t r a i n i n g  school, t h e r e  i s  only  
one way" (Light  Machine Shop worker, 0) -
Another worker a t t r i b u t e d  t h i s  l a c k  of d i s c r e t i o n  to t h e  technica l  
s t r u c t u r i n g  of work: 
You have to  do t h e  job the way they te l l  you. There 's  no way you can 
do it quicker  than t h e  machine does, you've got the  layout ,  you do i t  
the  way t h e  layout  says" (P res s  Operator, 0). 
I t  w a s  clear that workers w e r e  less concerned wi th  job content  as such 
than wi th  the r e l a t i o n  of t h e  mrk to timing and performance r a t ing .  
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A s  a programming assembly worker p u t  i t  i n  interview: 
"I use  t h e  m e t h o d  sham - I don ' t  change t h e  m e t h o d  - i t ' s  t h e  only 
method they show you. I don ' t  mind how the job's done a s  long as I 
can ea rn  performance." 
A s l i g h t l y  d i f f e ren t  p i n t  of view n e w r t h e l e s s  conveyed t h e  Same 
re l a t ionsh ip  between working methods and p e r f o m n c e :  
"Workers use  t h e i r  own l i t t l e  dodges - you f i n d  yourself  doing better. 
I f  you did i t  t h e  same way they shavcsid you, you wouldn't make a bonus. 
R u t  you f i n d  a l i t t l e  way to do it, you make something for yourselff '  
(P res s  operator, i). From t hese  comments i t  w a s  clear that workers 
p o t e n t i a l l y  had a s i g n i f i c a n t  part to p lay  i n  the organisa t ion  of 
working methods and assessment of problems of production and q u a l i t y .  
W e  9 on to explore this p o t e n t i a l  and t h e  associated, con t r ibu t ions  
i n  t h e  following sec t ions .  
a )  Worker Knowledge. 
The workers' i n t ima te  knowledge of the  job  meant, of course,  that 
they w e r e  much better q u a l i f i e d  to suggest e f f e c t i v e  changes i n  
m e t h o d  than management and even t h e  foreman. That t h i s  knowledge remained 
unused, w i th  the  consequences for production engineering and e f f i c i e n t  
work organisation that w e  s a w  above (pp188ff ), can be explained i n  
terms of a mutual dynamic of worker d i s t r u s t  and managerial d i sda in .  
In t h i s  sense t h e  underlying ahmagonism between workers and management, 
while  no t  t h e  occasion for o v e r t  r e s i s t ance ,  provided n o t  on ly  the  soil 
for that resistance (see C h a p t e r  4 )  but  also a powerful bar to e f f e c t i v e  
organisa t ion  of t h e  labour  process. The obstacles worked i n  severa l  ways; 
one, which might be described as "peer-group pressure" ,  w a s  sham i n  an 
example f r o m  a meter assembly worker: 
"I would tell t h e  foreman about a new method but  n o t  the  g i r l s  because 
t h e r e ' s  a l o t  of j e a l a s y  the re ,  they'd say I w a s  shaving off. 
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There w a s  a case last w e e k  - I suggested to t h e  g i r l s  on t h e  bench t h a t  
w e  had chutes  for t h e  parts - they d i d n ' t  want to h o w  - I went to 
Q u a l i t y  Control w i th  the  idea ,  t h e  chargehand thought i t  w a s  a good idea.  
I t o l d  him no t  to say  it w a s  my idea  - the  g i r l s  then w e l c o m e d  it." 
S ign i f i can t ly ,  t h i s  re luc tdace  to assist i n  t h e  organisa t ion  of t h e  labour  
process  w a s  a t t r i b u t e d  p a r t l y  to the f e e l i n g  that this w a s  simply n o t  
part of t h e  wodcers' sphere of r e spons ib i l i t y :  
"I do make suggest ions,  bu t  I don ' t  l i k e  poking my nose i n ,  i t 's no t  
my business ,  I could g e t  i n t o  t rouble .  They've got engineers ,  if t h e  
engineers  c a n ' t  do it they ' re  n o t  going to get production. It 's no t  the  
workers' job" Light  Mchine  Shop worker, i. 
As a g a i n s t  this a p o s i t i v e  h o s t i l i t y  w a s  expressed i n  terms of t h e  
opposing i n t e r e s t s  of workers and management: 
"I would suggest better ways of doing the job  but  you don ' t  get 
compensation so you d o n ' t  bother, you keep i t  to  yourself .  They'd 
j u s t  u se  i t  a p i n s t  you - if you got  something back, you might do 
it" (muld ing  Shop worker, 0)- 
Workers' re luc tance  to  offer t h e i r  suggestions w a s  re inforced by 
t h e  awareness that management w a s  t o t a l l y  unconcerned about t h e i r  
views and experience: 
"These new boxes - they j u s t  brought them along,  they d i d n ' t  ask 
u s  - t hey ' r e  no  good. If they'd asked us, they wou ld  have had more 
idea about it. They don ' t  a& t h e m r k e r s  because they probably don ' t  
th ink  welve got any i n t e l l i g e n c e .  It 's j u s t  done downstairs,  they don ' t  
a& u s  - now the re  a r e n ' t  enough boxes, t h e  work's p i l i n g  up" ( D i a l  
Assembly worker, i )  . 
Fina l ly ,  i n  spite of a l l  these  obstacles, s o m e  had offered suggestions,  
bu t  had been rebuffed: 
9 1 1  can th ink  of more product ive m e t h o d s  - yes,  d e f i n i t e l y .  For 
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example t h e  c o i l  - you have t o  wrap i t  in your hand - you could J u s t  
chop o f f  the  scrap. This  t o o l  could knock four  heads o f f ,  n o t  j u s t  
one. I have made suggest ions,  but  I ' m  recommended t o  p u t  them in t h e  
suggest ion book - t hey ' r e  n o t  i n t e r e s t e d ,  so why should anyone e l s e  
be i n t e r e s t e d ?  There 's  no response. ..The company doesn ' t  take much n o t i c e  
of what you th ink  - you're  he re  t o  do your j o b  and t h a t ' s  i t" 
Press  Operator,  i. 
To sum up t h i s  sec t ion ,  i t  can be sa id  t h a t  i t  was workers' conueptions 
of management and the  r o l e  of management, and v ice  versa ,  t h a t  stood 
i n  t h e  way of much of the  interchange of information t h a t  should have 
been poss ib le .  In t h i s  sense t h e  con t r ad ic t ion  was more deepseated than 
the  one w e  a r e  about t o  look a t ,  t h a t  between quan t i ty  and qua l i ty .  It  
resembles t h e  po in t  made by Cressey and MacInnes about t h e  con t r ad ic t ion  
between t h e  oppression of t h e  workforce and t h e  need f o r  i t s  co-operation, 
with the  d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  management d i d  n o t  - seek t h e  co-operation of t h e  
workforce, echoing the  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  workforce who on t h e  whole d id  
not  see t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  a s  in t h e  same sphere a s  those of management. 
Seeing production in terms of o i t p u t  r a t h e r  than content ,  management d id  
not seek workers' views because they simply d id  n o t  regard i t  a s  p a r t  of 
the j o b  of  the  workforce t o  do o t h e r  than, merely, produce. This s t r u c t u r i n g  
of the  labour process  towards output  was, more t r anspa ren t ly ,  respons ib le  
f o r  t h e  con t r ad ic t ions  between quan t i ty  and q u a l i t y  expressed by t h e  
workforce i n  t h e i r  commonts below. 
b) Qual i ty  versus  quan t i ty  
In t h e  context  of  t h e  campaign which had j u s t  been launched by t h e  
Qual i ty  Control manager which requi red  ope ra to r s  t o  record problems 
in q u a l i t y  wnile  car ry ing  o u t  t h e i r  work, most respondents were 
scornfu l  in  t h e i r  assessment of what they saw a s  t o t a l l y  c o n f l i c t i n g  
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p r i o r i t i e s :  
"If they w a n t  t he  g i r l s  to produce better work, they should g ive  
them more time - they want q u a n t i t y  and q u a l i t y .  You do your best, 
but  i f  they want accuracy they should g ive  you more t i m e "  L ight  
Eachine shop worker, i. 
"They want production, no t  q u a l i t y  ... they should be more exact about  
q u a l i t y  than quan t i ty .  They still want q u a n t i t y  no matter what - 
otherwise you're downstairs,  you get t h r e e  warnings...They're t r y i n g  to 
push t h e  operators too much - i f  they  want quan t i ty ,  they won't get 
qua l i t y"  Light  btachine Shop worker, i. 
In t h e  assembly department, t h e  clearest demonstration of t he  c l a s h  
between q u a n t i t y  and q u a l i t y  w a s  t h e  problem of bad p a r t s  caning through 
f r o m  manufacturing, t h i s  problem itself being caused by t h e  p re s su res  
of t h e  iTM/bonus system: 
"There's bad parts coming through so w e  c a n ' t  m a k e  bonus - it happens 
because t h e  p r e s s  operators are t r y i n g  to  make bonus." 
"The parts are bad more of ten than  no t  - W e ' r e  cons t an t ly  s t rugg l ing  
to get t h e  p a r t s  to f i t  - t h e r e ' s  a c l a s h  between q u a l i t y  and quant i ty"  
( D i a l  Assembly workers, 0). 
Fina l ly ,  t h e  somewhat w i s t f u l  comment of t h e  Programming Assembly 
worker quoted earlier shaved t h e  counterva i l ing  p res su re  of output  
even on a worker wplo c l e a r l y  cared about q u a l i t y  for i t s  Own sake: 
" I ' m  on loom so lde r ing  - i t ' s  i n t e r e s t i n g  because no two l o o m s  are 
t h e  same - I l i k e  t h e  v a r i e t y .  The number i s  high - it takes M e  of 
t h e  enjoyment o u t  of it, I would l i k e  more t i m e  to  do a pe r fec t  loom. 
It 's  n o t  as qxd a s  I would l ike,  I feel I ' m  rushing and rushing ....'I 
These comments speak for themselves i n  ind ica t ing  t h e  competing 
pressures  of reducing labour  t i m e  and improving the q u a l i t y  of t h e  
product,  i n  which t h e  latter c l e a r l y  lost ou t .  The economics of t h i s ,  
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if no t  t h e  l o g i c ,  w e r e  sound; speaking to t h e  D i a l  Assembly Shop 
steward during t h e  s t r i k e  about the  remeasured F?TN system, and being 
t o l d  once again that a major problem was t h e  high number of  bad 
p a r t s  being sen t  f r o m  o the r  departments, I p u t  the  po in t  that t h i s  
appeared to confl ic t  wi th  company ob jec t ives ,  to which she replied 
that t h e  company w a s  still producing t h r e e  times the  amount they had 
before the new system was introduced. 
A t  t h e  same time t h e  connnents of one of t h e  s k i l l e d  workers i n  the 
t o o l r o o m  ind ica ted  from a d i f f e r e n t  po in t  Of view some of t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  
pressures  which con t inua l ly  dogged e f f e c t i v e  production. Speaking of 
t h e  organisa t ion  of work i n  lhis sec t ion ,  he said: 
"There should be more planning i n  the t o o l r o o m ,  but  t h e r e  are too 
many breakdowns, etc. You start to  plan ahead for new jobs but  then 
- 'urgent  job' aga in  because t h e r e ' s  been a machine breakdown. The 
breakdowns happen because of MIM - use of t h e  tool is t h e  secondary 
factor. In t h e  past, they would p u t  use of t h e  tool before output .  
MrM has  ruined too l ing .  They're n o t  i n t e r e s t e d  i n t h e  tools themselves. 
llventy years  ago if a press operator not iced a change i n  t h e  blanks 
he'd s t o p  the  machine, now h e ' l l  go on producing for t h e  bonus - 
i t ' s  w a s t e d  mney,  t h e  f i r m  could pay more w a g e s  o u t  Of t h e i r  p ro f i t s . "  
This  worker 's  comments pinpointed c l e a r l y  t h e  con t r ad ic t ions  between t h e  
firm's press ing  need for h e d i a t e  output  and t h e  longer-term requirements 
of planning and c a p i t a l  investment. The counterposing of t h e  bonus 
as an incen t ive  to t h e  notion that t h e  f i r m  could pay t h e  same amount 
of w a g e s  "out of profits" belies t h e  "piecework myth" with i t s  shrewd 
suggestion that t h e  bonus itself made no d i f f e r e n c e  to  t h e  firm's w a g e  
asts. Thus the  ex i s t ence  of t h e  bonus is n o t  an attempt by the  firm 
to save labour  costs through a possible reduct ion i n  bonus when workers 
f a i l  to earn  a bonus, bu t  to increase  performance to a l e v e l  which, 
i n  t h i s  worker's view, w a s  counterproductive.  
In a way t h i s  sums up t h e  whole dilemma t h e  f in w a s  i n .  They had to 
increase worker performance to c e r t a i n  - p r e c i s e l y  quanif ied - l e v e l s ,  
or else, as t h e  Personnel Elanager had pointed o u t  wi th  this example of 
the  Japanese f i r m ,  they w e r e  Out of the  competition. They simply did 
not  have time, and for the same reasons d i d  n o t  have resources ,  to 
r e l y  on anything but  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour  to  get them o u t  of t h e i r  
s t i l l  s o m e w h a t  backward competitive pos i t i on .  And indeed t h e  
remeasurement exercise had, a s  t h e  Personnel &nager p u t  i t ,  ' p u l l e d  
the  company round". The problems w e r e  f i r s t l y  that, as w e  s a w  above, 
the  raised output  requirements had i n t e n s i f i e d  labour  to such a degree 
t h a t  workers w e r e  of ten simplyunable to a t t a i n  the  targets, and 
secondly that, as t h e  toolmaker quoted above made clear, they led 
d i r e c t l y  tothe sort of problems wi th  work organisa t ion ,  q u a l i t y  
con t ro l  and loss of worker knowledge which have j u s t  been discussed.  
The worker responses examined so far can be s a i d  to reflect less a 
fundamental protest a t  the alien&tibn of labour  and removal of worker 
d i s c r e t i o n  than a thwarted practical s t rugg le  to a t t a i n  f requent ly  
p r o h i b i t i v e  n m r s  of labour  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n .  Workers also had a 
percept ion of t h e  labour  process  s, l i t e r a l l y ,  "making money". 
Although " a t t i t t u d i n a l "  f a c t o r s  more familiar to i n d u s t r i a l  s c i o l o g y  
w e r e  impor tan t  i n ,  for example, demonstrating a basic h o s t i l i t y  towards 
management which made workers r e l u c t a n t  to p o s i t i v e l y  offer co-operation, 
i n  none of t h e  response is  a clear?pattem of organised and ove r t  worker 
r e s i s t a n c e  around elements of t h e  content  of t h e  labour  process apparent .  
One of t h e  c e n t r a l  ob jec t ives  of this t h e s i s  has been to explore  *hat 
t h e  i s s u e s  are around which worker r e s i s t a n c e  does cen t r e ,  and to 
follow through the  impl ica t ions  of t h i s  conten t  of res i s tance .  These 
themes are now taken up i n  t h e  f i n a l  s ec t ion  of t h e  report. 
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i i i )  Wil l ingness  to Work, Fatalism, The Tr iggers  of Resis tance.  
The basis and content  of worker r e s i s t a n c e  are explored i n  this 
sect ion.  W e  begin by looking mre c l o s e l y  a t  t h e  extent t o  which 
worker r e s i s t a n c e  may be focussed around a basic protest a t  t h e  
need to surrender  labour  to an employer, which i s  examined i n  the 
context  of 'WillinSpless to work". In the  fol lcwing two sec t ions  
we  look a t  t h e  paradoxical connect ions between an apparent  res igna t ion  
by workers i n  the face of w h a t  are seenas impossible odds, and t h e  
sudden "explosion" i n t o  r e s i s t ance .  F ina l ly  w e  p re sen t  a brief account 
of t h e  strike which w a s  t h e  v e h i c l e  of t h i s  r e s i s t a n c e ,  examining t h e  
issues  a t  its c e n t r e  and thos which surfaced dur ing  the  course of t h e  
strike and presented s o m e  crucial obstacles to  theworke r s '  s u w e s s .  
a )  Wil l ingness  to Work. 
W e  begin t h i s  s ec t ion  wi th  t h r e e  t h e o r e t i c a l  p i n t s  of reference.  
F i r s t l y ,  t h e r e  has been a suggest ion i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  (Friedman, 1977 
Carchedi, 1977) that workers resist, a t  t h e  m o s t  fundamental l e v e l ,  t he  
a l i e n a t i o n  of their l a b o u r  to t h e  employer. Secondly, w r i t e r s  such as 
Wards and L i t t l e r  & Salaman, as w e  argued i n  Chapter 2, have l a r g e l y  
def ined t h e  "control" i ssue  wi th in  t h e  labour  process  i n  terms of t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between labour  power and labour ,  and t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  faced 
by t h e  anployer i n  t r a n s l a t i n g  one i n t o  t h e  o t h e r ,  without  specific 
a t t e n t i o n  being given to t h e  level of l a b o u r  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n .  Thirdly 
w e  refer, more i n  l i n e  wi th  t h e  ensuing argument, to t h e  invocat ion of 
I Z a r x ' s  concept of t h e  "dul l  compulsion of labour"  by Abercrombie ,  Hill 
and Turner i n  t h e i r  Dominant Ideology Thesis  (1984). I t  i s  argued t h a t  
i t  i s  not p e r - c e n t r e d  coercion bu t  simple economic necess i ty ,  recognised 
by workers i n  a spirit of "pragmatic acceptance", which p r e v a i l s  upon 
them to sur render  t h e i r  labour .  
In  add i t ion ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  t h i s  it has been hypothesised i n  the c u r r e n t  
t h e s i s  (see Chapters 2 & 4) that t h e r e  i s  a level of effort which is  
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"acceptable" to workers and up to which they d i sp lay  an  uncoerced 
wi l l ingness  to, or acceptance of, work. I t  i s  a t  p a r t i c u l a r  l e v e l s  
of high i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of labour ,  such as those a t  L a n d i s  & Gyr, 
that workers may "resist" i n  t h e  sense of being unable, unwil l ing,  
or a b l e  only a t  g rea t  cost to themselves to  work a t  such l e v e l s .  The 
c e m e n t s  from workers below demonstrate a clear 'Wil l ingness  to  work" 
up to t h i s  point :  
"I work j u s t  as hard when I ' m  on a 'no time' job because I ' m  no t  
lazy,  I g ive  a fair deal...It doesn ' t  affect thevork I ' m  doing - 
I always work, always t r y  ay  best" Press  Operator, i. 
"People are conscient ious,  they c a r r y  on doing t h e i r  job.  You do i t  
because i t 's  your job" (Moulding shop worker).  
"...It's work. Once I ' m  on a job I t r y  my best, work as  hard as I can. 
W e  have to, even i f  you're n o t  on the bonus they pay you, M you have 
to  do t h e  reasonable th ing  - once I start to  work I j u s t  wrk...I'm 
here to w r k ,  w h a t  t h e  foreman g ives  m e  I j u s t  do." 
"1 j u s t  keep on i n  t h e  same way as i f  t h e r e  w a s  no time on the  job. 
Some people on a n-time job might slow down, but  I j u s t  work normal 
because everyone has to work for a l i v i n g  - I l i k e  to put  i n  a fair day ' s  
work - no one w i l l  pay you for it i f  you don ' t  work." 
Even a worker who emerged as one of the most f O E e f U l  suppor te rs  of t h e  
s t r i k e  expressed t h e  following view: 
" I ' m  t h e  type that would do it for myself and the f i r m ,  I felt j u s t  as 
much for t h e  firm as for myself - if I w a s  asked to s t a y  late, I would. 
M o s t  people don ' t  g ive a damn, that's t h e  f a u l t  of management...'' (meter 
assembly worker, i f .  
Gnmnents l i k e  the last  may seem to 90 beyond "pragnatic acceptance" 
to  a p o s i t i v e  aff i rmat ion of the  duty  to work, the need of the  f i r m  
to prosper etc. Hauever, whether "wi l l ingness  to work" is  expressed 
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i n  terms of a neu t r a l  component of t h e  employment r e l a t i o n s h i p  or as  
a moral ob l iga t ion ,  t h e  o v e r a l l  r e s u l t  i n  r e l a t i o n  to t h e  content  of 
worker r e s i s t a n c e  i s  t h e  same - t h e  issue of t h e  surrender  of labour  
i n  itself i s  not made a focus of that re s i s t ance .  This  po in t  is not  
made to argue a theory of "consent" bu t  to spec i fy  w h a t  r e s i s t a n c e  is  
about (and to emphasise the  fact that t h e  i s s u e s  concerned w e r e  
fundamental enough to overcome any minimal moral obligation to  t h e  
employer). What brought t h e  m r k e r s  a t  Lads & Gyr o u t  on s t r i k e  
w a s  no t  having t o  work, bu t  having to work hard,- so hard that they 
couldn ' t  "make t h e  number" - and even this w a s  no t  r e s i s t e d  u n t i l  two 
of them w e r e  threatened with d ismissa l  a s  part of t h e  company 
sanc t ions  aga ins t  low performance. Unt i l . then ,  as w e  saw,  the  high 
s r k  s tandards w e r e  viewed wi th  resentment and inc redu l i ty ,  but  w e r e  
not  r ebe l l ed  a g a i n s t  for t h e i r  own sake. 
b) Fatalism. 
I'art of  t h e  slowness t o  resist can be said to l i e  i n  the  huge 
p r a c t i c a l ,  political and economic obstacles confront ing workers who 
may a c t u a l l y  contemplate taking a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  a n  employer. To take 
up another  t heo re t i ca l  reference,  arguments such as those of eg E l g e r ,  
S ta rk  and Friedman, which p l ace  class s t rugg le  as a c e n t r a l  determinant 
i n  t h e  development of t h e  labour process ,  o f t e n  appear to suggest a l e v e l  
of e x p l i c i t  "protest" a g a i n s t  c a p i t a l i s t  con t ro l  of t h e  labour  process 
which is i n  f a c t  l ack ing  i n  most even ove r t  worker s t rugg les .  While 
inherent  antagonism is  b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  capitalist  labour  process ,  m r k e r s  
a r e  no t  hot-headed rebels grabbing a t  every opportuni ty  to  f i g h t  t h e  
"class s t ruggle"  on t h e  shop floor. R a t h e r ,  they are pragmatic p a r t i c i p a n t s  
i n  a bargain which d e l i v e r s  to them t h e i r  means of making a l i v i n g .  
I t  takes q u i t e  a lo t  to s h i f t  workers from t h i s  caut ious  awareness of 
" rea l i ty" ,  t h e  economic and practical parameters of which are again 
expressed i n  the  comments of workers fran Landis & Gyrt 
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''1 see t h i s  f i r m  as mul t ina t iona l  I t  has t h e  power to  close down t h i s  
factory.  The workers won't c o m e  o u t  - they c a n ' t d o  anything. Every 
shop sees th ings  d i f f e r e n t l y .  Workers won't act because they ' re  worried 
about t h e i r  jobs. m n g  on here  as t i g h t  as you can - you've got no 
choice - you c a n ' t  go anywhere. Other firms pay even lower wages"  
( P r e s s  Operator, 0). 
'I)o w e  work hard? Oh yeah, s i n c e  t h e  las t  pay round everybody p u t s  i n  
a lo t  more effort. Management can get away wi th  things because of 
unemployment. People won't s tand  up for t h e i r  r i g h t s  because of t h e  
cl imate  outside. . .I  doubt if t h e y ' l l  do anything about t h e  bad 
working condi t ions.  Knowing w h a t ' s  o u t  t h e r e  you ' l l  s u f f e r  here  i n  
s tead  of out  there .  Everybody i s  w e l l  a w a r e  of t h e  circumstances. If 
the re  w a s  a s t rong  leadersh ip  from t h e  trade union s i d e  everybody would 
want to do samething about i t .  The stewards are aware of t h e s i t u a t i o n ,  
but a t  the moment t h e i r  hands a r e  being t i e d .  I ' m  no t  blaming them, 
i t ' s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  outs ide"  (Moulding shop worker, i ) .  
Workers i n  t h e  assembly department broadened t h e  a n a l y s i s  to br ing  
i n  t h e  general  political s i t u a t i o n  (as indeed d i d  a large number of 
workers) : 
"These problems w e  have here i s  her  f a u l t ,  b k s  Thatcher. She 's  made 
t h e  unemployment and a l l .  Workers here  th ink  they c a n ' t  do 
t h e y ' l l  lose t h e i r  job" ( 2  d i a l  assembly workers, 0). 
Y e t  any p o t e n t i a l  for r e s i s t a n c e  w a s  viewed p r e s s h i s t i c a l l y  by the  
D i a l  Assembly shop steward (interviewed one day before t h e  s t r i k e  broke 
nothing, 
o u t ) :  
"The main 'shouts '  are about t i m e s  on jobs and bad p a t s  - i t ' s  
r id i cu lous  w h a t  you ' re  supposed to work with.  Who gives t h e  work, who 
takes  it away. Some days t h e r e ' s  t h r e e  or fou r  people coming wi th  
problems, some days i t ' s  t o t a l l y  q u i e t .  They p u t  a l o t  on t h e  stewards, 
emect t h e  steward to  sort everything ou t ,  they j u s t  want to c a r r y  on 
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working, won't do anything. I can see people j u s t  p u t t i n g  up wi th  
th ings  - they've given up nu#, they've lost  a lo t  of in t e re s t  i n  t h e  
las t  six months to a year,  they've gone down rap id ly  f r o m  w h a t  they'd 
do before. They're worried about t h e  work s i t u a t i o n ,  they ' re  now t o l d  
do i t  or get out ,  t h e r e ' s  t h e  dmr. I f  they do anything they won't get 
anywhere, t h e y ' l l  lose money. If I ' m  t a l k i n g  to k y  department, 1'11 
say w e  should do something about i t ,  but  w e  won't 90 out  if o the r  
departments won't 90 o u t ,  w e ' l l  j u s t  lose money. People are afraid 
of l o s i n g  t h e i r  jobs,  they feel why bother, w h a t ' s  the good of it." 
D e s p i t e  t h i s  steward's personal wi l l ingness  to f igh t , she  had caught 
the  p reva i l i ng  mood of  fatalism i n  t h e  face of ex terna l  economic 
realities which charac te r i sed  a l l  t h e  workers' comments on resistance. 
Of a l l  those who ra i sed  the  i s s u e ,  e i t h e r  spontaneously or i n  answer 
to a ques t ion ,  no t  one expressed a m i l i t a n t  determination to  90 on 
s t r i k e  - i n  fact the  comments quoted s h  overwhelmingly t h e  d i r e c t i o n  
of thought i n  t h e  fac tory .  Thir teen o u t  of 45 workers "observed" or 
interviewed raised t h e  issue of r e s i s t ance ,  a l l  of them from a "nothing 
you can do" perspec t ive .  
cy Tr iggers  of Resistance 
W e  have a l r eady  discussed (Chapter 4) the important d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
ove r t  and cover t  confl ic t .  One of t h e  ques t ions  this t h e s i s  sets o u t  to 
i n v e s t i g a t e  i s  w h a t  are t h e  t r i g g e r s  that a c t u a l l y  push workers who may 
be r e s e n t f u l ,  "alienated" but  never the less  pass ive  i n t o  a c t i v e  resistance 
t o  the  employer. W h a t  a r e  the  i s s u e s  that workers cannot but  s t rugg le  over? 
Looking a t  t h i s  ques t ion  may g ive  u s  some ind ica t ions  as to  t h e  class 
s ign i f i cance  of "everyday" s t rugg les -  
In t h e  case of Lanids & Gyr, the  comments j u s t  quoted, typical of 
t h e  workforce's  a t t i t u d e  of "There's nothing you can do" w e r e  a l l  
recorded during the two-week run-up to  w h a t  turned o u t  to be t h e  
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most major s t r i k e  i n  t h e  f ac to ry ' s  h i s to ry .  The shop steward 's  a n a l y s i s  
of her  members '  p o t e n t i a l  for action w a s  i n  fact made one day before the  
s t r i k e  broke out .  To g e t  s o m e  idea  of t h e  i s s u e s  which pushed workers 
i n t o  what was c l e a r l y  an  explosion of r e s i s t ance ,  le t  u s  examine the  
factors which workers themselves l inked  to t h e  question: "But w h i t  
can you do about it?" Of t h e  t h i r t e e n  workers who commented (negat ive ly)  
on t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  resistance, n ine  r e l a t e d  t h e  problems i n  t h e  f ac to ry  
to effort or t h e  effort/reward re la t ionship ;  t h e  rest simply mentioned 
the  recession and its e f f e c t  on the workforce as t h e i r  f irst  comment 
about work, making i t  p a r t  of a general  political overview of t h e  firm's 
s i t u a t i o n .  This  emphasis on effort and i t s  i n t e r r e l a t i o n  wi th  reward 
i s  perhaps predictable i n  view of t h e  preponderance of t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
i n  workers' experience.  liowever, it i s  worth r e i t e r a t i n g  that "control" 
i s s u e s  i n  t h e  sense of l a c k  of autonomy, coercion to work, etc, made 
n o  appearance i n  workers' conceptions of the  range of i s s u e s  e l i g i b l e  for 
resistance; only one "non-effect" i s sue ,  t h e  bad working environment, 
w a s  i n  fact mentioned i n  t h i s  connection, and even here  followed t h e  
spontaneous c i t i n g  of t h e  r e l a t ionsh ip  between increased i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  
of labour and unemployment. Three workers whd extens ive ly  discussed l a c k  
of autonomy and managerial oppression d i d  n o t  l i n k  these  grievances to 
any p o t e n t i a l  r e s i s t ance .  
J t  may Sean paradoxical, i n  a sec t ion  looking a t  "Reeistance", to devote 
almost t h e  w h o l e  of t h e  argument to  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of why workers d i d  no t  
resist. But w h a t  i s  being a r q e d  here  is p r e c i s e l y  that worker r e s i s t a n c e  
i s  a pazadoxical,  or a t  least a cont rad ic tory  phenomenon. Despite t h e  
resentment that shered  throughout t h e  f ac to ry ,  workers did no t  take a 
ca lcu la ted ,  strategic dec is ion  to  act a g a i n s t  t h e  employer. When they d i d  
act, the basis of t h e  r e s i s t a n c e  w a s  clear, and t h e  depth of f e e l i n g  
apparent ,  i n  workers' spontaneous comments during t h e  s t r i k e  meetings. 
'3ut the  push towards a c t i o n  w a s ,  as it w e r e ,  de l ivered  to them by a 
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management ac t ion  which r e l a t e d  c e n t r a l l y  to t h e  focus of p o t e n t i a l  
c o n f l i c t  i n  t h e  fac tory ;  two workers w e r e  threatened wi th  dismissal  
for low performance. 
Thus, whi le  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w a s  itself inhe ren t ly  explosive,  t h e  workers 
d i d  n o t  of themselves decide to set off t h e  explosion. The seeds of 
c o n f l i c t  l a y  not i n  t h e  ove r t  political consciousness of the  workers 
bu t  i n  t h e  con t r ad ic t ions  endemic i n  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  labour  process  to 
which t h e  workers e s s e n t i a l l y  reacted. W e  have attempted to  chart t h e  
political impl ica t ions  of t h i s  dynamic of worker response i n  our  last 
chapter. W e  can now i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  po in t  wi th  a brief account of the  
s t r i k e  and t h e  i s s u e s  i t  raised. 
d )  The s t r i k e .  
The d i s p u t e  began as a spontaneous stoppage of work by operators i n  
the  Assembly Department after i t  w a s  heard that two meter assembly 
workers had been threatened wi th  d ismissa l  for low performance. A 
meeting called that af ternoon decided unanimously to s t a y  o u t  and to 
come i n  only  for a s t r k m e e t i n g  t h e  following Monday. 
The d i s p u t e  l a s t e d  for two weeks, bu t  remained confined to t h e  assembly 
department, wi th  no clear a t tempt  being made to call t h e  manufacturing 
workers ou t .  During t h i s  time th ree  s t r i k e  meetings w e r e  held and 
management made a number of concessions,  including withdrawal of t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  warnings t h a t  had been issued,  i nves t iga t ion  of t h e  two 
jobs concerned, and t h e  s e t t i n g  up of departmental  working parties 
involving shop floor workers inorder  to  look i n t o  the t i m e s  of jobs i n  
general .  The s t r i k e r s  f i n a l l y  re turned after the  in te rvent ion  of t h e  
ful l - t ime district union official ,  although f e e l i n g s  w e r e  mixed and many 
still  argued that they should have s tayed out .  
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(hr assessment of t h e s t r i k e  c e n t r e s  on t h e  following i ssues :  
a )  W h a t  t h e g r i k e r s  thought i t  w a s  about ( including comments recorded 
after t h e  s t r i k e ) ;  b )  the  charac te r  of t h e  shop steward leadersh ip  and 
the  f a i l u r e  to extend t h e  s t r i k e  to  the  manufacturing department; c )  
the  theo re t i ca l  and practical obstacles that stood i n  t h e  way of t h e  
s t r i k e r s '  determined p u r s u i t  of t h e i r  ends. 
a) "Fetter times on jobsl" 
€%Q notable  €eature  of strike meetings w a s  t h e  counterpoint  hetween t h e  
stewards' i n s i s t e n c e  ( t h e  meetings w e r e  chaired and dominated by t h e  
convenor and h i s  immediate depu t i e s )  that t h e  d i spu te  w a s  about  t h e  
specific warnings that  had been given to  t h e  two workers, and t h e  
s t r i k e r s '  spontaneous f e e l i n g  that t h e  i s s u e  cent red  on the times 
themselves, a f e e l i n g  which coalesced i n t o  t h e  demand for "No more 
warnings". Thus, whi le  t he re  was concern about  redundancy, the s t r i k e r s  
w e r e  more focussed on the s t ruc tura l  s i t u a t i o n  which a l lnued  management 
to i s s u e  t h e  threats i n  t h e  f i rs t  p l ace  as a s n c t i o n  a g a i n s t  low 
performance. This led, i n i t i a l l y ,  to  an i n t e r e s t i n g  interchange i n  t h e  
f irst  s t r i k e  meeting i n  which t h e  convenor attempted to reassure  t h e  
workers by arguing, "The company i s n ' t  going to want to get r i d  of a l l  
of you - between you you share years  of experience." 
The s t r i k e r s ,  wi th  a r a t h e r  more accura t e  assessment of t h e d t u a t i o n ,  
shouted hack - 
"Oh, they can get anyone i n  off t h e  street." 
The gap between t h e  stewards' pos i t i on  of nego t i a t ing  a b o u t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
warnings and t h e  s t r i k e r s '  repudiat ion of t h e  performance standards and 
of the  sanct ion i tself ,  which p u t  the  whole managerial strategy 
ques t ion ,  w a s  brought o u t  in a direct c l a s h  between stewards and strikers 
towards t h e  end of t h e  second strike meeting. A f t e r  a p ro t r ac t ed  d iscuss ion  
on t h e  period management had of fered  for inves t iga t ion  i n t o  the  
into 
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threatened jobs,  which both t h e  s t r i k e r s  and some shop stewards s a w  as 
i n s u f f i c i e n t ,  t h e  convenor put  i t  to t h e  meeting: "If they ' r e  prepared to 
withdraw t h e  warnings, you're prepared to go back? Let's be clear. Do you 
resume back to normal working?" 
A t  t h i s  t h e  meeting d isso lved  i n t o  confusion, wi th  workers obviously 
f ee l ing  that a r e tu rn  to work would threa ten  t h e i r  underlying s tance  
on " t i m e s " .  There w e r e  shouts  of "Proper t i m e s  on jobs l"  and 'We c a n ' t  
make i t ,  j u s t  can ' t  make it". Another shop steward then intervened, 
"Let 's  g e t  i t  s t r a i g h t .  If these  warnings are withdrawn, t h e r e ' s  no 
reason why you shouldn ' t  r e tu rn  to normal working." A t  t h i s  t he re  w e r e  
f u r t h e r  p r o t e s t s  of " Y e s  t he re  i s l " ,  "No more warnings", ' W e  can ' t  make 
t h e  jobs" etc. A m e t e r  assembly worker swed it up: 
"You how h o w  much that is ,  90 performance? They don ' t  l i k e  l o w  
performance, the  people on t h e  floor don ' t  l i k e  low performance e i the r . "  
llere she  w a s  c l e a r l y  r e f e r r i n g  to t h e  a r t i c u l a t i o n  of w h a t  w e r e  felt to 
he impossibly high performance l e v e l s  w i t h b e  low earnings seffered by 
most of t h e  assembly workers. 
Some of t h e  d i f fe rences  between the shop steward5' perspec t ive  and 
the  more immediate response of the  s t r i k e r s  are examined below. One 
clear i s s u e  un i t ing  t h e  s t r i k e r s ,  M e v e r ,  w a s  t h e  u n i v e r s a l i t y  of 
t h e i r  experience of s t rugg l ing  wi th  high performance t a r g e t s ,  which 
l e d  to t h e  f e e l i n g  that t h e  warnings "could have happened to any one 
of US". This  argument wasput by programming assembly workers wai t ing  i n  
the  canteen before t h e  vote  to s t r i k e ,  and w a s  echoed by assembly workers 
i n  t h e i r  l a te rassessments  of t h e  dispute:  
"It 's my personal opinion that t h e  same th ing  could have happened to  m e  
- I w a s  down for a low performance letter because of switching jobs" 
(Programming Assembly worker, i ) .  
"The s t r i k e ?  The Same th ing  could happed t o  m e  - Joy'd been here 5 
y e a r s ,  if she c a n ' t  do t h e  job no one can" ( D i a l  Assembly worker, i). 
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"The same t h ing  could have happened to any one of us  - i f  I w a s  taken 
o f f  my jot ,  I ' d  get a letter for low perfdmance, b e c a u s e  on s o m e  jobs 
you j u s t  c a n ' t  - people a r e n ' t  l azy ,  you $ust can ' t  do it" (Programming 
assembly worker). 
Thus i t  was the  times on jobs, and t h e  shared and p o t e n t i a l l y  in t e r -  
changeable experience of d i f f i c u l t y  wi th  them, a h a t  for t h e  s t r i k e r s  
l a y  a t  the core of t h e  dispute. 
b) "Ebst union organisers are i n d i r e c t .  .. .If 
The comment that a press operator had earlier made, t a l k i n g  about t h e  
obstacles to  e f f e c t i v e  res i s tance ,  that "fLbst union o rgan i se r s  are 
i n d i r e c t ,  they ' re  no t  on bonus. Anything management tells them, t h e y ' l l  
agree,  they ' re  no t  losing" summed up a c e n t r a l  aspect of t h e  conduct 
of thestrike and indeed t h e  organisa t ion  of the fac tory .  The h i n a t i o n  
of t h e  negot ia t ing  committee, t h e  shop steward body t h a t  conducted 
d iscuss ions  wi th  management, by maintenance and craft workers (only 
one m e m b e r  of the  committee was an  assembly shop steward) compounded 
t h e  conservatism that w a s  a product of t h e i r  long entrenchment wi th  a 
total &bsence of the  experience that had sen t  the MlMworkers on to t h e  
p i cke t  l i n e s .  This shaved itself no t  only i n  t h e  in s i s t ence ,  noted 
above, t h a t  t h e  d i spu te  was about t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  "negotiable" i s s u e  of 
t h e  t w o  threatened workers, b u t  also i n  t h e  a t t i t u d e  towards approaching 
management i n  general. From t h e  beginning, t h e  convenor had argued t h a t  
'!you c a n ' t  d i c t a t e "  to  management, and was c l e a r l y  working wi th in  
a framework of cont inua l  preparedness to make concessions.  
This mingled wi th  a s o m e w h a t  l o f t y  a t t i t u d e  towards t h e  s t r i k e r s ,  i n  
which it w a s  made clear, through a semblance Of t r ade  union bureaucrat  
par lance,  that t h e  l eade r sh ip  w a s  a long way from identifying itself 
wholeheartedly with t h e  s t r i k e r s '  cause: 
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'We've t r i e d  to get something - if you want to  s t ay  ou t ,  tell us... 
You're t h e  
"It 's up to you people w h a t  you're going to do" (deputy convenor). 
In general ,  t h e  d ivorce  between a caut ious  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n  of 
c o n f l i c t  and any ful lblooded s o l i d a r i t y  wi th  the  s t r i k e r s  w a s  
a r t i c u l a t e d  through t h e  notion of "negot ia t ing under duress". In t h e  
face of t h e  s t r i k e r s '  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  ?Unt i l  they take these  warnings 
back w e ' l l  do nothing" (meter assembly shop steward) t h e  convenor 
complained, "It's very hard for u s  t o  do anything whi le  you're out",  
to which the  branch chair added, Wanagement d o n ' t  l ike negot ia t ing  
under duress." 
This  culminated, as w e  s a w  above, i n  a direct c l a s h  betweenthe 
workers' i n c i p i e n t  chal lenge of e x i s t i n g  r e l a t i o n s  of production and 
the  8tewards' philosophy of negot ia t ion  wi th in  an e s t ab l i shed  s t ruc tu re :  
"I don ' t  be l ieve  i n  neqot ia t ions ,  w e  should s t i c k . t o  w h a t  w e  want" 
(meter assembly worker).  
"If they withdraw t h e  warnings, w h a t  then?" (deputy convenor). 
"No more warningst" (shouts  from workers).  
"You might as w e l l  f o rge t  i t ,  you'd be t a l k i n g  f o r  ever  and a day. 
N o  d i scuss ions ,  nothing a t  all. N o t  a cat i n  h e l l ' s  chance" (deputy 
convenor ) . 
iones l o s i n g  money. You tell  u s  w h a t  you want" (convenor). 
The stewards'  r e j e c t i o n  of t h e  workers' s tand as e s s e n t i a l l y  
amateurish went a long wi th  an u n c r i t i c a l  embracing of many of t h e  
company's perspec t ives .  This  w a s  clear no t  only on t h e  i s s u e  of 
performance itself ( t h e  convenor had argued a t  t h e  first meeting that 
t.he company had "got i n t o  a profit  s i t ua t ion"  through remeasurement - 
to whichhis audience retoled "On t h e  opera tors '  backs") but  also i n  
t h e  o v e r a l l  s u p p r t  given to management's r a t h e r  than t h e  strikers' 
d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n :  
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!?If t h e  working p a r t y  w a s  set up, t h e  company would come out  better 
than you would. If a CSEU/EEF agreement on peformance i s  signed, 
t h e r e ' s  nothing to  s t o p  t h e m  dismissing you" (bbuldiing shop steward). 
This lukewarm a t t i t u d e  to  t h e  d i s p u t e  w a s  shown m o s t  s e r ious ly  i n  t h e  
f a i l u r e  to br ing  o u t  t h e  manufacturing department i n  support  of the 
s t r i k e r s .  Thus a t  t h e  first strike meeting t h e  convenor f i n a l l y  
yielded,  after r e s i s t i n g  for a long time, to pressure  to hold a m a s s  
meeting of MIM departments t h a t  had no t  come ou t ,  by saying t h a t  he 
would g e t  the departments to  clodc o u t  for a meeting. towever, t he re  
was no subsequent evidence that t h i s  meeting, or any at tempt  to call 
it, a c t u a l l y  took place. A t  t h e  s a m e  time it  w a s  clear, from 
discuss ions  wi th  workers and shop stewards during t h e  s t r i k e ,  that 
s u b s t a n t i a l  support  did exist for t h e  stoppage: 
"If you a l l  come together  wi th  t h e  m e m b e r s ,  management would climb 
down very  e a s i l y ,  because you're taking away t h e i r  bread and b u t t e r ,  
taking t h e  blood away from them. This  d i spu te  m i g h t j w  be a start..." 
Light  b'achine Shop steward. 
"It could be m e  next - I ' d  come out of t h e  shopdid" P res s  Operator. 
We haven't  had much information on w h a t  t h e s t r i k e  is about - w e  need 
a m a s s  meeting. There's  been no guidance f r o m  t h e  shop stewards. The 
times are r id i cu lous ,  w e ' r e  doing much mre for much less - if they 
br ing  t h i s  i n  i t  th rea t ens  a l l  of us .  I support t h e  'no warnings' 
stand because if t h i s  w a s  brought i n  a l l  jobs would be threa*ed" 
bbulding Shop worker. 
A t  t h e  same time t h e  f e e l i n g  by even t h e  m o r e  m i l i t a n t  shop stewards 
that it was not t h e i r  place to exert p res su re  on the roanufacturing 
workers ("You can't put pres su re  on - the decision has to be l e f t u p  
to them" D i a l  Assembly shop steward+ cmbined  wi th  the usua l  
sect ional ism,  accusa t ions  of previous t reachery  etc., conspired 
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to keep t h e  manufacturing workers pass ive .  A s  t h e  Light  Machine shop 
steward, one of t h e  few who had made an attempt to get h i s  s ec t ion  ou t ,  
pu t  it: 
"I sa id  a t  t h e  meeting, L e t ' s  fo rge t  t h e  past. S t i l l  t h e  m e m b e r s  said 
the  agreement shouldn ' t  have been signed. ..People were a b i t  r e luc t an t .  
They could see t h e  warnings could apply to  them, but  they  w e r e  rehuctant  
because they w e r e  a g a i n s t  t h e  union for f o r c i n g  t h e  agreement through. .. 
Ienagement has now got  everything they want - t hey ' r e  making these  people 
s u f f e r ,  and reducing earnings." 
c )  " H e ' l l  j u s t  tear you to pieces". 
Fina l ly ,  however, t h e  factor that most weakened t h e  strikers' reso lve  
was t h e i r  mdor sem&nt, a e i n s t  a l l  experience,  of the  " sc i en t i f i c "  
legi t imacy of MIM standards.  This  emerged m o s t  c l e a r l y  i n  t h e  d iscuss ion ,  
during t h e  second s t r i k e  meeting, of the  management proposal to set up 
'Working parties" which would i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  e x i s t i n g  performance 
s tandards i n  r e l a t i o n  to  specific jobs: 
"They've given you t h e  working pa r ty ,  t h e  warnings frozen etc. The 
people they put  on the  committees (working parties) a r e n ' t  r e a l l y  
s t rong enough to  face those they've got to face - they need t ra in ing"  
(convenor) 
'Working pa r ty?  Last t i m e  t h e  w r k i n g  pa r ty  w a s  thrown o u t - p e o p l e  
d i d n ' t  know JM"" D i a l  Assembly worker - 
"People have to have knowledge of MTlrl, procedures etc. I t ' s  no good 
arguing about your a ~ n  job, h e ' l l  j u s t  tear you to pieces"  (convenor). 
IWm've we  (Xt to  do th i s?"  
'mot enough experiences - how w i l l  w e  know i f  they've got  enough 
exwrience?"- s t r i k e r s .  
Thus, whi le  the  experience of no t  being a b l e  to make the  t i m e s  w a s  
t h e  main d r iv ing  force behind t h e  s t r i k e ,  t h e  workers' acceptance of 
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t h e  ob jec t ive  v a l i d i t y  of measured work targets echoed managerial 
perspec t ives  i n  i t s  conceptua l i sa t ion  of t h e  l a b u r  process a s  
pr imar i ly  about numbers, not  q u a l i t a t i v e  job  content.  The most 
s i g n i f i c a n t  th ing  about the  above interchange w a s  t hemrke r s '  
convict ion,  bo ls te red  by t h e  convenor, t h a t  they w e r e  incapable of 
mustering t h e  technica l  expertise demanded by MTM. This w a s  one of 
the  c e n t r a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  facing t h e  direct workforce; t h e  workers 
knew they couldn ' t  m a k e  t h e  t i m e s ,  bu t  t h e  system sa id  they could. 
The system, wi th  its panopl ies  of consul tan ts ,  tables, c a l c u l a t o r s  
and stop watches, possessed a technica l  mystique the  workers could 
never hope to challenge; sure ly ,  being so " sc i en t i f i c " ,  i t  must be 
r i g h t .  The system possessed t h i s  a u t h o r i t y  even i n  t h e  d i r e c t  face of 
the  workers' experience; thus  t h e  s t r i k e r s ,  d e s p i t e  t h e i r  cont inual  
p r o t e s t s  a t  not  being a b l e  to make t h e  t i m e s ,  w e r e  thrown i n t o  confusion 
by t h e  spectre of "knowing bTW' that confronted them wi th  the  
proposal of t h e  working pa r ty  ( t h e  convenor's comment t h a t  they would be 
"tom to pieces" seemed only too a p t ) .  MIPl had, indeed, proved its 
u n a s s a i l a b i l i t y  even t o  t h e  probings of a formally approved "trade 
union rep on timings." This  pos i t i on  had e x i s t e d  for some th ree  years ,  
s ince  t h e  beginning of remeasurement, but  t h e  p re sen t  incumbent 
( interviewed during t h e  s t r i k e )  had r a r e l y  managed to make any 
e f f ec t ive  in te rvent ion  on behalf of t h e  workforce: 
"It's no t  of ten  I manage to get anything o u t  of them. Only on four  or 
f i v e  o u t  of t h i r t y  or f o r t y  cases i n  two years  have I managed to get 
any t i m e .  m1 g e t s  i t  a l l  buttoned up before I get there .  I only do i t  
from t i m e  to t i m e ,  I don ' t  get any p rac t i ce .  I ' ve  checked t h e  job, and 
t h e r e ' s  no  more t i m e  to be found. You can ' t  j u s t  go down and a y ,  This  
t i m e  i s  r i g h t ,  you need proof ... There's  t h ree  g i r l s '  jobs  I c h a d ,  
they w e r e  earning 70 performance, t h e  foreman knew the  workers weren ' t  
real slackers. I spent  days on those four  or f i v e  jobs and I couldn ' t  
f ind  any extra t i m e  - on s o m e  jobs t i m e  could be taken off ... Findlng 
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pxtra t i m e  - if t h e r e ' s  no  extra moments which a r e n ' t  accounted for by 
FiTM, you c a n ' t  f i nd  extm t i m e . "  
It w a s  clear that everyday concepts l i k e  no t  b e i n g  a b l e  to do a job  
i n  t h e  t i m e  given found no place i n  the predetermined r i g i d i t i e s  of MTM 
- "time" within t h i s  system meant a d i f f e r e n t  and more a r t i f ic ia l  th ing  
than i t  d i d  i n  t h e  world outs ide .  While, as w e  see i n  t h e  f i g u r e s  i n  t h e  
Appendix, i t  i s  cler that only a minority of workers a c t u a l l y  could n o t  
m a k e  performance a t  a l l ,  those who d id ,  or even made bonus, d i d  so by 
working, as t h e  t imings rep s a i d ,  " l ike  a blur"  - so fast  t h a t  i t  w a s  
d i f f i c u l t  to s tudy them. I t  was for t h i s  reason that t h e  assembly 
workers, a t  any rate, fe l t  ovefihelmingly that t h e  threatened dismissals 
f o r  no t  r i s i n g  to  t h e  requirements of Em1 were "something that could 
happen to any one of us". 
The d i r e c t  c o n f l i c t  between workers' experience of t h e  labour  process  
and the  managerially imposed output  norms w a s ,  as w e  have said, t h e  
basis of the  s t r i k e .  A t  t h e  same time, and for t h e  same reasons,  i t  
made t h e s t r i k e  itself u l t imate ly  unwinnable, o the r  t h a n  by overturning 
the  whole s t r u c t u r e  of management and ownership i n  t h e  fac tory ,  Eventually,  
the  workers would h3ve to p back, but  the  quest ion of how to produce an 
apparent ly  acceptable  se t t lement  was d i f f i c u l t .  
There was confusion and uncer ta in ty ,but  i n  t h e  end it was the  
in t roduct ion  of t h e  district o f f i c i a l ,  brought i n  to persuade the  
s t r i k e r s  to "be reasonable" and hold over t h e i r  heads t h e  prospec ts  of 
the  firm's c losure ,  which proved dec is ive .  C lea r ly  i t  w a s  impossible 
for t h e  strikers to win t h e i r  a c t u a l  Bmand ("no more warnings") which 
s t ruck  c e n t r a l l y  a t  t h e  firms s t r a t e g y  of ty ing  the purchase of labour  
power to  a specified l e v e l  of production; they were also f a t a l l y  weakened 
by t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  o the r ,  s l i g h t l y  less hardhi t ,  MTM departments 
to j o i n  them i n  t h e i r  stoppage. Nevertheless , the strikers had gained 
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some concessions. The t w o  workers had not  been sacked; and they had 
beenoffered the  j o i n t  working parties, which i n  the  hands of those more 
sure  of themselves than t h e  krPi  workforce might have been turned i n t o  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  negot ia t ing  weapon ( i n  t h e  event  they d ied  out  after a f e w  
weeks). Basical ly ,  as t h e  strikers themselves s a w  it, they had "taken a 
stand", they  had "refused to l e t  management walk a l l  over them", and, 
as a r e s u l t ,  management had been forced to, hcwever s l i g h t l y ,  retreat. 
The w a r  of a t t r i t i o n  continued. 
The s igni f icanke  of t h e  strike w a s  two-fold. F i r s t l y ,  i n i t s  expression 
of the  seemingly i n e v i t a b l e  sur fac ing  of con t r ad ic t ions  wi th in  t h e  
capitalist  labour  p rocess j  secondly, i n  i t s  symbolisation of the  
bedrock of resistance which, however apparent ly  passive t h e  workforce, 
w a s  a c t i v  ated by t h e  impact of t h e  firm's requirement 's  on the  workers' 
l i v i n g  standards.  The shop steward organisa t ion  i n  t h e  fac tory ,  without  
which, as the  convenor had p u t  i t  i n  an earlier interview,  " t h i s  f i r m  
would run so sweetly" w a s  a para l l e l  example of t h i s  basic intransigence.  
For a l l  t h e i r  conservatism, t h e  stewards' pos i t i on  as workers and 
r ep resen ta t ives  of workers inev i t ab ly  gave them an understanding and 
awareness of t h e  problems of t h e  shop floor: 
"...The main i s s u e  is money. People c o m e  here  for a wa-, to work i n  
comfort. k b s t  i s s u e s  you get are money - bonus is the  number one 
problem. Everyone keeps moaning about the  bonus earnings.  Tenper c e n t  
of the  f a c t o r y  i s n ' t  achieving bonus, 20$:, is g e t t i n g  t h e  minimum, ill-5 
a week. The majori ty  of workers are i n  t h e  range around 120 performance. 
m e n  those on maximum bonus are s t i l l  being short-changed - they th ink  
they ' r e  having to work too hard for that b i t  of mney.  The new times 
w e r e  brought i n  gradual ly  - now they ' re  humanised robots" (convenor 
i n  an earlier in te rv iew) .  
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The ex i s t ence  of t h e  stewards i n t h e  f ac to ry  w a s  the  organisa t iona l  
expression of t h i s  onwing  antagonism, t h e  i r r e d u c i b l e  l e v e l  of conflict  
that revolved around t h e  central dynamic of effort and reward, 
performance and p r o f i t .  A confused and cont rad ic tory  expression, as w a s  
the  s t r i k e  itself, but  never the less  a representa t ive  force which meant 
that  management, even wi th  t h e  b i t  between i ts  t e e t h  as w a s  now t h e  
case ,  w a s  s t i l l  t r ead ing  a dangerous pa th  wi th  the  increas ingly  common 
in t roduct ion  of new working arrangements "over t h e  heads" of t h e  shop 
stewards. This tendency, which w a s  becoming clear tmards the  end of 
my t i m e  a t  the  f ac to ry ,  had meant r eve r sa l s  on t r a i n i n g  time and 
flexi-time agreements, and w a s  now, i n  t h e  aftermath of t h e  s t r i k e ,  
l ead ing  to the  strict enforcement of a "bench-tpebench" 9-minute 
tea-bmk which overstepped ( i n  an echo of t h e  then recent  B r i t i s h  
Leyland d i spu te )  t h e  custom-and-practice time allowed f o r  "wa?shing 
UP". 
The danger of t h i s  strategy f o r  management w a s  that  i t  brought t h e  
stewards closer to  t h e i r  g ra s s roo t s ,  defensive role. This  increas ing  
l ' f i l l i nq  i n  of t h e  pozes" of t h e  labour  process,  along with a growing 
managerial arrogance, w a s  resented by t h e  workforce, who began pushing 
t h e  equal ly  indignant  shop stewards back to t h e i r  older, more 
"confrontat ionis t"  pos i t ion .  The s i t u a t i o n  a t  t h e  close of research w a s  
balancing on something of a kni fe  edge of competing class forces. The 
management, increas ingly  confident ,  w a s  beginning t o  behave more and 
m o r e  a s  i f  the  stewards d i d n ' t  exist. But the stewards d id ,  and t h e  
kind of i s s u e s  which management w e r e  now imposing over t h e i r  heads 
w e r e  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  k ind  which give workplace representa t ion  i t s  meaning 
and r a t iona le .  The stewards' ideologica l  subservience,  and t h e i r  
confusion i n  t h e  face of managerial soph i s t i ca t ion ,  prevented t h e m  
f r o m  c l e a r l y  see ing  i t  i n  that way; bM t h e i r  class posi t ion-meant  
that t h a t  w a s  w h a t  they d id .  
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Conclusions on Worker Response. 
The f o r e w i n g  provides  s o m e  evidence that workers s a w  t h e  labour 
process  i n  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r a t h e r  than qua l i , t a t ive  terms, that is t h a t  
t h e i r  primary p o i n t s  of reference w e i e  those of 'performance" and t h e  
effort/reward r e l a t i o n s h i p  r a t h e r  than job content ,  autonomy,&iscretion, 
skill etc. In t h i s  sense hypotheses 
b) Workers would experience t h e  labour  process pr imar i ly  i n  t ens  of 
quafi t i ty  r a t h e r  than q u a l i t y  of labour ,  and 
c )  Hesentment/resistance would occur p r imar i ly  over economic i s s u e s  
centred on t h e  effort/reward re l a t ionsh ip  
are t e n t a t i v e l y  c o n f i n e d .  The research  also shuxed that ove r t  
r e s i s t ance  w a s  provoked by economic i s s u e s  ref lect ing c e n t r a l  contradic- 
t i o n s  r a t h e r  t h a n  by any general  d e s i r e  for "control". 
In t h i s  study some of t h e  major p o i n t s  made by writers on t h e  labour  
process  w e r e  set a g a i n s t  t h e  experience and response of workers i n  an 
e x i s t i n g  "direct production" context  charac te r i sed  by d e t a i l e d  work 
measurement, extreme d iv i s ion  and spec ia l i s a t ion  of labour ,  and a 
ca l cu la t ed  in t e r lock ing  of newer, more i n t e n s i f i e d  working practires 
wi th  subsis tence.  The preoccupations of w r i t e r s  such as Elger with 
work conten t ,  of Cressey and MacInnes wi th  t h e  cont rad ic tory  requirement 
f o r  worker co+peration, and of Fri-an, Edwards et  a1 wi th  worker 
r e s i s t a n c e  to the  a l i e n a t i o n  of t h e i r  labour ,  are set a g a i n s t  the  
empirical  realities of a work s i t u a t i o n  i n  which none of these  a r e a s  
was a s ign i f i can t  focus for e i t h e r  managerial s t r a t e g y  or worker 
response. Indeed, t h e  overwhelming meaning of the  production process 
for both "sides" w a s  quanti-t ive r a t h e r  than q u a l i t a t i v e ,  and a s  w e  
s a w ,  such q u a n t i t a t i v e  imperatives were forced upon the  twogoups,  
r a t h e r  than being t h e  r e s u l t  of d e l i b e r a t e  choice between two 
equal ly  feasible a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  through competit ive p re s su res  on one 
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s i d e  and t h e  s t ruggle  for subs is tence  on t h e  o ther .  
In  t h i s  sense no t  only the  hypotheses onworker response b u t  our  
i n i t i a l  hypothesis regarding management, that t h e i r  primary concerns 
would be material r a t h e r  than p o l i t i c a l ,  are c o n f i n e d  i n t h e  research. 
bbreover, t h e  dynamic of management/worker relations put  forward i n  our  
t h e o r e t i c a l  arguments as stemming from the  underlying s t r u c t u r i n g  of 
production tauards va lo r i sa t ion  w a s  if anything "over-conf6rmed" by t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  a t  Landis Gyr. The maximalised norms of output  ordained by 
b T N  and t h e i r  direcdl l i n k  wi th  t h e  company's p r o f i t  l e v e l s  imposed a 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  s t r a i t j a c k e t  on t h e  labour  process  i n  which every method 
and every movement weEe t a i l o r e d  to t h e  requirements of va lo r i sa t ion .  
In t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  any s u g p s t i o n  of a c e n t r a l  plitical con tes t a t ion  of 
"control" or preoccupation byworkers  w i th  t h e  content  and avnership of 
t h e i r  labour  appears  increas ingly  i r r e l e v a n t .  
We set o u t  to "test" empir ica l ly  whether, wi th in  a range of va r i ab le s ,  
worker response would fall closer to the  political or the  material end 
of the  spec t  m. In each case it w a s  found tha t ,  of necess i ty ,  material 
i s s u e s  both constructed experience and governed response; and t h i s  w a s  
also t r u e  , ul t imate ly ,  i n  determining t h e  " t r igge r s  of res i s tance"  t h a t  
f i n a l l y  pushed a genera l ly  pass ive  and fa ta l is t ic  workforce i n t o  ove r t  
conflict .  In t h i s  sense the t h e o r e t i c a l  arguments set o u t  i n  chapter 5 
regarding t h e  dynamic and explosive na tu re  of worker r e s i s t a n c e  w e r e  
t-mpirically confirmed. A t  t h e  Same time t h e  uneven and e s s e n t i a l l y  
spontaneous na tu re  of worker response w a s  p a r a l l e l l e d  by a " f i re f igh t ing"  
approach on t h e  p a r t  of a management unable to subordinate  i t s  
r q u i r e m e n t s  of va lue  production to any concern with,  or acknowledgement 
of, t h e  pos i t i on  of i t s  workforce. 
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We cjo on now, i n  ou r  second case study, to examine a labour  process  
s t ruc tu red  equal ly  c e n t r a l l y  by cons idera t ions  of value,  b u t  i n  
which t h i s  s t r u c t u r i n g  and i t s  associated con t rad ic t ions  emerged 
i n  a somewha t  d i f f e r e n t  form. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Case Study 2 
Our second case s tudy  was ca r r i ed  out  i n  t h e  Wembley, West London branch 
of  t h e  B r i t i s h  Oxygen Company, a branch once c e n t r a l  t o  BOC's  opera t ions  
i n  t h e  Southern Region, bu t  a t  the  t i m e  of t h e  research, as  we s h a l l  
see ,  undergoing some dec l ine .  The research was ca r r i ed  out  over  approx- 
imate ly  the  same per iod,  and using t h e  same in te rv iewing  methods and 
ques t ions ,  a s  i n  our  previous s t u d y  a t  Landis & Gyr. 
Landis & Gyr is only  one fac tory ,  and in approaching t h e  very d i f f e r e n t  
circumstances of a branch of the massive BOC combine i t  was by no means 
c e r t a i n  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  obtained i n  ou r  f i r s t  case s t u d y  would be re- 
peated. There were two f a c t o r s  about BOC Wembley which underl ined t h i s  
doubt; t h e  use of process  r a t h e r  than product technology, and Wembley's 
membership of a v a s t  conglomerate with r e se rves  f a r  exceeding those  of 
Landis 6 Gyr. In t h i s  l i g h t  we were concerned t o  show t h a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  
hypotheses of the t h e s i s  could never the less  be sustained - viz:  
a )  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  and o b j e c t i v e s  of  management would express t h e  o v e r a l l  
p r i o r i t y  of v a l o r i s a t i o n  through a primary concern w i t h  such f a c t o r s  a s  
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of  labour ,  reduction of  s o c i a l l y  necessary labour  time, 
and t h e  general  s t r u c t u r i n g  of  the  labour process  towards the  production 
of  va lue  i n  terms of  t h e  ca l cu la t ion  and imposi t ion of q u a n t i t a t i v e  
norms of production; 
b )  workers i n  t h e i r  t u r n  would be concerned with equal ly  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
i s s u e s ,  i e  subs is tence ,  l e v e l s  of labour i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n ,  and t h e  r e -  
l a t i o n s h i p  between them. These i s sues  would be  more c e n t r a l  t o  worker 
experience of t h e  labour  process  than f o r  example the  q u a l i t a t i v e  con- 
tent of  work or any con te s t a t ion  of t h e  provis ion  of labour a s  such; 
c )  t h e  a reas  of resentment and " t r i g g e r s  of r e s i s t ance"  f o r  workers 
~ ~~~~ 
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would focus on the  o v e r a l l  exigencies  of  "making a l iving",  i e  pay, 
earn ings  enhancement, job  s e c u r i t y  e t c ,  r a t h e r  than  on the  more sub- 
j e c t i v e  and p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s  emphasised by writers on t h e  labour process.  
In undertaking the  case s tudy  a t  BOC, w e  expected t o  f ind  the  same over- 
a l l  p reva lence  of economistic concerns both amongst workers and manage- 
ment a s  a t  Landis & Gyr, but  perhaps l e s s  sharp ly  focussed around a 
c e n t r a l  e f for t / reward  nexus in what was a f t e r  a l l  a less d i r e c t l y  "prod- 
uc t ive"  context .  In general ,  a l e s s  s t ruc tu red  set of r e l a t ionsh ips  around 
the  product ion of s u r p l u s  va lue  was an t ic ipa ted .  Given the  r e l a t i v e  "loose- 
ness" o f  t h e  r e l a t ionsh ips  between labour process ,  subs is tence  and su rp lus  
value involved i n  a process  p l a n t  w i t h  a r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  p r o f i t  base, 
t h e  g r e a t e r  po ten t i a l  f o r  more "sophis t icated" forms of c o n f l i c t  cen t red  
around i s s u e s  of managerial domination and t h e  "control"  of work was rec-  
ognised. Had such concerns been found t o  be paramount, t h e  major theore t -  
i c e 1  p ropos i t i ons  of our t h e s i s  would, of course,  have been se r ious ly  un- 
dermined. 
These propos i t ions  - summed up in t h e  o v e r a l l  hypothes is  t h a t  both mana- 
g e r i a l  o b j e c t i v e s  and worker response a r e  p r imar i ly  s t ruc tured  by quant i -  
t a t i v e  and economic f a c t o r s  - were, as  w e  saw, s u b s t a n t i a l l y  confirmed by 
t h e  s tudy  a t  Landis 6 Gyr. Here a major d i spu te  had indeed spontaneously 
broken o u t  over  the  issue o f  "performance" which had been shorn t o  be t h e  
c e n t r a l  dynamic opera t ing  in management/worker r e l a t i o n s .  However, i n  our 
second study, while no such dramatic  c o n f l i c t  erupted,  t h e  major axes of  
management/worker r e l a t i o n s  were never the less  revea led  t o  be s t r u c t u r e d  
around t h e  same central po in t  of p r o f i t  and subs is tence .  The p a r t i c u l a r  
p a t t e r n  through which these  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  were expressed was i n  i t s e l f  
h ighly  symbolic of t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  p r i o r i t i e s  and con t r ad ic t ions  on which 
t h e  t h e s i s  has  focussed, and w i l l  be examined in d e t a i l  i n  the  p re sen ta t ion  
of our  f ind ings .  
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Product ive Context, Current S i tua t ion ,  Recent Changes 
The major d i f f e rence  between t h e  productive s e t t i n g  provided by our new 
case study and t h a t  of the  l a s t  was t h a t  between p rocess  and production. 
While t h e  Landis & Gyr workers moulded bake l i t e  cases ,  pressed out  screws 
and assembled these  components i n t o  a f in i shed  product,  the  dispensers ,  
cy l inde r  f i l l e r s  and s o r t e r s  and fork l i f t  d r i v e r s  a t  BOC Wembley simply 
processed gases  from bulk l i q u i d  form i n t o  smaller  t r anspor t ab le  cy l in-  
ders ,  and then loaded these  cy l inde r s  t o  be " fe r r ied"  longer or s h o r t e r  
d i s t ances  t o  customers i n  t h e  surrounding areas .  
The workforce a t  t h e  Wembley depot consis ted f i r s t  of  a l l  of t h e  (nomin- 
a l l y )  s i x  d ispensers  (in r e a l i t y  four )  who piped o f f  t h e  l iqu id  gases 
from bulk conta iners  which were s t i l l ,  a t  the  s t a r t  of  t h e  research, a r -  
r i v i n g  by t r a i n  from t h e  Northern p l an t  where t h e  gas  was produced. The 
research  was c a r r i e d  out  a t  a t ime when, amongst many o t h e r  changes, t h e  
dispensing and t r anspor t  of l i q u i d  gases was due t o  be cen t r a l i s ed  a t  
Thame r a t h e r  than Wembley. The a r r i v a l  of the  f i n a l  t r a i n  to  br ing a bulk 
de l ive ry  was thus  witnessed during the  period of the  research;  an event 
which in i t s  t u r n  put  i n t o  grave question the  jobs  of t h e  four dispensers .  
The d i spensa r s  a t tached p ipes  t o  the  tanks on t h e  t r a i n ;  the l i q u i d  gas  
was then e i t h e r  t r ans fe r r ed  t o  huge cooling towers, t h e  steam from which 
made t h e  p l a n t  e a s i l y  i d e n t i f i a b l e  from a d is tance ,  or piped d i r e c t l y  in- 
to  t h e  tanks  on the  backs of t h e  " l i q u i d "  l o r r i e s .  From t h e  cool ing towers 
t h e  processed gas was piped t o  t h e  var ious a reas  o f  cy l inde r  f i l l i n g ,  of 
which t h e  l a r g e s t  was t h e  c e n t r a l  f i l l i n g  area,  bu t  which a l so  included 
f o r  example t h e  compressing a r e a  in which gas was prepared and f i l l e d  f o r  
a i r c r a f t .  
The c e n t r a l  f i l l i n g  a rea ,  which employed the  l a r g e s t  group of workers on 
the  si te,  was t h e  r e s u l t  of the in t eg ra t ion ,  i n  1979, of  the  t h r e e  origi- 
na l  "docks" - those handling argon, oxygen and n i t rogen .  This i n t e g r a t i o n  
had been accompanied, or s h o r t l y  preceded by, t h e  in t roduc t ion  of  "pa l le t -  
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i s a t i o n "  i n  which the  cy l inde r s  f o r  t h e  gases, r a t h e r  than being loaded 
d i r e c t l y  on t o  the  l o r r i e s  by hand, were placed on wooden p a l l e t s  which 
could be t ranspor ted  by fork  l i f t  t r u c k  e i t h e r  t o  t h e  l o r r i e s  or,  when 
empty, t o  t h e  f i l l i n g  shed. F ina l ly ,  a t  t h e  same time as t h e  t r a n s f e r  
t o  t h e  Central  F i l l i n g  Area, the  f i l l i n g  process  i t s e l f  was computerised. 
The impact of  these  changes, and of  changes i n  o t h e r  work a reas  de t a i l ed  
below, w i l l  be d e a l t  with more f u l l y  i n  the  re levant  sec t ions .  Meanwhile, 
we go on t o  l i s t  the  o t h e r  workgroups on whom the  research  focussed. 
These were, respec t ive ly ,  t h e  cy l inde r  t e s t  opera t ives ,  a l s o  r ecen t ly  a f -  
fec ted  by computerisation; t h e  f o r k  l i f t  t ruck  d r i v e r s  who t ransported p a l l e t s  
t o  and from t h e  l o r r i e s  and from t h e  t e s t  shop t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  f i l l i n g  area; 
the s i t e  s e r v i c e s  workers, who d e a l t  with r e p a i r  and maintenance jobs  around 
the  s i t e  and who were the  most f l e x i b l e  group of  workers; and, of course,  
the  lorry dr ivers .  These l a s t  were divided i n t o  t h r e e  groups, VCH or cyl- 
inder  d r i v e r s  who took 5 - ,  8-  or 10-pa l l e t  vehic les  o u t  on loca l  rounds, 
the  "ferry"  d r i v e r s ,  using a r t i c u l a t e d  l o r r i e s  with t r a i l e r s ,  who drove 
longer d i s t ances  with 16-18 p a l l e t  loads,  and f i n a l l y  t h e  "cryospeed" d r ive r s ,  
taking small  samples of  l i q i d  n i t rogen  o r  argon t o  f i rms  i n  the  area t o  he lp  
them decide on t h e  bes t  use of t h e s e  gases within t h e i r  production processes.  
O f  t hese  workgroups, t h e  propor t ions  interviewed were as follows: 
Central  F i l l i n g  Area (cy l inder  f i l lers and s o r t e r s )  12 of 13 
Fork L i f t  Truck d r i v e r s  4 of  6 
Cylinder Test ope ra t ives  4 of 6 
S i t e  Serv ices  workers 5 of 9 
Dispensers 4 o f  5 
Compressors 3 of  4 
Cylinder d r i v e r s  2 of  19 
Liquid drivers 1 of  7 
These groups of  workers were chosen f o r  t h e i r  involvement i n  t h e  most d i r -  
e c t l y  "productive" a reas  and f o r  t h e  semi-ski l led n a t u r e  of t h e i r  work. 
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Thus f o r  example s i t e  serv ice  and cy l inde r  t e s t  workers were interviewed, 
desp i t e  t h e i r  i nc lus ion  by BOC i n  t h e  c a t e g o q o f  "Technical Services"  
workers, r a t h e r  than t h e  vehic le  maintenance workers a l s o  included i n  
t h i s  ca t egoy  whose work contained some c r a f t  elements. Other  groups of 
workers t hus  omitted were engineering maintenance craftsmen and a n c i l l a r y  
workers such a s  those  in t h e  canteen. For similar reasons,  t h e  women wor- 
king i n  t h e  schedul ing o f f i c e  were a l s o  excluded, even though t h e i r  cur- 
r en t  employment prospec ts  posed s i g n i f i c a n t  i s s u e s  with t h e  in t roduc t ion  
of computerisation. 
The main focus of research,  then, was on what was known as t h e  "Operations 
and Di s t r ibu t ion"  department, one of  t h r e e  departments i n t o  which t h e  
Wembley branch was s t ruc tured;  i n  add i t ion  t o  Technical Serv ices ,  there  
was a l s o  t h e  Commercial department, which handled o rde r s  and s a l e s  and t h e  
workforce of which was white c o l l a r  a p a r t  from two men who served on what 
was known a s  t h e  "Bearer Dock", r o l l i n g  cy l inde r s  on and o f f  a concrete  
deck in t h e  old-fashioned manner f o r  i nd iv idua l  c a l l i n g  customers. 
The management and supervisory s t r u c t u r e  followed the  l i n e s  o f  these  three  
departments. There was an o v e r a l l  Branch Manager with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
t h e  whole opera t ion ,  with each department i n  turn  headed by i t s  own manager. 
Beneath t h i s  layer ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  t h e  Opera t ions /Dis t r ibu t ion  and Technical 
Services  departments w i t h  which t h e  research  was t h e  most concerned, t he re  
was a cons iderable  add i t iona l  l eve l  o f  supervis ion,  i nc lud ing  i n  t h e  case 
of "Ops/Dis t"  two Cylinder foremen with beneath them two Cent ra l  F i l l i n g  
superv isors ,  one superv isor  f o r  the  compressors, and two Transport  foremen 
overseeing t h e  d r i v e r s ;  in Technical Services  t h e r e  were a S i t e  Services 
and a Cylinder t es t  superv isor  i n  t h e  a r e a s  w i t h  which w e  were concerned, 
a s  wel l  a s  an Engineering Maintenance foreman and a foreman f o r  the  depart-  
ment as a whole (who a l s o  doubled as works engineer).  Of t h e s e  mamagers and 
superv is  rs  t h e  fol lowing were interviewed: 
Branch Manager, Opera t ions /Dis t r ibu t ion  Manager, Technical Serv ices  Manager, 
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two Cen t ra l  F i l l i n g  Area foremen, two Transport  foremen, one Technical 
s e r v i c e s  foreman, one S i t e  Serv ices  supervisor ,  one Cylinder T e s t  s u p e r -  
v i s o r . a n d  one Compressors supervisor .  The branch and reg iona l  personnel 
managers were a l so  interviewed. As in our previous case  study, t h e  f i n d -  - 
ings from these  d iscuss ions  with management w i l l  be presented before  w e  
examine t h e  response of t h e  workforce and t h e i r  representa t ives .  
The above, then, was t h e  employment s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  Wembley branch of  
BOC, numbering roughly 175 employees, a s  i t  ex i s t ed  a t  the  time of t h e  
research  (Spring, 1985). However, many changes, p r i n c i p a l l y  a f f e c t i n g  
manpower, had taken p lace  o v e r  t h e  previous ten yea r s  and more r ecen t ly ,  
and t h e  branch was during t h e  time of t h e  research  undergoing s t i l l  more 
d r a s t i c  change in t h i s  respec t .  During t h e  p a s t  year ,  f o r  example, t h e  
number of  " l i q u i d "  d r i v e r s  employed a t  t h e  branch had been reduced from 
25 t o  7 in readiness  f o r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of t h e  e n t i r e  l i q u i d  gases d i s t r i -  
but ion opera t ion  t o  Thame. This in i t s  t u r n  a f f ec t ed ,  as we have noted 
above, t h e  pos i t i on  of t h e  d ispensers ,  who by t h e  time t h e  research was 
under way v e r e  i n  l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  t h e i r  jobs would be redundant by t h e  
time ( u s u a l l y  estimated a s  September 1985)  t h a t  t h e  t r a n s f e r  was complete. 
The repercuss ions  of t h e  t r a n s f e r  echoed through t h e  p l an t ,  and i n  f a c t  
during t h e  f i n a l  week of t h e  research  period i t  was announced t h a t  16 
workers amongst t h e  manual workforce a s  a whole were t o  be made redundant. 
Alongside these  fa r - reaching  changes was t h e  ongoing development of 
computer isat ion i n  t h e  o r d e r i n g  and scheduling of de l ive ry  of  gases, 
which aga in  during t h e  per iod  of t h e  research r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  compulsory 
redundancy of n ine  of t h e  (female)  gas orders  c l e r k s  - hal f  of  t h e  e x i s t -  
ing vorkforce.  Indeed I was f requent ly  to ld  during t h e  period of  my re- 
search  a t  Wembley t h a t  t h e  vorkforce  a s  a whole had been more than halved 
over t h e  previous ten yea r s  as t h e  r e s u l t  of such changes i n  combination 
with a genera l  d r ive  towards t h e  reduction of  manpower. 
The same pressures  t h a t  had l ed  t o  t h i s  d r i v e  a l s o  underlay o t h e r  changes 
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in work 
been forced on t h e  company by the  recess ion .  These included work meas- 
urement and p roduc t iv i ty  programmes, themselves o r i g i n a l l y  motivated 
by t h e  dec is ion  t o  i nves t  "in a b ig  way" i n  the  plant ;  meaning tha t  man- 
agement "had t o  g e t  c o s t s  down". The changes which c u r r e n t l y  a f fec ted  
workers a t  BOC Wembley can be summarised a s  follows: 
o rgan i sa t ion  and p r a c t i c e s  which had, a s  many managers p u t  it, 
1966 F i r s t  Work S t u d y  Review, i e  work measurement exerc ise ,  which 
in t h e  Personnel Manager's words "slashed hours and reduced 
wag e s 'I. 
USR 2 - a more complex review tak ing  place over  t h r e e  years 
which measured p roduc t iv i ty  in each area  t o  f ind  o u t  f o r  ex- 
ample how long it  took t o  move cy l inde r s  - "a long exerc ise  
in work measurement". 
1969 
1971 Product iv i ty  schemes " f i n a l l y  agreed" a f t e r  the  work study 
1972 I reviews enabled t h e  company t o  "drop a l o t  o f  workers". 
1973 "Model Plans" drawn up which included r e l axa t ion  of  demarc- 
a t i o n  l ines ,  increased f l e x i b i  l i t y ,  and t imings on jobs.  
Monthly "Product ivi ty  Meetings" inaugerated t o  d i scuss  any 
problems w i t h  these  p lans  and product iv i ty  general ly .  
1979 A "stre .pl l ining exercise"  or ongoing p roduc t iv i ty  dea l  i n i -  
t i a t e d  a process  whereby "year by year  they come i n  and say 
they want t o  ge t  r i d  of x people,  h e r e ' s  t h e  money" (dispen- 
ser). While t h e  exe rc i se  was o f f i c i a l l y  " j u s t  about numbers" 
it had a l s o  led t o  some changes i n  working p r a c t i c e s  (eg t h e  
systems of "coverage" and "dead man s h i f t s "  which were forms 
of enforced overtime).  
In t roduct ion  of p a l l e t i s a t i o n  f o r  t r anspor t a t ion  of  cy l inders  1978 
1979 I n t e g r a t i o n  of separa te  docks i n t o  Central  F i l l i n g  Area 
1979-80 Computerisation of cy l inde r  f i l l i n g  process  
1904 Announcement of Thame t r a n s f e r  
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. 1985 In t roduct ion  of  computerisation i n t o  d r i v e r  schedul ing 
1985 Computerisation of cy l inder  t e s t i n g  process. 
The impact of these  changes f o r  the  current na ture  of  management/ 
worker r e l a t i o n s  and t h e  labour process  a t  BOC Wembley can be summed 
up in terms of  a c e n t r a l  con t r ad ic t ion  between ob jec t ives  on manning 
and overtime on t h e  p a r t  of both workers and management. This  ordained 
an entrenched s e t  of  antagonisms which, while  l e s s  immediately dramatic 
and explosive than t h e  "performance" c o n f l i c t  a t  Landis 6 Gyr, was a s  
fa r reaching  in i t s  e f f e c t s .  Br ie f ly ,  t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  o b j e c t i v e s  can be 
l i s t e d  a s  follows: 
MANAGEMENT 
Wants reduct ions  t o  achieve 
"'ING c o s t  savings 
Has t o  increase /enforce  t o  
make up f o r  lack of f l e x i b i l i t y  
caused by manning reduct ions;  
a t  t h e  same time at tempting t o  
reduce i n  o r d e r  t o  con t ro l  cos ts .  
Would p r e f e r  t o  r e t a i n  r a t h e r  
than inc rease  b a s i c  r a t e  
OVERTIME 
WORKFORCE 
Opposes reduct ions,  but  
a l so  opposes recru i tment  
and redeployment as t h i s  en- 
croaches on t h e i r  overtime 
Resents l eve l s  o f  but  seeks 
o u t  in order  t o  enhance r e l -  
a t i v e l y  low b a s i c  r a t e .  
Uses a s  main bargaining coun- 
ter  but o b j e c t s  t o  l eve l s  of 
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  assoc ia ted  
w i t h  forms of overt ime such 
a s  "coverage". 
The impact of these  inhe ren t ly  con t r ad ic to ry  ob jec t ives  on both manager- 
i a l  o rganisa t ion  o f  and  worker response t o  t h e  labour process  a t  BOC 
was, as we have ind ica t ed ,  s r ecu r r ing  f e a t u r e  of our f ind ings .  The 
c o n s t r a i n t s  within which both management and workers found themselves 
a long these l i n e s  w e r e  f u r t h e r  i n t e n s i f i e d  by the  d e t e r i o r a t i n g  posi-  
t i o n  of  the p l an t  i t s e l f .  Once the  c e n t r e  of  opera t ions  i n  t h e  Southern 
Region, with a degree of worker combativi ty  t o  match, i t  was now reduced 
t o  something of an outpos t ,  i t s  key ope ra t ions  d iver ted  t o  an ou t ly ing  
ares and i t s e l f  now by no means Immune t o  t o t a l  c losure.  As t h e  Oper- 
a t i o n s  and D i s t r i b u t i o n s  Manager p u t  It: "About ten years  ago, not  very 
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long ago, Wembley w a s  very big,  t h e  biggest  in the  country - t o  sug- 
ges t  Wembley coul?  c l o s e  was a Joke. Now i t  would be  no problem to  
c l o s e  - i t ' s  g e t t i = <  t h a t  rea l i sm across  t o  people.". 
A t  t h e  same time, b w e v e r ,  whatever i t s  immediate prospec ts ,  BOC 
Wembley remained p r r t  of a v a s t  multimational conglomerate f ac ing  
minimal compet i t iac .  Indeed BOC's  problem was not  t h a t  of increas ing  
i t s  revenue, whict. unu ld  have brought it i n t o  c o n f l i c t  with the  Mon- 
opo l i e s  Commission, b u t  of keeping down i t s  cos ts .  A t  the  same time 
t h e  company's p r o f i t s  were, t o  say t h e  l e a s t ,  hea l thy ;  the  Company 
Report f o r  1986, X C ' s  centenary year,  announced "record p r o f i t s  on 
worldwide tu rnove r  of around f2 bi l l ion" ,  while  pre- tax  p r o f i t s  had 
r i s e n  24% during 1355 and turnover  stood a t  €2261.4111 as opposed t o  
the 1984 f i g u r e  of S443.Om. 
There was, then, uo conce ivab le  danger of BOC as a company going o u t  
of business.  A s  the g l o s s y  pamphlet promoting t h e  BOC Group begins: 
The BOC Group - t r ibu te s  t o  t h e  economies of some 50 
coun t r i e s  t h roc&out  t h e  world. In  each of t hese  economies 
i t  manufacturea as s e l l  as markets one o r  more o f  i t s  major 
product l ines :  i z d u s t r i a l  gases ,  hea l th  care ,  carbon-based 
and welding prcdxacts.  In a l l  of these products  t h e  Group 
i s  e i t h e r  wrL& l e a d e r  o r  among t h e  world's major producers. 
. A QlBATU l e a f l e t  puts i t  perhaps less wholeheartedly,  a f t e r  quot- 
i ng  both t h e  year-and p r o f i t s  of f138 mi l l ion  and the f771,600 p a  
s a l a r y  of Dick Giordrno, Group Chief Executive: 
Now t h a t  means a success fu l  company i n  anybody's language - 
don' t  i t  j u s t :  
And a l l  t h e  CZ3 v a n t s  i s  a SHARE IN THE WEALTH. 
Sounds f a i r  to  as ... pardners:  
In  t h i s  s ec t ion  w e  have summarised some of t h e  r ecen t  changes, regard- 
ing  both manpower P d  working p r a c t i c e s ,  which lay  behind the  produc- 
t i v e  and i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  s i t u a t i o n  i n  Wembley. In our next  sec- 
-240- 
t i o n  we go on t o  look a t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f ,  and a t t i t u d e s  towards, 
t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  by Wembley managers. 
THE flAh'AGERS 
Despi te  t h e  apparent ly  u n s e t t l i n g  l eve l  of employment i n s e c u r i t y  and 
f l u x  e x i s t i n g  a t  t h e  depot,  t h e  general  atmosphere, among management 
a t  l e a s t ,  was one of a calm pragmatism which cont ras ted  not iceably  
with the  nervous aggression of the  management a t  Landis & Gyr. This  
was undoubtedly due a t  l e a s t  in p a r t  t o  t h e  secure  p r o f i t s  s i t u a t i o n  
mentioned above. A t  t h e  same time, neve r the l e s s ,  cons idera t ions  of 
c o s t  and p r o f i t a b i l i t y  were found again t o  be more press ing  concerns 
for management than any o b j e c t i v e  of "control"  p e r  s e  - conceptions 
of  "control", where mentioned, being t i e d  ( a s  a t  Landis & Gyr) t o  a 
s p e c i f i c  s e t  of r e l a t i o n s  between time and money. In L a n d i s  6 Cyr's 
case  t h i s  s e t  centred on t h e  i s s u e  of "performance"; fo r  BOC Wembley 
i t  was t h e  manninglovertime nexus deccribed above. We now go on t o  ex- 
amine the managerial responses obtained a t  Wembley in t h e  l i g h t  of 
t h i s  ongoing, and cont rad ic tory ,  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between ob jec t ives  on 
manning and overtime, beginning with t h e  frequently-used concept of 
"management of change". 
"Management of Change" 
A s  s t a t e d ,  t h i s  was a phrase f requent ly  employed by managers both a t  
t h e  p l an t  and a t  r eg iona l  l e v e l  t o  desc r ibe  t h e i r  c e n t r a l  t a s k  and ob- 
j e c t i v e .  As the Regional Personnel Manager p u t  i t ,  "The r o l e  of my de- 
partment is to  e f f e c t i v e l y  manage change and and minimise t h e  damage 
t o  peopleand t h e  company." The Technical Serv ices  manager r e f e r r e d  t o  
f a c t o r s  such as "too many people, overtime a b i t  high - t h i s  would 
set  o f f  t h e  process of change." 
Such re ferences  t o  t h e  "management" and "process" of change a s  c e n t r a l  
t o  t h e  business of management might be thought t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  general  
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a c t i v i t y  of planning and implementing an overarching managerial s t r a t -  
egy. Indeed, comments were made which r e fe r r ed  (in a p a r t i c u l a r l y  rea- 
l i s t i c  fash ion)  t o  t h i s  funct ion of s t r a t e g i c  planning: 
"...You've got  t o  know 3 , 4 , 5  yea r s  where you ' re  going. That does tend 
t o  change. Equally wel l  I th ink  w e  a r e  i n  a depot t h a t ' s  cont inua l ly  
changing by f o r c e s  beyond our con t ro l ,  so t echn ica l  changes and plans 
w i l l  be modified...you never ge t  there"  (Technical Serv ices  Manager). 
"...Working t o  a plan almost implies  bu i ld ing  a c a s t l e ,  and once i t ' s  
b u i l t  i t ' s  s t a t i c ,  but i t ' s  a dynamic business,  your plan never ends. 
We' 11 s t i l l  go down t h e  same t rack ,  bu t  w e '  11 never  get there"  (Oper- 
a t ions /Di s t r ibu t ion  manager). 
T h i s  r e a l i s a t i o n ,  on the  one hand expressing an almost d i a l e c t i c a l  grasp 
of the  complexi t ies  of the process  of change, and on t h e  o t h e r  r e f l e c t -  
ing  a r e a l i s t i c  pragmatism, cont ras ted  w i t h  t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  o f  the  Land- 
is & Gyr management on imposing a s p e c i f i c  set of o b j e c t i v e s  whether 
or not  t h i s  accorded with e x i s t i n g  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  dynamics. This 
was not  because BOC managers were n o t  prepared t o  u n i l a t e r a l l y  imple- 
ment, a s  w e  see below, but  q u i t e  poss ib ly  because whi le  t h e  surv iva l  of 
BOC Wembley might be threatened, t h a t  of t h e  company a s  a 
n o t  i n  question. However, t h e r e  was a more immediate and p r a c t i c a l  rea- 
son f o r  management's phi losophical  acceptance of  change a s  an ongoing 
process  - and t h i s  was t h a t  "change" and "the management of  change" were 
in f a c t  euphemisms f o r  the  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  and des t a f f fng  o f  t h e  Southern 
Region a s  a whole and BOC Uembley in p a r t i c u l a r .  
That t h i s  was t h e  concrete  n a t u r e  of t h e  "change" being "managed" was 
c l e a r  i n  t h e  managers' ana lys i s  of  workers' r e s i s t ance ,  or a s  the  
Technical Serv ices  manager put  it, " iner t ia" ,  t o  change. Not only t h i s  
manager but  management i n  general  appeared t o  view worker response i n  
t h i s  area aa a t echn ica l  problem, comparable to ,  a s  t h e  Technical Ser- 
whole was 
v i c e s  manager's terms sugges ts ,  a problem i n  engineering. However, 
s ince  t h e  i s sue  of worker r e s i s t a n c e  in t h i s  a r ea  and management's 
view of  t h i s  r e s i s t a n c e  t a k e s  us i n t o  a d i s t i n c t  and complex sphere, 
we s h a l l  postpone cons ide ra t ion  of t h i s  t o  a l a t e r  sect ion.  Meanwhile 
we examine the  underlying r a t i o n a l e  of t h i s  c e n t r a l  programme of change 
- reduct ions  i n  manning, reduct ions  i n  overtime through the e l imina t ion  
of r e s t r i c t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  - which, n o t  su rp r i s ing ly ,  was presented by 
management in terms o f  c o s t  reduct ion.  
Management of Change - ( i ) C o s t  Reduction 
Many managers prefaced t h e i r  remarks on t h e  need f o r  change with a ref- 
e rence  t o  "the recession". This  was seen a s  a c a t a l y s t  for a l ready  re- 
qui red  change r a t h e r  than a d i r e c t  cause in i t s e l f :  "The recess ion  hap- 
pened and i t  h ighl ighted  and emphasised t h e  problems of low product iv i ty .  
Management perceived themselves forced t o  reduce cos t s "  (branch person- 
n e l  manager). When t h e  s p e c i f i c  n a t u r e  of these recession-  and cost-  
induced changes was gone i n t o ,  t h e  c e n t r a l i t y  of t h e  overtimehnanning 
nexus became c lear :  "With t h e  dec l ine  i n  bus iness  i n  t h e  l a t e  '705, 
t h i s  h ighl ighted  overtime and manning. When t h e r e  was l o t s  of work and 
c o n s i s t e n t  growth t h a t  d i d n ' t  matter. The c l imate  of i n d u s t r i a l  re la -  
t i o n s  was then, a t  a l l  c o s t s  d i s rup t ion  must  be avoided to  maintain 
production. I '  
Overtime and manning were, then,  t a r g e t t e d  by t h e  Personnel Manager as 
"obvious" candidates  for change, with t h e  emphasis on t h e  redac t ion  o f  
overtime as a p r a c t i c a l  p r o j e c t  s t e p s  towards which could now be under- 
taken: 
"I don ' t  have a long-term p l a n  - I concentrate  on t h e  obvious problems. 
It's well-knnwn amongst management here  what needs t o  be done t o  improve 
th ings  - g e t  con t ro l  of overt ime,  manning, understanding of procedures, 
b e t t e r  communications...The f i r s t  s t e p  is t o  analyse overtime l e v e l s  i n  
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r e l a t i o n  t o  a c t u a l  r equ i r emen t s  - se t  p r i o r i t i e s  f o r  changing w h a t ' s  
n e c e s s a r y .  I' 
For t h e  Branch Yanager, too,  t h e  removal of  t h e  " r e s t r i c t i v e  p r a c t i c e s "  
a s s o a i a t e d  w i t h  o v e r t i m e  vas  seen a s  a p r i o r i t y :  
"We ana lysed  a l l  b lockages  - I asked t h e  foremen t o  l i s t  t o  me i n  
t h e i r  s e c t i o n s  what r e s t r i c t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  t h e r e  were - i d e n t i f y i n g  
them, r a t h e r  t h a n  d o i n g  a n y t h i n g  abou t  them, i n  t h e  f i r s t  year." 
I t  was c l e a r  t h a t  such concern about  " r e s t r i c t i v e  p r a c t i c e s "  was i n  
t h e  main r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  d e v i c e s  used by workers  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  over-  
time o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and t h u s  t h e i r  e a r n i n g s :  "The dange r  i s  o f  manufac- 
t u r i n g  a d d i t i o n a l  pay by t a k i n g  9 h o u r s '  work and s t r e t c h i n g  i t  t o  1 2  
- t h e r e ' s  an advan tage  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i n  do ing  t h a t "  ( T e c h n i c a l  Ser-  
vices Xanager). The Branch ilanager a l s o  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  a r t i f i c i a l  
" s t r e t c h i n g "  of  J o b s  by workers: "Their  performance r a t e  i s  t h e i r  ac- 
t i v i t y  t ime  - t h e  time t aken  t o  complete  c e r t a i n  a c t i v i t i e s .  They neve r  
r e a c h  t h e  t i m e  because  ove r t ime  comes i n t o  p l a y  b e f o r e  they get  the re . "  
In f a c t ,  t h e  whole wage b a r g a i n i n g  p r o c e s s  i n  t h e  p l a n t  r evo lved  
around overt ime.  A s  t h e  Transpor t  Foreman p u t  i t ,  "They ' re  l o o k i n 2  
f o r  t h i s  e x t r a  time - we've g o t  t o  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  i t ' s  a r i d i c u l o u s  
s i t u a t i o n ,  y o u ' l l  come up t o  me and say  I want q u a r t e r  o f  an h o u r  be- 
c a u s e  I had t o  w a i t  t o  g e t  o u t  t o  Eas t  Lane - f a l s e  ove r t ime ,  a11 f a l s e  
o v e r t i m e  ... Everyone's looking f o r  ove r t ime ,  b u t  no one  seems t o  want t o  
work i t ."  
A c e n t r a l  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  "change" r e f e r r e d  t o  by management was , then ,  
c l e a r l y  t o  reduce t h i s  l e v e l  of a r t i f i c i a L  ove r t ime  w i t h  i t s  d e l e t e r -  
i o u s  e f f ec t s  on c o s t s .  B u t  a t  t h e  same time t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  p r e s s u r e  
f o r  p roduc t ion  c o n t i n u a l l y  undermined t h i s  o b j e c t i v e .  A s  t h e  same 
foreman p u t  it: "We have t o  be c o s t  consc ious  - we g e t  p r e s s u r e  from 
p e o p l e  above. Overt ime - you have t o  t r y  t o  keep i t  down - a v e r y  hard 
-244- 
t h i n g  t o  c o n t r o l .  So many t h i n g s  go wrong, t h e  o n l y  way you can 
g e t  t h e  j o b  i s  by paying peop le"  ( i e  g i v i n g  o v e r t i m e ) .  
Yet t h e  company p r i o r i t i e s  i nvo lved  i n  t h i s  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  were made 
b r u t a l l y  c l e a r  i n  t h e  same fo reman ' s  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  comparat ive 
i n v e s t m e n t s  involved i n  l o r r y  and d r i v e r .  "The company does i t  on a 
c o s t  b a s i s  - l o r r i e s  c o s t  f15,300 f o r  c y l i n d e r ,  6130,003 f o r  a l i q u i d  
t a n k e r  - you pay t 2 5  f o r  ove r t ime .  I t ' s  worth i t ,  b u t  i t  means t h e  
customers a r e n ' t  g e t t i n g  service." 
The r e l e n t l e s s  c o s t  p r e s s u r e s  weighing on management exposed them t o  a 
c o n t i n u a l ,  and unwinnable, b a l a n c i n g  of p r i o r i t i e s  w i t h i n  impossibly 
t i g h t  c o n s t r a i n t s .  I t  was no wonder t h a t  managers r e f e r r e d  r e s i g n e d l y  
t o  t h e  l a c k  o f  p r o g r e s s  i n  t h e  p r o j e c t  o f  r e d u c i n g  ove r t ime  l e v e l s .  
"I d o n ' t  t h i n k  a t  t h e  moment i t  h a s  been t a c k l e d  who lehea r t ed ly  - I 
d o n ' t  t h i n k  much has  come o u t  o f  i t .  I t h i n k  t h e  management l o c a l l y  - 
t h e  b ranch  management - t h e y ' r e  unsu re  about  where t h e y  can reduce 
o v e r t i m e  wi thou t  c o n s t r i c t i n g  s e r v i c e s "  (Branch Pe r sonne l  kianagerj. 
Overtime, t hen ,  f i l l e d  i n  t h e  c r a c k s  l e f t  by t h e  manpower r e d u c t i o n s ,  
b u t  a t  a c o s t  t o  which management could n o t  q u i t e  r e c o n c i l e  themselves.  
The p a r a l l e l  p r o j e c t  o f  r e d u c i n g  manning was, o f  c o u r s e ,  a l s o  d i c t a t e d  
by c o s t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  b u t  w i t h i n  t h e  o v e r r i d i n g  set  of  p r e s s u r e s  or -  
dained by "cos t "  i t  appeared a t  t imes  t o  be a somewhat ad hoc d e c i s i o n  
a s  t o  whether  t h e  b a t t l e  a g a i n s t  o v e r t h e ,  o r  t h e  need t o  ma in ta in  ad- 
e q u a t e  customer s e r v i c e  on t h e  b a s i s  of a dwind l ing  and o v e r s t r e t c n e d  
workforce,  would be t h e  immediate p r i o r i t y .  That t h e  c e n t r a l  i m p e r a t i v e  
governing m a n a g e r i i l  a c t i v i t y  was indee? c o s t  was as c l e a r  a t  BC: 
Wembley a s  i t  had been a t  Landis  h Gyr: 
"1:id-term aims a r e  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  budget every 1 2  months - you have 
t o  r educe  c o s t s  by x - t h a t ' s  what i n f l u e n c e s  what y o u ' r e  t r y i n g  t o  do 
w i t h  t h e  workforce,  i n f l u e n c e s  what y o u ' r e  t r y i n g  t o  do. I t ' s  t h e  main 
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f a c t o r  which i n f l u e n c e s  day-to-day manage r i a l  p rac t i ce . . .A t  t h e  end 
of t h e  day I ' v e  always g o t  t h a t  f e e l i n g  which says ,  How much i s  i t ,  
w h a t ' s  c o s t  and revenue" (Techn ica l  S e r v i c e s  Hanager). And t h e  over-  
a l l  programme for r e d u c i n g  " r e s t r i c t i v e  p r a c t i c e s "  was sunmed up by 
t h e  Branch iianager i n  t h e  same terms: 
"It was f e l t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  remove t h e  s t i n t  p r a c t i c e s  because they 
were hampering t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  branch - we were n o t  c o s t  e f -  
f e c t i v e ,  w e  were n o t  competit ive. . .So c o n t r o l  meant t o  manage cos t s ,  
t h a t ' s  what i t  meant, manage c o s t s .  Managing c o s t s  o b v i o u s l y  meant people  
had t o  work a l i t t l e  b i t  ha rde r .  Harder i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  they had t o  
work c o n t i n u o u s l y  f o r  l onge r  p e r i o d s ,  i n s t e a d  of  sweat ing."  
In  a few s e n t e n c e s ,  t h e  Branch P:anager had i n t e r r e l a t e d  t h e  i s s u e s  of  
c o s t ,  "control" ,  imposed by t h e s e  c o s t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  l abour  t i n e  and 
1 abour r e o  r g a n i  s a t  i o n  and i n  t en s i  f i c a t i o n .  
,?!anagement of Change - "! l inimisat ion of  D i s rup t ion"  
I n  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  we have a t t empted  t o  r e l a t e  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  change t o  
t h e  meaning management themselves  gave t o  i t  - t h e  r e d u c t i o n  of c o s t s  
i n  t h e  a c c o u n t i n g  terms of budget ,  cost  c e n t r e s  e t c ,  which i n  t h e i r  
p r a c t i c a l  r e a l i s a t i o n  took t h e  shape of  t h e  programxe of r e d u c i n i  ove r -  
t ime and manning. However, t h e r e  i s  o f  cour se  a f u r t h e r  dimension i n  
which t h i s  p r o c e s s  c r u c i a l l y  i n t e r a c t e d  w i t h  t h o s e  who r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e  
c o s t  t o  be reduced - t h e  workers. J u s t  a s  w e  have t r i e d  t o  show t h e o r e t -  
i c a l l y  how v a l o r i s a t i o n  w i t h i n ,  and t h u s  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f ,  t h e  labour  
p r o c e s s  depends on a nexus of  s u r p l u s  v a l u e / s u b s i s t e n c e ,  or pa id  and 
unpaid l abour  t ime,  s o  w e  would p r e s e n t  t h i s  i n t e r a c t i o n  a s  t h e  s t r u c -  
t u r a l  b a s i s  of  l abour  p rocess  o r g a n i s a t i o n  and conduct a t  Cembley. 
Neve r the l e s s ,  t h e  ve ry  "cond i t ions"  which management s e t  o u t  t o  r eg -  
u l a t e  a s  p a r t  of t h e i r  c o s t  r e d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s  - t h e  workers  - were, of  
cour se ,  l e a s t  s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  a s y s t e m a t i c  programme of improvement. 
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Nanagement themse lves  showed a l i v e l y  awareness  o f  t h e  "blocking" 
r o l e  of worke r s  i n  t h e  imp lemen ta t ion  o f  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s :  
"'rhe b i g g e s t  o b s t a c l e  was worker r e s i s t a n c e  - t e c h n i c a l  f a c t o r s  a r e n ' t  
an o b s t a c l e  - t h e y ' r e  p r a c t i c a l  t h i n g s  t h a t  can  be done  i f  t h e y ' r e  
w e l l  p lanned .  Peop le  changes a r e  h a r d e r  than  machine changes" (Branch 
bianager). The same manager added l a t e r ,  "Worker o r g a n i s a t i o n  i s  an 
i n t e r f a @  - i t ' s  always t h e r e "  - a comment which, a s  we go on t o  s e e ,  
can  be s a i d  t o  sum up t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  worker r e s i s t a n c e  w i t h i n  t h e  p l a n t .  
The O p e r a t i o n s / D i s t r i b u t i o n  manager made t h e  same p o i n t :  "Uorker resp- 
o n s e  i s  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  i n  g e t t i n g  i n  t h e  way. Most of o u r  p l a n s  a r e  
v e r y  s i m p l e ,  t h e  o n l y  r e a s o n  we d i d n ' t  do them y e s t e r d a y  i s  because 
i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  has  d i c t a t e d  t h a t  we c a n ' t . . . I f  t h e r e  wasn ' t  t h a t  
problem, you could  p u t  a monkey i n  my job ."  
We have  a l r e a d y  d i s c u s s e d  some o f  t h e  ways i n  which workers ,  through 
a p r o c e s s  of a t t r i t i o n  o r  i n  some c a s e s  o u t r i g h t  r e s i s t a n c e  i n  s t r i k e  
a c t i o n ,  b locked  t h e  manage r i a l  o b j e c t i v e  o f  r e d u c i n g  o v e r t i m e  - he lped ,  
a s  we have  seen ,  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  management themse lves  had l i t t l e  a l -  
t e r n a t i v e  on  e c c a s i o n  bu t  t o  have  r e c o u r s e  t o  o v e r t i m e  a s  a means of 
overcoming gaps  i n  s e r v i c e  l e f t  by t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  manpower. The Dp- 
e r a t i o n s / D i s t r i b u t i o n s  manager summed up t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  dynamics of 
t h i s  s i t u a t i o n :  
"Changes happen a l l  t h e  time. I n  t h e  long term t h e  t i g h t e r  t h e  r u l e s  t h e  
less  t h e  d i s r u p t i o n .  The d i s r u p t i o n  a r i s e s  because  p e o p l e  a r e  working a t  
t h e  edge o f  t h e  r u l e s  - up t o  t h e  l i m i t  and w i t h  what t h e y  can g e t  away 
wi th .  I f  t h e  r u l e s  a r e  c l e a r  c u t  we can minimise d i s r u p t i o n .  They ' r e  n o t  
so c l e a r  c u t  because  i f  t h e y  work t o  r u l e ,  n o t h i n g  g e t s  done. i o  I r e l y  
on t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  work t o g e t h e r  - t h a t  works f i n e  i f  W E  have t h e  
same common aim. I d o n ' t  b e l i e v e  we o f t e n  do have." 
T h i s  manage r ' s  u s e  of t h e  n o t i o n s  of "rules" and " d i s r u p t i o n "  provided 
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an i n t e r e s t i n g  c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  r o l e  of worke r s  a s  t he  " f l y  i n  
t h e  o in tmen t "  i n p e d i n g  manage r i a l  p l a n s .  Desp i t e  t h e  sor!ewhat ph i losoph-  
i c a l  t o n e  o f  h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  " d i s c i p l i n e "  and " r u l e s "  were c l e a r l y  n o t  ab- 
s t r a c t  d e s i d e r a t a  bu t  p a r t  o f  t h e  ongoin; and everyday  b a t t l e  between 
pay and p r o d u c t i v i t y .  As an example, t h e  xanager  s a i d ,  "'The l i q u i d  t r a n s -  
f e r "  ( t h e  t r a n s f e r  of l i q u i d  t a n k e r  d r i v e r s  t o  Thaae )  " i s  c l a s s i c  - they  
c a n ' t  c o n t r o l  t h i s  s o  why n o t  c a u s e  maxiTun d i s r u p t i o n .  I wan: minimu? 
d i s r u p t i o n ,  t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e i r  a i m . . . t h e i r  aim i s  d o l l a r s  today." 
The "rules" which t h e  workers  c o n t i n u a l l y  b roke  o r  c h a l l e n z e d  x e r e  t h o s e  
gove rn ing  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  l a b o u r  t ime and a l l o c a t i o n  of ove r t ime ;  
t h e  "min imisa t ion  of d i s c i p l i n e "  f o r  which t h e  manager s t r o v e  was one  i n  
which t h e  m a n a g e r i a l l y - s t r u c t u r e d  l abour  p r o c e s s  was c a r r i e d  on  w i t h  a s  
l i t t l e  i n t e r r u p t i o n  and wi thd rawa l  o f  l abour  a s  p o s s i b l e .  a u t  t he  break- 
i n g  of  such  " r u l e s "  was n o t  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  any wish by t h e  workforce t o  
u s u r p  t h e  manage r i a l  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  working norms, b u t  s i m ? l y  t o  t h e  aim, 
i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  wi th  t h a t  o f  management, o f  " d o l l a r s  today"  - acknowledged 
i n  t h e  manager ' s  l a c o n i c  comment t h a t  "I d o n ' t  b e l i e v e  we o f t e n  do have" 
( a  common aim).  
Indeed ,  i n  one  way t h e r e  was a c l e a r  r e c o g n i t i o n  by bo th  t h e  G?e ra t ions /  
D i s t r i b u t i o n  and Branch managers of t h e  very  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n s  behind 
t h e  workers '  i n t r a c t a b i l i t y :  
"I b e l i e v e  I ' m  c o n s c i e n t i o u s .  My a i m  i s  a long  term s o l i d  founda t ion  we 
can  b u i l d  on. Some h i g h l y  pa id  p e o p l e  a r e  look ing  f o r  pounds today. They 
s e e  they  c a n ' t  c o n t r o l  tomorrow, j u s t  today. I d o n ' t  blame the7  €o r  mak- 
i n g  a buck." 
"People do t r y  t o  c r e a t e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  e a r n i n g  more, which they  can 
o n l y  do th rough  over t ime.  I f  I was them, I ' d  do t h e  same t h i n g  - I ' d  be 
bound t o  form a s i m i l a r  p l a n ,  i f  I wanted more money o u t  o f  t h e  s y s t m . "  
I n  t h i s  t h e  managers e x p r e s s e d  a c u r i o u s  pragmatism, appa ren t  i n  t h e  
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g e n e r a l  etmosphere o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a t  t h e  p l a n t ,  i n  which managers 
and shop s t ewards  appea red  t o  meet on t h e  same t e r r i t o r y  of  hard-  
nosed ma te r i a l i sm.  T h i s  t o t a l l y  i n s t r u m e n t a l  r a t i o n a l e  was acknow- 
ledged i n  t h e  a c c e p t a n c e ,  o r  o the rwise ,  by workers  of  t h e  much-discussed 
"change": 
"ir'hen I was t r y i n g  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  c a r r y i n g  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  v e h i c l e s ,  
a l l  t h e  s tewards were on my s i d e  excep t  one,  because he was making over-  
t ime. ~ l l  t h e o t h e r s  were q u i t e  happy, because  they want t h e  company t o  
be  p ro f i t ab le . . .D ive rgence  from t h a t  comes when i t  a f f e c t s  an i n d i v i d -  
u a l ' s  pocket...Some of  t h e  t ime we're  working t o g e t h e r  e f f e c t i v e l y ,  f o r  
example t h e  changes on n i g h t s  - t h e  b l o k e s  a r e  h e l p i n g  u s  because  i t  
d o e s n ' t  k i t  t h e i r  pocke t s "  ( O p s / D i s t  Xanager).  I n  g e n e r a l  terms t h e  
manager r ecogn i sed  t h a t  workers  "work t o  1 ;ve, they  d o n ' t  l i v e  t o  work. 
Money i s  t h e i r  t o p  p r i o r i t y . "  
In everyday terms, t h e n ,  t h e  manager r ecogn i sed  t h a t  i t  was economic 
r a t h e r  than i d e o l o g i c a l  f a c t o r s  which came i n t o  p l ay  i n  t h e  t h w a r t i n g  
by workers o f  manage r i a l  p l a n s ;  where such p l a n s  d i d  n o t  " h i t  t h e i r  
pocke t s "  workers might w e l l  j o i n  w i t h  management i n  "wanting t h e  com- 
pany t o  be p r o f i t a b l e " .  The same almost  twin o u t l o o k  on t h e  p a r t  o f  
management and work fo rce  was r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  Branch Manager's a s s e s s -  
ment o f  workers '  a t t i t u d e s  towards him: 
"Workers see me a s  a manager, a person t r y i n g  t o  g e t  t h i n g s  done a s  
c h e a p l y  a s  I can - t h e y  s e e  t h e i r  j o b  a s  t r y i n g  t o  g e t  a s  much o u t  of  
management a s  t hey  can." 
In t h i s  s e c t i o n  i t  h a s  been made c l e a r  f i r s t l y  t h a t  Wembley managers,  
l i k e  those  a t  Landis  & Gyr, saw t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s  p r i m a r i l y  i n  terms o f  
c o s t ;  but t h a t ,  s e c o n d l y ,  t h e  i n t e r m i t t e n t  t a s k  o f  "minimisat ion o f  
d i s r u p t i o n "  was s e e n  a s  n e c e s s a r y  i n  o r d e r  t o  ach ieve  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s .  
So f a r  t h i s  approach can  be summed up n o t  so much a s  a d r i v e  f o r  man- 
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a ; , e r i a l  a u t h o r i t y  or " c o n t r o l "  - indeed,  a s  we s h a l l  show, many e x p l i c -  
i t l y  r e j e c t e d  such an o u t l o o k  - a s  t h e  s t a n c e  o f  a somewhat wary com- 
b a t a n t  aware and t o  sone e x t e n t  r e s p e c t f u l  of  t h e  opponen t ' s  g r i e v a n c e s  
and s t r e n g t h .  : a n a g e r i a l  p r i o r i t i e s  c l e a r l y  remained i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  cost  
r e d u c t i o n  r a t h e r  than worker r e s i s t a n c e  and i t s  r e p r e s s i o n .  
The a n a l y t i c a l  crunch,  however, comes when we p robe  f u r t h e r  i n t o  how 
t h i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  u n d e s i r a b l e  r e s i s t a n c e  i s  t o  be engaged w i t h  and o v e r -  
come, an i s s u e  e x p l i c i t l y  t a k e n  up  i n  t h e  r e s e a r c h  i n  an a t t e m p t  t o  push 
t h e  " c o n t r o l "  q u e s t i o n  t o  i t s  f i n a l  f r o n t i e r s  i n  terms of t h e  manage r i a l  
r e s p o n s e  t o  worker r e s i s t a n c e .  We t h e r e f o r e  go on t o  examine a number o f  
f a c t o r s :  whether t h e  managers' pragmatic  and economis t i c  acknowledgement 
o f  worke r s '  motives a l lowed  them t o  concede any ground; t h e  t a c t i c s  u s e d  
t o  a c h i e v e  managerial  g o a l s  i n  t h e  f a c e  of  worker r e s i s t a n c e ;  m a n a g e r i a l  
a t t i t u d e s  t o  con t inued  r e s i s t a n c e ;  and t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of u n i l a t e r a l  imp- 
l e m e n t a t i o n  o f ,  or c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s t  i n s i s t e n c e  on,  manage r i a l  goa l s .  
"Control" and C o n f l i c t  
i )  Sympathy but.. .  
AS we saw above, managers when ques t ioned  were c l e a r l y  aware o f ,  and t o  
some e x t e n t  even i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h ,  t h e i r  w o r k f o r c e ' s  m o t i v a t i o n s  i n  man- 
i p u l a t i n g  t h e  wage-e f fo r t  b a r g a i n ,  e t c .  However, i t  was c l e a r  t h a t  such 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i n  no way l e d  t o  concess ions  by managers t o  t h e  demands 
themselves.  A s  t h e  Operations/Distributions Fianager p u t  i t :  
"I can unde r s t and ,  sympathise ,  b u t  t h a t  d o e s n ' t  mean I can a g r e e  or can  
a c c e p t  - I can s e e  i t  th rough  t h e i r  eyes ,  bu t  t h a t  d o e s n ' t  mean I s h o u l d  
c o n t i n u e  t o  accep t  t h e  poor  levels of  p r o d u c t i v i t y . "  
The Regional  Personnel  Manager, i n  h i s  t u r n ,  confirmed t h e  t e n a c i t y  o f  
management i n  t h e  f a c e  of  developments which might  t a c t i c a l l y  s t r e n g t h e n  
t h e  workforce.  "Some t h i n g s  we've done have s t r e n g t h e n e d  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  
t o  be d i f f i c u l t  - f o r  example c e n t r a l i s i n g  a t  Thame. Also t h e  C e n t r a l  
F i l l i n g  Area, c e n t r a l i s i n g  i t  h a s  made them s t r o n g e r .  B u t  se t  a g a i n s t  
- 
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t h i s  i s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  we w i l l  manage t h e  s i t u a t i o n  and n o t  run away." 
Desp i t e  a t r a d i t i o n ,  once c o n s i d e r a b l e  b u t  now much weakened, of  work- 
group s t r e n g t h  and endemic r e s i s t a n c e  a t  Wembley, management knew them- 
s e l v e s  t o  be  t h e  s t r o n g e r  p a r t y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  economic c i r -  
cumstances.  Sooner o r  l a t e r ,  though worker r e s i s t a n c e  c o n s t i t u t e d  a t iresome 
o b s t a c l e ,  they would g e t  t h e i r  way. 
i i )  "Yodify your  aims.. ." 
How, then, was t h i s  o b s t a c l e ,  w i th  a l l  i t s  r o o t s  i n  t h e  half-acknowledged 
need f o r  workers  t o  make a l i v i n g ,  approached and d e a l t  w i t h ?  We sax. a t  
Landis  & Gyr how a d i r e c t  c l a s h  between managerial  o b j e c t i v e s  and workers' 
needs  and c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  n e v e r  f u l l y  c o n f r o n t e d  by management, l e d  t o  a 
" f i r e f i g h t i n g "  syndrome i n  which un reso lved  i s s u e s  e r u p t e d  unpred ic t ab ly  
i n t o  c o n f l i c t .  A t  BOC Wembley a l s o  t h e r e  was something of  a t r a d i t i o n  of 
" f i r e s "  b reak ing  o u t  i n  t h e  s e n s e  of workers '  tendency t o  walk out  i n  "un- 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l "  s t r i k e s ,  and i n  f a c t  two such  a c t i o n s  took p l a c e  during the 
p e r i o d  of t h e  r e s e a r c h .  A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  however, t h e r e  was t h e  impression 
of  an ongoing and compara t ive ly  e f f e c t i v e  machinery f o r  h a n d l i n g  c o n f l i c t  - 
n o t  so much t h e  o f f i c i a l  machinery of  t h e  procedure agreement,  which as  the 
branch pe r sonne l  manager mourned was f r e q u e n t l y  ignored,  o r  even t h e  lower- 
l e v e l  n e g o t i a t i n g  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  monthly p r o d u c t i v i t y  mee t ings ,  but a w i ; -  
l i n g n e s s  by management t o  t a k e  on and d i s c u s s  worker response:  
"The achievement of  change i s  by pe r suas ion .  You s i t  down and t a l k  to  people 
... I f  i t ' s  a minor change, u s u a l l y  t h e r e ' s  coapromise. The o n l y  way i s  to  
s i t  down and t a l k  t o  peop le ,  modify y o u r  aims w i t h i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  goals" 
(Techn ica l  S e r v i c e s  J.:anager). 
"Opposit ion i s  bound t o  be  t h e r e  - how do you minimise i t ?  Ey be ing  as  open 
a s  p o s s i b l e  about  changes t h a t  m u s t  come" (Ops j ' J i s t  hanage r ) .  Cunning, too, 
was impor t an t  i n  g e t t i n g  through manage r i a l  o b j e c t i v e s :  " U t h e r  techniques? 
Sneaky t h i n g s  - a s k  f o r  100 ~ when you o n l y  want 4 3  ,, s o  t h e  guys  a r e  pleased 
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t h a t  i t ' s  o n l y  40. .  Change from x t o  z spread  about  h7hen i t ' s  r e a l l y  x 
t o  y. . ."  The sane  manager concluded  t h a t  "I u s e  cunning ,  n o t  b r u t e  f o r c e ,  
be-ause  wi th  b r u t e  f o r c e  y o u ' r e  on t h i n  i c e ,  w i th  cunning  you keep t a l k -  
i ng .  " 
Other  managers a g r e e d ,  i d e a l l y ,  w i t h  t h i s  s o f t l y ,  s o f t l y  approach:  
"I s e e  zanagemen t ' s  j o b  a s  t r y i n g  t o  r educe  r e s i s t a n c e ,  e a s e  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n ,  
by i n v o l v i n g  t h e  employees concerned  i n  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  r eason  why 
changes  a r e  n e c e s s a r y "  (3 ranch  i ' e r sonnel  ' :anager) . 3 n c e  a g a i n ,  h e r e  t h e r e  
was no c o n c e s s i o n  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  n e e d s  o f  t h e  workforce ,  b u t  a d i p l o m a t i c  
commitment t o  p e r s u a s i o n  - worker r e s p o n s e  was t aken  s e r i o u s l y ,  even i f  
i t s  a c t u a l  c o n t e n t  was n o t  i n t e g r a t e d  i n t o  manager ia l  p l a n s .  
i i i )  h'orkers and t h e i r  "Percept ions" .  
Such manage r i a l  a t t i t u d e s  d i s p l a y e d  an  admi rab le  adhe rence  t o  t e X t b O O K  
i d e a l s  of "communication" i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  work fo rce .  However, i n  t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  t h e  c a s e  i t  had t o  be a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y  acknowledged t h a t  "com- 
munica t ion"  i n  i t s e l f  was n o t  enough, s i n c e  c o n f l i c t  con t inued .  From t h i s  
p o i n t  o f  view i t  was i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  t h e  manage r i a l  a t t i t u d e  towards 
worker r e sponse ,  which d e s p i t e  t h e  s imul t aneous  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  hard-headed 
economic m o t i v a t i o n ,  was c h a r a c t e r i s e d  a s  " i l l o g i c a l " :  "C lea r ly  w s ' d  l i k e  
t o ,  n o t  have  a weak workforce ,  b u t  a more l o g i c a l  one - some arguments a r e  
i l l o g i c a l  - more r e a l i s t i c  I guess"  (Ops /Dis t  manager). 
And workers  were over -emot iona l :  
" S t r i k e s  a r e  emot ive ,  n o t  v e r y  well though t  ou t .  Workers and management 
a r e  e q u a l l y  emot ive ,  b u t  management w i l l  no rma l ly  s t e p  back and r e f l e c t "  
(Branch P e r s o n n e l  >:anager).  
The Regional  P e r s o n n e l  Planager ag reed :  
"If  you t a k e  s toppages ,  t hey  a r i s e  from emot ion . . .There ' s  l a c k  o f  c l a r i t y ,  
emot ions ,  a f l a s h p o i n t .  A bu i ldup ,  t h e  s t r a w  t h a t  b r e a k s  t h e  came l ' s  back." 
I n  a s i m i l a r  f a s h i o n ,  workers '  r e s p o n s e s  t o  m a n a g e r i a l  p l a n s  were d e s -  
c r i b e d  i n  terms o f  "pe rcep t ions"  which, i t  was impl i ed ,  might e a s i l y  be  a s  
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s u b j e c t i v e  and u n r e l i a b l e  a s  i n  t h e  more e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  meaning o f  t h a t  
term. Such " p e r c e p t i o n s "  were t h e  c h i e f  problem f a c i n g  t h e  branch person- 
n e l  o f f i c e r :  
"We have s i g n i f i c a n t  changes coming through which a r e  p e r c e i v e d  a s  being 
of  disadvantage.  For example t h e  new d i s t r i b u t i o n  schedu l ing  system re-  
q u i r e s  g r e a t e r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  from d r i v e r s .  The p e r c e p t i o n  w i l l  be, we have 
t o  work h a r d e r  f o r  no more pay." Overt  worker r e a c t i o n  t o  such e v e n t s  had 
long been beleaguered by e q u a l l y  i n a c c u r a t e  "percept ions":  
"There 's  no r eason  why we c a n ' t  have h i g h  t r a d e  union a c t i v i t y  and y e t  
s t i l l  good i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  - our fo rma l  s t r u c t u r e  assumes a h i g h  l e v e l  
of c o n s u l t a t i o n  and n e g o t i a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  un ions  - what needs t o  change is 
t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  t h a t  u n o f f i c i a l  a c t i o n  i s  needed t o  be e f f e c t i v e . "  
i v )  The heeds of t h e  Bus iness  
However u n r e a l i s t i c  such "percept ions" ,  t h e  p r o b l e n  was t h a t  f o r  one reason 
o r  a n o t h e r  t hey  e x i s t e d  and led workers  t o  t a k e  a c t i o n  which was i n  many 
c a s e s ,  a t  l e a s t  t e m p o r a r i l y ,  e f f e c t i v e  i n  t h w a r t i n g  manage r i a l  p l ans .  30 
how d i d  management d e a l  w i t h  worker r e sponse  which was i n  t h i s  way iminune 
t o  "communication" and "compromise"? 
I!hile managers were, a s  we have seen ,  r e l u c t a n t  t o  adop t  a p o s i t i o n  o f  
o u t r i g h t  c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,  t h i s  was accep ted  a s  a normal p a r t  o f  t h e  indus-  
t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  scene:  
"It sometimes comes down t o  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  when t h e  t a l k i n g  f i n i s h e s  - d i f -  
f i c u l t  t o  s ay  how o f t e n .  I f  i t ' s  a s e r i o u s  problem, i t  u s u a l l y  comes down 
t o  some form o f  c o n f r o n t a t i o n . . . I f  y o u ' r e  a long way o f f  t a r g e t ,  i t  l eads  
t o  c o n f r o n t a t i o n .  If y o u ' r e  n e a r ,  t h e r e ' s  n o t  a l o t  o f  mi l eage  i n  l o s i n 2  a 
coup le  o f  days '  pay" (Tech S e r v i c e s  . ,anager) .  
The Regional Pe r sonne l  l lanager  was c l e a r  i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  p o i n t  a4 which 
a t t e m p t s  a t  n e g o t i a t i o n  and compromise were no longer  p o s s i b l e :  "There have 
been i n s t a n c e s  when t a l k i n g  h a s  t o  s top ,  due t o  t h e  needs o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s ,  
t h e r e ' s  n o t h i n g  f u r t h e r  t o  d i s c u s s .  For example t h e  C e n t r a l  F i l l i n g  Area - 
we've answered a l l  your  q u e s t i o n s ,  we've shown you t h e  f i g u r e s  ... w e ' l l  i m -  
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p l e n e n t  on J a n  3. I f  we g e t  no agreement,  w e ' l l  go ahead i f  a l l  i s s u e s  
have been exhausted." 
However, such u n i l a t e r a l  implementat ion was n o t  c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  a s p i r i t  o f  
w i sh ing  t o  c rush  o r  weaken t h e  workforce.  S e v e r a l  managers were emphat ic  
t h a t  t h i s  was n o t  t h e  case .  The branch pe r sonne l  manager v a s  anong them i n  
p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h e  dange r s  o f  such a s t r a t e g y :  
"?\educing o r g a n i s a t i o n  i s n ' t  a v i a b l e  p o l i c y ,  because  i f  y o u ' r e  seen a s  
a t t a c k i n g  t h e  ztewards o r  t h e  union,  t h i s  would s t r e n g t h e n  r e s i s t a n c e ,  i n -  
duce u n i t y ,  encourage u n i t y  of  a c t i o n  and mutual s u p p o r t "  - c l e a r l y  t h e  
l a s t  t h i n g s  t h e  branch pe r sonne l  manager wished t o  s e e .  
O t h e r  managers echoed, i n  d i f f e r e n t  ways, t h i s  r e l u c t a n c e  t o  t a k e  on a 
head-on c o l l i s i o n  w i t h  t h e  t r a d e  union o r g a n i s a t i o n  i n  t h e  p l a n t .  For  one  
t h i n g  a "weak" o r g a n i s a t i o n  was seen a s  " i l l o g i c a l "  and a s  " l ead ing  t o  a r -  
guments among themselves" (Ops/Dist  manager) and second ly ,  any n o t i o n  of 
a "power" o r  "con t ro l "  s t r u g g l e  between management and workforce was d i s -  
missed a s  wi thou t  r e f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  managers' c o n c e p t u a l  vocabulary - i n -  
deed, c o u l d  a t  b e s t  be g iven  a "personal"  meaning: 
"In t e rms  of a long-term power s t r u g g l e ,  I d o n ' t  know, I wouldn't  have 
though t  t h e  guys on s i t e  s e e  i t  i n  t h o s e  terms - some of them z i g h t  have 
been i n t e r e s t e d  i n  s e r i o u s  s o c i a l  change, bu t  f o r  most i t ' s  much more 
p e r s o n a l  - money's t h e i r  p r imary  aim" (Tech S e r v i c e s  : lanager).  
"A b a t t l e  f o r  c o n t r o l ?  D i f f e r e n t  s tewards t r ea t  i t  i n  d i f f e r e n t  ways - 
t h e r e  a re  two s tewards who want c o n t r o l .  You cou ld  sum i t  up  a s  t h a t .  
These two guys want c o n t r o l  for  t h e i r  own p e r s o n a l  gain...You g e t  power 
a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  - o t h e r  s t ewards  genu ine ly  r e p r e s e n t  t h e i r  members - 
t h e s e  o t h e r s  a r e  i n  a power s t r u g g l e  t o  he lp  t h e m s e l v e s  p e r s o n a l l y  - more 
o v e r t i m e ,  p r o t e c t i n g  t h e i r  j o b s ,  more pe rks"  ( O p s l D i s t  manager). 
B u t ,  wha teve r  t h e  s t r e n g t h  o r  weakness o f  t h e  shop s t eward  o r g a n i s a t i o n  in 
t h e  p l a n t  - and i t  was r e c o g n i s e d  by many managers t h a t  t h i s  was s e r i o u s l y  
weakpned by s e c t i o n a l i s m  - t h e  s i t u a t i o n  was seen  u l t i m a t e l y  in t h e  terms 
- 2 54- 
summed up by t h e  branch p e r s o n n e l  manager: 
"I expec t  t h e r e  w i l l  be r e s i s t a n c e "  ( t o  t h e  programme o f  ove r t ime  reduc- 
t i o n )  "but i t  w i l l  have t o  be accep ted  e v e n t u a l l y ,  s ince i n  t h e  f i n a l  an- 
a l y s i s  t hey  d o n ' t  c o n t r o l  i t ,  so t h e y  must a c c e p t  it." 
I n  t h e  above we at tempted t o  a s s e s s  manage r i a l  a t t i t u d e s  t o  "con t ro l "  i n  
terms of t h e  fo l lowing  a r e a s :  manage r i a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  worker motivat ion;  
managerial  r e s p o n s e  t o  worker r e s i s t a n c e ;  and how f a r  managers were prepared 
t o  push t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s  a g a i n s t  con t inued  o p p o s i t i o n .  I n  r e s p e c t  of  a l l  
t h r e e  of t h e s e  a r e a s ,  t h e  f i n d i n g s  can  pe rhaps  b e s t  be  summed up by t h e  rec- 
o g n i t i o n  t h a t  n e i t h e r  manage r i a l  a t t i t u d e s  n o r  t h e  t e n a c i t y  of worker r e s -  
i s t a n c e  weighed s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a s  f a c t o r s  i n f l u e n c i n g  manage r i a l  a c t i v i t y  
a g a i n s t  t h e  o v e r r i d i n g  q u a n t i t a t i v e  g o a l s  o f  c o s t  and p r o d u c t i o n  - t h e  
'needs o f  t h e  business" .  
h 'hi le ,  a s  w e  have seen, t h e s e  economic o b j e c t i v e s  were mediated p r i m a r i l y  
through t h e  d u a l  programme of  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  manning and ove r t ime ,  t h e r e  
were a l s o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  "performance" by t h e  workforce which, whi l e  
l e s s  c e n t r a l  t h a n  a t  Landis & Gyr, were imposed w i t h  an e q u a l l y  r e l e n t l e s s  
d i s r e g a r d  f o r  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  o b s t a c l e s  encountered by t h e  workforce.  Some of  
t h e s e  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  ou r  n e x t  s e c t i o n ,  which a l s o  examines managerial  a t -  
t i t u d e s  t o  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  of  l abour  i n  i t s e l f .  
Wi l l i ngness  t o  Work, and "Performance" 
i )  "They've g o t  a j o b  t o  do,  and t h e y  know i t "  
I t  was c l e a r  from t h e  comments o f  bo th  managers and foremen t h a t  workers '  
p repa redness  t o  work was n o t  a q ' o r  p r o b l e a  a t  Wembley. However, i n  t h e  
n a t u r e  of t h e  management s t r u c t u r e  a t  Wembley, i t  was foremen and super-  
v i s o r s  who were a c t u a l l y  concerned w i t h  t h e  day-to-day t a s k  of s e e i n g  t h a t  
work g o t  done, and i t  was they  who t e s t i f i e d  t o  workers '  o v e r a l l  co-operat ion:  
"There's  n o t  a c o n t r o l  problem i n  g e t t i n g  them t o  do t h e  work i t s e l f ' '  (Trans- 
p o r t  Foreman). 
"If t h e y ' r e  i n  t h e  r i g h t  frame o f  mind they d o n ' t  need me t o  s u p e r v i s e  them 
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... I f  t h i n g s  a r e  go ing  n i c e l y ,  no h a s s l e s ,  no  f r i c t i o n  between men and 
foreman, you g e t  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  work...You g e t  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  work - i f  
you h a s s l e  them t h e y ' l l  go slow" ( O p e r a t i o n s  Foreman). 
O t h e r  foremen, and managers, emphasised t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  o r g a n i s i n g  t h e  
work so t h a t  i t  flowed smoothly, r a t h e r  t han  d i r e c t l y  c o e r c i n g  workers  
t o  do i t .  The S i t e  S e r v i c e s  foreman, f o r  exa-nple, s a i d :  " - , r g a n i s i n z  h,ork 
o r  c o n t r c l l i n g  t h e  work fo rce  - I should say o r g a n i s i n z .  Once you 've  got  
y o u r  p r i o r i t i e s  r i g h t  and g o t  i t  o r g a n i s e d  - t h i n g s  run s r o o t h l y  once 
you 've  organised."  
For t h e  Zranch i:anager, such p r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  work t o  ensu re  a smooth 
f l o w  was a p r i o r i t y :  
" .Set t ing s r o d u c t i o n  more e f f i c i e n t ?  I t ' s  a l l  t o  do wi th  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  work 
- having t h e  c y l i n d e r s  ready h7hen you need them. !.ii.e ? a l l e t i s a t i o n  - i t  
was a t e c h n i c a l  evenin;-out o f  t h e  f low of work." The g r e a t  v a l u e  of  t h e  
j o i n t  p r o c e s s e s  of p a l l e t i s a t i o n ,  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  t h e  docks and i n t r o d u c t i o n  
of f o r k - l i f t  t r u c k s  had been, a s  both h e  and t h e  Kegional . ' e r sonne l  ..anager 
emphasised, t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  "peaks and t roughs"  i n  t h e  l abour  p rocess .  
? r e - i n t e g r a t i o n ,  workers  had o f t e n  been "forced" t o  r e a a i n  i d l e  d u r i n g  
s l a c k  p e r i o d s  when no c y l i n d e r s  could be brought  t o  thex.  ;;ow: 
i'eaks and t roughs  have been e l imina ted . . .Br ing ing  5 1 1  t h E  v a r i o u s  groups 
t o g e t h e r  i n  a small  a r e a  means good use  of  f o r k - l i f t  t r u c k .  I t ' s  more of 
a f low p r o c e s s  than a s t o p - s t a r t ' '  (Reg iona l  Pe r sonne l  :ianager). 
S t r u c t u r i n g  t h e  work th rough  t h e s e  t e c h n i c a l  and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  i nnova t ions ,  
t h e n ,  was seen  a s  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  f a c t o r  i n  r a i s i n g  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  r a t h e r  than 
t h e  ha r ra s smen t  o f  employees. I n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of l abour ,  however, f o r  t h e s e  
same employees - a g a i n  n o t  i n  terms of " s l a v e d r i v i n f "  b u t  of a s u b s i s t e n c e -  
r e l a t e d  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  labour  t ime - was undoubtedly an e q u a l l y  important 
c o n t r i b u t i o n .  We examine t h e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  between some a spec t s  o f  t h e  use  
o f  ove r t ime  t o  e x t r a c t  more hour s  o u t  o f  t h e  workforce,  and t h e  a t t e m p t  t o  
impose measured "performance" s t a n d a r d s ,  i n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n .  
I, 
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i i )  Performance 
C l e a r l y  t h e  i s s u e  of "performance", i n  t h e  sense  t h a t  i t  had loomed a t  
Landis & Gyr. was n o t  paramount i n  t h e  minds of t h e s e  managers and f o r e -  
men i n  a s s e s s i n g  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of  t h e  labour  p r o c e s s .  While, a s  we s e e  
below, workers  s u b j e c t e d  t o  "automatic  cover"  and o t h e r  k i n d s  of  semi-enforced 
ove r t ime  ( d e s c r i b e d  i n  more d e t a i l  i n  O U K  s e c t i o n  on K o r k e r s )  r e s e n t e d  t h e  
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  o f  l abour  ensu ing  from t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  p r a c t i c e  of  "covering",  
t h i s  was f a r  from being t h e  i s s u e ,  i n  terms of  a n x i e t y  abou t  and f a i l u r e  t o  
conform t o  work measurement t a r g e t s ,  t h a t  i t  had been f o r  t h e  Landis 6 Gyr 
workers.  C o n f l i c t  a t  BOC Wembley c e n t r e d  around t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of ove r t ime  
r a t h e r  t han  problems d i r e c t l y  t o  do w i t h  t h e  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of  labour.  
However, "performance" d i d  crop u p  as an i s s u e  i n  two r e s p e c t s :  one, rel-  
a t i v e l y  minor,  t o  do w i t h  t h e  l e n g t h  of work b reaks ,  and a n o t h e r ,  a l r e a d y  
r e f e r r e d  t o ,  i n  r e s p e c t  of  workers '  " s t r e t c h i n g "  of t h e i r  a l l o c a t e d  work 
times i n  o r d e r  t o  g e t  i n t o  t h e  ove r t ime  b racke t .  These w i l l  be b r i e f l y  
d e a l t  with i n  t u r n .  
a )  Breaks 
l:ork b r e a k s  which went on f o r  l onge r  t h a n  had been a g r e e d ,  r a t h e r  than 
" s l ack ing"  w h i l e  a c t u a l l y  invo lved  i n  p roduc t ion ,  was mentioned by foremen 
and managers as  a common problem i n  s lowing  down t h e  p a c e  o f  work: 
"he 've  been push ing  up t h e  numbers" (o f  c y l i n d e r s  t e s t ed )  "not by making 
peop le  work h a r d e r ,  j u s t  by g e t t i n g  them t o  change t h e i r  working p r a c t i c e s ,  
f o r  example c o v e r i n g  f o r  t ea -b reaks .  Le 's@ i n  a s i t u a t i o n  where people  j u s t  
t a k e  i t  f o r  g r a n t e d  t h a t  t h e y  t a k e  much longer  b r e a k s  t h a n  they should be..." 
( S r a d u a t e  E n g i n e e r ) .  
The Works Eng inee r ,  however, was o f  t h e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  chang ing  t h i s  p e r v a s i v e  
p r a c t i c e  was n o t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  c e n t r a l  t o  a c h i e v i n g  maximum p r o d u c t i v i t y :  
"I doubt  i f  you'd g e t  much more a t  t h e  end o f  t h e  day i f  you cu t  down t o  t h e  
o f f i c i a l  times. Orr t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  s i d e  we can a c t u a l l y  s a y  we a r e  xi. e f f i c i e n t ,  
and i f  d u r i n g  t h e  day we ' r e  up t o  9'3: of  t h a t ,  we won't  be concerned w i t h  1 0 .  
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h e r e  O K  t h e r e .  .4t t h e  end o f  t h e  day, I e x p e c t  t h e  work t o  be done and 
I won't be  t o o  concerned  i f  they  spend a l i t t l e  m o r e  t ime t h a n  t h e y  ought." 
T h i s  seemed t o  i n d i c a t e  a r e l a x e d  approach  t o  an " a c c e p t a b l e "  l w e l  of 
e f f o r t  xh ich  p e r h a p s  matched t h e  workers '  own s t a n d a r d s  i n  r e j e c t i n g  ex- 
t r e m e s  o f  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  o f  l abour  f o r  a " r easonab le"  p r o v i s i o n .  The 
Branch . :anager '  s a s s e s s m e n t  of worker behav iour  was, howtver,  
c r i t i c a l :  
"They can do i t"  (match  up t o  measured work t a r g e t s )  " p a r t  o f  t h e  t i m t ,  
b u t . . . I t ' s  a q u e s t i o n  o f  takin: b reaks .  FOK example t h e y  t a k e  t o o  long be- 
f o r e  t h e y  s t a r t ,  f a r  t o o  long  f o r  b r e a k s ,  a smoke t a k e s  l o n g e r  t h a n  t h e  f i l -  
l i n g  o f  c y l i n d e r s . "  .And, he  added, "The b u i l d i n g  U? o f  o v e r t i m e  i s  a major 
m o t i v a t i o n  i n  t h a t . "  
r a t h e r  more 
b )  " j t r e t c h i n g "  work 
This comnient o f  t h e  Branch ,hanager 's  t a k e s  u s  on t o  t h e  second i s s u e  r a i s e ?  
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  "performance",  t h e  a r t i c u l a t i o n  by worke r s  o f  ex tended  Labour 
t i m e  w i t h  t h e  e a r n i n g s  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  a f f o r d e d  by o v e r t i n e .  The 3ranch  . . an -  
a g e r  was I'erhaps t h e  most e x p r e s s i v e  on t h i s :  
"\:hatever t h e y ' r e  g i v e n  a s  a d a y ' s  work, t h e y ' l l  t r) .  t o  ex ten?  i t  t o  g c t  
o v e r t i m e  - a l o t  o f  O U K  work i s  c o n t r o l l i n g  o v e r t i z e .  You c o u l d  say  xanz ie -  
ment i s  t r y i n g  t o  make i t  chea?er  and cheape r ,  b u t  we have  a code  o f  p r a c t i c e ,  
a n  a g r e e <  per formance  r a t e  - t h e r e  should  n o t  be  o v e r t i m e  t i l l  t h e y  meet t he  
per formance  r a t e  - t h e y  n e v e r  r each  t h e  per formance  r a t e  b u t  t h e y  have h igh  
ove r t ime . .  . 
"I would l i k e  t o  b e  a b l e  t o  g e t  t h e  s t e w a r d s  t o  come on t o  t h a t  p l a t f o r m ,  
g e t  them t o  a g r e e  t h a t  p e o p l e  should  r e a c h  c e r t a i n  p e r f o r n s n c e  r a t e s .  i'hc 
s t e w a r d s  say ,  ' i , : e ' l l  do what W E  c a n ' ,  b u t  you can  measure i t ,  you can g e t  
away from, '>,de' Ll do what we can, we ' l l  do o u r  b e s t ' . . .  
? I 1  we can do i s ,  o v e r  t h e  years ,  g e t  p e o p l e  t o  u n d e r s t a n ?  a b o u t  t h e  meas- 
urement of a d a y ' s  work, t a k e  t h e  mys t ique  o u t  of i t .  The mys t ique  i s  c r e -  
a t e d  by t h e i r  mates." 
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This  "mystique" and i t s  peer-group r a m i f i c a t i o n s  were presumably c r e a t e d  
by j u s t  t h a t  r a t i o n a l e  which t h e  manager h imse l f  r e c o g n i s e d ,  t h a t  "2eople 
d o  t r y  t o  c r e a t e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  e a r n i n g  more which t h e y  can do on ly  by 
overt ime."  Aga ins t  t h i s  "mystique" t h e  manager t r i e d  t o  p i t  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
c e r t a i n t i e s  o f  t h e  work measurement scheme, b u t  t h i s  was, a s  h e  appeared t o  
r e s i g n e d l y  r e c o g n i s e ,  something of  a l o s t  c a u s e  g iven  t h e  c e n t r i n g  o f  t h e  
whmle e f f o r t / r e v a r d  nexus a t  t h e  p l a n t  on o v e r t i n e .  With i t s  r o o t s ,  a s  we 
have seen,  i n  t h e  d r a s t i c  r e d u c t i o n  of manning, t h i s  dominat ion o f  t h e  o r -  
g a n i s a t i o n  o f  work by ove r t ime  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  had s p r e a d  even more damagingly 
t o  t h e  d e l i v e r y  a r e a ,  where a long-term s h o r t a g e  o f  c y l i n d e r  d r i v e r s  aggra- 
va t ed  t h e  a l r e a d y  a p p a l l i n g  d e l i v e r y  r eco rd  ( c a l c u l a t e d  a t  50% by t h e  works 
e n g i n e e r ) ,  and t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  computer ised s c h e d u l i n g  f o r  t h e s e  and 
o t h e r  d r i v e r s  had s imul t aneous ly  s l a s h e d  t h e i r  e a r n i n g s  and f u r t h e r  a f f e c -  
t ed  t h e  q u a l i t y  of  s e r v i c e  by undermining d r i v e r s '  p e r s o n a l  knowledge of 
r o u t e s  and p a s s e n g e r  r equ i r emen t s .  
I n  an i n t e r e s t i n g  r e v e r s a l  of t h e  n o t i o n  of  " m y s t i f i c a t i o n "  w i t h  which we 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  t o  performance s t a n d a r d s  a t  Landis 6 Gyr, man- 
agement a t  Wembley a t t r i b u t e d  workers '  t r a n s g r e s s i o n s  o v e r  t h e  s t a n d a r d s  
t o  an i r r a t i o n a l  "mystique"to which was c o n t r a s t e d  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  c a l c u l -  
a t i o n s  of work measurement. Again, t h e n ,  a s  a t  Landis  & Gyr, measured t a r -  
g e t s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  l i nked  t o  t h e  l e v e l  o f  economic v i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  branch 
were used  a s  c e n t r a l  axes  w i t h  which t o  s t r u c t u r e  and a s s e s s  t h e  labour  
process .  The i m p o r t a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t ,  a t  Wembley, such s t a n d a r d s  were c u t  
a c r o s s  i n  a c o n t r a d i c t o r y  f a s h i o n  by t h e  p r e s s u r e  from b o t h  management and 
workforce f o r  ove r t ime ,  d i d  n o t h i n g  t o  reduce t h e  v a l i d i t y  f o r  management 
of  time-measured p roduc t ion  norms as key c r i t e r i a  f o r  j u d g i n g  t h e  e f f e c t i v e -  
n e s s  o f  t h e  l a b o u r  p rocess ;  a s  was c l e a r l y  demons t r a t ed  i n  t h e  example of 
t h e  l o r r y  d r i v e r s  ( s e e  below, Workers, s e c t i o n  I) whose problems i n  ach- 
i e v i n g  schedu led  d e l i v e r y  times were wi tnessed  on s e v e r a l  occas ions  by 
management y e t  t r e a t e d  a s  of l i t t l e  account  a g a i n s t  t h e  work s t u d y  depa r t -  
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ment ' s  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  I t  was t h e s e  p roduc t ion  t a r g e t s ,  t hen ,  and t h e i r  i n -  
t e r r e l a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  v a r i o u s  s t r a n d s  o f  economic p r e s s u r e  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  
b ranch  (summed up i n  t h e  need t o  reduce c o s t s  w h i l e  m a i n t a i n i n g  "customer 
s e r v i c e " )  which s t r u c t u r e d  t h e  dynamic o f  managementlworker r e l a t i o n s ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  any c e n t r a l  conce rn  by management t o  e x e r c i s e  dominat ion o v e r  
t h e  workforce.  
"Au t h o  r i  t y  " and "%e spon s i b i 1 i t y " 
IVe have s e e n  i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  s e c t i o n  t h a t  any a s p e c t s  of Tanagementl 
worker r e l a t i o n s  which might p l a u s i b l y  be  comprehended Under a r u b r i c  o f  
" c o n t r o l "  were i n  r e a l i t y  shaped by and s u b o r d i n a t e d  t o  much more d i r e c t l y  
economic c o n s t r a i n t s .  .;est managers, indeed,  a s  i t  were s u b l i m i n a l l y  ac- 
c e p t e d  t h i s  i n  d i r e c t i n g  t h e i r  remarks a long  an a x i s  o f  c o s t  and economic 
v i a b i l i t y  r a t h e r  than one of dominat ion and s u b o r d i n a t i o n .  une manager, 
however, who more e x p l i c i t l y  took on managementlworker r e l a t i o n s  from a 
p e r s ? e c t i v e  o f  manage r i a l  " a u t h o r i t y "  and worker r e s i s t a n c e ,  o r  non-co- 
o p e r a t i o n ,  was t h e  Branch , ;anager.  he  s h a l l  t h e r e f o r e  cons ide r  h i s  remarks 
i n  some d e t a i l  b e f o r e  p a s s i n g  t o  O U T  conc lud ing  s e c t i o n .  
The views of t h e  ;ranch ~ i a n a g e r  were ,erhaps t h e  most d e f i n i t i v c  i n  a r t i c -  
u l a t i n g  t h e  s h i f t i n ;  r e l a t i o n s h i ; > s  between ;mnager i a !  o b j e c t i v e s  and worker 
r e s p o n s e  i n  t h e  p l a n t ,  between t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  " c o n t r o l "  and t h e  c o r r e -  
sponding o b s t a c l e s  g e n e r a t e d  by t h e  workforce.  T h i s  manager d e l i v e r e d  a 
s t r o n g  n e g a t i v e  t o  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  he might wish t o  "show t h e  workers who's 
boss  he re"  and was adamant t h a t  any "long term p o l i c y  of  e s t a b l i s h i n g  man- 
a g e r i a l  a u t h o r i t y "  v a s  " t o t a l l y  unnecessary".  A t  t h e  same time, i n  an e a r l i e r  
i n t e r v i e w ,  h e  had argued t h a t  " the  a s s e r t i o n  o f  manage r i a l  a u t h o r i t y "  was 
needed " i f  y o u ' r e  always s p l i t  down t h e  m i d d l e ,  on two s i d e s . "  
I n  o t h e r  words, t h e  need f o r  a u t h o r i t y  stemmed from c o n f l i c t ,  r a t h e r  t han  
c a u s i n g  i t  - an argument w i t h  which we a r e  f a m i l i a r  through,  f o r  example, 
t h e  w r i t i n g s  of  Stephen Hi11 (1961)  d i scussed  in Chap te r  2, b u t  which goes 
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on6 s t e p  f u r t h e r  than t h e  assumption, c r i t i c i s e d  i n  Chapters  1 and 2 ,  
t h a t  worker r e s i s t a n c e  i s  a r e sponse  t o  manage r i a l  r e p r e s s i o n .  On t h e  
o t h e r  hand, what a r e  t h e  "two s i d e s "  a b o u t ?  They can h a r d l y  be ,  a s  c e  a r -  
gued i n  Chapter 2 ,  a d i r e c t  r e sponse  t o  i n t e r e s t s  e x p l i c i t l y  r ecogn i sed  
around t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  e x p l o i t a t i o n  and p r o d u c t i o n  of s u r p l u s  value,  
s i n c e  such a r e c o g n i t i o n  would imply an a r t i c u l a t e  awareness o f  c a ? i t a l i s t  
p roduc t ion  r e l s t i o n s .  For  t h e  Branch :.ianager, t h e  d i v i d i n g  l i n e  was de- 
f i n e d  i n  terms o f  " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y "  and "running a bus iness ' l i  
" C e r t a i n l y  t r a d e  union r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  such t h a t  t h e y  d o n ' t  nac-  
e s s a r i l y  a g r e e  w i t h  running a b u s i n e s s .  Why?...trade un ions  l i v e  i n  t h e  
p a s t ,  you cou ld  say  managements l i v e  i n  t h e  p a s t ,  b u t  t hey  c a n ' t  l i v e  t o o  
f a r  i n  t h e  p a s t ,  t hey  have t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  f u t u r e  - t r a d e  un ions  d o n ' t  
have t o  d e a l  w i th  t h e  f u t u r e ,  o r  t a r g e t s ,  or g e t t i n g  s t u f f  t o  custor .ers ."  
In t h i s  a n a l y s i s  of  t h e  r e a c t i v e  r o l e  of t r a d e  un ions  and i t s  implica-  
t i o n s  f o r  t h e  d i v i s i o n  of  l abour  unde r  c a p i t a l i s m ,  t h e  Branch bianager's 
remarks echoed t h o s e  o f  l i i chae l  Edwardes, i n  Back From The Brink ( 1 5 ~ 3 )  
when h e  c a s t i g a t e d  t h e  YL shop s t e w a r d s  f o r  t h e i r  " i r r e s p o n s i b l e "  a t t i t u d e :  
"It  i s  management who have r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  b u s i n e s s ;  i f  t h e  pawer i s  
t o  move t o  t h e  shop s tewards,  l e t  them have r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  business ,  
l e t  them f i n d  t h e  banks t o  l end  t h e  money, l e t  them pe r suade  gove rn ren t s  of  
any c o l o u r  t o  t i d e  them ove r  bad times, l e t  t hen  pe r suade  c o m p e t i t o r s  t o  
c o l l a b o r a t e ;  and l e t  the unions p e r s u a d e  customers  t o  buy t h e  p roduc t s  the)  
d e s i g n ,  b u i l d  and d e l i v e r . "  
The Branch Xanager was r e a l i s t i c  abou t  h i s  w o r k f o r c e ' s  r e f u s a l  t o  t ake  
" r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  h i s  g o a l s  were d e f i n e d  very x c h  
i n  t h e s e  terms:  
"I b e l i e v e  t h a t  workers  ou;ht t o  be a c c o u n t a b l e  f o r  e v e r y t h i n g  they do. I 
would l i k e  t o  see less s u p e r v i s i o n  and t h e  workforce made accoun tab le .  I 
d o n ' t  t h i n k  t h a t ' s  p o s s i b l e ,  so what we have i s  a workforce t h a t  d o c ' t  
a c c e p t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  - a b s o l u t e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  e v e r y t h i n g  thay do - 
t h e y  a c c e p t  a c e r t a i n  amount o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  they  a c c e p t  t h a t  t hey 've  
g o t  t o  come i n  h e r e ,  do a c e r t a i n  amount o f  work. I n  t h e  i d e a l  s i t u a t i o n  
t h e y ' d  check  t h e  que ry  for t h e  cus tomer ,  e t c . "  
The need f o r  " c o n t r o l " ,  t hen ,  was a p ragmat i c  r e s ? o n s e  t o  t h e  n e e d s  o f  
p r o d u c t i o n ,  which were f u l f i l l e d  o n l y  i n  p a r t  by t h e  workforce .  "Each 
p e r s o n  should  be  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e i r  own j o b  - t h a t  makes nanagerjent 
v e r y  easy .  I f  t h e y ' r e  n o t  prepared  t o  a c c e p t  r e s l o n s i b i l i t y  you need con- 
t r o l .  Con t ro l  g e n e r a l l y  means management c o n t r o l ,  more s u p e r v i s i o n ,  t h e y ' r e  
more t i g h t l y  s u p e r v i s e d .  ,411 I want i s  r e s u l t s  - I ' m  g o i n g  f o r  r e s u l t s  - 
how do I g e t  t h e r e ?  T h e r e ' s  a number of a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and one  o f  t h o s e  i s  
p e o p l e  t a k i n g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . "  
.And, l a t e r ,  "You use t h e  system of m a n a g e r i a l  a u t h o r i t y  t o  g e t  work done, 
t h a t ' s  what t h e  sys tem i s  about." 
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e r e  remained t h i s  i n v i s i b l e ,  i f  w e l l - d e f i n e d  l i n e  beyond 
which workers  were n o t  p repa red  t o  go i n  o r d e r  t o  "ge t  work done". i s  we 
have  seen ,  t h i s  was n o t  a q u e s t i o n  o f  n o t  b e i n g  p repa red  t o  ''come i n  h e r e  
and do a c e r t a i n  amount o f  work" bu t  o f  a c t u a l l y  e x e r c i s i n g  an  overvieh- o f  
t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  i t s  aims, r a t i o n a l e  and c o - o r d i n a t i o n ,  which becane 
by d e f a u l t  t h e  s p h e r e  o f  manager ia l  " con t ro l " .  
Nhen i t  came t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  why workers  were n o t  p repa red  t o  go beyond 
t h i s  p o i n t  (which, i r o n i c a l l y ,  many l abour  p r o c e s s  w r i t e r s  h a v e  seen  a5 
" c o n t e s t e d  t e r r a i n "  between workers and management from p r e c i s e l y  t h e  op- 
p o s i t e  p o i n t  o f  view) t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  was u n e q u i v o c a l l y  economic. 'Yhy 
a r e n ' t  t h e y  p repa red  t o  t a k e  on r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ?  They d o n ' t  g e t  p a i l  f o r  i t ,  
t h e y ' r e  governed by d i f f e r e n t  r u l e s .  The r u l e s  o f  t h e  union a s  such, oi 
union  groups ,  somehow come down t o  r e s t r i c t i n g  what you have  t o  do i n  t n e  
c o u r s e  of a day." 
The "somehow", however, t h e  r a t i o n a l e  of what t h e s e  r u l e s  "came dohn t o "  
emerged a s  c l e a r l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  workers '  s t r u g g l e  f o r  s u b s i s t e n c e :  
'They w i l l  s ay  t o  me, look how much t h e  company makes...they f e e l  they  
have  more o p ? o r t u n i t i e s  t o  make more - 
i t ' .  I ' v e  s a i d  t o  t h e  s t e w a r d s ,  'You've g o t  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  you can choose 
- e i t h e r  money r e l a t e d  t o  p r o f i t ,  o r  money r e l a t e d  t o  t r a d e  union n e g o t i a -  
tion! I f  i t ' s  t h e  f i r s t ,  t hen  they  m u s t  be  pa id  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  any drop  i n  
p r o f i t ,  i f  i t ' s  t h e  second, t h e y  g e t  t h e  b e s t  d e a l ,  a market dea l .  T h e r e ' s  
a marke t ,  t h e y  r i l l  go i n  and say  we w2nt t h e  minimum..." 
The i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  manage r ' s  argu,-le;it h e r e  i s  t h a t  workers '  commitment 
i s  t o  a " n e g o t i i t i o n "  o r  "market" p e r s p e c t i v e  - i n  o t h e r  words, b a r g a i n i n g  
f o r  t h e  b e s t  d e a l  w i t h i n  a g i v e n  r ange  o f  s u b s i s t e n c e .  Thus wh i l e  he  appeared  
t o  s e e  no t h e o r e t i c a l  r eason  why workers  should  n o t  b e  a b l e  t o  t a k e  on a 
' I t ' s  a b i g  company, they  can  a f f o r d  
managing" f u n c t i o n  i n  t h e  s e n s e  o f  c o - o r d i n a t i n g  and t a k i n g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  p r o d u c t i o n  - "There ' s  n o t h i n g  magic i n  management, g e t t i n g  j o b s  done. I f  
you 've  g o t  two 2eop le  and a b u s i n e s s ,  t h e y ' r e  b o t h  managing and t h e y ' r e  both 
working' '  - a t  t h e  same t ime t h e  Branch . :anager was f o r c e d  t o  r e c o g n i s e  t h a t ,  
p r i m a r i l y  due  t o  t h e i r  " n e g o t i a t i n g "  s t a n c e ,  worke r s  were  n o t  i n  f a c t  p r e -  
pa red  t o  t a k e  on such f u n c t i o n s .  The two approaches  were i n  f a c t  incompat- 
i b l e ;  s p e a k i n g  of  t h e  r e s t r i c t i v e  t r a d e  union  " r u l e s " ,  t h e  manager conc lu -  
ded, ". . . they c a n ' t  manage. One o r  t h e  o t h e r ,  you c a n ' t  do both ."  
"Cont ro l" ,  t h e n ,  was n e c e s s a r y  i n  t h e  absence  o f  w o r k e r s '  w i l l i n g n e s s  ( r a t h e r  
t h a n  c a p a c i t y )  t o  t a k e  on m a n a g e r i a l  f u n c t i o n s .  The need  f o r  " r e s u l t s " ,  t h e  
mee t ing  o f  " t a r g e t s " ,  " g e t t i n g  work done" n e c e s s i t a t e d  a c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e  
which would b e  i r r e l e v a n t  i f  worke r s  were p r e a p a r e d  t o  ex tend  t h e i r  r e l a t -  
i o n s h i p  t o  work beyond a "ba rga in ing"  a?proach. But t h e y  were n o t ,  and t h i s  
i n  i t s  t u r n  made f u r t h e r  c o n f l i c t  i n e v i t a b l e .  To r e t u r n  t o  t h e  Branch .:an- 
a g e s ' s  o r i g i n a l  p o i n t :  "The a s s e r t i o n  of  management a u t h o r i t y  i s  needed i f  
y o u ' r e  s p l i t  dohm t h e  middle ,  on  two s ides . "  The "two s i d e s "  could  o n l y  have 
t h e i r  o r i g i n s  i n  workers '  s t r u g g l e  f o r  s u b s i s t e n c e  and l ack  of  i n t e r e s t  i n  
o t h e r  a s p e c t s  of t h e  l abour  process. 
I ,  
Managers and Cont ro l :  Summing-Up 
The p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  our f i n d i n g s  on management h a s  a t t empted  p r i n c i p a l l y  t o  
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f o l l o w  through t h e  dynan ic  o f  manage r i a l  o b j e c t i v e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  worker 
r e s i s t a n c e ;  how such r e s i s t a n c e  i s  looked on, i n  t e rms  of i t s  u n d e r l y i n g  
r a t i o n a l e ,  and what l e n g t h s  managers a r e  p repa red  t o  t a k e  t o  d e a l  w i th  i t .  
C l e a r l y  t h e  p r o j e c t i o n  o f  a more or l e s s  d e f i n i t e  s e t  of  manage r i a l  ob- 
j e c t i v e s ,  and t h e  i n t e n d e d  O K  a c t u a l  imp lemen ta t ion  o f  such o b j e c t i v e s  i n  
t h e  f a c e  o f  worker r e s i s t a n c e ,  can  be  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t e rms  o f  a d r i v e  f o r  
m a n a s e r i a l  " con t ro l " .  However, t h e r e  was l i t t l e  of such an a b s t r a c t  p o l i t -  
i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  i n  t h e  managers' a t t i t u d e  t o  a c h i e v i n g  t h e i r  t a s k s ,  o r  t o  
t a c k l i n g  worker r e s p o n s e  w i t h i n  t h i s  p rocess .  The t a s k s  themse lves ,  d e s p i t e  
t h e  somewhat g r a n d i o s e  d e s c r i p t i o n  "management of change" g i v e n  by many o f  
t h o s e  i n t e r v i e w e d ,  emerged a s  t h e  s p e c i f i c  and u n e q u i v o c a l l y  economic 
g o a l s  of  r e d u c i n g  o v e r t i m e  and manning. Nor were t h e y  seen  a s  p a r t  o f  a 
c o n s i s t e n t  o v e r a l l  s t r a t e g y ,  l e a s t  o f  a l l  one a i 3 i n g  a t  a c h i e v i n g  manager ia l  
" c o n t r o l "  and i n  f a c t  n o t  even r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  more modest g o a l s  o f  t e c h n i c a l  
and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  change. Rather  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  was acknowledged a s  be ing  
t o o  dynamic and u n p r e d i c t a b l e  t o  a l l o w  f o r  any such long- te rm p lanning; .  
S p e c i f i c  manage r i a l  o b j e c t i v e s ,  however, were r e a l  enough ( d e s p i t e  be ing ,  
a s  we p o i n t e d  o u t ,  i n t e r n a l l y  c o n t r a d i c t o r y )  and managers had no  h e s i t a t i o n  
i n  implementing them when t h e  o c c a s i o n  demanded. such  s ingle-mindedness ,  
however, was l i n k e d  t o  " the  needs  o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s "  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  any wish 
t o  a s s e r t  manage r i a l  a u t h o r i t y  a s  such  - t h i s  n o t i o n ,  i n  f a c t ,  be ing  v ig-  
o r o u s l y  den ied  on more than  one o c c a s i o n .  Indeed t h e  managers seemed t o  
d i s p l a y  a k ind  o f  p r a g m a t i c  empathy w i t h  t h e  needs  o f  t h e  work fo rce ,  ar, 
everyday  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  worker r a t i o n a l i t y ,  underx ined  o n l y  when worKers' 
con t inued  r e c a l c i t r a n c e  l ed  t o  t h e  m y s t i f i e d  c h h r a c t e r i s a t i o n  o f  w o r ~ f r s '  
behavtour  a s  " i l l o g i c a l " .  
I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  t h e r e  does seem t o  emerge a p i c t u r e  o f  workers  and manage- 
ment a t  Kembley a s  a lmos t  " p a r t n e r s "  l i n k e d  i n  a k ind  o f  c o m p l i c i t y  o f  t h e  
c a s h  nexus. Les t  t h i s  should  c o n j u r e  up  a p i c t u r e  o f  two rough ly  equa l  
combatants  i n  an ongoing  " c l a s s  s t r u g g l e "  ( c f  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  Friedman, 
1 9 7 8 ,  i n  Chapter  2 ) ,  such an i m p r e s s i o n  should  s w i f t l y  be removed by r e -  
minding o u r s e l v e s  o f  t h e  f a r  more f o r m i d a b l e  power of t h e  managers, pa r -  
t i c u l a r l y  i n  hembley ' s  c u r r e n t  s i t u a t i o n ,  t o  " u n i l a t e r a l l y  implement". .Is 
t h e  branch  p e r s o n n e l  manazer had p u t  i t ,  "In t h e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s  they  d o n ' t  
c o n t r o l  i t ,  s o  they  m u s t  a c c e p t  it:' I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  worker r e s i s t a n c e  r e -  
mained i n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a war of a t t r i t i o n ,  a c o n t i n u a l  i r r i t a n t  and ob-  
s t a c l e  t o  manage r i a l  o b j e c t i v e s ,  b u t  i n  no way, a s  t h e  managers the ; i se lves  
r e c o g n i s e d ,  an  o v e r t  o r  a g g r e s s i v e  "power s t r u g g l e " .  
:.;anagers a t  Kembley, t hen ,  had o v e r a l l  " c o n t r o l "  o v e r  what went on, m i t i -  
g a t ed  more by t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  economic c o n s t r a i n t s  w i t h i n  which they  were 
f o r c e d  t o  work t h a n  by any s u s t a i n e d  l e v e l  of  worker r e s i s t a n c e .  Such 
" c o n t r o l "  was, however, a f a c t  o f  l i f e  o r d a i n e d ,  f i r s t  o f  a l l ,  by t h e  com- 
p a n y ' s  economic supremacy and n e c e s s i t a t e d ,  s econd ly ,  by t h e  workers '  i n -  
d i f f e r e n c e  t o  manage r i a l  f u n c t i o n s  and commitment t o  s t r u g g l i n g  f o r  t h e i r  
own s u b s i s t e n c e .  I t  was n o t  a d e l i b e r a t e  p o l i t i c a l  g o a l  o f  domination and 
s u p p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  workforce ;  n o r  was i t  i n  i t s e l f  made n e c e s s a r y  by  any 
d i s t u r b i n g  l e v e l  o f  worker r e s i s t a n c e  o v e r  e i t h e r  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  of labour  
or any o t h e r  issues fundamenta l  t o  management/worker r e l a t i o n s  a s  such. 
Ra the r ,  t h e  achievement  o f  manage r i a l  o b j e c t i v e s  a t  Kembley appeared  t o  be 
undermined more s e r i o u s l y  by t h e  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  w e  have 
d e s c r i b e d  between c o n f l i c t i n g  s e t s  o f  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  than  by any s u s t a i n e d  
problems w i t h  worker r e sponse .  A t  t h e  same time, t h e  whole i s s u e  o f  ove r -  
t ime  was c r u c i a l l y  t i e d  i n  w i t h  workers '  s u b s i s t e n c e  and t h u s  t h e i r  c e n t r a l  
r e sponse  t o  t h e  l a b o u r  p r o c e s s ;  and i t  is t o  t h i s  and t h e  o t h e r  major f e a -  
t u r e s  o f  worker e x p e r i e n c e  a t  Wembley t h a t  we now t u r n .  
THE WOKKELS 
As i s  c l e a r  from t h e  manage r i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  workers  a t  BOC Kembley had 
f o r  some y e a r s  now s u f f e r e d  a s y s t e m a t i c  e r o s i o n  of  t h e i r  s t a f f i n g  l e v e l s  
which had, a l o n g  w i t h  o t h e r  changes,  l e d  t o  a s t r u c t u r e d  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  
o f  l abour  through "coverage", "dead man s h i f t s "  and s i m i l a r  p r a c t i c e s  
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i n v o l v i n g  en fo rced  over t ime.  I t  was t h i s  development which now c e n t r a l l y  
i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  and r e sponse  t o  t h e  l a b o u r  p r o c e s s  f o r  wor- 
k e r s  a t  t h e  Kembley branch. We s h a l l  t h e r e f o r e  b e g i n  by look ing  i n  more 
d e t a i l  a t  t h e  d imens ions  of t h i s  over t ime/manning  nexus ,  wh i l e  o t h e r  re- 
l a t e d  i s s u e s ,  such a s  worker knowledge and w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  work, w i l l  be 
examined i n  d u e  cour se .  
i )  Over t ime and :arming - t h e  r e a l i t i e s  
S i n c e  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  a f f e c t e d  p a r t i c u l a r  groups  o f  t h e  workforce  i n  d i f -  
f e r e n t  ways, we s h a l l  look  a t  t h e  impact  on t h e  v a r i o u s  groups  - C e n t r a l  
F i l l i n g  Area and a s s o c i a t e d  workers ,  s i t e  s e r v i c e s  worke r s ,  d i s p e n s e r s ,  
and d r i v e r s  - i n  t u r n .  
C e n t r a l  f i l l i n g  Area a )  Overtime 
k'orkers i n  t h e  C e n t r a l  F i l l i n g  Area,  c y l i n d e r  t e s t  shop ,  and compressing 
shed ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  f o r k  l i f t  t r u c k  d r i v e r s  s e r v i n g  t h e s e  a r e a s ,  sha red  
t h e  same ",.:ode1 k'lan" agreement ,  d a t i n g  from 1973, h.hich gave them f i v e  
hour s '  g u a r a n t e e d  o v e r t i m e  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  b a s i c  38-hour week;. A s  w e l l  
a s  t h i s ,  a l l  workers  i n  t h e s e  a r e a s  were expec ted  t o  b e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  
coverage",  t h e  system whereby worke r s  could be  c a l l e d  o u t  fro::. home i n  I, 
t h e  ( t y p i c a l )  e v e n t  o f  hav ing  t o o  few workers t o  c o v e r  a s h i f t .  .".iter- 
n a t i v e l y ,  a s  i n  t h e  compress ing  a r e a ,  s p e c i f i c  ag reemen t s  might r e q u i r e  
t h e  a l r e a d y  s m a l l  number of worke r s  t o  p r o v i d e  r e g u l a r  e x t r a  h o u r s  i n  o r d e r  
t o  make up f o r  a permanent s h o r t f a l l  i n  t h e  workforce .  3 0 t h  t h e s e  k i n d s  o f  
en fo rced  o v e r t i m e ,  though p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  f i r s t ,  v a r i e d  throughout t h e  
y e a r ,  becoming p a r t i c u l a r l y  p r e v a l e n t  i n  t h e  summer. 
Workers had, a s  might be  expec ted ,  a mix tu re  o f  f e e l i n g s  towards t h i s  s y s -  
tem, which b rough t  them e x t r a  e a r n i n g s  but  a l s o  c o n s i d e r a b l y  r e s t r i c t e d  
t h e i r  l i v e s  o u t s i d e  work, even l e a v i n g  a s i d e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of t h e  i n t e n s i f i -  
c a t i o n  o f  l a b o u r  ( d i s c u s s e d  f u r t h e r  b e l o x )  which t h i s  i n t e r l i n k i n g  o f  l o n z e r  
hour s  and manning r e d u c t i o n s  b rough t  aboc t .  
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"The 7a:n t o  6pm s h i f t ,  you g e t  ove r t ime  bu t  f o r  t h e  amount of  o v e r t i n e  
y o u ' r e  expected t o  do an awful l o t .  Between u s  we ' r e  o n l y  working 6 hours 
o f  t h e  9 hour s  t h a t  man does,  
a way o f  e a r n i n g  a few e x t r a  pounds, b u t  a t  t h e  same time i t ' s  too much" 
( J o e  and Ken, c o n p r e s s o r s ) .  
"This e a r l y  s h i f t ' s  n e a r l y  a s  bad a s  t h e  l a t e  s h i f t  used t o  be...:.ox you 
c a n ' t  g e t  o u t  a t  n i g h t .  They neve r  c o n s i d e r  t h a t ,  t hey  expec t  you t o  be 
behind t h e  door  w a i t i n g  f o r  t h e  phone t o  r i n g "  (J im and A l f ,  f i l l e r  o?er-  
a t o r s ) .  
Thus, wh i l e  t h e  e x t r a  money provided by ove r t ime  was seen  a s  welcome, even 
i n d i s ? e n s a b l e ,  t h e r e  was some resentment  ove r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e s e  enhanced 
e a r n i n g s  had t o  be gained by such a demanding means. : l o s t  worKers em?hasisea 
how e s s e n t i a l  t h e  e x t r a  e a r n i n g s  were t o  t h e i r  income: 
"You have t o  do o v e r t i m e  t o  g e t  a l i v i n g ,  w i thou t  ove r t ime  t h e  wages i s  
u s e l e s s ' '  (Ed, f i l l e r / s o r t e r ) .  
"We d o n ' t  f e e l  we ' r e  being t r e a t e d  r i g h t .  We're l i v i n g  on o v e r t i m e . . . I t  
makes t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between l i v i n g  w e l l  and j u s t  managing" ( J i m  and A l f ,  
f i l l e r  o p e r a t o r s ) .  
I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  i t  should be remembered t h a t  Biz, n o t  s u r p r i s i n g l y  given 
i t s  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  s t a t u s  and i m p r e s s i v e  p r o f i t  f i g u r e s ,  was n o t o r i o u s  a s  
a "high payer" i n  t h e  a r e a ;  i ndeed ,  some workers who had been employed f o r  
t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  pe r iod  of 4-5 y e a r s  s t i l l  cou ld  n o t  q u i t e  b e l i e v e  t h e i r  
luck. A t  t h e  same t ime,  a s  t h e  worker j u s t  quoted p o i n t e d  o u t ,  "It would be 
w i s e r  f o r  peop le  t o  remember t h a t  a c t u a l l y  t h e  b a s i c  r a t e  i s  lower than they 
t h i n k  i t  i s ,  because of  guaranteed overt ime."  
so we have t o  cra:n i n  an e x t r a  3 hours .  I t ' s  
b )  !tanning r e d u c t i o n s  and i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of l abour  
A s  we have i n d i c a t e d ,  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  ove r t ime  w i t h  i t s  i n c r e a s e d  e a r n i n g s  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  was i n t e g r a l l y  l i nked  t o  t h e  d r a s t i c  d e c r e a s e s  i n  manning 
which had t aken  p l a c e  ove r  t h e  p r e v i o u s  decade o r  so. The outcome of t h e s e  
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combined f a c t o r s  was t h a t  w h i l e  d u r i n g  t h e  same p e r i o d  t h e  work had be- 
come p h y s i c a l l y  much e a s i e r ,  t h e r e  was a marked i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  pace  and 
i n t e n s i t y  o f  l abour .  The i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  p a l l e t i s a t i o n  and f o r k  l i f t  t r u c k  
convey ing  o f  c y l i n d e r s ,  which had r o u g h l y  c o i n c i d e d  w i t h  t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  
t h e  t h r e e  o l d  docks  i n t o  t h e  C e n t r a l  ? i l l i n g  Area, had t r a n s f o r m e d  t h e  
n a t u r e  of  t h e  work p r o c e s s  from a s t r e n u o u s  l i f t i n g  of heavy m e t a l  "bot- 
t l e s "  ( c y l i n d e r s )  on  t o  t h e  backs  o f  l o r r i e s  t o  a c o m p a r a t i v e l y  i m i o b i l e  
p r o c e s s  o f  m o n i t o r i n g  and checking .  The w o r k e r s  a 2 p r e c i a t e d  t h e  e a s i n g  o f f  
i n  p h y s i c a l  h a r d s h i p :  
"It was j u s t  l i k e  c a r t h o r s e s  o v e r  t h e r e ,  t h e  work, e v e r y t h i n g  was doub le  
work. The j o b  h a s  changed i n s o f a r  a s  where you had t o  r o l l  t h e  b o t t l e s  o f f  
t h e  l o r r i e s  and r e l o a d  them, now i t ' s  been p a l l e t i s e d .  The main change i s  
f o r  t h e  b e t t e r .  I t ' s  e a s i e r  i n  t h a t  s e n s e  - n o t  a s  much w a l k i n g  invo lved"  
( H a r r y ,  f i l l e r / l o a d e r ) .  
Asked whe the r  t h e s e  changes  had meant a g e n e r a l  i ap rovemen t ,  t h e  same worker 
commented t h a t  "You ' re  f i l l i n g  more c y l i n d e r s  now t h a n  you was, o n l y  one man 
f i l l i n g  on each  g a s ,  i t  used  t o  be two, so i n  t h a t  respect y o u ' r e  f i l l i n 2  
more gas t h a n  what you d i d  b e f o r e  p e r  man. You're  working  h a r d e r  f i l l i n , . "  
The d i s t i n c t i o n  be tween i n t e n s e  p h y s i c a l  e f f o r t  and increased i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  
of l a b o u r  was r e c o g n i s e d  by many worke r s ,  w i t h  r e s e n t m e n t  f o c u s s e d  on t h e  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  manning and t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  i n c r e a s e  i n  e f f o r t  ( a s  well  a s  
t h e  imba lance  i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tween e f f o r t  and r eward ,  t o  be  d i s c u s s e d  
more f u l l y  below):  
" I t ' s  g o t  f a s t e r ,  t h e y  h a v e n ' t  a s  much hand on  t h e  b o t t l e s  a s  t h e y  used t o  
have  - w i t h  t h e  new system, f i l l i n g  b o t t l e s  i s  f a s t e r .  h e ' r e  workin2  h a r d e r  
now t h a n  we used  t o ,  t h e r e ' s  fewer  men d o i n g  a l i t t l e  more work" ( . , i c h a e l  e, 
f o r k  l i f t  t r u c k  d r i v e r ) .  
We're d o i n g  way more work now, a l o t  o f  men have  gone. T h e r e  used  t o  be *, 
t h r e e  s h i f t s ,  more r e s t  time. Then t h e y  took  o f f  t h e  n i g h t  s h i f t ,  we had t o  
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c a t c h  up on tha t . . .L ' e ' r e  d o i n g  t h e  work o f  two nen,  g e t t i n g  more work, 
o p e n i n g  up new shops ,  g e t t i n 2  r i d  o f  t h e  o l d  way o f  d e l i v e r i n g  ... The 
work s i d e  i s  g e t t i n g  h a r d e r  a l l  t h e  time" ( T i n , ,  f i l l e r / s o r t e r ) .  
S i t e  i e r v i c e s  k 'or i iers  a )  Overtir-le 
.tit t h e  t ime o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h  t h i s  group o f  workers ,  who m a i n t a i n e d  t h e  s i t e  
and f i l l e d  i n  on t h e  o p e r a t i n g  s i d e  when r e q u i r e d ,  %ere p a r t i c u l a r l y  a f f e c -  
t e d  by t h e  overt i : : :e  ; l o s i t i o n  i n  t h a t  t h e i r  r e g u : a r  xeE4end o v e r t i r : e ,  i S i c h  
had been a v a i l a b l e  t o  the:,, f o r  s o a t  seven  y e a r s ,  ha< a b r u p t l y  been w i t h -  
drawn. S o t  s u r p r i s i n g l y  t h e y  were somewhat d i s g r u n t l e d  by t h i s  move, which 
had t a k e n  p l a c e  w i t h o u t  u s e  o f  t h e  normal  p r o c e d u r e s ,  and had s t a g e d  a t h r e e -  
day  s t o p p a g e ,  ended when management ag reed  t o  t c l k s .  ?'he wi thd rawa l  of  t h e  
r e g u l a r  o v e r t i m e ,  and i t s  s u b s t i t u t i o n  w i t h  o c c a s i o n a l  weekends f o r  on ly  
one  o r  two worke r s ,  had meant a c o n s i d e r a b l e  d r o p  i n  i n c o n e  f o r  t h e s e  ernploy-  
ees ,  who were n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  "coverage"  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  o f f e r e d  t o  t h e  
c e n t r a l  f i l l i n g  worke r s .  
The worke r s  were  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a g g r i e v e d  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  had n o t  been 
o f f e r e d  any compensa t ion  f o r  t h e i r  l o s t  e a r n i n g s ,  a p r e v i o u s  "custon, and 
p r a c t i c e "  r i g h t  : 
"Fe f e e l  v e r y  bad a t  t h e  monent, t h e  weeke;ids hzd t o  coine t o  a c l o s e  soii:e- 
t ime, b u t  o t h e r  d e p a r t m e n t s  have been compensated,  t h e y ' r e  t r y i n g  t o  back 
o u t  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  u s  - w h a t ' s  f a i r  f o r  one i s  f a i r  f o r  a n o t h e r . "  
The l o s s  of  o v e r t i m e  undoub ted ly  meant a c o n s i d e r a b l e  d r o p  i n  income: 
"We'll miss i t ,  make no mis t ake . . . i f  t h e  b a s i c  r a t e  was h i g h e r ,  you could  
h a v e  a d e c e n t  l i v i n g  wage - w i t h  t h e  Tory government e v e r y t h i n g ' s  go ing  up. 
A l l  t h a t ' s  buggin2  u s  i s  money - we lose €70 a week t a k e  home pay - we u s e i  
t o  c l e a r  t 1 8 3  a week, working a 46 h o u r  week i t ' l l  be k115" ( t h e  s i t e  ser-  
v i c e s  worke r s  a l r e a d y  had 6 h o u r s  a week c o n t r a c t u a l  o v e r t i m e ) .  
A s  mentioned ea r l i e r ,  t h e  o v e r t i m e  had been withdrawn w i t h o u t  go ing  through 
t h e  ag reed  procedures (management's j u s t i f i c a t i o n  b e i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  was no 
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c o n t r a c t u a l  o b l i g a t i o n )  and t h e  workers '  r e s p o n s e  had f o c u s s e d  a r o u n d  t h i s  
v i o l a t i o n  o f  s t a t u s  quo:  
"When t h e y  t o l d  u s  t h e y  w e r e n ' t  go ing  t o  g i v e  o v e r t i m e ,  no way w e ' d  t a k e  
i t  s i t t i n g  d o m ,  i t ' s  a h e l l  o f  a l o s s .  iie went  and s a i d  t h e r e  was a d i s -  
p u t e ,  w e  asked  f o r  t h e  s t a t u s  q u o  t o  be r e s t o r e d ,  t h e  foreman s a i d  t h e  
s t a t u s  q u o  i s  t h e  model p l a n . . . t h e  l a d s  came t o  me" ( a i l 1  5, t h e  s t e w a r d )  
"and a sked  me t o  go u p s t a i r s ,  a s k  f o r  s t a t u s  quo - t h e y  t o l d  me t h a t  s t a t u s  
quo i s  t h e  model p l a n ,  I s a i d  i t ' s  a s  you were. Lie gave  them t h r e e  h o u r s '  
warn ing ,  w e  p l ayed  them r i g h t  t o  t h e  book" ( t a l k i n g  abou t  t h e  t h r e e - d a y  
w a l k o u t ) .  
These  worke r s ,  t hen ,  b a c k s  a g a i n s t  t h e  w a l l  o f  t h e  seeming ly  i n e v i t a b l e  er- 
o s i o n  o f  s t a f f i n g  and h o u r s  i n  t h e  branch ,  were s t u b b o r n l y  p u r s u i n g  t h e i r  
c a s e  f o r  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  p r e v i o u s  income i n  terms o f  t h e  " r e a l "  c e a n i n g  
of s t a t u s  quo - t h e  r e t e n t i o n  o f  e x i s t i n g  cus tom and prac t ice  ("as you  were") 
u n t i l  a l l  p r o c e d u r e s  had been  exhaus ted .  Any e f f e c t  t h e i r  o r i g i n a l  w a l k o u t  
migh t  h a v e  had was d i s s i p a t e d  by t h e  d e f e r e n c e  o f  b o t h  s teward  and menbers  
f o r  f o r m a l  p r o c e d u r e s  and  by, as  emerged l a t e r ,  a n  a lmos t  t o t a l  l a w  o f  Frat- 
t i c a l  s u p p o r t  from t h e  convenor .  a t h e r  workers  a t  t h e  branch ,  a l s o ,  were  r ~ l -  
u c t a n t  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  s i t e  s e r v i c e s  workers ,  who t h e y  saw a s  g reedy  and a s  
h a v i n g  f a i l e d  t o  p r o v i d e  them w i t h  s u p p o r t  i n  t h e  p a s t .  .As t h e  d i s p u t e  wen- 
d e d  i t s  s low way t h r o u g h  p r o c e d u r e ,  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
s i t e  s e r v i c e s  workers '  f o r m e r l y  " p r i v i l e g e d "  p o s i t i o n  appea red  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
b l e a k .  
Dispensers a )  Over t ime and  work t ime 
As ment ioned  i n  o u r  i n t r o d u c t i o n ,  t h e  d i s p e n s e r s  had a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  re- 
s e a r c h  been p l a c e d  i n  a n  i n c r e a s i n g l y  u n c e r t a i n  p o s i t i o n  d u e  t o  t h e  e n d i n g  
o f  r a i l  d e l i v e r i e s  o f  l i q u i d  g a s  t o  t h e  Leinbley branch .  T h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  i t -  
s e l f  b r o u g h t  abou t  by t h e  " l i q u i d  t r a n s f e r "  t o  Thame, w o u l d  remain  u n r e s o l v e d  
u n t i l  t h e  t r a n s f e r  i t s e l f  had been f i n a l l y  d e a l t  w i t h ,  o s t e n s i b l y  t h a t  Sep- 
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tember  ( i e  w i t h i n  s i x  months) .  
'Yeanwhile, t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  work f o r  t h e  d i s p e n s e r s  had slowed doh- a lmos t  
t o  a s t a n d s t i l l ,  w i t h  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  i r o n y  t h a t  t h e y  were a l l  on l a r g e  
amounts of  o v e r t i m e .  T h i s  was a g a i n  due  t o  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e 6  manning 
s h o r t a g e .  The e s t a b l i s h e d  number o f  d i s p e n s e r s  was s i x ,  b u t  one  o f  t h e s e  
p o s t s  remained pe rmanen t ly  u n f i l l e d ;  t h e  o t h e r  was occup ied  by the  convenor ,  
and was t h e r e f o r e  i n  p r a c t i c e  u s u a l l y  u n s t a f f e d .  The c o n v e n o r ' s  absence ,  t h e  
"dead man s h i f t "  ( a s  c o v e r i n g  f o r  t h e  u n f i l l e d  p o s t  was c a l l e d )  and t h e  t e c h -  
n o l o g i c a l  n e c e s s i t y  t o  keep t h e  d i s p e n s i n g  f u n c t i o n  s t a f f e d  arotind t h e  c l o c k ,  
meant t h a t  i t  was common f o r  t h e  d i s p e n s e r s  t o  work e x t r e m e l y  long, o f t e n  
12-hour  s h i f t s .  
P i s p e n s e r s  d e s c r i b e d  t h e  p a t t e r n  of  work and i t s  changes  s i n c e  t - e  announce- 
ment o f  t h e  t r a n s f e r  t o  'l'ha:ne: 
" T h e r e ' s  a s t e a d y  rundown o f  l o r r i e s  corning i n ,  p r i v a t e  c ~ s t o m e ~ s  a r e  slow- 
i n g  down a s  w e l l  ... T h e r e ' s  no  changes  on o v e r t i m e ,  t h e r e ' s  f i v e  :f u s  up  
h e r e ,  one  who 's  convenor ,  h e ' s  h a r d l y  e v e r  h e r e ,  we 've g o t  t o  ccve r  h i s  j o b .  
The t r a i n ' s  s t o p p e d  noi;. T h e r e ' s  n o t h i n g  t o  d o .  I n  t h e  l a s t  eig?.: months,  
t h e r e ' s  been l e s s  a n i  l e s s  work. . .Yefore t h i s ,  we had ii h e l l  o f  i l o t .  I n  
t h e  l a s t  two y e a r s  t h c  l i q u i d  we had g o i n ;  o u t  n e a r l y  doub!ed....nere's been 
a changeover  from i n t e n s e  work t o  n o t h i n g "  ( P a u l  5.) 
"l,hen I f i r s t  came i n ,  t h e r e  was p l e n t y  of  work, wagons a l l  o v e r  t h e  p l a c e .  
I t ' s  d i f f e r e n t  now, I f e e l  I ' m  w a s t i n g  my t ime. . .Lveryone h e r e  f e e l s  t h e  
same way - we've j u s t  l o s t  i n t e r e s t  - t h e  p l a c e  i t s e l f  h a s  real!:%. gone down- 
h i l l  - i t ' s  on a k n i f e  edge  - a l l r i g h t ,  t h e y ' v e  i n s t a l l e d  a nel; b u i l d i n z "  
( t h e  C e n t r a l  F i l l i n g  Area)  "bu t  t h e y  cou ld  j u s t  p i c k  up t h e  machinery a n t  
go - n o t h i n g ' s  permanent ,  I t h o u g h t  I was h e r e  f o r  l i f e  b u t  not  now" ( i a u l  
and :)art in).  
While t h e  e a r n i n g s  a f f o r d e d  by t h e  c o n t i n u e d  h i g h  l e v e l s  of o v e r t i m e  were 
a p p r e c i a t e d ,  a t  t h e  same time t h e r e  was r e s e n t m e n t  a t  t h e  encroachment  i n t o  
worke r s '  l i v e s :  
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"I d o n ' t  want weekends" ( o v e r t i m e ) .  "If I ' n  do ing  o v e r t i m e ,  I ' d  l i k e  t o  
f i t  i t  i n t o  my l i f e ,  n o t  f i t  my l i f e  round ove r t ime"  (Yaul ;;). 
"I d o n ' t  t h i n k  we should have t o  work ove r t ime  t o  g e t  a decent  wage - I 
d o n ' t  t h i n k  we should have t o  work a 40-hour week to .  I ' m  g e t t i n g  r ipped  
o f f  by iiOC" (A lan ) .  
was c l e a r  from t h i s  s t a t e m e n t ,  t h i s  worker was m o r e  e x p l i c i t l y  p o l i t i -  
c a l l y  aware than  most a t  Wembley. i a r l i e r  ke had co;nzented t h a t  "i iorkers 
a r e  always b e i n g  t o l d  t h e  b u s i n e s s  i s  being squeezed, maybe t h a t ' s  t r u e  on 
c y l i n d e r s ,  b u t  on bulk l i q u i d  management's making money hand over  f i s t ,  bu t  
a l l  we ' re  g e t t i n g  i s  j o b  l o s s e s ,  cu tbacks  and clawbacks on pay - I d o n ' t  
l i k e  working ove r t ime ,  bu t  t h e  r e a l i t y  i s  b lokes  on t h i s  s i t e  d o n ' t  work 
ove r t ime  because  they  a g r e e  w i t h  i t ,  b u t  because i t ' s  t h e  on ly  way t o  make 
a decen t  wage ... You're economical ly  f o r c e ?  t o  do more h'ork t o  ge t  overti ine." 
T h i s  l a s t  comment summed up i n  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  u s e f u l  way t h e  c r u c i a l  i n -  
t e r a c t i o n s  between workers '  s u b s i s t e n c e  r equ i r emen t s  and t h e  manaze r i a l  o r -  
g a n i s a t i o n  o f  l abour  time, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  view o f  t h e  s imul t aneous  i n t e n s i -  
f i c a t i o n  and e x t e n s i o n  of  l abour  t h a t  v a s  t h e  s p e c i f i c  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  organ- 
i s a t i o n  of  t h e  l abour  p r o c e s s  a t  Lembley. i s  Alan p o i n t e d  o u t ,  w o r ~  was 
"forced" o u t  of workers,  no t  by any c0tlt-c i v e  a c t i v i t y  on t h e  p a r t  of man- 
agement, b u t  through t h e  p r e s s u r e  of  workers' own need  t o  make a l i v i n z .  
Sor ,  i n  a v a r i a t i o n  from Landis  & Gyr, was such "work" n e c e s s a r i l y  always 
of a d i r e c t l y  o r  i n t e n s e l y  p r o d u c t i v e  kind,  b u t  might c o n s i s t  o f  p r o t r a c t e d  
h o u r s  of  r e l a t i v e l y  p a s s i v e  mon i to r ing  o rda ined  s imply by t h e  t e c h n i c a l  r e -  
qu i r emen t s  o f  t h e  p roduc t .  
b)  ::anning and U n c e r t a i n t y  
T h e  most s a l i e n t  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  d i s p e n s e r s '  work l i v e s  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  was, of 
cour se ,  t h a t  a l l  " s ix"  o f  t h e i r  j o b s  were i n  q u e s t i o n  i n  t h e  con tex t  of t h e  
impending t r a n s f e r  t o  Thaine and t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  end ing  of  r a i l  d e l i v e r i e s .  
Uh i l e  t h e  workers  knew what was happening, no one had spoken fo rma l ly  t o  
them abou t  t h e  situation: 
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" I t ' s  n e a r l y  f i n i s h e d ,  we d o n ' t  knox i f  w e ' r e  coming o r  g?ing...iie keep  
g e t t i n g  t o l d  no  compulsory r e d u n d a n c i e s ,  w h a t e v e r  v a c a n c i e s  a r i s e  w i l l  be  
f i l l e d  by u s  o r  someone e l s e ,  v e h i c l e  m a i n t e n a n c e  f o r  exanple .  . . I t  a f f e c t s  
them a s  w e l l .  T h a t ' s  where t h e  problem i s  - t h e r e  might  n o t  be any jobs . . . "  
( P a u l  1 : ) .  
A l o t  o f  worke r s  nade t h e  p o i n t  t h a t ,  a s  Alan p u t  i t ,  '%ow t h e  o l d  men a r e  
gone." I n  o t h e r  k-s rds ,  management had r eached ,  a s  i t  were,  t h e  bone i n  c u t -  
t i n g  down on t h e  work fo rce ;  t h e r e  were no more men who would w i l l i n g l y  go. 
A s  Alan p o i n t e d  o u t ,  t h i s  t h r e a t  o f  compulsory redundancy  fo l lowed  what  was 
f o r  many worke r s  an e x p e r i e n c e  o f  b e i n g  he rded  round t h e  s i t e  w i t h  " c o n s t a n t  
f e a r  o f  j o b  l o s s "  - "For  example t h e  two Z a u l s  w i l l  be  r edep loyed  - t h i s  i s  
t h e  second  t i n e  i n  two y e a r s  - t hey  become l i k e  i n d u s t r i a :  g y p s i e s .  For  t h e  
Thame d r i v e r s  t h i s  w i l l  o n l y  l a s t  f i v e  y e a r s ,  t h e n  t h e y ' l l  be t r a n s f e r r e d  
t o  iou thampton ."  
i4orkers '  a t t i t u d e  t o  t h i s  c o n t i n u a l  i n s e c u r i t y  was o n e  o f  mingled r e sen tmen t  
and  r e s i g n a t i o n :  
" T h e r e ' s  no p o i n t  i n  t a k i n g  a c t i o n ,  t h e  w o r k ' s  gone anywe:;. ~ o o k  a t  i t  a l l ,  
i t ' s  c o s t .  i t  makes s e n s e  t o  move t o  t h e  j o u t h e r n  SeLion ,  t h a t ' s  k-here t h e  
wori: i s . . .The  men on t h e  f l o o r  know w h a t ' s  g o i n g  on and  x x t  shou ld  be  done. 
3 u t  h 7 h a t ' s  coming down from t h e  t o p  h a s  t o  ha??en.  ?or ex2,:iple t h e  t r a n s f e r  
t o  Thane i s  go ing  ahead even  though %!e know i t  won ' t  work" ( ? a u l  and . ; a r t i n :  
The w o r k e r s  a c c e p t e d ,  t h e n ,  w i t h  a r e s e n t f u l  f a t a l i s m ,  thaL there  was 
l i t t l e  t h e y  could  i o  a b o u t  t h e  d i s a ? ? e a r a n c e  o f  t h e i r  j o b s .  .\t t h e  s a n e  t i r l E  
t h e r e  was s o n e t h i n s  o f  a d i s l o c a t i o n  between t h i s  acce? ta ; lce  o f  t h e  i n e v i t -  
a b l e  and  t h e  workers '  o p i n i o n s  abou t  what ough t  t o  be done,  bo th  i n  terms 
o f  t h e  f u t u r e  o f  t h e  p l a n t  and r e g i o n  ( t h e  w o r k e r s  j u s t  ~ u o t e d  were n o t  a lone  
i n  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  t h e  t r a n s f e r  might  n o t  work, o t h e r s  c a s t i n g  doubt  on  wheth- 
e r  Thame c o u l d  a c t u a l l y  cope w i t h  We-ibley's work a s  w e l l  a s  i t s  own) and a l -  
so  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  u n i o n ' s  f a i l u r e  t o  f i g h t .  The u l t i m t e  s e n s e  o f  pow- 
e r l e s s n e s s  by workers  was due  n o t  o n l y  t o  t h e  o v e r w h t l n i n ,  weight  o f  Aci, . : 's  
s t r e n g t h  a s  a m u l t i n a t i o n a l ,  q u i t e  c r u s h i n g  enough i n  i t s e l f ,  b u t  a l s o  t o  
t h e  g e n e r a l  l a c k  o f  e f f e c t i v e  t r a d e  union o r g a n i s a t i o n  or. t h e  s i t e ,  which 
i n  i t s  t u r n  was r o o t e d  i n  t h e  s e c t i o n a l i s t  d e f e n s i v e n e s s  of o t h e r  workers 
i n  j e a l o u s l y  gua rd ing  t h e i r  over t ime.  These prob1er.s w i l l  be  looked a t  i n  
niore d e t a i l  l a t e r .  Lieanwhile, t h e r e  appeared  t o  be l i t t l e  t h e  d i s p e n s e r s  
c o u l d  do b u t  a p a t h e t i c a l l y  c a r r y  on wi th  t h e  semblance o f  what had once 
been p u r p o s e f u l  j o b s .  
D r i v e r s  a )  Overtime and  s c h e d u l i n g  
Over t ime f o r  t h e  d r i v e r s  was l a r g e l y  a q u e s t i o n  o f  e s t i m a t e d  j o u r n e y  t imes ,  
which i n  t h e  p a s t  had o f t e n  been l o o s e  enough t o  g i v e  t h e 2  a c o m f o r t a b l e  
margin  o f  e a r n i n g s .  how, however, a g e n e r a l  t i g h t e n i n g - U ?  o f  t i m e s ,  paving  
t h e  way f o r  t h e  c o x p u t e r i s e d  schedu l ing  of d e l i v e r i e s  d u e  i n  A u g u s t ,  t h r e a t -  
ened t h i s  p r a c t i c e :  
"If t h e y ' v e  g o t  a j o b  i n  Ipswich ,  f o r  example, t h e  n o t i o n a l  t i m e  i s  13  hours 
- t h i s  i s  what t h e y ' r e  p a i d  however long i t  t a k e s ,  a f t e n  i t ' s  s h o r t e r . . .  . , a t -  
i o n a l l y ,  o v e r t i m e  i s  now b e i n g  a t t a c k e d .  No d r i v e r  a c t u a l l y  does  more than  9 
h o u r s ,  bu t  t h e y  were g e t t i n g  14  hour s  - i t ' s  a pay c u t  of  between 2 4 9  an? 
f69" ( k l a n ,  d i s p e n s e r s ) .  
K h i l e  t h i s  might a p p e a r  a c l a s s i c  example of t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  " f idd le" ,  
what i t  had a c t u a l l y  r e s u l t e d  i n  was s imply  a comfor t ab le  l i v i n g  wage f o r  
t h e  d r i v e r s ,  which would n o t  have been a t t a i n a b l e  on b a s i c  pay. Alan, i n  
f a c t ,  saw c o m p u t e r i s a t i o n  i t s e i f  p r i m a r i l y  i n  terms o f  a pay c u t :  
"Computer t i m e s  - w e l l ,  t h e  i s s u e  i s  n o t i o n a l  because i t ' s  t h e  pay packe t  
r e a l l y  and management's i n t e r e s t  i s  i n  c u t t i n g  t h e i r  pay ? a c k e t . .  ..;anage:ent 
i s  more i n t e r e s t e d  i n  c u t t i n g  pay than  i n c r e a s i n g  j b b s "  ( i e  i n t e n s i f y i n :  
l a b o u r )  "though t h a t  w i l l  co:ne, E s T e c i a l l y  w i t h  rha . E . "  
Whether o r  n o t  t h e  s o l e  o r  even the  major pu rpose  of i n t r o d u c i n g  computer i sa-  
t i o n  was t o  c u t  pay, t h i s  was c e r t a i n l y  one  o f  i t s  e f f e c t : .  The com?uter i sed  
s c h e d u l i n g  o f  z a s  d e l i v e r i e s ,  u s u a l l y  r e f e r r e d  t o  a: L : . ,  o r  Branch L i s t r i b u -  
t i o n  Schedule ,  had t w o  a s p e c t s :  t h e  d i r e c t  l i nka , ; r  :f t h e  cus to i : ie r ' s  k;?s 
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sup:.rl ies v i t h  the  branch ,  so t h a t  t h e  corj?uter c o u l d  "inform" t h e  branch  
i f  s u p ? l i e s  were getting l w ;  and t h e  c o n p u t e r i s e d  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  d e l i v e r y  
r o u t e s ,  s2eeds  and t i n e s .  I t  was on t h i s  second s c o r e  t h a t  t h e  d r i v e r s '  pay 
and c o n d i t i o n s  x o u l ~ ~  s u f f e r  t h e  w o r s t ,  w i th  t h e i r  overti::e 0 2 p o r t u n i t i e s  
be ing  t h r e a t e c s d  i n  two ways; t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  e a t i m a t e d  T i l e s  p e r  h o u r ,  and 
t h e  t i g h t e n i n :  of  t h e  t i n e  s p e c i f i e d  for t h e  a c t u a l  d e l i v e r y .  The f i r s t  
would a l s o  ? u t : ? a t i c a l l y  i n c r e a s e  t h e  number o f  "drops"  a c y l i n d e r  d r i v e r  
(one  making s h s r t e r  l o c a l  t r i p s )  would be expec ted  to mace. 
T h i s  i n c r e a s e d  p r e s s u r e  on dr ivers  was p a r t  o f  an  o v e r a l l  tendency which 
had t a k e n  p l a c e  o v e r  some y e a r s ,  c u l m i n a t i n g  i n  what were seen  a s  t h e  un- 
r e a l i s t i c  t imes  c a l c u l a t e d  by t h e  computer: 
" . . . you ' r e  g iven  t h r e e  minutes t o  unload ,  t u r n  a round ,  bu t  you can '  t ques- 
t i o n  i t  because  ' i t ' s  i n  t h e  c o n p u t e r ' .  335  i s  mean ing le s s  because  t r a f f i c  
c o n d i t i o n s  chenge a l l  t h e  time" (Alan) .  
"The t i m e s  a r e  too  t i g h t .  The t r a f f i c ' s  i n c r e a s i n g ,  management's t r y i n g  t o  
g e t  t h e  t i m e s  dorm. Times t i g h t e r  s t i l l ,  how t i g h t  can  you g e t  it: Dr ive  
l i k e  a maniac:" ( 3 e o r g e  'T). 
The "meaninglessness"  of  a t t e m p t i n 2  t o  measure and t i g h t e n  d e l i v e r y  t i n e s  
i n  any s y s t e n e t i c  and a c c o u n t a b l e  f a s h i o n  had indeed  been e m p i r i c a l l y  dem- 
o n s t r a t e d  more than  o n c e  t o  t h e  O p e s a t i o n s l b i s t r i b u t i o n  manager when he  had 
accompanied c y l i n d e r  d r i v e r s  o u t  on t h e i r  rounds :  
"I 've n e v e r  been a b l e  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  i t .  He knows t h e  problems, he  went o u t  
w i t h  s e v e r a l  f e l l o w s  so he  knows i t ' s  n o t  a wind-up or  n o t h i n g  l i k e  t h a t .  
\$e was d o i n g  i t  by t h e  book, we do i t  o u r  way - we can  do more, bu t  h e  
wants  u s  t o  do  more t h a n  tha t . . . \ i e  had a union  m e e t i n g  one n i g h t ,  he con- 
ceded a c e r t a i n  amount o f  c a l l s  was t o o  much, w e  came i n  t h e  n e x t  morning 
and i t  was e x a c t l y  t h e  same, we'd wasted our t ime"  (George T ) .  
Nanagement, then, i n  a manner r e m i n i s c e n t  o f  t h e  "performance" c a l c u l a t i o n 5  
a t  Landis E. Gyr, were de te rmined  t o  adhe re  t o  a q u a n t i t a t i v e  c a l c u l a t i o n  of  
what times were, presumably unde r  i d e a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  a t t a i n a b l e ,  r a t h e r  than  
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a c c e p t i n g  a more r e a l i s t i c ,  and a c t u a l l y  observed,  q u a l i t a t i v e  assessment  
of  t h e  a c t u a l  work p a t t e r n .  Given t h i s  expe r i ence  o f  t h e  managerial  res- 
ponse,  t h e  advent  of  coniputerised times was seen a s  b a f f l i n g ,  i f  n o t  im- 
p o s s i b l e :  
"I d o n ' t  t h i n k  t h e r e ' l l  be enough t i m e  t o  do t h e  j o b  anyway. I f  i t ' s  going 
t o  be  a s  t i g h t  a s  t hey  say  i t  i s ,  we'd b e t t e r  do somethin2 b e f o r e  we a l l  
g e t  t h e  sack  f o r  n o t  being a b l e  t o  do t h e  work" (George T). 
I n  t h i s  impending s i t u a t i o n  t h e r e  was, t hen ,  an i n c r e a s i n g  c o n v i c t i o n  a:nong 
t h e  d r i v e r s  t h a t ,  l i k e  t h e  workers a t  Landis 5 Cyr, t h e y  s imply vould n o t  
be  a b l e  t o  adhe re  t o  new manage r i a l  norms of  product ion.  The  d i s t i n c t i o n  
between " w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  work" and r e s i s t a n c e  t o ,  o r  i n c a p a b i l i t y  o f ,  max- 
i m a l i s e d  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of  l abour  was h e r e  d e f i n e d  once more. 
b )  . .anning 
There was no doubt  t h a t  t h e  d r i v e r s  had s u f f e r e d  by f a r  t h e  l a r g e s t  r e c e n t  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e i r  numbers. The t r a n s f e r  t o  Thame a l o n e  had s l a shed  t h e  
number of l i q u i d  d r i v e r s  from 25 t o  7 w i t h i n  a ve ry  s h o r t  p e r i o d ,  wh i l e  
t h e  number of  c y l i n d e r  d r i v e r s  had a l s o  droppet? d r a s t i c a l l y ,  ove r  a longer  
t i n e s c a l e ,  from 66 t o  2 2 .  
!!hile t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  l i q u i d  d r i v e r s  followed l o g i c a l l y  from t h e  t r a n s f e r  
t o  Thame, t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  on c u t t i n g  down on nunbers  of  c y l i n d e r  " f e r r y "  
d r i v e r s ,  backed up by t h e  con t inuous  p r e s s u r e  f o r  i n c r e a s e s  i n  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  
c l e a r l y  c u t  a c r o s s  any a t t e m p t  t o  improve on t h e  d e c i d e d l y  poor  (50;:) de l -  
i v e r y  r eco rd .  Attempts t o  t a c k l e  t h i s  seened t o  be  d i r e c t e d  towards t h e  com- 
p u t e r i s e d  methods of i n c r e a s i n g  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and a s s e s s i n g  customer denand 
r e f e r r e d  t o  above, r a t h e r  t han  r a i s i n g  an) r e n o t e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  
t h e  number of  d r i v e r s .  
Indeed,  t h e  c u r r e n t  p o l i c y  seemed t o  be  havin; r a t h e r  t h e  r e v e r s t  e f f e c t ,  
a s  t h e  Mnch  was hav ing  d i f f i c u l t y  f i l l i n g  t h e  f o u r  p o s t s  f o r  c y l i n d e r  d r i -  
v e r s  t h a t  were c u r r e n t l y  vacan t  and suspended u n t i l  t h e  complet ion o f  t h e  
t r a n s f e r  t o  Thame. i ven  t h e  t h r e a t e n e d  d i s p e n s e r s  were n o t  i n t e r e s t e d  in 
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t h e s e  j o b s ,  which ca r r i ed  a r e p u t a t i o n  for t h a n k l e s s  s l a v e d r i v i n ~ .  The 
l e v e l  o f  speedui ,  was T - . ~ V  S U C ! ~  t h a t  t h e r c  was a h i g h  t u r n o v e r  even axon, 
t h e  c u r r e n t  k ,orkforce ;  a s  one  o f  thein, , eo rge  T ,  iumir.ed i t  up, t h e  e x i s t -  
i n ;  nor.:.  o f  2 5  c a l l s  i d a y  i i a s  a l r e a d y ,  even b e f o r e  t h e  a d v e n t  0 5  co:n?uter- 
i i z t i o n ,  "a h e ; r t - a t t . ? i k  job" .  
i i )  : ;es-,o-se= an; ~. . t ,act io! is  - t h e  wor::fcrce B S  a v11ole 
T!le !!onin:J,nce o f  o v e r t i y e  i n  c!l t h e s e  u r ' : e r s '  l i v e s  i n  two s e n s e s  - 
f i r s t l y  i n  i t s  s t r u c t c r i n a  o f  t h e  l a b o u r  p r o c e s s  and s e c o n d l y  a s  a v e h i c l e  
f o r  i n c r e a s i n z  t h e i r  s u b s i s t e n c e  - h e l d  the:i t o  soxe  e x t e n t  t r a p ? e d  i n  a 
form o f  c o l l u s i o n  w i t h  management. A s  we i n d i c a t e 6  i n  o u r  i n t r o d u c t i o n ,  
bo th  managertent and t k s  w o r k f o r c e  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  sough t  and r e j e c t e ?  over -  
t i n e ,  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  r e ' s o n s :  on t h e  wor::ers'  p a r t  t h e  wish  and need t o  
enliance e a r n i n g s  i n  c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n  t o  t h e  reser . ted  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  and 
e x t e n s i o n  o f  l a b o u r ;  on management 's  thc. d r i v e  t o  c u t  dohn on l a b o u r  c o s t s  
as  a g , a i n s t  t h e  need t o  c o v e r  f o r  t h e  i n f l e x i b i l i t i e s  t h a t  t h i s  caused .  
The p u r s u i t  o f ,  and a t t e m p t  t o  c o n t r o l ,  o v e r t i m e  and j o b  s e c u r i t y  on t h e  
one  hand,  s t a f f i n g  an? c o s t  r e d u c t i o n s  on t h e  o t h e r ,  was t h e n  a t  t h e  c e n t r e  
o f  c o n f l i c t  between w o r i f o r c e  and m a n a g c e n t  a t  I.:eibley. 3 e f o r e  : o o k i n _  
more c l o s e l y  a t  t h e  d i r e n s i o n s  o f  workp lzce  o r g a n i s a t i o n  i n  t h e  branch i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n ,  we s h a l l  e x p l o r e  two f u r t h e r  a r e a s  which have 
been a s suned  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  t o  p r o v i d e  f o c a l  p o i n t s  o f  worker  r e s i s t a n c e ;  
worker  k n o w l e d g e l c r e a t i v i t y ,  and w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  work. 'de s h a l l  a l s o  look  a t  
what h a s  been  a rgued  i a  t h e  t h e s i s  t o  be a more s a l i e n t  b a s i s  f o r  such  res- 
i s t a n c e ,  worke r s '  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between e f f o r t  and reward. 
a )  h!orker Knowledge: '"iou work i n  t h e r e ,  y o u ' r e  a l l  i d i o t s "  
There  was no  doubt  t h a t  worke r s  were aware  o f ,  and c y n i c a l  a b o u t ,  management's 
l a c k  o f  r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e i r  a b i l i t i e s .  A t  t h e  same time t h e i r  own i n t i m a t e  
knowledge o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s  d e l i n e a t e d  f o r  them t h e  a r e a s  where 
management was nowhere n e a r  g e t t i n g  i t  r i g h t :  
,,, ,>E cou ld  d e f i n i t e l y  r u n  t h i s  o u r s e l v e s ,  more e f f i c i e n t l y  w i t h  fewer  l o s s e s ,  
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more safely. . .For example, g e t  r i d  of t h i s  system" ( t h e  computer console) 
" - t h e y ' r e  making losses  because they ' re  pumping t h e  s t u f f  through so f a s t  
i t ' s  h e a t i n g  up and they ' r e  los ing  more" (Alan, d i spensers ) .  
"If  we had a say i n  the  running of things,  w e  could run i t  b e t t e r  than 
tha t .  We have no say i n  the  choice of vehic les ,  t h e y ' r e  sometimes unsui t -  
ab le ,  they put  the i n s t a l l a t i o n s ,  t h e  tanks, in s i l l y  pos i t ions ,  everyone's 
t h e r e  except  the dr iver"  (Pe te  U, l i q u i d  d r ive r ) .  
A t  the  same time, i t  was accepted t h a t  management had no i n t e r e s t  in any- 
th ing  t h e  managers might want t o  say: 
"The guv'ners don't  l i k e  to  be t o l d  anything, we had a suggestion box, b u t  
management doesn ' t  l i k e  to  th ink  t h a t  workers a r e  doing t h e i r  work" (Eugene, 
f i l l e r ) .  
"With modern management, they don ' t  r e a l l y  l i s t e n  to  what you've go t o  
say - they do things t h e i r  way, u p s t a i r s  somewhere, they don't  l i k e  to  be 
proved wrong" (Ken and Joe, compressors). 
"More say? You don't  ge t  a l o t .  I t ' s  always been t h e  same, 'Because you 
work i n  t h e r e ,  you ' re  a l l  i d i o t s ' .  Even though you do the  Job day i n  day 
out"  (Jim and A l f ,  f i l l e r  opera tors ) .  
However, while  workers c l e a r l y  recognised t h a t  they knew more about t h e  job 
than management and t h a t  management had high-handedly c u t  o f f  t h i s  a r ea  of 
knowledge from t h e i r  own opera t ions ,  such i l l o g i c a l i t i e s  were viewed pass- 
i ve ly ,  r a t h e r  than being a focus of a c t i v e  resentment. So f a r  were workers 
from f e e l i n g  any commitment t o  "crea t iv i ty"  in t h e i r  work ( t h e  opportuni ty  
f o r  which was, i n  any case,  hard ly  overwhelming) t h a t  while recognising 
t h e i r  r o l e  a s  a "tool of t h e  machine" they p o s i t i v e l y  welcomed th i s :  
"It 's  much e a s i e r  than when you had t o  f i l l  them" ( t h e  cy l inders )  "before 
- every th ing ' s  done i n  the  consoles"  ( i e  computerised). "I suppose i t  is 
a bad t h i n g  because you a r e  t h e  s l ave  of t h e  machine...It doesn' t  a f f e c t  
me t h a t  much...It's much e a s i e r  with the  machine" (John, f i l l e r  opera tor ) .  
"The machine r e a l l y  in some re spec t s  i s  c o n t r o l l i n g  you. r a t h e r  than 
t h e  o t h e r  way round...Before you could work o u t  fo r  yourself  how you 
d id  t h e  work. Do I miss i t?  Not a t  a l l  - i t  was old-fashioned" (Richard,  
t e s t  shop). 
Among t h e  d r ive r s ,  however, t he re  was some f r u s t r a t i o n  over how t h e  tak- 
i n g  over  of t h e i r  own organisa t ion  of  the  j o b  by computerisation influenced 
t h e i r  r e l a t ionsh ip  w i t h  t h e  customer: "Our knowledge of t h e  j o b  is j u s t  
wasted, gone by the board now...It's a l t e r e d  a l l  the work p a t t e r n  - i t  
used t o  be compact, now i t ' s  spread out  a l l  over  the place. . . I  don ' t  bother 
r e a l l y ,  we j u s t  do our day 's  work and t h a t ' s  i t .  In the  old days if you'd 
done t h e  round and had a b i t  of l i q u i d  l e f t ,  you'd drop i t  o f f "  (Pe te  k, 
l i q u i d  d r i v e r ) .  
A t  t h e  same time, any a c t i v e  attempt t o  a l t e r  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  was seen a s  
going beyond the workers' b r i e f .  As the  VCH d r i v e r  p u t  i t :  
"The planning of the  drops doesn ' t  make sense - two wagons can end up going 
t o  t h e  same p lace  on t h e  same day - we know, because we do the  job,  but  
management - i f  you suggested anything management would think you was a 
r i g h t  creep - ' rho  t h e  h e l l  i s  t h i s  l i t t l e  u p s t a r t ? '  - you s t a r t  g e t t i n g  
o u t  of  your own s p h e r e  and, you know, 'What do you know about i t ? ' "  
b )  Willingness t o  Work: "Your job comes up t o  you day a f t e r  day" 
J u s t  a s  the  above comments were reminiscent of those of Landis & Cyr workers 
i n  t h e i r  awareness o f ,  bu t  r econc i l i a t ion  to ,  managerial a t t i t u d e s ,  so the  
Wembley workers shared a s i m i l a r  "pragmatic acceptance" with regard t o  the  
o b l i g a t i o n  t o  work. We have already seen from t h e  comments of both super- 
v i s i o n  and management t h a t  "chasing" the  workforce was not  a major necess- 
i t y  or preoccupation (up t o  the  point  of " r e spons ib i l i t y"  def ined by the 
Branch Manager) and t h i s  was r e f l ec t ed  in workers' remarks: 
"Supe'rvision? We &n i t  ourselves .  We're a law unto ourselves  up here,  un- 
l e s s  they send d i f f e r e n t  l o r r i e s .  We do the  supervis ion ourse lves ,  we 
know what 's  t o  be done" (gaul  M, disps) .  
. .  
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There was a general  recogni t ion  t h a t  i t  made very l i t t l e  sense f o r  
workers t o  do anything e l s e  but work: 
"I enjoy i t  because i f  I don ' t  someone e l s e  w i l l .  Someone's go t  t o  f i l l  
i t  so I might a s  wel l  f i l l  i t  in good f a i t h "  (Winston, Central  F i l l i n g  
Area ) . 
Refer r ing  t o  the f i l l i n g  o f  jobs r a t h e r  than cy l inders ,  t h i s  comment 
could be seen a s  an eloquent  statement of t h e  interchangeable  and com- 
modity s t a t u s  of labour. As the  same worker had sa id  e a r l i e r ,  "no one 
f e e l s  anything g r e a t  about work, you ' re  h e r e  f o r  your wages, you do 
what you have t o  do f o r  your wages.'' H i s  workmate expressed (independent- 
l y )  a s imi l a r  point:  "Like i t ' s  f o r  a day 's  wages and t h a t ' s  i t  - you 
have to  work someplace and t h a t ' s  i t .  When you can ' t  have what you l i k e  
then you m u s t  l i k e  what you have" (Eugene, CFA). 
Most workers expressed a s imi l a r  f e e l i n g  t h a t  the  s i t u a t i o n  was so bas ic  
a s  t o  be unquestionable:  
"The job  is a l l r i g h t .  . . i t ' s  a job, i s n ' t  it. I f  t h e  k i tchen  is too hot ,  
you ge t  out" (Monahan, t e s t  shop). 
"There's no good p o i n t s  about work. I j u s t  t r y  t o  ignore i t  and j u s t  g e t  
on with the  job  and do i t  and t h a t ' s  a l l  
loader ) .  
"Your Job comes up t o  you l i k e  day a f t e r  
and do it" (Michael and Michael H, fork  
t h e r e  is t o  i t"  (Harry, f i l l e r /  
say,  you j u s t  keep going l i k e  
i f t  t ruck  d r ive r s ) .  
One worker, it was t r u e ,  took t h i s  bas i c  acceptance o f  work a l i t t l e  fur- 
ther: "I work r i g h t  up t o  my time. I be l i eve  t h a t  when you're a t  work the 
governer has bought your time, i t  don ' t  belong to  you, i t  belongs t o  him, 
so if you take time o f f  you're s t ea l ing"  (Monahan, f i l l e r ) .  
mile, a s  w e  s h a l l  see,  there  was cons iderable  awareness of and r e j ec t ion  
of  p r o f i t  a s  a counter  t o  t h e i r  own l eve l  of  reward among t h e  workforce, 
t h i s  was not  r e l a t e d  by any of them to  t h e  provis ion of labour,  with t h e  
except ion of Alan from dispensmrs. As he p u t  i t:  
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"If I d i d n ' t  f e e l  t h a t  the  purpose of my pork is t o  make some o the r  
bugger r i c h ,  I ' d  put  a l o t  more e f f o r t  in. In genera l ,  t h a t ' s  shown by 
f o r  example w i t h  t h e  h o s p i t a l s "  ( t o  which BOC suppl ied oxygen) 'I  - people 
w i l l  put  themselves o u t  because they f e e l  t h a t  t h e  NHS is p a r t  of them. 
In the  Falklands war, t h e  blokes who supported i t  worked very hard...I 
don ' t  th ink  p r i v a t e  p r o f i t  can ge t  work ou t  of workers - we come t o  work 
t o  make a l iving." 
Here Alan was expressing a c r u c i a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  which in h i s  experience 
r eg i s t e red  in the  response of t h e  r e s t  of t h e  workforce, while n o t  nec- 
e s s a r i l y  being e x p l i c i t l y  r e c y i s e d  by them - t h a t  between the  provis ion  
o f ,  and a t t i t u d e  towards, t h e  use of  t h e i r  labour  power as  a commodity, 
and any p o s i t i v e  c r e a t i v e  involvement in t h e  work i t s e l f .  The same d i s -  
t i n c t i o n  t o  which t h e  Branch Manager had drawn a t t e n t i o n  t o  in h i s  argu- 
ment about " respons ib i l i ty" ,  i t  in a sense r eve r ses  t h e  conception (with- 
in the  labour process  deba te)  of workers a s  s t r i v i n g  f o r  more "autonomy", 
more "discret ion" over  t h e  organisa t ion  of t h e i r  work. B u t  t h i s  r e s i s t a n c e  
was not  due t o  any o v e r t  " h o s t i l e  w i l l "  (Friedman, 1977) on the  workers' 
p a r t  t o  t h e  provis ion of t h e i r  labour a s  such; r a t h e r  the l i n e  i s  drawn 
simply by the d e f i n i t i o n  of work in terms of "making a l iving" - of  t h e  
s a l e  of labour power a s  a barga in  which involves  Just as much labour a s  
is requi red  t o  "do your job" - "and t h a t ' s  it". 
We now go on to  look a t  i s s u e s  which have been argued within the t h e s i s  
t o  be more cent ra l  t o  workers' response t o  t h e  labour  process than these  
more q u a l i t a t i v e  ques t ions ;  t h e  r e l a t ionsh ips  between e f f o r t ,  reward and, 
where re levant ,  p r o f i t .  
-
c) P r o f i t s  and Wages: "We g e t  the  crumbs'' 
Although employees d id  n o t  e x p l i c i t l y  l i nk  t h e i r  provis ion of no more 
- and no less - than what was required by t h e  "bargain" of employment, t o  
t h e  p r o f i t  motive i t se l f ,  s e v e r a l  of t h e i r  comments showed t h a t  they  were 
sharply aware o f ,  and b i t t e r  about, the  d i s p a r i t y  between t h e i r  OM pos- 
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i t i o n  a s  workers whose pay could only be r a i s e d  above the  average by 
l a rge  amounts of overtime, and t h a t  of  BOC a s  a vas t  mul t ina t iona l  con- 
glomerate w i t h  a very hea l thy  turnover. T h i s  d i s p a r i t y  had a p a r t i c u l a r l y  
c l e a r  expression i n  t h e  gargantuan s a l a r y  of  BOC's Group Chief Executive, 
Dick Ciordano, whose pay a t  the  time of t h e  research had j u s t  r i s e n  48;. 
t o  f 7 7 1 , 6 0 0  a year. As Paul H from the  d ispensers  p u t  it: 
"I t ' s  a sore  poin t  w i t h  Ciordano - t h e r e  was anf80m p r o f i t  r i s e  f o r  the 
f i r s t  s i x  months of  t h i s  year  - h i s  s a l a r y  r i s e s  accordingly - they could 
a f fo rd  t o  pay the  workers a r i se . "  I n  f a c t  t h e  "union s ide" of  t h e  nation- 
a l  nego t i a t ing  committee had now agreed on a claim of 257. on t h e  bas i c  
r a t e ,  with add i t iona l  bwnefits,  t o  be p u t  forward a t  the  annual negot i -  
a t i o n s  the  following month, but few among t h e  workforce hoped f o r  any- 
th ing  more than s i x  or seven pe r  cent.  
Ciordano tended t o  be t h e  f i g u r e  on whom workers pinned t h e i r  resentment 
a t  n o t  ge t t i ng  a " f a i r  share", p a r t i c u l a r l y  s ince  he himself was rememb- 
e red  f o r  having announced, perhaps rash ly ,  some years  before  t h a t  he 
thought workers ought t o  ge t  more bene f i t  from company p r o f i t s :  
"Pay - i t ' s  not  a l o t ,  compared w i t h  some jobs  ou t s ide  i t ' s  good, b u t  
when you look a t  t h e  p r o f i t s  i t ' s  not  a l o t .  Giordano's the  man who s a i d  
workers should be g e t t i n g  more, t h e r e ' s  no sign of i t  here" ( Joe  and Ken, 
compressors). 
There was a general  sense,  then, t h a t  while  the  advantages of working fo r  
a company a s  la rge  and s t a b l e  a s  BOC were p o t e n t i a l l y  considerable ,  they 
somehow were not  f i nd ing  t h e i r  way t o  t h e  workers: 
"Working f o r  BOC - bigger  p r o f i t ,  so you should ge t  bigger  wages, but 
i t ' s  not  always l i k e  t h a t  - too many shareholders.  With the  t r a n s f e r  t o  
Thame d r ive r s  a r e  leaving and not  being replaced - the  company's saving 
money, economising, making p r o f i t s  - i t ' s  good luck  i f  we g e t  a b i t "  
(Pe te  W, l i q u i d  d r i v e r ) .  
"Pay? When you look a t  t h e  p r o f i t s  t hey ' r e  making, you c a n ' t  say i t ' s  
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f a i r  - we ge t  the crumbs'' (Harry, f i l l e r / l o a d e r ) .  
This  d i s p a r i t y  between t h e  unusually high company p r o f i t s  evinced in 
these  workers' employment, and t h e i r  own comparatively humble l e v e l  of 
subsis tence,  was f u r t h e r  underlined by a more common resentment a t  the  
widening gap between e f f o r t  and reward: 
"There's un fa i r  t reatment  i n  respec t  of money - more and more, we're no t  
on bonus, they keep adding and adding, we're producing q u i t e  a l o t  and 
t h e r e ' s  ha l f  the s t a f f  - a third...They c u t  t h e i r  running c o s t s ,  t h e y ' r e  
g e t t i n g  more work done w i t h  l e s s  men - lovely f o r  them, t h a t ' s  bus iness  
a i n ' t  it" (Jim and Alf, f i l l e r  opera tors ) .  
"Management's got greedy nowadays - they want more and more o u t  of  you 
f o r  l e s s  and l e s s  - more production f o r  no more money, more d e l i v e r i e s  
i n  t h e  same amount of time...You have a tendency t o  f e e l  we're doing the 
a c t u a l  work, they ' re  g e t t i n g  the  benef i t s .  I t  doesn ' t  a f f e c t  t h e  a c t u a l  
work, but  your a t t i t u d e  - you do t h e  job and t h a t ' s  it" (Pe te  W). 
Yet, however unsa t i s f ac to ry ,  i t  was money and money alone t h a t  was marked 
o u t  a s  the c e n t r a l  motivat ion both f o r  working a t  a l l  and a l s o  f o r  any 
involvement i n  o u t r i g h t  res i s tance :  
"I only come t o  work f o r  money so I can do t h e  b e s t  for my family - the  
s tandard o f  l i v i n g  is going t o  go down...If i t  comes down t o  rock bottom, 
might have t o  ge t  another  j o b  as  w e l l "  (George T, VCH dr ive r ) .  
"That's what we're h e r e  f o r  - we're a l l  he re  t o  work f o r  money. w e ' l l  
come o u t  f o r  money" (Jim h Alf, f i l l e r  ope ra to r s ) .  
i i i) So What Can You Do About It? worker Organisat ion and Resis tance a t  
BOC Wembley 
6 )  No more Numbers - t h e  Erosion of Employment 
The Wembley branch of BOC d i f f e red  from t h e  Landis 6 Gyr f ac to ry  in hav- 
i n g  had a long-term reputa t ion ,  damaged on ly  recent ly ,  f o r  impressive 
workplace s t r eng th  and organisat ion.  As t h e  convenor put  it: "We're in a 
weak pos i t i on  i n  recent  yea r s  compared t o  what i t  used t o  be. We used to  
-283- 
d i c t a t e  more or l e s s  what we wanted. I t ' s  t h e  h i g h  l e v e l s  of  unemploy 
men t . 'I 
Not o n l y  unemployment a s  such,  b u t  a l s o  t h e  change i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  O f  
t h e  Wembley branch i t s e l f  from t h e  s t r a t e g i c  centre of o p e r a t i o n s  in t h e  
Southern Region t o  what was p o t e n t i a l l y ,  w i t h  t h e  t r a n s f e r  t o  Thame, 
l i t t l e  more than a depo t ,  was behind t h i s  development. The compara t ive ly  
s t r o n g  p o s i t i o n  of  b o t h  t h e  b ranch  and t h e  union o r g a n i s a t i o n  w i t h i n  i t  
had been c l e a r  a s  r e c e n t l y  a s  1977, when Wembley d r i v e r s  had played a 
l e a d i n g  p a r t  i n  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  n a t i o n a l  four-week l o r r y  d r i v e r s '  d i s p u t e .  
T h i s  a p p a r e n t  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  t e n a c i t y  was, however, something o f  a 
temporary h a l t  in what was i n  fac t  a long term p r o c e s s  o f  d e c l i n e  i n  em- 
ployment and t h u s  o f  b a s i c  workplace s t r e n g t h ,  which t h e  conveuor d a t e d  
from 1964. Somewhat b e l a t e d l y ,  t h e  convenor now announced himself  d e t e r -  
mined t o  stem t h i s  flow, w h i l e  a t  t h e  same time d e m o n s t r a t i n g  h i s  aware- 
ness of t h e  i n e v i t a b l e  advance o f  "progress":  
"A l o t  of  peop le  have been made redundant - b u t  t h e y  were a l l  about  60,  
q u i t e  happy to go - b u t  now we're g e t t i n g  t o  t h e  s t a g e  where t h e  workforce 
i s  g e t t i n g  younger. We'll oppose on p r i n c i p l e ,  i t  w i l l  be opposed from 
now on...Obviously you c a n ' t  oppose p r o g r e s s ,  s ay  Thame, you c a n ' t  i n s i s t  
on m a i n t a i n i n g  j o b s  when t h e y ' v e  j u s t  disappeared.  B u t  l a t e r  we w i l l  have 
t o  have a p o l i c y  of  m a i n t a i n i n g  j o b s  because we w i l l  have a younger work- 
f o r c e  wi th  no i n t e n t i o n  of l e a v i n g .  We h a v e n ' t  adopted a Luddi te  s t a n c e  
- t h e r e ' s  no op t i o n  b u t  t o  change. BOC had t o  compete i n  t h e  market,  b u t  
w e  had no problem because  so many peop le  wanted t o  l e a v e  - we d i d n ' t  t r y  
t o  s t o p  them...In f u t u r e  we w i l l  f i g h t  i t  j o b  by j o b  - t h e  blokes work 
q u i t e  a l o t  of  overtimw - i t ' s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  say  t o  p e o p l e  We'll t a k e  pe- 
o p l e  o u t  o f  t h e  d o l e  queue, you drop  your ove r t ime .  It might be a l l r i g h t  
t o  have h i g h - f l y i n g  t h e o r i e s  abou t  t h e  25-hour week and so on, people  
j u s t  t h i n k  o f  themselves  and t h a t ' s  understandable ."  
In t h e s e  comments t h e  convenor expressed a number of c o n f l i c t i n g  p r e s s u r e s  
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and r e a l i t i e s  about the  s i t u a t i o n  f ac ing  t h e  BOC workforce. The almost 
casual  response by stewards and the  workforce t o  t h e  l a rgesca le  redund- 
anc ies  which had taken p lace  i n  the  p l an t  was, i t  i s  true, based on the  
accura te  assessment t ha t ,  as  o l d e r  workers, these were personal ly  qu i t e  
happy t o  leave behind a l i f e t i m e  o f  gr inding  t o i l  a t  BOC and receive what 
were by a l l  accounts subs t an t i a l  payoffs. A t  the  same time t h e  f a c t  rem- 
ained t h a t  the  redundancies had not  been fought, and t h i s ,  a s  well as  ef-  
f e c t i v e l y  allowing t h e  u l t imate  rundown of the  branch, had p u t  t h e  conve- 
nor  and stewards i n t o  a pos i t i on  where they were going t o  have to  summon 
up r e s i s t ance  from a very low base. There was no reason why t h e  convenor 
should have much c r e d i b i l i t y  i n  the  ma t t e r  of f i g h t i n g  redundancies or 
indeed i n  taking a very s t rong s tand over  any i s s u e  aga ins t  management, 
an image which was re inforced  by some of t h e  weaknesses i n  h i s  own pas t  
behaviour and t h e  union organisa t ion  i n  t h e  p l an t  genera l ly ,  t o  be looked 
a t  i n  more d e t a i l  below. 
Thus, while i t  was indeed by now urgent ly  necessary t o  f i g h t  redundancies 
"job by job" given t h a t  whatever s l ack  t h e r e  had been i n  t h e  workforce 
was decidedly used up, t h e  l ike l ihood of e f f e c t i v e  ac t ion  seemed low, 
and was f u r t h e r  lowered by the  two o t h e r  f a c t o r s  t h e  convenor had ment- 
ioned; t h e  workers' s t rong  adherence t o  overtime, a l ready  discussed above, 
and t k e  s t r u c t u r a l  "necess i t ies"  t h a t  d i c t a t e d  events  such as the  t rans-  
f e r  t o  Thame. 
There was, of course,  no ob jec t ive  reason why t h e  workers should have 
had t o  s a c r i f i c e  t h e i r  overtime, or a t  l e a s t  the earnings accruing from 
i t ,  i n  order  t o  g e t  fellow-workers o f f  t h e  dole,  but  t h e r e  was a s t rong 
acceptance amongst many of  even the  "gui l ty"  workers t h a t  i t  was t h e i r  
greed i n  working overtime t h a t  was c r e a t i n g  unemployment. Perhaps unsur- 
pr i s ing ly ,  the  convenor was unable t o  provide,  or even consider  looking 
for ,  any s t r a t e g y  t h a t  could go beyond t h e  s a c r i f i c e  of  one or other  
group of workers. 
On the  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  of t h e  company, s p e c i f i c a l l y  the t r a n s f e r  of  l i q u i d  
- 2 8 5 -  
gas d i s t r i b u t i o n  t o  Thame, while i t  was t r u e  t h a t ,  a s  Paul M from d i s -  
pensers  had sa id ,  "it made sense" to  c e n t r a l i s e  opera t ions  t h e r e  given 
t h e  e x i s t i n g  production and d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  l i q u i d  gases a t  Thame (no t  
t o  mention the cheaper r a t e s  p reva i l i ng  t h e r e )  a t  the  same time t h e  rem- 
o r se l e s sness  of t h e  dec is ion ,  with i t s  t r a i l  of redundancies (a  f u r t h e r  
16 being announced towards the  end of t h e  r e sea rch  per iod)  expressed 
only too fo rc ib ly  t h e  way in whioh these  workers, trapped by the  move- 
ments of a vas t  conglomerate l i k e  BOC, seemed in a very r e a l  sense power- 
l e s s  t o  inf luence  t h e i r  f a t e .  I t  was as though a t  BOC Wembley the  t r a d i t -  
i o n a l  workplace o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  t a c t i c s  which had worked f o r  the  p a s t  
twenty or t h i r t y  yea r s  were now enter ing  t h e i r  f i n a l  phase, while  a t  
Landis & Gyr new groups o f  workers were t ak ing  up and t r y i n g  out  these  
t a c t i c s .  The s t rugg le  a t  Lendis & Gyr was in some ways J u s t  beginning; 
a t  Wembley i t  appeared t o  be ending. However, the  p i c t u r e  was n o t  i n  a l l  
ways pessimist ic .  
b )  New Stewards and Old Tr i cks  - Weaknesses in Workplace Organisat ion 
One of the  major problems fac ing  cu r ren t  workplace organisa t ion  a t  the 
branch was t h a t  t h e  waves of redundancy had c a r r i e d  off  with them n o t  
on ly  t h e  "old men" i n  genera l  but a l so  the  o ld ,  i n  o ther  words experienced, 
shop stewards ( s e e  Terry 1984 for a re ference  t o  t h i s  development in in- 
dus t ry  general ly) .  The convenor himself had only held o f f i c e  f o r  t h e  l a s t  
two o r  three  years ,  and was general ly  regarded a s  i n f e r i o r  t o  h i s  prede- 
cessor:  so much so t h a t  a steward from another  branch had r ecen t ly  been 
e l e c t e d  as  Chair of  t h e  Southern Region shop stewards'  committee, a pos- 
i t i o n  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  he ld  by the convenor a t  Wembley. The most r ecen t  ex- 
ample of the convenor's ahortcomings had been the  d ispute  among t h e  s i t e  
s e r v i c e s  workers, i n  which the  convenor had been absent from the  s i t e  a t  
t h e  c r u c i a l  time and had f a i l e d  t 6  yse h i s  i n f luence  to  persuade manage- 
ment t o  maintain s t a t u s  quo or grant  t h e  s i t e  se rv ices  workers compen- 
s a t i o n  fo r  t h e i r  l o s t  earnings.  
The new and l e s s  experienced stewards were i n  general ,  according t o  Alan 
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and o t h e r  workers from dispensers ,  an easy prey f o r  managerial w i l e s  
which involved buying t h e  stewards dr inks a f t e r  meetings and otherwise 
exposing them t o  the  f u l l  f o r c e  of managerial ideology: 
"The lack of a fu l l - t ime  convenor, fo r  example, i s  company policy... 
Other management ways of undermining shop steward organisa t ion  - l i k e  
a f t e r  meetings they'd a l l  go of f  t o  the pub - n o t  necessa r i ly  doing dea ls ,  
but  workers think t h e r e ' l l  be dea ls ,  so cynicism grows. Also they t r y  to  
bu i ld  up company loya l ty ,  e spec ia l ly  w i t h  t h e  stewards,  they take  them 
o f f  t o  a country house, show them the c h a r t s  and so on - even among t h e  
most m i l i t a n t  stewards you g e t  the  argument t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  exceptions,  
you have t o  p ro tec t  customer x" (Alan). 
Such managerial " t r icks" ,  however, could be e f f e c t i v e  largely because 
t h e r e  was no longer any very s i g n i f i c a n t  g ra s s roo t s  organisa t ion  on s i t e ,  
or indeed much l e f t  of t h e  combine s t r u c t u r e  which a t  one time had backed 
up shop stewards i n  t h e  company a s  a whole: 
"In 1 9 7 7 ,  when we had t h a t  s t r i k e ,  we had a combine throughout t h e  com- 
pany, bu t  t h a t  was broken up by the  na t iona l  o f f i c i a l s .  In  1980-1, t h e r e  
was a t h r e a t  t o  t h e  Corby a i t e . . t h e  combine was going to  meet but  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  o f f i c i a l s  stopped i t  - t h e  combine hasn ' t  met since"(A1an). 
This  lack of a s t rong  o u t s i d e  organisa t ion  was r e f l ec t ed  i n  t h e  branch 
i n  a f a l l i ng -o f f  of t h e  once important t r ade  union branch and s i t e  meet- 
ings  which had taken p l a c e  a t  Wembley. This  e ros ion  of g ra s s roo t s  parti- 
c i p a t i o n  i n  uaion a f f a i r s  was blamed by Alan f o r  management's increased  
a b i l i t y  t o  spread rumours and  s p l i t  the  workforce: 
"Tou c a n ' t  c a l l  s i te  meetings - we're always r e a c t i n g  to management, we 
don ' t  have a policy.  We're n o t  r e a l l y  weak here ,  but  we're not  wel l  org- 
anised...klanagement d e l i b e r a t e l y  s t a r t  whispering campaigns, f o r  example 
s i t e  se rv ices  - t h e r e ' s  n o t  a l o t  of d i f f e rence  between groups but  man- 
agement d e l i b e r a t e l y  spreads  the myth t h a t  some groups ge t  more - they 
i s o l a t e d  the  s i t e  s e r v i c e s  workers, they obscured t h e  r e a l  i s sue  - when 
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overtime has gone, t h e  group has  always been conpensated f o r  one p a r  
- they broke t h i s ,  broke procedure - they d i d  the same t o  t h e  f i t t e r s  
t h e  week before" (Alan). 
The "union" on s i t e  was a l s o  seen as having been r e spons ib l e  f o r  the  
condoning and spread o f  overtime, with its consequences f o r  d e s t a f f i n g  
and redundancy: 
/Why so much overtime?/"Because of the  union, I think...At t h e  moment 
they do encourage overtime. Aanagement isn'  t w o r r i e d ,  i t  means they don't 
have t o  employ someone e l se .  The union should be doing i t  t h e  o t h e r  way 
round, g e t t i n g  more people working...All overtime on the s i t e  should 
have been stopped u n t i l  everyone's sor ted  out t h e i r  jobs" (Paul  M, d i s -  
pens e r s  ) . 
B u t  the  f a c t  was t h a t  on a day-to-day b a s i s  t h e  stewards were both forced 
into, and accepted, t h e i r  "other" r o l e  of defending t h e i r  own and t h e i r  
members' s tandards  of l i v ing  by maintaining a n d  where poss ib l e  increasing 
l e v e l s  of overtime. It was t h i s  cont ra ry  pressure which was behind one of 
t h e  most s e r ious  s e c t i o n a l  weaknesses on the  s i t e ,  t h e  j e a l o u s  guarding 
by s p e c i f i c  groups of workers of t h e i r  oppor tun i t i e s  fo r  overtime. 
c )  Workplace Sect ional ism a t  Wembley 
As Paul M went on t o  say: 
"Dominic"(the fo rk  l i f t  t ruck  d r ive r  shop steward) "said you a i n ' t  coming 
down here  and s topping  our overtime." 
The p l i g h t  of t h e  d i spensers ,  six vacancies i n  search of a p o s t  elsewhere 
on t h e  s i t e ,  n e a t l y  i l l u s t r a t e d  t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  s e t s  of worker i n t e r e s t s  
which coalesced round t h e  i s sue  of overtime. Rather t h a n  welcoming the 
e x t r a  manpower brought by the  dispensers  as represent ing  a l i gh ten ing  of 
t h e i r  load, workgroups i n  t h e  Central  F i l l i n g  Area adopted a "dog-in-the- 
manger"-ish a t t i t u d e  t o  any possible  s lackening  in t h e  t i g h t  s t a f f i n g  pro-  
v i s i o n s  which might threaten t h e i r  oppor tun i t i e s  f o r  "coverage". This a t -  
t i t u d e ,  in f a c t ,  had been responsible  f o r  the  workers' o r i g i n a l  reluctance 
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t o  leave the  o ld  docks and accept  i n t eg ra t ion  i n t o  t h e  Central  F i l l i n g  
Area. 
Mick, t h e  CFA shop steward, summed up some of t hese  responses: 
"When you've got a group of men you've got  l i t t l e  bene f i t s ,  so when they 
want to  change yon lo se  a l l  them, s t a r t  from scra tch ."  (Uhat sort of ben- 
e f i t s ? )  "You don ' t  want t o  lo se  overtime, th ings  l i k e  that...I don ' t  reck- 
on any change bene f i t s  workers - i t  might be e a s i e r ,  but t h e r e ' s  less mon- 
ey i n  your pocket. Having an e a s i e r  job doesn ' t  pay the  b i l l s . ' '  On t h e  is- 
sue of t h e  dispensers ,  he went on: "The Central  F i l l i n g  Area doesn ' t  want 
more, because of overtime and coverage. The d ispensers  went out  of  t h e  
Cent ra l  F i l l i n g  Area, t h e r e  were jobs vacant h e r e  and they wouldn't take 
them, now they want t o  come back - we went o u t  o f  t h e  gate  t o  ge t  what 
we've got"  ( r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  three-week s t r i k e  i n  t h e  f i l l i n g  area 18 
months before)."Ue've done a l l  our negot ia t ing ,  w e  don ' t  want more." 
A common aspect  of  workplace sect ional ism,  a s  we saw a t  Landis 6 Gyr, i s  
t o  blame another group of workers f o r  some aspec t  of  support t h a t  has  n o t  
been forthcoming in t h e  past .  In f a c t  the  d i spense r s  had had l i t t l e  choice 
but  t o  "go out" of t h e  Cent ra l  F i l l i n g  Area i n  t h e  general  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  
of t h e  workforce t h a t  was t ak ing  place a t  t h i s  time. B u t  t h e  stewards i n  
t h e  a rea  showed l i t t l e  sympathy fo r ,  indeed d isp layed  pos i t i ve  h o s t i l i t y  
towards, t h e  dispensers  i n  t h e i r  current  p l igh t .  
Another f a c t o r  which exacerbated sect ional ism i n  t h e  p l an t  was t h e  i n s t -  
i t u t i o n a l i s e d  racism which had ex is ted  f o r  a s  long as anyone could remem- 
ber. P u t  a t  i t s  b lun te s t ,  I r i s h  workers worked i n  t h e  Central  F i l l i n g  
Area, English workers were d r i v e r s ,  and West Indian  workers were found 
i n  t h e  veh ic l e  maintenance a rea .  Although t h i s  l a t t e r  grouping presumably 
d id  not d a t e  back t o  t h e  founding of the p l an t ,  t h e  prevalence of I r i s h -  
men i n  Central  F i l l i n g  c e r t a i n l y  went back t o  t h e  time when t h i s  work was 
predominantly t h e  "humping" around of heavy metal  bo t t l e s .  As the  convenor 
put  it: "At one time t h e  v a s t  major i ty  of people were I r i s h ,  because t h e  
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work was so hard...people came from 
The r a c i a l  d i v i s i o n s  e x i s t i n g  in t h e  workforce d id  not  so much display 
themselves i n  open h o s t i l i t y  a s  under l ine  t h e  perceived c o n f l i c t s  of 
i n t e r e s t  between d i f f e r e n t  groups of workers i n  t h e  p lan t .  I n  pa r t i cu la r ,  
perhaps, the  c u l t u r a l  t r a d i t i o n s  of English and I r i s h  workers were very 
d i f f e r e n t ,  t h e  d r i v e r s  seeing themselves a s  somewhat cunning opera tors  
while t h e  f i l l i n g  workers were to  some ex ten t  s t i l l  regarded a s  bra in less  
labourers.  
I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h i s ,  however, i t  was d i f f i c u l t  n o t  t o  sometimes take an 
o p t i m i s t i c  view of t h e  e f f e c t s  of working together  on d i f f e r e n t  cu l tures ,  
when witnessing t h e  frequent  uproarious outbreaks of t e a s i n g  and laugh- 
t e r  which would t a k e  p lace  in t h e  canteen between the  black garage workers 
and the  female I r i s h  canteen a s s i s t a n t s .  
hr;lding s i t e s  on t o  here." 
d )  S t i l l  Some S p i r i t  L e f t  - Continued R e s i s t i c e  a t  Wembley 
On the  "opt imist ic"  s i d e  a l so  (depending on one's poin t  of view) was the 
f a c t  t h a t ,  while workplace organisa t ion  a t  Wembley was by no means the  
fo rce  t h a t  i t  had been, over t  r e s i s t a n c e  was s t i l l  common amongst workers 
in the  sense t h a t  spontaneous walkouts were a f a r  more common fea tu re  of 
management/worker i n t e r a c t i o n  than they had been, f o r  example, a t  Landis 
& Gyr. While both Alan and the  convenor mourned t h e  passing of  the  so l id  
s t r i k e  a t  Wembley. both gave examples of very recent  stoppages: 
(Alan) "When you had a s t r i k e  before,  you J u s t  walked o f f ,  no p icke t ,  no 
asking f o r  support  - now you need s i t e  meetings. The l a s t  one - t h r e e  
d r i v e r s  wanted t o  t ake  voluntary redundancy, went f o r  o t h e r  Jobs,  then 
were to ld  they cou ldn ' t  have t h e i r  redundancy money. So the  o t h e r  groups 
stopped." 
(Convenor) "I t ' s  more of a reac t ion  than an ac t ion  s i t u a t i o n  now - you 
could ge t  the  s i t e  t o  r e a c t  a t  the  drop  o f  a ha t  - you could g e t  s t r i k e s ,  
i t  was a doddle, b u t  no t  now. The i s sues?  Mostly over  wages. J u s t  now 
we're in t h a t  s i t u a t i o n  again. You d i s s i p a t e  your energy. We had a small 
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s t r i k e  on Friday - t h e  s i t e  serv ices  management sa id  they couldn ' t  
work weekend* any more. I f  t h i s  e sca l a t e s ,  w e  could have a two-week 
s t r i k e ,  t h e n  we'd d i s s i p a t e  our energies  f o r  any longer s t r i ke  over 
pay." 
I t  was a s  i f ,  d e s p i t e  the.weakness and non-par t ic ipa tory  na tu re  of 
workplace organisa t ion ,  and the  powerful f o r c e s  which workers were up 
aga ins t ,  they continued t o  r eac t  i n  t h e  same way t h a t  had served them 
f o r  so many years.  An i n s t a n c e  of r e s i s t ance  which would have been a 
major event a t  Landis 6 Gyr was an almost casua l ,  everyday occurrence 
a t  Wembley. Currently,  such sporadic r e s i s t a n c e  gave no h i n t  of t h e  dev- 
elopment of any p o s i t i v e  long-term s t r a t egy  f o r  t h e  workers a t  t h e  p l a n t ,  
and indeed seemed r a t h e r  t o  r e in fo rce  t h e i r  powerlessness in i t s  sec- 
t i o n a l  nature ,  but a t  the  same t ime the re  were rank-and-f i le  murmurings, 
in t h e i r  own way rooted in the  m i l i t a n t  t r a d i t i o n s  in t h e  pas t ,  which 
seemed t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a more e f f e c t i v e  involvement by 
workers i n  the s t rugg les  which lay ahead, 
CONCLUSIONS 
In  looking a t  t h e  responses  of t h e  workforce a t  both Uembley and l a n d i s  
6 Gyr our main concern has been whether or n o t  t h e y  bear o u t  our c e n t r a l  
t h e o r e t i c a l  hypothesis about  the  economistic n a t u r e  both of r e s i s t a n c e  
and consent by workers, and the  c e n t r a l i t y  of exp lo i t a t ion  in workers' 
experience of t h e  labour process.  As a t  Landis 6 Gyr, the  responses of  
workers a t  Uembley can be taken a s  la rge ly  support ing t h i s  hypothesis.  
Far from seeking increased  con t ro l  over t h e i r  work, these workers ac t ive -  
ly,  or perhaps i tvshould  be sa id  passively,  r e s i s t e d  such add i t iona l  d i s -  
c r e t i o n ,  seeing t h e i r  work c e n t r a l l y  in terms of making a l iving.  
. 
As we have seen, t h e  main d r iv ing  fo rce  behind worker response and 
r e s i s t a n c e  a t  Wembley was t h e  i s sue  of overtime, which both provided a 
shoring-up of b a s i c  subs is tence  and a l so  v i t i a t e d  any e f f e c t i v e  s t r u g g l e  
t o  hold on to  jobs.  I t  was only now t h a t  t h i s  s t rugg le  was becoming 
urgent ,  and the  de jec ted  f aces  of the  s i t e  s e rv i ces  workers on hearing 
t h e  announcement of s i r t e e n  more redundancies spoke only too c l e a r l y  of 
t h e  r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  s t r u g g l e  might now be too l a t e .  
The workers' exc lus ive  concern with immediate "economistic" i ssues ,  i n  
o t h e r  words w i t h  t h e i r  s t anda rds  of l iv ing ,  had indeed l e d  them i n t o  
something of an impasse i n  which sect ional ism and t h e  lack o f  any long- 
term s t r a t e g y  would now al low management, a s  one of  the  c e n t r a l  f i l l i n g  
workers p u t  it, to  "pick u s  o f f  one by one". But what had got them i n t o  
t h i s  p o s i t i o n  was p rec i se ly  t h e  d i r e c t  and short- term economism which i n  
i t s e l f  has  gone l a rge ly  unrecognised i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  Although the re  
was some adhermce t o  managerial  ideology among t h e  workforce and t h e i r  
r ep resen ta t ives ,  i t  was n o t  t h i s  which had weakened them but the  d a i l y  
s t r u g g l e  t o  keep up an acceptab le  standard of l i v i n g  aga ins t  what were 
by now overwhelming odds - odds n o t  of a d r ive  f o r  managerial domination 
for i t s  own sake but of t h e  ha r sh  r e a l i t i e s  of  t h e  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  of a 
mul t ina t iona l  conglomerate. 
In our  t h e o r e t i c a l  c r i t i q u e  of t h e  labour process  debate  "control" t h e s i s ,  
w e  sought t o  d i s t ingu i sh  t h e  sepa ra t e  s t rands  which entered i n t o  the  as- 
sumption t h a t  "control" i s  what workers seek a t  work. These f e l l  i n t o  
t h r e e  main areas:  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  of labour power i n t o  lab- 
our ,  t h e  c e n t r a l i t y  of worker c r e a t i v i t y ,  and r e s i s t a n c e  to  managerial 
domination, which is again seen as aimed a t  con t ro l  p e r  se. 
On any of these  c r i t e r i a ,  t h e  workers both of BOC and of l and i s  & Gyr f a i l  
t o  conform t o  t h e  "control" t h e s i s .  In  both cases,  t h e  workers displayed 
a s t o i c a l  "wil l ingness  t o  work" which was s t r u c t u r e d  by the understanding 
o f  t h e  provis ion  of t h e i r  labour  a s  p a r t  of a bargain so fundamental t o  
t h e i r  ex i s t ence  a s  sellers of labour  power t h a t  i t s  o v e r a l l  r a t iona le  
went unquestioned. True, a s  t h e  Branch Manager pointed o u t ,  h i s  employees 
f a i l e d  t o  take t o t a l  rcspons ib i  l i t y  f o r  the  outcome of t h e i r  jobs;  b u t  
t h i s  re fwsa l  was not based on any e x p l i c i t  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  the  surrendering 
of labour t o  an expropr ia t ing  employer, but  simply on t h e  assessment 
t h a t  any su rve i l l ance  of work beyond a c e r t a i n  poin t  was not what they 
were paid for .  
On worker knowledge, workers were indeed cyn ica l ly  aware both t h a t  they 
knew more about t h e  j o b  than management and a l so  t h a t  management was not  
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e i r  knowledge, indeed j ea lous ly  guarded t h e i r  own "expert- 
ise".  But  t h i s  recogni t ion  was n o t  accompanied by any i n t e n s e  resentment, 
nor was i t  a t  any time a c a t a l y s t  f o r  o v e r t  r e s i s t ance  a g a i n s t  management. 
Rather, such r e a l i t i e s  were accepted with a casual  r e s igna t ion ,  an a i r  of 
"What e l s e  can you expect". Although workers were well  aware t h a t  in some 
a reas  "we run t h i s  place", any d e s i r e  t o  take  i t  over was f a r  from being 
on the  agenda. 
F ina l ly ,  a s  w e  saw in discuss ions  with management, even among t h e  m o s t  
combative of  shop stewards and t h e  workgroups c o n s t i t u t i n g  most of an ir-  
r i t a n t  t o  management, what was a t  i s s u e  was not  any s t r u g g l e  f o r  "power" 
o r  "control" but  simply what the  managers defined a s  "personal gain" i e ,  
on the  whole, money. When d r i v e r s  i n s i s t e d  on e x t r a  overt ime f o r  being 
kept  wai t ing by t h e  garage, what they were looking f o r  was overtime, no t  
a chance t o  score aga ins t  management or t h e  foreman. As  we saw, the Wem- 
bley workforce's  former f o r t r e s s - l i k e  pos i t i on  was based more on t h e  s t r a t -  
eg i c  s ign i f i cance  of  t h e  branch f o r  t h e  region, and t h e  o v e r a l l  l eve l s  of 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  involved i n  t r anspor t ing  gas,  than on any coherent  plan f o r  
overwhelming management with worker power. The lack of  any such plan was, 
of course,  p a r t l y  respons ib le  f o r  the  pos i t i on  t h e  Wembley workers now 
found themselves in. B u t  i t  remains important t o  recognise  t h a t  workers 
ac ted  i n  the  pas t ,  and s t i l l  a c t ,  because of immediate economic pressures  
and not  a s  p a r t  of any p o l i t i c a l  s t r u g g l e  f o r  "control". 
What we appear t o  be l e f t  w i t h ,  then, i s  a bleak and f r u i t l e s s  economism. 
B u t  i t  i s  economism, and it is important t o  recognise i t  f o r  what i t  is .  
Once we do so, i t  may be poss ib le  t o  acknowledge and p ick  o u t  the  p o l i t -  
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i c a l  impl ica t ions  and p o t e n t i a l  of such e x i s t i n g  responses by workers, 
a s  w a s  attempted i n  Chapters 4 and 5 of t h i s  t h e s i s .  B u t  while labour 
process  writers continue t o  assume t h a t  workers e r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
th ings  they a re  not  i n  f a c t  i n t e r e s t e d  in ,  the s t rugg les  of workers 
l i k e  those a t  Landis 6 Gyr and BOC Wembley w i l l  remain unrecognised, or 
a t  l e a s t  misunderstood. 
CWMER EIGHT 
Conclusions 
The arguments w i t h i n  t h i s  t h e s i s  have f a l l e n  i n t o  t h r e e  main 
groups: a c r i t i q u e  of e x i s t i n g  l a k u r  process t h e o r y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
t h e  concept  of "control";  t h e  es tab l i shment  of a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  
a n a l y s i s  of t h e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  cap i ta l i s t  l abour  process, cen t r ed  on 
t h e  r e l a t i o n  of e x p l o i t a t i o n ;  and a theory  of r e s i s t a n c e  and 
consc iousness  w i t h i n  t h e  l abour  process i n  which these economic 
categories are emphasised. 
T h e o r e t i c a l  Arguments 
In  t h i s  concluding chapter w e  shall review t h e  arqments i n  t u r n ,  
c o n t i n u i n g  wi th  an attempt to  summarise them i n  terms of the  c e n t r a l  
t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n s t r u c t s  con ta ined  wi th in  t h e  t h e s i s .  h'e shall then 
assess t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  of the empirical data p r e s e n t e d  wi th in  t h e  
t h e s i s  to t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  hypotheses.  F i n a l l y ,  w e  attempt to look to  
t h e  f u t u r e  i n  t ens  of b o t h  the "objective" and "subjec t ive"  developments 
w i t h i n  t h e  labour  process which have been examined i n  t h e  t h e s i s  as a 
whole. 
( i )  C r i t i q u e  of t h e  C r i t i q u e s  
I n  our i n t r o d u c t o r y  chapter w e  s a w  that t h e  "labour process  debate" 
of t h e  last decade or 50 has c o n s i s t e d  mostly of criticisms of 
Bravesman (1974). Braveman is lauded for having p laced  t h e  concept  
of " the  labour  process" back on t h e  agenda of e x p l o r a t i o n s  of Work, 
and i n  this sense  i t  is  implicit  that a Marxist approach to t h e  s t u d y  
of work i s  seen as bo th  welcome and innovatory.  A t  t h e  same time, 
&ever ,  fundamental criticisms of Bravemm's approach a r e  made 
which, w e  have argued i n  o u r  own c r i t i q u e  of these pos t -Bravemn 
arguments, i n  t h e i r  c o n t e n t  and impl i ca t ions  appear to cance l  o u t  
much of t h e  Wandsn" to which t h e i r  a u t h o r s  profess to ascribe. 
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In itself the simultaneous embracing of and criticism of hrx  
is, of course, no crime; i n  fact i t  can be sa id  to have been the 
lifeblood of the developent  of Elarxisn and a l l  other fonns of 
critical social theory. In this case, hcwever, w h a t  we have arwed 
throughout the thesis fo be a crucial  "absence11 in cu r ren t  labour 
process theory is  the fa i lure .  w h e t h e r  del iberate  or otherwise, t o  
apply major, part icular ly  economic, categories of Elarxist theory to 
tbe analysis  of thestructure  and management of work a t  the  point of 
production. 
An h p o r t a n t  and i n  many ways valid reason for th is ,  as acknmledged 
i n  Chapter (kre, is the postwar reaction amongst Marxists against  
~*cconanic determinism", itself a response both to Stalinism and the 
r e j e c t i o n  of revolutionary ideas by a comparatively affluent Western 
working class, w h i c h  has coalesced i n  the movement kKvn as Western 
Mzxism''.  A cr i t ique  of many of the ideas represented by t h i s  mvemnt,  
which are seen as leading away fmm the ident i f icat ion of central  
amtradictims of c a p i t a l i s t  class re lat ions,  is  offered i n  Chapters 
One and Five. Fbr our purposes, the importance of these ideas is that 
they are arwed to have cent ra l ly  influenced current theories of the 
labour process and thus to have had a parallel influence within this 
area i n  concentrating analysis  alwst exclusively on the superstructural 
- political and ideological - aspects of capitalist production relations.  
m i s  concern w i t h  the superstructural i s  echoed, w e  have arwed, w i t h i n  
c r i t i ques  of Bravenmn by a corresponding emphasis on the subjective 
i n  the analysis of worker response w h i c h  is shown i n  m y  of its 
expressions to echo thc -erns of an earlier "industrial Sojaopy". 
The continued awphasis on the subjective experience of work (reminiscent 
of such themes as "job satisfaction". Worker m ~ t i v a t i o n ' ~  and ~ 
mauneri te  vorsion of "alienation"),  the repr~rch of Brave- for 
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paying insufficient heed to the character of social rda t ionsh ips  a t  
work, and the unquestioncd pr ior i t i sa t ion  of the qua l i ta t ive  wn ten t  
of work, a l l  echo themes CQmwn w i t h i n  t rad i t iona l  industr ia l  sociology. 
Most of the major themes w i t h i n  the  labour process debate so far can, 
then, w e  have argued, be related t o  one or other  of these theoretical 
currents. The pervasive focussing within the debate on issues  of 
h i n a t i o n  and SubordiMtiOn i n  managment-worker relations, for 
e-ple, reflects the general concern within Western hBrxisa with 
superstructural issues ,  w h i l e  analyses of w o r k e r  response i n  terms 
of hegemonic mnsensus (such as those of Burawoy (1979, 1985) and 
Lazonick (1983) are a more sophisticated extension of the same 
theoretical perspective. The equally widelpshared assumption 
that what i s  primarily a t  stake w i t h i n  the labour process are issues  
relatcd t o  the qua l i t a t ive  content of work and workers' response to 
such issues raises the question of p r e c i s e l y  i n  w h a t  respect the 
debate has gone beyond industr ia l  sociology. par t icular ly  given the 
ooncern of sow r e c e n t  writers with constructing typologies of work, 
and the increasing trend towards contingency theory. 
Tht issues  w h i c h  the contanporary labour pmcess debate has raisrd, 
around both of these trro thcontical axs, a n  neither unimportant nor 
irrelevant.  What is lacking - and this thesis has been an attmpt to 
redress that lack - is any clear attempt to locate such issues  w i t h i n  
the frammmrk of the system within w h i c h  they are i n  fact located - 
that is, the capitalist mode of production. Such a location would 
m u i r e  a further a p l o a t i o n  of the inpacts of that mode of production 
on the labour process i tself;  and th is ,  with our discussion of, 
for example, the intensif icat ion and abstraction of l abur  on one hand, 
and the centring of worker response on a reward-effort d s ,  we have 
attempted to do. The o\nrwhelming anphsis within labour process 
theory so far, however. has been on a content-related view of work  
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which effect ively disregards the economic Context, i n  terms of the 
overriding pressure for valorisation. within w h i c h  t ha t  work takes 
place. As such it has been criticised as expressing a profoundly 
ahistorical view of the labour process which is  perhaps most  c l e a r l y  
represented in the use of the  term %ontrolft. 
The theme of "control", as w e  s a w  (Chapter Z ) ,  w h i l e  widely used by 
labour process theorists, has been defined and specified by very few 
of than (though Cressey and MacInnes and Storey, fo r  example, see 
the need for such a definit ion).  A t  the same time, the concept 
appears to represent a crucial  aspect, the nervecentre almost, of post- 
Braverman perspectives on the labour process. In our second chapter 
w e  set out to chart the dimensions of this concept as used by a range 
of labour process w r i t e r s .  Its use was broken dmm i n t o  three major 
areas: the t ranslat ion of labour power i n t o  labour, the  nature of 
social relat ianships  within the labour process, and the c r e a t i v i w  of 
labour. 
Each of these groups of a r w n t s ,  w h i l e  i n  their own terms inaccurate, 
we have maintained, i n  ref lect ing the real M~UFS of managerial strategy 
and worker response, more importantly raise fundamenw questions as 
to our perspectives on and interpretat ion of the c a p i t a l i s t  labour 
process. ult imately a l l  three strands of the %mtrol*~ approach reflect 
a concretely pmduction- oriented view of the  labour proass (pmduction 
of use- rather than a x d u n ~ ~ l u e )  which iQlores the histnriUl 
context i n  which t ha t  production takcs place. 
The view that labour has to be coerced out  of labour-per once 
purchased, for atample, suggzsts first of all t h a t  the use-value of 
labour-pavor continues to reside with the  worker, i n  terms of the 
worker's freedaa to create useful objects (as in a "natural" labour 
p-ss i n  which labour simply in t e rac t s  with the -s of p d u c t i m ,  
which are its objects). Within capitalism, &ever, the 
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use-value of labour-power is the creation of surplus value - that 
is w h a t  labour i s  for. As such, labour takes place w i t h i n  a structure 
shaped by the objective of valorisation i n  which, as I.8rx indicates 
par t icu lar ly  with his concept of the real subordination of labour, the 
relationship between the labourer and the means of production is 
cruc ia l ly  reversed so that the labourer becomes the instrument of the 
means of production rather than the other way round. 
In everyday terms t h i s  means, as w e  have argued throughout the thesis, 
that  most workers have l i t t le  choice but to work up to certain levels 
of intensif icat ion ef labour. What  is more, as w e  have also arwed 
throughout. worker resistancc is concentrated not a t  the point of 
t rans i t ion  from labour paver to labour but precisely a t  the point a t  
w h i c h  such levels of intensif icat ion are contested.  In other words, 
res is tance is not to the alieMtiOII of labour, but to its intensif icat ion 
beyond the contested point; a point itself defined pa r t ly  i n  terms of 
what it is  possible for workers to do and pare by w h a t  they regard 
as involved in the sale of their labour p e r  as a comod~ ' ty .  
This second point, the s t a tus  of labour powor as a ' ty ,  has 
increasingly ken q u e s t i d  by recent writers as part of the overall 
p r io r i t i s a t ion  of ideological and political factors i n  the analysis 
of t h e  labxu p-ss. As we argue i n  chapters 2 and 3, th sale of 
labour pomr as a ~~RWCII ' t y  i s  i n  fact central to tre w hole relationship, 
itself the f~fomdaticm'* of the apitalist mode of production, of the 
creation of surplus value; and it is thc role ef subsistence (the price 
of labour ptwer) i n  rehktion to defining t h i s  surplus t h a t  workers 
implici t ly  rccoQlise i n  th i r  conception of 'Working for a living". 
Relationships which have been viewed by labour process writers i n  t h e  
wake of Braveman as revolving primarily round the exercise of 
domination and subordimtion i n  the creation of use-values can thus 
be seen from an e n t i r e l y  different  perspective once the prior i ty  of 
exchange-value creation under capitalism is brought i n to  the picture. 
Relations of domination and subordination (as  w e l l  as the creationof 
use-values) exist, after a l l ,  i n  class Society, and this is 
one reason why w e  have called the post-Braverman perspective on the 
labour  process 'fahistorical". 
Another reason is encapsulated i n  the qhasis of writers such as 
for example Cressey and EgcInnes, whose  work is discussed at  length 
i n  Chapter 2, on the creative p o t e n t i a l  of labour. This in t r ins ic  
c rea t iv i ty  is  said to pose a cent ra l  contradiction (one cited also 
by Storey and a s s e n t e d  t o  by L i t t l e r  and Salaman) between capitalist 
pat terns  of "efficiency'l such as hierarchies and different ia t ion of 
function, and the creative i n i t i a t i v e s  w h i c h  are both possible and i n  
fact essent ia l  for workers to a m t n h t e  to the labour process. 
Wi th in  t h i s  argument "efficiency" i n  the orpanisation of work and 
production tas been ident i f ied  w i t h  "control" i n  the repressive 
political sense, a re la t ian  which is held solely to emerge fmm the 
overall political re la t ions  of -nation and subordination which 
characterise capitalism. As we have argued in Uapter 2, this make5 
tbe foxms of f k o n t r o l "  cited by Cressey and h@cInnes inexpliwble 
i n  their mvn r ight ,  apart fmp as instruments for thc rcprcssion of 
the worwOra per se- 
In Contrast, within t h i s  thesis w e  have tried ta d r a w  a t tent ion ta a 
spec i f ica l ly  capitalist d p  of ffefficimcy'f in which r-ts of the 
ormnisa t ion  and intansifiiortion of labour like detai led t a sk  
different.ht.ien may arguably be "Flloglcal" i n  principle but rake perfect 
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sense i n  r e l a t ion  to the economic ob jec t ives  of capitalisan. tiere, 
despite the contri trution which q u a l i t a t i v e  w o r k e r  knowledge could 
and should make to t h e  organisa t ion  of production, the emphasis i s  
on speed, output ,  in te rchangeabi l i ty ,  s tandard isa t ion .  Work is 
atomised and abstract r a t h e r  than rich i n  complex, integra*& and 
variable c o n t e n t ;  the criteria of e f f i c i e n t  production under 
capi ta l i sm are q u a n t i t a t i v e ,  no t  q u a l i t a t i v e .  
I n  p u t t i n g  this argument we have reversed David Gordon's dictum, also 
discussed i n  Chapter 2, that ef f ic iency  under capi ta l i sm is assessed  
i n  the q u a l i t a t i v e  terns of haw e f fec t ive ly  production processes 
themselves reproduce capitalist  r e l a t i o n s  of production. In  c o n t r a s t  
w e  have t r i e d  to emphasise the overwhelming p res su res  emanating from 
with in  c a p i t a l i s t  r e l a t i o n s  of production themselves i n  ordaining 
the measurement, timing, i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  and abs t r ac t ion  of labour  
w h i c h  together make up the dimensions of w h a t  these writers have 
called "control". 
What w e  have criticised as t h e  ah is tor ic i sm of an approach which 
focusses  on aspects of production r e l a t i o n s  not specific to capitalism 
also raises a more fundamental po in t  about the role of cont rad ic t ion .  
Briefly,  w h i l e  this p o i n t  w i l l  be discussed i n  more d e t a i l  below, i t  can 
be said that the concern w i t h  the productive,  q u a l i t a t i v e  content  of work  
reflects a location of cont rad ic t ion  ou t s ide  -se m n t r a d i c t i o n s  which 
are i n t e r n a l  to capitalisan. In  other w o r d s ,  rather than systauatic contrad- 
i c t i o n s ,  contradictions between systems ( t h a t  of capitalist, i d e n t i f i e d  
i n  a primarily political sense, and some system involving a "natural" 
labour  p-ss which avoids the political c o n s t r a i n t s  of capi ta l i sm)  are 
being looked a t .  And this i n  its turn a d d s  any c e n t r a l  e x a d n a t i o n  of how 
the cont rad ic t ion  i n t e r n a l  to capitalim i n  fact undermine and surface 
within tha t  system. Th i s  p o i n t  w i l l ,  as w e  have said, be explored i n  
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more detail  after w e  have reviewed the arguments w i t h i n  this thesis 
on the nature of internal  ecoIlomic contradictions w i t h i n  capital.ism 
and the i r  expression i n a r m s  of worker response to the labour process. 
(ii) Valorisation and Sxploitation 
In ou r  second set of arguments w e  have sought ,  i n  contrast  to the 
predominance of itcontrol" arguments within the labour pIocess debate, 
t o  advance a theory of the specif ical ly  c a p i t a l i s t  labour  process. 
As w e  have argued above, theories of "mntro l"  have tended to leave 
aside the question of hwi the impact of economic processes such as 
valorisation affects the labour process; and indeed any s t ructural  
analysis,  i n so fa r  as i t  is recognised, i s  criticised for  ignoring the 
complexities of social relationships with i n  the labour process. L i t t l e r  
and Salaman, for example, criticise Braverman fran the point of view 
that Throughout Bravernun's' analysis  there runs a highly necham 'stic, 
deterministic strain w h e r e b y  relationships, once established as 
necessary, are regarded as sa t i s f ac to r i ly  understood and explained. 
Braveman i s  not interested...in questions of hov these theoretically 
required relationships are ac tua l ly  organised and structured i n  
practice" ( L i t t l e r  and Salaman. 1982. 251). Later in the  8ame paper 
these a u t b r s  specif ical ly  disallav any notion of e capitalist labour 
process. 
mt  w h a t  we are interested i n ,  and have tried to tackle i n  this 
thesis, is  the question of - bau these Yheoret ical ly  required relationships" 
ac tua l ly  influence and condition hov relationships a t  uork are "orpadsed 
and structured i n  practice". An essent ia l  task thus becomes the 
reversal of the relationship i n  which c a p i t a l i s t  re la t ions of 
production a n  seen as important, insofar as they are specified a t  a l l ,  
p r h r i l y  as consti tuting a framework of political pressures of 
dopination and subordination, to  one i n  which the i n t r i n s i c  workings 
of capitalism as a system of production are seenzas cent ra l  t o  that 
system's foundation, its labour process. 
I t  i s  for  this reason that i n  our third chapter we turn& to the  
e x p s i t i o n  of some c e n t r a l  pr inciples  of Flatxist ecanomics, a source 
which, as w e  pointed out,  has been markedly neglected i n  mst merit 
writ ings on the  labour process. Were i t  s i n p l y  for the purpose of 
textual exegesis this exercise would be, q u i t e  l i t e r a l l y ,  academic. 
m r ,  the analysis of the c a p i t a l i s t  labour process contained 
not only i n  Chapter 7 of Capital but also i n  the pore recently- 
t ranslated Resultate ("discovered" i n  the year of the publication of 
Labour and Monopo l y  Qp ital) presents crucial i n s i g h t s  w h i c h  a t  the 
very least should not be i q o r e d  by those Who have aligned themselves 
with the tern tflabmr processtt. 
Chief among these is  the location of valorisation, expansion of value, 
as the overriding objective of the capitalist d e  of production, and 
the impact of t h i s  objective i n  terms of a reversal of the mlationship 
between the means of pro&ction and the labourer. W e  have a l ready  
referred to t h i s  reversal 
labour and labour pmwer; its significance, or a t  least t h e a q i f i c a n c e  
of its recoglit ion,  lies i n  a chanped perspective in which the 
dimensions of the labour process can be seen as st ructured by the drive 
fo r  valor isat ion rather than being continually Wecrooited", as it  w e r e ,  
i n  an ongoing process of reworking the relationship between "mn" and 
'kature" anew. The structures of Capitalism - par t icu lar ly  i n  their 
physical fom under the real subordination of labour - can be seen 
as providing an exis t ing context i n t o  which a l l  the sh i f t ing  and 
changing re la t ions  of tcclmologY, work organisation, and maMgPwnt- 
worker relations must f i t ,  or in terms of which  they are defined. 
i n  discussing t h e  re la t ionship between 
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We have already p o i n t e d  out  that this crucial  shift i n  perspective 
i s  one on which our w h o l e  thesis is  prernissed. I n  Chapter 3 we set 
o u t  f irst  of a l l  to provide a more detai led accountof the economic 
theory on valorisation involved i n  t h i s  argument, and then  went  on 
to clcplore its implicationsin terns of a twofold analysis  centred on 
the key relationship of exploitation; the analysis emphasised onthe 
one hand the dimensions of the labour process associated w i t h  thr 
extraction of surplus value, and on the other those re la ted  to the 
d e t e d n a t i o n  and contestation of slbsistencc. A cent ra l  argument 
of the thesis w a s  tha t  these two aspects frequently meet anti are 
integrated a t  the  heart of the labour process i n  the effort/reward 
nexus. 
'Ilre issue of the impact of the valorisation objective on managerial 
organisation of the labour process, then, w a s  taken up i n  terns of the 
phase of real subordination of l a b u r  on which capitalism enters when its 
methods of production becane adequate to the requirements of this c e n t r a l  
objective; i n  other words, when the dewlopentof  machinery, etc., enables 
c a p i t a l i s t s  to extract relative rather than absolute surplus value from 
therorkforcc. This issue i s  itself approached i n  terns of the overriding 
need of capitalists to reduce soci+l ly  necessary labour time i n  order to 
cupete. 
a d  the mrresponding a b i l i t y  to extract a re la t ive ly  greater.-t of 
surplus vrlue fmm w o r k e r s  within the aame amount of time generates an 
intensification of labour which w e  s a w  as a central  feature  of workers' 
experience of the capitalist labour pmcess - again, one i n  which i n  these 
terns appears to have ken neglected by current labour process theorists. 
reduction of the time necessary to produce a given ' t Y  
In contrast ,  w e  have attempted to sha* h m  this intensif icat ion under 
the real subordination of labour has achieved still more concentrated 
expression i n  the techniques of sc i en t i f i c  managenen t ,  Of w h i c h  Marx 
a t  the t h e  of writ ing his Resultate and developing the concept of 
real subordination of labour (which itself, as w e  argued, has been 
Widely misinterpreted by labour process theorists i n  terns of political 
re la t ions  of domination and subordination) could not have been aware .  
Sc ien t i f ic  management, too, with its dissection, atanisation and timed 
measurement of work pat terns ,  could be seen to give rise to an increasing 
real isat ion within production itself of the pr inc ip le  of abstract labour 
which Marx s a w  as characterising cowodl ' t y  production. Same support for 
t h i s  arguably "idealistlf posit ion was obtained fraa writers such as 
Kay, Brave- and Gleicher, and Paul W i l l i s  i n  his important book 
Learning to Labour adds an in te res t ing  footnote: 
'We saw.. . that ,  to a l l  i n t e n t s  and purposes, 'the lads' do not 
basical ly  different ia te  between particular concrete types of work 
which they regard as being open to them...There i s  near indifference 
to the particular work f ina l ly  chosen Y) long as i t  falls within c e r t a i n  
limits defined, not technically,  but social ly  and culturally...I want 
to suggest here that this perspective...can be understood i n  the l i g h t  
of a real penetration of the role of labour i n  the modern s t ructure  
of capitalist pro&ction...The inner logic of capitalism is that a l l  
concrete forms of labour are standardised i n  that t h e y  all umtain 
the potent ia l  for the exploitation of abs t rac t  labour" (Willis, 1978, 
133). This leads +n to a discussion of the abstraction Qf l abour  
wi th in  pmQlction itself in.which W i l l i s  notes that "The whole 
thrust  of modern techniques of organisation and methods such as t i m e  
and motionstudy is, in one important sense, to narmw the ~ . p  
between concrete and abstract labour" (136). Further strands of 
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W i l l i s '  argument as t o  the non-differentiation of labour are discussed 
i n  Chapter 4. 
The location of this frrealff abstraction of labour at  the heart  of 
the manufacturing labour process is a key proposition w i t h i n  our 
thesis. In making the point w e  are attempting to shw that '%ylorist" 
pr inciples  of wrk organisation, rather than representing primarily 
attempts to repress thewrkforce, are i n  fact an  expression of the 
ongoing logic of c a p i t a l i s t  developnent and thus truly,  as haverman 
puts  it, "the explicit verbalisation of the cap i t a l i s t  mode of 
production*' (Braverman, 1974, 86). This poin t  is made also i n  Chapter 
1. 
What this 
for the workforce i s  that forms of the technical developwent and 
organisation of prodrction structure their work in such a way that 
its - form, geared towards the maximisation of surplus value, becomes 
more important thanits &tent .  It i b  as thaugh work takes place w i t h i n  
a skeletal construct of interchangeable and t iphly measured prototypes 
each themselves reconsti tuted from the atomised elements of labour 
charted i n  work measurement. The impact of such abstraction and 
quantification of labour, itself shaped by the incessant drive for 
valorisation on the part of c a p i t a l i s t  mnagePnnt, is that for workers 
too the m n i n g  cf their work lies i n  its quanttication i n  toms 
of the linked variables of effort and reward. 
i n  terms of the dai ly  experience of the labour process 
In looking a t  the ways i n  which the overall objective of Mlorisaltion 
structures the managerial Organisation of the labour process. then, 
we have emphasised as key aspects the i n t endf i ca t ion  and abstraction 
of labour and attcnptd tobring out  the relation of both of these 
to the developnent of sc i en t i f i c  management. he nature of the 
experience of such abstraction and in tens i f ica t ion  for  thewrkforce 
is examined more c lose ly  i n  Chapter 4, which is  a survey of published 
eolpirical accounts of work. Here the issue of the levels  of 
intensif icat ion of work a t  w h i c h  workers resist is  charted more 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n  terms of the managerial objectives of machine-like 
application, consistency and predictabi l i ty  on the part of the workforce. 
In concluding our argument en  exploitation as the central  relationsljip 
i n  the  capitalist labour process, hauever, we went on to look a t  i t s  
subs is tencere la ted  aspects. 
l h i s  section began w i t h  a defence of the labour theory of value on 
the g m d s  of the unique capac i ty  of labour to produce surplus, and 
went on to shau hav this surplus i s  essent ia l ly  susbsistence- realted 
- determined i n  terms of themlation of paid to unpaid labour time. 
As such, w e  armed, subsistence i s  dontinually contested within 
capi ta l ina,  and the forms this contestation takerrange fran the 
cheapening of labour power through degkill ing (though t h i s  is  not 
deski l l ing 's  primary purpose) to direct a t m p t s  to  reduce the value 
of labour power w h i c h  ccmnonly, w e  argued, take place w i t h i n  the labour 
pzvcess itself. 
In put t ing the point of v iew that subsistence issues  are materialised 
within the labour precess as arch, our argument ( a s  we adarauledge) 
g w s  solwwhat beyond Ma=, who makes cler that the determination of 
subsistence belongs to the sphere of circulat ion and the market. It 
seems t o  us, hauever. to  be an e s s e n t i a l  aspect of relat ions within 
the ap i t a l i s t  labour process tha t  issues of effort and reward are 
d a i l y  fought out as part of the very s t ruc ture  of work. N o t  only, 
as w e  argued, is s u b d s t a r c e  used as an  5ncent ive" byyaanagemmt i n  
order to extract more effort out  of the workforce, but also, as w e  s a w  
in Chapter 4, ismes ef tted labour and worker reward are frequently 
interlocked i n  such a r a y  that t h e h l e  Wasuroment and organisation 
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of work is linked to a given l eve l  of subsistence.  When the output  
of t h e  wrkers i n  t h e  factories studied by Fullert and Westwood fell 
belm a c e r t a i n  l e v e l ,  the "ratchet" of theizpay slipped,too, to an 
inferior grade. In addition w e  saw c l e a r l y  i n  e u r  cam case s t u d i e s  hckv 
'perforname", i n  the first example. and the overtime/manning nexus. 
i n  the  seoond, linked i n  w i t h  subsistence i n  the o r m i s a t i o n  of the 
labour process. Given that, f i r s t l y ,  the determination of subs is tence  
is thus  s t ruc tured  i n t o  the organisation of the labour process in these 
and many other ins tances ,  and secondly that workers themselves echo 
mmagement i n  seeing their work in q u a n t i t a t i v e  and value-oriented 
terms, it fellws that these tendencies, w h i c h  are an e q r e s s i o n  of t h e  
dimensions of capitalist r e l a t i o n s  of production, hemselves reflect 
the cont rad ic t ions  inherent  in those re l a t ions .  And indeed the corollary 
of our argument on exploitation is that w o r k e r  response and resistance 
c e n t r e  on the emergence of the cen t r a l  con t r ad ic t ion  between subs is tence  
and suzplus value, paid and unpaid labour, a t  tbe heart of the l abour  
process itself. Our next set of argrrments deals w i t h  the  relations 
between this eont rad ic t ion ,  or group of con t r ad ic t ions ,  and the nature 
of w o r k i n g c l a s s  consciourness and struggle.  
iii) Acquiescence and R e s i s t a n c e  i n  the Capitalist Labour Process 
W e  have d l ibe ra t e ly  included the theme of  acquiescence" i n  introducing 
t h i s  f i n a l  set of ar-ts, because i n  cons ider ing  the nature of rrorker 
response to the labour process the question of w h a t  workers do m)t resist 
is seen as equally important w i t h  w h a t  they do. This is p a r t l y ,  a s  with  
previous arguments, inorder to repudiate w h a t  seem to us some mistaken 
assumptions about the M ~ U I - ~  and content of worker resistance, bu t  also 
i n  fact to focus the d iscuss ion  on the very  question of 
r e s i s t a n c e  is m. It seems to us that i n  throwing the fact of 
rarker resistance, as it  were, in to  the Weth  of an obs t ina t e  Bravenaanian 
worker 
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structuralism, w r i t e r s  on the labour process have i n  effect ignored 
the need to explore the dimensions of such resistance and have in many 
ways taken fo r  granted that i t  revolves around t h e  issues  with which 
they have been preoccupied, i e  the content  of work and its associated 
political and social relationships. 
In focussing on the question of the actual issues  involved inworker  
r e s i s t a n c e  and acquiescence, then, w e  undertook first of a l l ,  i n  
Chapter 4. an empiridaa survey of published case studies (our own being 
preLented i n  Chapters 6 and 7 )  i n  order both to identify these issues  
and to explore the nature of workers' everyday experience of the 
labur process i n  re la t ion  t o  them. 
Chr overal l  finding, w h i c h  accorded with the theoretical hypotheses 
advanced earlier i n  the thesis, w a s  tha t  the content of worker response 
(and indeed managerial objectives) in re la t ion  to the labour p m e s s  
was overwhelmingly econcmistic; and that ,  w h i l e  it might seem a 
contradiction i n  tenas,  this applied also to the rationale of uorker 
acquiescence. Approaching the material v ia  a cr i t ique  of the use by 
labour process w r i t e r s  of Goodrich's concept of a " f ron t i e r  of Control", 
we shated that those areas of W.scipline and mnagement" which according 
to Goodrich himself w e r e  seen mttpn ly  by management tut by most workers 
as be@ the %orderline" of their m concerns, w e r e  not i n  fact the 
i s sues  primarily contested by workers. 
That workers and management a r e e n ,  by both %ides**, as having 
separate spheres of in t e re s t  (or, i n  Haworth and Ramie's phrase, 
differing "universes*') is  arqeci  i n  more detail i n  the following 
chapter when we consider workers' frpraglpatic acceptance" of the e m d c  
structure  i n  w h i c h  they f ind  thsmselves. Maanwhile our i n i t i a l  survey 
of the findings of mrds and scul l ion 's  detailed series of case 
studies i n  'Ihe Social Organisation of Industr ia l  ODnflict established 
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the primacy of an effort/reward nexus for workers' struggles which the 
examinationof fur ther  case s tu ides  would subsequently confirm. Perhaps 
more fundamentally, the ewmples provided by Edwards and Scullion also 
indicated further contradictions lying a t  the mots of such struggles: 
first of a l l  the incessant e f f o r t  of management to shift the balance 
of the effort-reward relat ionship i n  the direct ion of greater productc 
iv i ty ,  even w h e r e  this disturbed a relat ively "stable" pat tern of 
i n d u s t r i a l  relations and was thus counterproductive (a phenomemm s e e n  
c lear ly  i n  our own first case study); and secondly the undermining of 
workers' (par t icular ly  shop stewards') cum acceptance of the legitimacy 
of managerial noms of production by action i n  defence of their own 
ixmnediate i n t e r e s t s  - a syndrome referred to by t3wards and Scullion 
as %on-directed conflict". Both these signif icant ly  contradictory 
pat terns  of managerial aml worker response w e r e  discussed i n  more 
detail i n  Chapter 5.  
The anpir ical  material which fol lared our amsideration of timuads 
and scullion, which was derived mainly from three case studies  of 
women factory workers(a1though "male" material fm Working for %rd 
and Nichols and Beynon's Living With Capitalism is also used) was 
examined under the headings of workers' experience of the intensification 
and abstraction of labour, fo l lwed  by the the-mne y n e w s  and m p l e s  
of overt resistance by workers. I t  was found that, i n  correspondence 
w i t h  our theoretical argment ,  substantial  amounts of the case study 
material Qalt w i t h  the cen t r a l i t y  of the incessant pressure for 
output on rrorkers' experience of the labour process, and that i t  is t h i s  
dimension of effort, rather than the substantive wntent  of their work, 
which constructrd its meaning for the uorkers concerned. However, 
porhaps t h e  key finding consisted i n  the riarous interlocking of 
mrk measurment and production tarpets  with the levels of reward 
received by workers, m isme discussed i n  &?ail above. In the 
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Same way, noms of production w e r e  continually raised so that the 
objective of mrudmisdng surplus value was furthered by a simultaneous 
increase  i n  productivity and decrease i n  reuani. 
The effort/reward nexus, then,  was defined as central  to workers' 
experience of the labour  process, underlined by their precarious 
relationship to subsistence itself; and, f inal ly ,  the same immanent 
conflict between effort and reward was seen  as giving rise to those 
instances of overt  resistance, such as "downers" and strikes, w h i c h  
are recounted in the case studies. Ultimately, if Overt conflict 
occurred, it was seen to be over olch %ottoPl ine* '  issues  as pay 
awards, ra te-cut t ing under the bonus system, productivity deals  - 
issues around w h i c h  workers had no choice but to resist if they w e r e  
to maintain their ekis t ing  standards of l i v ing  or even, i n  the case 
of our cwn first case study, their  jobs. The resistance may not always 
have beensuccessful, hut it w a s  one into which w o r k e r s  w e r e  prow lled 
by t h e  very s t a tus  of their w o r k  as the use-value of a saleable  caumodi t Y  * 
And, a s  w e  argued i n  the next chapter, it is precisely the necessity 
of this resistance urd its mots i n  the subsistence-related aspects 
of q l o i t a t i o n  that lends it a political p o t e n t i a l  and resonance 
not apparent, be- a first glance, i n  b conception of "control"- 
related resistance propounded by w r i t e r s  on the labour process. 
It was this 'politicill s ide of e c 0 d s ~ P  that me sought to define 
i n  our next chapter. ?he pufpose of the cbpter, expandin9 on a theme 
again central  to the thesis as a whole, w a s  to 90 beyond the posit ion 
implied within the labour process debate that worker struggles are to 
be taken seriously only insofar as  they w e  overtly v p o l i t i c a l l t  and 
to shcw tktt struggles  w h i c h  are i n  r e a l i t y  economistic i n  fact have 
a fundamental politicrl meaning. W e  ret about this task in two ways: 
f i r s t l y  via an a r m n t  as to the essent ia l ly  dynanic --re of 
worker struggles and their relat ion to class consciousness, and secondly 
. 
-311 - 
through loca t ing ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  to the Western Marxist emphasis on hegemony 
and s i m i l a r  supers t ruc tura l  cons t r a in t s ,  the c r u c i a l  undermininq role of 
con t r ad ic t ions  a t  the  base and t h e i r  expression i n  w r k e r s '  struggles. 
The f irst  argument w a s  approached through a critical ana lys i s  of the 
genera l ly  negative view of " e c o n o m i y D t ~  espoused by political and industrial  
t h e a r i s t s  frm Lenin Xn What  Is To Be Done? to  Goldthorpe and Lockwood i n  
t h e i r  study of "affluent workers". Both approaches w e r e  related to what 
was criticised as the static and'mechanisti c model of ifclass consciousness" 
contained in the three- or four-part typologies p u t  forward by authors 
such as Mann and Giddens; here c e r t a i n  ideological preconditions such as 
%lass ' identity ' ' ,  "class opposition" and the fullygfledged conception 
of an "alternative order" are seen as being n e c d s a r y  before workers 
can be accounted f u l l y  class-conscious. 
Such tabulations w e r e  criticised a s  overlooking the fact tha t  developments 
i n  class consciousness are engendered by and wi th in  struggle;  and also 
tha t  such s t r u d e  is an Meven, unpredictable, explosive prmess i n  
which apparently irredeemably "parochial1' perspectives on the part of 
workers may suddenly expand i n t o  a much wider challenge to industrial 
or political &nation. To recognise t h i s  i s  to locate a fur the?  
impl ica t ion  of c r i t i q u e s  of %conaninn" stemming frun such alternative 
models of fully-fledged class consciousness; that no poss ib i l i ty  appears 
thereby to exist for everyday worker s t ruggles  t o  break through the 
"charmed circle" of r u l i n g c l a s s  ideology. It was this assumption that 
we sought to challenge i n  the final psrt of t h i s  chapter, which dealt 
w i t h  the "undexminings" inherent  i n  the contradictions of capitalism. 
=sed on the postulation of a f'gapte i n  consciousness w h e r e  m y  theorists 
have envisaged a positive acceptance of the d a d n a n t  ideology, this 
a r g u w n t  was extended to ikuss on the key concept of "prapoatic 
acceptance", the phrase used by Kichael mnn to describe workers' 
. 
a t t i t u d e s  to overall social i n e q u a l i t i e s ,  i n  its a n a l y s i s  of the 
na tu re  of work inpc la s s  consciousness and response.  -use in this 
perspective workers are n e i t h e r  wholly entrapped by or r e j e c t i n g  
of r u l i n g c l a s s  ideology, but  l a rge ly ,  i n  their (ym l ives ,  i n d i f f e r e n t  
to it, a space i s  created i n t o  which the material pressures  endemic 
wi th in  those lives can f ind  their expression i n  acts of resistance. 
In  t h i s  sense w e  have argued that r u l i n g c l a s s  ideology and hepmonic  
forces, w h i l e  c l e a r l y  crucial to t h e  opera t ion  of a class soc ie ty ,  exist 
a t  a d i f f e r e n t  
w i th in  capi ta l ism,  such as exploitation, w h i c h  i n  fact con t inua l ly  
undermine. i n  their sporadic surfacing,  j u s t  these supe r s t ruc tu ra l  
elements. Cr i t i ques  of classical b ~ r x i s m  such as those stemning from 
Al thusser  appea r . t o  r eve r se  this po in t  i n  their i n s i s t e n c e  that 
\dse-superstructure. theory involves  a crude model of the emnanic base 
deterreinin2 the supers t ruc ture .  In fact another meaning can he found 
for a theory w h i c h  maintains  t h e  ongoing s ign i f i cance  of the e w n a n i c  
r e l a t i o n s  i n  soc ie ty  through shar ing  that these r e l a t i o n s  are both 
d e f i n i t i o n a l  to that s o d e t y ' s  mode of production and ar also themselves 
e s s e n t i a l l y  mnt rad ic to ry .  In  this way the cont inuing "relevance" of 
the economic base can be acknar ledgdthrough the understanding of haw 
the cont rad ic t ions  of su rp lus  value production, most obviously wi th in  
the labour  process, a c t u a l l y  prevent  the untrammelled maintenance of 
ru l ing -c l a r s  hegemony- 
fran the everyday experience of con t r ad ic t ions  
F ina l ly ,  i n  seeking theoretical support  for a more dialectical alternative 
to the e s s e n t i a l l y  pessimistic models both of "class consciousness" 
and hegemonic damination, w e  turned to  G r a m s c i .  Through c i t i n g  Gramsci ' s  
i n s i g h t s  i n t o  the %onflicting mnsciousness~~ of the %mm i n  the mass" 
w e  attenptd both to provide another pointer  to the political s igni f icance  
of workers' tpractical a c t i v i t y "  md also to go on from this to develop 
a concept of lpraxisl* i n  which worker organisa t ion  and experience are 
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seen a s  having, a t  least p o t e n t i a l l y ,  a cumulative effect i n  building 
a "storehouse" of working-class consciousness. W e  concluded this 
section w i t h  a brief discussion of the much-neglected topic of reformism 
and w h a t  are again seen as its cont rad ic tory  tendencies and implications. 
Empirical "Evidence" 
In the foregoing w e  have attempted to present  the main theo re t i ca l  
hypothesis and innovations of this thesis, which can be suimed up as 
the argument that exp lo i t a t ion  rather than "control" is the cent ra l  
re la t ionship  of the capitalist labour process and that the 
cont rad ic t ions  i n  this re l a t ionsh ip  express themselves i n  l'econOllListic" 
forms of worker response. WO empirical case s tud ie s  were undertaken 
for the  thesis through which w e  hoped towlore how these hypotheses 
might relate to  t h e  "real world" of labour and capital. W e  shall ncnv 
briefly stmimarise-the material gained from these s t u d i e s  and attenpt 
to assess their confirmation or otherwise of the theoretical arguments. 
A s  w e  s a w  i n  Chapters 6 and 7. the  s t r u c t u r e  of and relations 
within the labour process of both s t u d i e s  revolved around the kind of 
labour time/money nexus explored i n  the theoretical part of the thesis. 
In the case of the first plant, LaneJis & Gyr, the c e n t r a l  i s s u e  was 
t ha t  of *perfomaxe"; i n  the semnd, Boc Weabley, a contradictory 
relationship between manaperial and wrker objectives on overtime and 
manning. 
Both studies addressed the same basic range of issues; for the 
workforce, the immediate impact and meaning of the labour process, levels 
of effort, reward and the relationship between them, wil l ingness  to 
work, worker kKvledge and f inal ly  attitudes tauards resistance; for 
management, the nature of managerial objectives, and obstades seen 
as posed by the workforce tothese, strategies i n  relation to the 
o r g a n i s a t i m  of the labour process and dea l ing  w i t h  worker resistance, 
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and f i n a l l y  the approach to the whole i s s u e  of "control". In the 
second case study this i s s u e  was probed rather more deeply i n  terms 
of the  a r m n t  that wen if management did n o t  on We surface regard 
the i s s u e  of k o n t r o l "  as important (as has been the case a t  wdis & 
Gyr) never the less  "control" approaches could be regarded as re levant  
to  t h e  t ack l ing  of worker r e s i s t ance .  The sequence of events  f r o m  
managerial ob jec t ives ,  worker response, obstacles to managerial 
o b j e c t i v e s  and methods of dea l ing  w i t h  those obstacles w a s  therefore 
gone through wi th  the ECC management. 
mle both studies w e r e  rich i n  material, there was l i t t le  i n  
either to lead 
and w e  would maintain that t h i s  w a s - n o t  a ques t ion  of in t e rp re t a t ion .  
The predominance of econcanic issues and a t t i t u d e s  w a s  overwhelming 
i n  both the p l a n t s  v i s i t e d ;  i n  fact i t  would have appared i r r e l e v a n t  
or fanc i fu l  to suggest that  wrkers w e r e  p r imar i ly  concerned wi th  
the q u a l i t a t i v e  content  of their jobs or management wi th  the political 
subordinat ion of the mrkforce - both  counter-proposit ions which w e  
sought to test. 
us to se r ious ly  quest ion our  theoretical proposi t ions,  
It was true that ,  a t  Landis b Gyr i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  such a t t i t u d e s  
w e r e  ev ident  first of a l l  i n  workers' somewhat embittered attitude 
tauards the imposs ib i l i ty  of producing good q u a l i t y  work and secondly 
i n t h e  more hectoring, aggressive approach of management as mmpared to 
that of BDC. &it a t  the same t i m e  both sets of attitudes w e r e  subordinated 
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to the far  more s a l i e n t  p i m r i t y  of simply g e t t i n g  t h e  work o u t  - i n  
the workers' case for fear of job loss and bonus reduct ion,  i n  managementls 
i n  o rde r  to conform to the overwhelming "cost" imperatives far more 
c e n t r a l  to their d a i l y  l i v e s  than thoeof %ontrol". 
Indeed, t h e  case of Landis 6 Gyr could be said to  almost "over mnfirntl 
our thesis i n  its i n t e g r a l  connection between performance targets and 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  Boc Wembley. without such immediate competitive pressures, 
could aga in  be said to bear out  our a m e n t s  fmm a much lwer basis 
of pro b a b i l i t y  i n  that despite the extremely secure  pos i t i on  of t h e  
canpany as a w h o l e ,  the r u t h l e s s  efforts c u r r e n t l y  being made to keep 
dwm costs by reducing the workforce were the prrdominant feature 
i n f luen ing  both managerial and worker experience of the  labour process. 
The cont rad ic tory  aspects of managerial perspectives as representing 
the priorities of capitalisn, a theme which has recurred through the 
thesis as a w h o l e ,  w e r e  central featu'res of both s tudies .  In  both cases, 
managers' overwhelmingly q u a n t i t a t i v e  d e f i n i t i o n s  of and objectives within 
t he  labour process con t ra s t ed  and conflicted w i t h  the less measurable 
realities both of workers' capac i ty  and their ultimate resistance.  As 
w e  have mentioned earlier bothin these conclusions and i n  chapter 4, 
the u l t ima te  capitalist  o b j e c t i v e  of having workers perform with the 
cons is tency  and p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  of machines i s  cont inua l ly  confounded 
both by the d i f f e r e n t  levles of energy a v a i l a b l e  to workers during the 
day and also by the unpred ic t ab i l i t y  of the  material world i n  terns of 
machine breakdams, traffic jams etc - an unpred ic t ab i l i t y  w h i c h ,  
paradoxical ly ,  could be managed if management were able to abandon 
the exc lus ive ly  q u a n t i t a t i v e  approach to the o r q n i e i o n  of work. 
-ever, as w e  argued i n  our theoretical ana lys i s ,  they are unable to  
do this p rec i se ly  because of the r e l e n t l e s s  p re s su res  of cost a d  competition, 
and this i n a b i l i t y  to, as i t  w e r e ,  s top  and consider  was w e l l  attested 
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to  i n  both the s tud ie s  i n  terms of management's den ia l  or evasion 
of the empirical evidence o f t en  l i t e r a l l y  before their eyes of workers1 
i n a b i l i t y  to m e e t  some production targets. 
This paradoxical den ia l  of " rea l i t y"  i n  the i n t e r e s t s  of meeting 
urgent (bu t  thereby only p a r t l y  attainable) prodrc t ion  goals w a s  
echoed i n  the managerial a t t i t u d e  to worker resistance. Thus i n  the  
Landis & Gyr case t he  knowledge that, first of a l l ,  large sections 
of workers had not accepted the recent "performance" agreenents and, 
secondly, that t h e  impact of these agreements w a s  c l e a r l y  aga ins t  the 
i n t e r e s t s  of these and other groups, was suppressed through the 
nonchalant assumption that occasional "firefighting" would inev i t ab ly  
be necessary to deal w i t h  the r e s u l t a n t  conflict. Among the more 
sophis t ica ted  management of Boc, w h i l e  the workers' ,case was i m p l i c i t l y  
acknwledged on the one hand a d a n  approach of campromise and 
~komnunioation" favoured formally, managers referred to worker, 
r e s i s t a n c e  i n  technica l  terms and were unable to accept, beyond' 
the po in t  at  w h i c h  i t  became more than an irritant. that such resistance 
could be "logid".  Indeed, w h i l e  on the one hand overtime w a s  used as 
an indispensable incent ive  i n  order to maintain production, i t s  
manipulation by the workforce as a means of enhancing subsistence w a s  
defined by the Branch m g e r  as centred on a "mystique" counterposed 
to the q u a n t i a t i v e  logic i n w l v e d  i n  uorlc measurePent. A t  the same 
t ime ,  it w a s  clear i n  both s t u d i e s  that  such q u a n t i t a t i v e  objectives 
far o u t w e i g h e d  any political ams ide ra t ions  of "control" in sanagers' 
m i n d s .  
0-1 the issue of worker resistance, the situations a t  Landis & Gyr 
and Wembley 5X respec t ive ly  could be said to bear aut the "positive** 
and %egative" implications of our thesis on econaaism and its 
implications. In both cases there was l i t t le  doubt that the 
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and content of res is tance was overwhelmingly econanistic - workers 
' p r a p a t i c a l l y  accepted", for example, the  need to  work for the 
employer, an acceptance itself ewmistic i n  its implicit  acknouledgement 
of the commodity s t a t u s  of labour, but a l s o  demonstrating tha t  w r k e r  
resistance would not focus around the essent ia l ly  political issue of 
w h a t  would ultimately be a challenge to c a p i t a l i s t  re la t ions of production. 
Rather, i n  both cases it w a s  i s s u e s  much "closer to home7f - job s e c u r i t y  
and the effort/reward relat ionship -which eventually 
i n t o  overt  resistance, an act, whatever the myths surrounding indus t r ia l  
re la t ions,  that is  seldom undertaken l igh t ly .  
spurred workers 
The economistic nature of this spur had, hauever, for the two groups 
of employees, different dimensions and implications. mr the Landis & 
Gyr workers, as  w e  s a w ,  i t  propelled a previously inexperienced section 
of workers in to  a hard-fought rttike which w a s  the longest i n  the 
canpanyls history and, w h i l e  only pa r t i a l ly  successful, undoubtedly 
put the  campany to some s t r a i n  and e%pense. The nature of t h i s  resistance 
was d e a r l y  %xplosive" - l i t e r a l l y  the day after saying that they s a w  
any act ion as pointless,  the workers had left the i r  machines. A 
previously passive and fatalistic workforce was thus wept i n t o  resistke 
and so l ida r i ty  through a purely econaoic pressure. 
mr the Bot: workers, on the other hand, sporadic and. i n  the past, 
successful t5ndustrial action" was a far more rrrmaonplace aspect of 
their experience. The traditional readiness to take action, consistently 
aIound economic issues, continued even i n  the current recession to be a 
strength of themrkforce, but a t  the same time the very m b a t i v i t y  on 
subsistence-related issues  involved i n  th is  t rad i t iona l  of resistance 
conveyed a parallel tradition of sectionalism w h i c h  seriously weakened 
the poss ib i l i t y  of any ef fec t ive  resistance to aanaQment's long-tern 
s t ra tegy a t  the plant. 'Lhe economic pressures which pushed workers i n t o  
resistance,  then ,  w e r e  the same which, for  "personal p i n ) ' ,  as the 
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management p u t  it, l e d  tbem i n t o  the kind of jealous w a r d i n g  
of overtime which left each workgroup to fend for itself. A t  the 
same t i m e ,  j u s t  as the defeat a t  M s  & Gyr must be seen as having 
the probable outcome of renewed p a s s i v i t y  and defeatism (although a t  
the close of research there w e r e  s i g n s  of renewed indignat ion  a t  
management tactics) there was no reason to assume that the se r ious  
problem on job s e c u r i t y  and overt ime reduction TKW f a c i n g  the workforce 
a t  BDc would not push them i n t o  a n  enforced uni ty .  
(Xlr rn case s tud ie s ,  then, much like the published s t u d i e s  reviewed 
i n  Chapter 4 (indeed, w i t h  still greater c l a r i t y  in sorpe instances) 
appear to confirm the o v e r a l l  theoretical conclusions reached i n  the 
thesis as a w h o l e ;  t h a t  both managerial ob jec t ives  i n  t h e  organisat ion 
of the labour process and worker experience of andresponse to  that 
process revolve around a nexus of surp lus  value and explo i ta t ion .  (Xlr 
i n t e r e s t ,  i n  q l o r i n g  t h i s  empirical material, has been i n  both 
s t r u c t u r e  and response; and t h i s  dual approach is taken up i n  the 
first of WO theoretical sunnnaries of overall themes i n  the thesis. 
Overa l l  Themes 
( i )  Sub jec t iv i ty  and o b j e c t i v i t y  
It has been argued that i n  a t tempt ing  to correct w h a t  has been seen 
as the %echanisticff framework of Brave-, w r i t e r s  i n  the labour 
process debate have p e r s i s t e n t l y  igrored t h e  actual a n t e n t  of lrorker 
response i n  f a w u r  of an e l u s i v e  dynamic of "control" i n  W h i c h  the 
basic struggle to defend standards of l i v i n g  r a r e l y  ga ins  r eccq t i t i on  
i n  i ts am terns. It is the worker's personal or psydrological response 
to the experience of w r k  itself, the impact of production on the  
ind iv idua l  i n  terns of "autonaoy", 11oPpression", etc that are taken as 
the central focus  of debate rather than more humdnrm i s s u e s  of pay or 
job secu r i ty .  
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VI c o n t r a s t  t he  present  thesis has attempted to redress the  balance 
between individual  experience and ob jec t ive  s t r u c t u r e  through 
r e i n t e g r a t i n g  the a c t u a l i t y  of workers' econamist ic  s t rugg le s  i n t o  
the theoretical cons idera t ion  of the  labour process. T h i s  task has been 
pursued through the groups of arguments a l r e a d y  reviewed i n  these 
conclusions: a c r i t i q u e  of the "controll l  thesis, the at tempt  to 
establish an a l t e r n a t i v e  theory of the  s p e c i f i c a l l y  c a p i t a l i s t  labour  
process, and an "economisticf' theory of worker r e s i s t a n c e  and 
acquiescence. The purpose of these  arguments, then,  w h i l e  they have 
attempted t o  locate a specific ecormmic framework for worker response 
i n  the prodtrction r e l a t i o n s  of .capi ta l i sm,  has not been to deny 
the relevance of the sub jec t ive  but  rather to reassert the c e n t r a l  
role of objec t ive  economic factors i n  shaping worker response. In 
this sense  i t  represents  a br inging  toge t h e r  of subjective and 
o b j e c t i v e  within the framework of the material realities of capitalism. 
Thus the exis tence of f e e l i n g s  of "al ienat ion" and resentment by 
workers a t  their personal degradat ion has been adcnowledged i n  f u l l  
w i th in  the  thesis (cf chapters 2 and 4 i n  particular). A t  the same time 
such responses have been drawn i n t o  an a n a l y s i s  which locates thm as 
underlying and f u e l l i n g  more o v e r t  forms of resistance without themselves 
being seen as an -licit p r i o r i t y  for struggle among workers. The 
consideration of worker response i s  thus  carried beyond the purely 
"humanistic" to i ts  actual erpress ion  as a phenamaal i sa t ion  of 
capitalist production r e l a t i o n s .  In this way it  has been poss ib le  to 
indicate a dynamic (cf chapter 4b) between underlying themes of resentment 
and h o s t i l i t y  and the propuls ion of often p rev ious ly  passive workers i n t o  
r e s i 3 t a n c e  a p i n s t  the  invas ions  of capitalism. 
TU f u l l y  articulate the M ~ U T ~  of worker response r equ i r e s  both a 
k i t i o n  of and a t t o n t i o n  to e x i s t i n g  struggles and also an a n a l y s i s  
of the objective s t r u c t u r e  wi th in  which Ksubjective" response can be 
adequately understood. The description which Braverman provided i n  
Labour and Monopoly Capital of changes i n  capitalist production over 
the past hundred years w a s  an  attempt t o  delineate t h a t  structure;  
indeed, Braverman himself s a w  this work a s  a 'precondition" for the 
task of understanding work inwlass  wnsciousness. AS he puts i t  i n  
"Two Comments", a reply made shor t ly  before his death to some of the 
criticisms t h a t  had already been forthcoming of Labour and Monopoly 
Capital : 
"...the va lue  of any analysis of the composition and social  trends 
within the working population can only l ie i n  precisely hau w e l l  i t  
helps us to anwer  questions about class consciousness...It w a s  my 
in t e re s t  i n  that very questionof class wnsuousness ,  i n  fact, which 
led  t o  my taking up. the e n t i r e  study i n  the first place. When1 did 
so, however, I a r e a d y  had the  fim conviction that l i t t le  purpose 
w u l d  be served by a direct attack on the subject. s i n c e  it did mt  
appear to m e  i n  any condition to yield to  such an attack. T\uo major 
preconditions seemed to me to be lacking. The first has t o  do with 
the lack of e concrete p i m r e  of the working class, w h a t  i t  i s  made 
up of, the trends of in-, ski l l ,  exploitation, 'alienation' and so 
for th  among workers...etc. I thought t h a t  my efforts might best be 
directed tauard helping to f i l l  t h i s  wp" ( B T a v p n s ~ ,  1976, 122). - 
In  effect Brawrman's book provides u s  w i t h  a picture  of how the 
constraints  bearing on the tanployer and managerial s ide of the 
capital/labour re la t ion i n  terns of the requirements of prof i tab i l i ty  
have forced cer ta in  forms of work organisation characterised by 
deski l l ing and the separation of mental  and manual labour to emerge. 
While equally concerned with the effects of the objective of axplus  
value extraction on the labour process, t h i s  thesis has sou&t a l so  
to d r a w  out  the implications of the "otherside" of this cen t r a l  
objective, namely exploitation and i ts  impact On the experience and 
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response of the wrkforce i n  terms both of the  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of 
labour  and the s t rugg le  for subsis tence.  
Both these approaches have attempted to understand capitalism on its 
dun terms, to  get to g r i p s  w i t h  i t s  i n t e r n a l  cont rad ic t ions ,  rather 
than l o c a t i n g  m n t r a d i c t i o n s  between the  capi ta l is t  labour  process 
itself and s o m e  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  more 'ha tu ra l "  or "ra t iona l"  labour 
process. The same po in t  can be appl ied to mrker response. The 
realms of the subjec t ive  and ob jec t ive  wi th in  capitalism can be 
brought together by acknwledging the relevance of workers' oun 
conceptual framework of capitalism as t h e  system wi th in  which they 
operate and which is the o n l y  one they knw. In  this sense the barxist 
notion of "fetishism" can be taken on for bo th  capitalists and workers, 
not as a n  i l l uk ion  which can somewhw be exposed to reveal the 
a b s u r d i t y  of the w h o l e ,  b u t  as a system of relations which a c t u a l l y  
shapes both managerial s t r a t e g y  and worker response.  
(ii) Contradict ions 
This adaKnuledgwent of the dimensions of the e x i s t i n g  system and its 
e s s e n t i a l l y  fetishised re l a t ionsh ips  i s  c e n t r a l  to our second ove ra l l  
theme, w h i c h  i s  mncerned wi th  contradict ion.  -re w e  have attempted 
to emphasise WO points :  f i r s t l y  the systemic and secondly the undezmining 
character of cont rad ic t ions  wi th in  the capi ta l is t  mode of production and 
labour  process. 
In  the first aspect of t h i s  arplment we have been concerned, and have 
arqed that other writers on the labour process ought also to be 
ooncerned, with the contradictions i n t r i n s i c  to  capitalism i n  our 
analysis of the capitalist  labour  process. I t  w a s  suggested earlier 
that the  preoccupation of many writers on the labour process wi th  t h e  
con t r ad ic t ion  between capitalist "illogicalities" i n  the organisa t ion  
of work and the q u a l i t a t i v e  r equ i r a ren t s  of a n  ahistorial labour 
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process indicates a mistaken loca t ion  of con t r ad ic t ions  between 
r a the r  than wi th in  systems which i s  inadequate for understanding 
the dimensions of the capitalist labour process. I t  may now be 
f u r t h e r  suggested tha t  this evasion of an overall conceptual framework 
i n  terns of the looa t ion  of labour process issues wi th in  the specific 
framework of capitalism may be responsible for many of the ventures 
by labour process theorists i n t o  the wider reaches of contingency 
theory, etc., which have been criticised as taking us no t  far beyond 
a wnvent iona l  industrial sociology. 
A p a r t  f r a o  this perhaps insular p o i n t ,  two more fundamental misazrehens- 
i ons  can be i d e n t i f i e d  i n  the particular location of cont rad ic t ions  
referred to above. The first i s  the implication that capitalism can 
somehcru work i n  a way that is  not  indicated by c a p i t a l i s t  r e l a t i o n s  of 
production. But, as w e  have argued, the reality is that capitalist 
production imposes such " i l l o g i c a l i t i e s "  as heirarchical production, 
separation of conception and execution. etc., p r e c i s e l y  because this i s  
the l o g i c  of capitalist  r e l a t i o n s  of production. Such organisation i s  
not engendered by an irrational drive for power bu t  by the requirement 
of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  which c o n s t i t u t e s  these re la t ions .  
-
The sewnd misapprehension relates to the p e r s i s t e n t  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
of work itself, i n  the q u a l i t a t i v e  sense, as the site both of 
w n t r a d i c t i m s  and the dynamic of worker response. I n  fact we have seen 
tht  neither workers nor management are pr imar i ly  concerned to contes t  
the t e r r a i n  of work organisation as such. Father the object of wntes t  
is the fetishised form of relations to which capitalism gives  rise 
-work as value, both for the capitalist i n  the form of surplus value 
and for the worker as the wage. 
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In t h i s  way it is  not the "exposure" of the f e t i s h  w h i c h  is placed 
on the agenda of conf l ic t  between labow and capi ta l ,  but t he  working 
out  of the  contradictions within these fetishised re la t ions  themselves. 
When, for  example, Qrol Ahnson i n  her paper on Vhe Problem of 
Reformism and Mxx's Theory of Fetishismii queries Marx's f a i lu re  to 
integrate  his analysis  of fetishism into an overall theory of reformism, 
what is absent is the recognition that these fetishised relationships 
actual ly  construct capitalism itself. To focus on their exposure as a 
strategy for overthrowing the system invokes a purely idea l i s t  
perspective, a toothless weapon i n  cont ras t  to which mrx, w h e t h e r  
del iberately o r  not, emphasispraxis, the gravth of opposition i n  
the context of a s t r u w e  which itself is engendered by eamanic 
contradictions. 
If w e  accept t h i s  point,  central  to our own thesis, that it is the 
underlying contradictions w i t h i n  capitalism itself which s t ruc ture  
the organisation of and response t o  the labour process, then c e r t a i n  
implications follrm as to the nature of resistance and conflict. The 
first of these is that conflict will not centre  round, as has 
frequently been suggested, the re lat ions of production in t h a s e l w s .  
Ihe posit ion of the worker i n  c a p i t a l i s t  society is tha t  of a seller 
of labour paver, a position stepped into i n  M already e d s t i n g  
and largely lnrquestioned s t ructure  rather than one requiring conscious 
%eproduction". These 
the world t h t  workers find themselves in. 
the re lat ions of production w h i c h  construct 
Y e t ,  secnndly, the contradictory nature of these re la t ions  mean that 
t h i s  a n n o t  be a passive %ccupancy". Jus t  as the  whole rationale of 
production for surplus value within capitalism imposes specific 
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requirements on the Owners and managers of capi ta l ,  so the same 
st ructure  involves workers i n  a process of sale of labour parer and 
creation of surplus value the terms of which are continually contested.  
% w h o l e  mode of production under capitalism is based on a contradiction, 
that between surplus and subsistence. As Juch there is i n  a sense m 
Deed to evoke explicit p o l i t i c a l  conflict a t  the l eve l  of opposition 
to the ex is t ing  relat ions of production; comict arises fran those 
re la t ions  of production themselves and expresser itself i n  terns of 
an i n t r i n s i c  antagonkn a t  the  heart of the c a p i t a l i s t  labour process. 
W e  have argued throughout that the invocation of economic base i n  
re la t ion to superstructure need not imply a sterile relat ion of 
determinism; rather that the recognition of t h e  contradictions within 
that base are crucial  for the understanding of the actual  nature of 
worker response to the labour process and also f o r  t h e  a b i l i t y  to 
move beytmd c lass i f ica t ions  and typologies to  the awareness that  
worker zpsistance i s  a dynamic, f l u id ,  explosive process, triggered 
almost cer ta in ly  by the material  pressures imposed on workers but 
a p a b l e  of reaching beyond t h i s  to embrace a c r i t i que  of the relat ions 
of production W h i c h  impose such pressures. What w e  have axwed is that 
it is the i n t r i n i s i c  contradictions of capitalism as experienced da i ly  
within the labour process w h i c h  t r igger  such a process. rather than 
any fully-fledged awareness of or concern about capitalist relat ions 
of production on the  part of vorkers whose  means of l i fe  are t ied  up 
with thii system.  he conception of worker response and resistance as 
thus structured and propelled by a shared experience of the impact of 
capitalist contradictions provides US with a conceptual basis not only 
for assessing workers' current industr ia l  struggles but also for 
analysing saae of the emergent tendencies both i n  production and i n  
class s t ruc ture  and amdousness. It is to these tendencies that we 
turn i n  our concluding section. 
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4)  Bad Futures and Good 
Despite some of the more optimistic arguments within our own thesis 
as to t h e  political p o t e n t i a l  of econanistic workers' struggles,  the 
prognosis for the f u t u r e  of therorking class seems i n  Br i t a in  a t  least 
to be one of mitigated g l o o m .  The old s t r u c t u r e s  whereby the o r g a n i d  
vmrking class has sus t a ined  i t s  organisa t ion  and s t rength  i n  the  post-war 
period appear p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h  wake  of the miners' strike to be f i n a l l y  
breaking down. The rapid spread of casual and sub-contractedmrk i n  the 
%la& economy", typified i n  the large-scale re-emergence of the "lump" 
in the building indus t ry ,  brings the destruction of orwised tmde 
unionism and other workers' defences which i n  the past have ensured an 
acceptable level of working conditions i n  i t s  t r a in .  W h a t  i s  more, tre 
development of the new technology "sunrise indus t r i e s "  a t  the opposite 
end of this spectrum of technological d e c l i n e  appears to pranote exac t ly  
equivalent tendencies i n  the elimination of trade unionism. One-union, 
-strike or *pendulum" agreements vitiate w h a t  gestures tcwards trade 
union organisation remain, w h i l e  the "leading edge" organisa t ions  i n  the 
field of new.technology such as science parks lead the anti-union tide 
Wi th  their ideology of "clean work, d i r t y  unions" (Cohen and Egssey, 1984). 
What 6urawy has termed the ''new despotic production politics of the 
contemporary period" appears to have found a n  echo i n  the leadership 
of the labour movement itself i n  the concept of 'hew realism" which has 
been described as a logical extension of those tendencies of cmpromise 
and acumcdatian a l r e a d y  present i n  traditional reformism. What i s  morel 
as Michael Terry (1984) points out and OUT am case s M y  at  Boc 
-firmed, the brutal fact of widespread redundancies has itself 
effectively wakened organisa t ion  a t  plant level through the removal 
"t a stroke" of large sec t ions  of more experienced shop stewards. 
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SO w h e r e  are the grnunds for  optimism? Some can  be found i n  the 
hcwledge that a l l  this has happened before - the organised mrking 
class has at an  earlier stage i n  Britain been defeated, torn apart 
by its am sectionalism and t imidi ty ,  and subjec ted  t o  repressive 
ruling class legis la t ion and ideological manipulation. True, the 
re-creation of effective workingclass organisation from the nadir 
took place i n  the context of a post-war "affluence" w h i c h  i s  IXW 
l i t t l e  more than a bitter memory. But indus t r ia l  production within 
capitalism still continues, and wi th  it the grounds for  resistance. 
As production breaks new ground, both nationally i n  the growth of 
mic-lectronics and internat ional ly  in  terms of the relocation and 
restructuring of capi ta l ,  new sections are continually brought i n t o  
the confrontation with the system. 
The d e v e l o p m t  of micro-electronics itself seems to p rcdse  a 
vpost-industrial '*, worker-less future. Y e t  "chips" L t i l l  have to be 
made, and those w h o  make them may not always su&t as docilely to 
Japanese-style management as is suggested in ib r  example Michael 
Wguire 's  a m u n t  of a Northern I r i s h  telecnrmunications plant. 
Egguire emphasises the strategy mf recruit ing young workers as  part 
of an overal l  attempt to create l i fe long loya l ty  to t h e  fim. tbwever, 
recent struggles i n  e lectronics  f inns i n  Scotland suggest tkt equally 
young workers are h i t t i ng  back i n  dmand.~ 'ng their rights to join and 
organise in a union. 
A s igni f icant  addition to this is  the increase in the number of 
- women involved i n  production w i t h  the growth i n  s m a l l - d e ,  labour- 
intensive, "dextrous" forms of work. While cur ren t ly  this has gone 
along with an increased tendency tawanis part-time, low-paid, 
unorganised patterns of employment, the exposure of large numbers of 
comparatively inexperienced wrkers to the rigours of exploitation 
and ultra-intensive production is capable of pmducing, as was shown 
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by the w o m e n  a t  Landis b Gyr, a %adclashl* more sustained and 
determined than that  of older, more tired sections. 
Tu =me extent, havever, the  employment of women and youth i n  labour-  
intensive, "super+xploited" sectors of production must be seen as 
a retrograde step against  the overall  tendency of c a p i t a l i s t  
development in  the direct ion of thewho lesa l e  camputerisation, 
and thus automation, both of productionitself and of the s c i e n t i f i c  
and infonuation-related processes which surround it. In this sense  
the developnent of c a p i t a l i s t  production can  be seen as i n  logical 
accord w i t h  the  tendencies which w e  have outlined i n  this thesis, 
m r d s  the total quantification and abstraction of productive 
ac t iv i ty .  A t  present such developnents are distorted and, i n  h!drx's 
phrase, "fettered" by the contradictions w e  have outlined i n  exis t ing 
relations of production. In the futureithey have thepotential ,  though 
perhaps only within a system free from such contradictions, of freeing 
the workforce from the drudgery and oppression so eloquently chronicled 
by writers on the labour process. 
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